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This dissertation explores the politics o f a region’s engagement in decentralized aid for 
development policies. Defined as the international development co-operation activities of 
sub-state units, decentralized aid for development has been perceived by the specialized 
literature as the incarnation of a major change in the normative agenda o f international 
development co-operation.
However, despite the normative overtones o f the debate around decentralized aid for 
development, very little attention has been paid to the motives pushing regional and local 
administrations to engage in these kinds of policies. This dissertation aims to bridge this 
gap in the literature by devolving the analysis o f decentralized aid for development to the 
realm of regional politics.
The main argument is structured as follows. Part I establishes the limits o f the 
decentralized aid puzzle. I distinguish two main ways of approaching regions’ 
engagement in decentralized aid policies. Firstly, the analysis o f the constituents 
decentralized aid as a political practice; Secondly, the analysis of decentralized aid as a 
political process. It is argued that if  we are to unfold the politics behind regions* 
engagement in decentralized aid polices we have to focus on the second kind o f  analysis.
Part II and Part III analyse the politics of decentralized aid in the Basque country and 
Tuscany. Finally, in Part IV both cases are reassessed in a comparative perspective, 
describing the main features of the politics o f  decentralized aid for development. The 
analysis of these cases shows how despite important differences in the nature o f  policy 
outcome, both processes of the constitution o f decentralized aid policies share a number 
of features. Firstly, in both cases decentralized aid policies arise after mobilization on the 
part of NGOs operating in the territory. Secondly, both regions’ decentralized aid 
programs are launched in a context of institutional uncertainty, in which the limits of 
regional autonomy are not clearly stated. Thirdly, both cases show how the establishment 
of decentralized aid for development policies is linked to the process of construction of 
the region as a polity. In both cases decentralized aid serves the needs o f the regional 
agenda of foreign policy. What is more, decentralized aid is heavily influenced by the 
politics of region-building and the nature of both inter-institutional relations and the 
relations between institutions and the organizations in the civil society within the limits 
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I. The initial steps of a research itinerary
In 1999, in the midst of a seminar organized by the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, I 
discovered the existence o f decentralized aid for development. Defined as the international 
co-operation o f sub-state entities, decentralized aid was meant to incarnate the most 
important change in the normative agenda of development assistance after the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system. Decentralized aid was perceived as a turn towards the forgotten 
needs of recipient communities; decentralized aid was meant to bridge the gap between 
society and development assistance policy; what is more, decentralized aid was meant to 
blur the distinction between donor and recipient countries. Or at least so were the words of 
the speaker in that seminar.
If I had approached political science in a different way, perhaps this research would never 
have been undertaken and I wouldn’t have spent the last five years working on the 
motivations o f regions in engaging in decentralized aid for development schemes. Yet, to a 
mind raised on a diet o f not fully digested mainstream political science (as any 
undergraduate’s mind is), there were too many problems with the concept of decentralized 
aid as it was presented in that seminar.
First, there was the problem of a sub-state unit acting like a state in the sphere of 
international politics. That is, what does it mean that a region or a local government could 
push itself beyond the borders of the State delivering aid to similar communities in the third 
world? Haven’t we discussed in our International Relations Theory seminars that the State 
was the sole relevant actor in the international sphere? Haven’t we agreed on the fact that 
the State’s national interests, more often than not, would hinder co-operation in a context of 
anarchy? And if  so, why did States permit sub-state units go beyond borders and develop 
their own development assistance agenda, sometimes even contradicting the national 
interest?
The second problem related to the position of morals in politics .In other words, the conflict 
between value-oriented and interest-oriented political action. Haven’t we heard about self- 
interested political action? About actor’s preferences? About dilemmas and rational 
behaviour? Then, it had to be something ‘hidden’ and ‘rotten* in decentralized aid,
11
something that would bring back politics, understood as the clash o f interests in a zero s u m  
game, to centre stage.
In sum, I had decided to discover the politics behind decentralized aid for development. 
Yet, before getting there, I decided to examine whether the so-called specialized literature 
on decentralized co-operation for development had dealt with these issues. To my surprise, 
the literature has continued the path opened by the speaker during the seminar. That is ,  
overloading the concept o f  decentralized co-operation with a wide array o f normative 
considerations without getting to what I intuitively thought were the “real” motivations 
behind regions’ and local governments’ engagement in decentralized co-operation policy 
schemes.
Now I was ready. I had my mainstream -political -science -kind-of-puzzle and I had the  
alibi o f  a gap in the specialized literature. I decided to structure my research proposal along 
the research question why do regions engage in decentralized aid politics?  Politics will 
strike back in the realm of decentralized aid.
12
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II. ‘There and back again*: a reassessment of the underpinnings of this dissertation
Doing research at a PhD level is to a just-graduated mind like drinking a glass of 
bicarbonate soda after a huge meal. Maybe it is not the easiest thing to swallow, yet it is a 
good remedy for ill-learned theories, barely analysed debates and underdeveloped 
methodological skills. After five years o f research my intention remains to bring politics to 
the study of decentralized aid for development. That is, to respond to the question why do 
regions engage in decentralized aid policies? Yet, the underlying motivations (normative 
and academic) have changed slightly.
11.1 Taking decentralized aid seriously
The perception that the way in which decentralized aid for development has been analysed 
by the current literature pays lip favour to the normative agenda that the concept o f 
decentralized aid is supposed to embody lies at the heart o f this dissertation.
The concept of decentralised aid appeared in the political agenda as a response to the break­
down o f both the development paradigm sponsored by the Bretton Woods institutions and 
the international politics of the Cold War period. Decentralised aid was conceived as part o f 
the conceptual apparatus o f a  new development paradigm. This paradigm was mainly 
defined in terms of a return towards the needs of recipient countries, and placed special 
emphasis upon opening the development realm to organisations and institutions beyond the 
dark practices of States* administration development agencies.
However, beside general statements (such as building development from the grassroots; 
devolving development to local communities; encouraging participation in development 
issues) very little has been said about the manner in which this normative agenda can be 
implemented through decentralized aid. What is more, the lack o f analysis o f the domestic 
underpinnings o f decentralized aid policies results in a kind o f blind justification of any sort 
of international co-operation policy including non-state agents and/or civil society 
organizations, precisely because it recalls the virtues o f the general agenda of human 
sustainable development.
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I believe that, if we are to pay something else rather than lip favour to the values contained 
in the human sustainable development agenda, a proper discussion o f what is happening in  
the realm of decentralized aid for development is needed. This dissertation intends to  
contribute to re-assessing the value of decentralized aid. In doing so, it intends to shed lig h t 
on the politics o f decentralized aid, not because it aims to show the prevalence o f ro tten  
politics over good will, but because I believe that it is only through recognising th e  
existence o f a political dimension to decentralized aid that we will be able to free th ese  
policies from ill-digested moral arguments.
The reduction o f poverty and a more equal distribution o f economic resources is (or at least 
should be) one of the most pressing challenges in contemporary world politics. 
Decentralized aid is, since the beginning of the nineties, an important element of a broader 
agenda o f international development, which seeks to emphasise the needs of recipient 
communities, rather than the interests o f donor agencies, and the necessity of constructing 
development from the grassroots, that is from the needs and potentialities of the territories, 
rather than by imposing a development model from above.
If we are to take this agenda seriously we must be sure that our instruments of analysis are 
not simply meant to offer a moral alibi to any kind of practice that might resemble an  
implementation o f the above mentioned values, but that they can help us to critically 
understand how decentralized aid policies are constructed and what can we do to improve, 
not only the manner of their implementation, but mainly the way in which we conceive 
their contribution to the alleviation of poverty and underdevelopment.
11.2 Theoretical shortcomings of current literature on decentralized aid
From a theoretical perspective this dissertation tries to address three major shortcomings in 
current analyses o f decentralized aid for development policies: firstly, it tries to analyse 
decentralized aid from the point of view o f regional politics rather than as a result o f major 
changes in the international agenda of development; secondly, it tackles the problems of the 
domestic determinants o f regions’ involvement abroad, an issue that has not been properly 
examined in the literature; thirdly, at the methodological level it tries to overcome the 
single-case oriented strategy followed by current literature in decentralized aid by
14
presenting a comparative cross-national oriented analysis of decentralized aid policies in 
two European regions.
11.2.1 Decentralized aid as regional policy
The analysis o f decentralized aid for development policies has been monopolized by 
scholars from the field of international development studies. This body o f literature, as we 
have said before, has taken decentralized aid as kind of conceptual guru through which a 
new normative agenda o f economic development could be introduced into the theoretical 
debate on the practices o f international development co-operation.
Decentralized aid has been analysed as the result o f major changes in the normative agenda 
o f international economic assistance. According to the specialized literature, the notion of 
human development has brought about a major change in the way recipient needs are 
understood. A new emphasis is placed on intercultural relations and exchanges; the 
necessity o f putting communities to work together; and the need to give development a 
local dimension1.
As a result, the literature on decentralized aid has tended to legitimate, in terms of the 
implementation of this superior nonnative agenda, sub-state units’ practice in the 
international co-operation realm. Yet, at the level of theoretical analysis, this research 
agenda has obscured important elements of the phenomenon. These elements are related to 
the nature o f the region as an actor in the international scene, and more specifically in the 
realm of international economic development. For example, one could ask why some 
regions embraced decentralized aid policies in the eighties, whereas others had only come 
to know of its existence in the late-nineties? What is the relation between regions’ domestic 
institutional structure and the constitution o f decentralized aid schemes? What is more, if 
decentralized aid is the result of a major change in the agenda of international economic
1 See, among others, González Parada, José Ramón ed. 1998: * Cooperación descentralizada: ¿Un nuevo 
modelo de Relaciones Norte-Sur?* ; Madrid. La Catarta-IUDC/UCM. Ch.l.; Confederación de fondos de 
cooperación y solidaridad 2001: 'Municipalismo y  solidaridad : guía sobre la cooperación descentralizada’ 
Barcelona : Confederación de Fondos de Cooperación y Solidaridad; Mario Grieco and Sergio Lenci eds. 
1999: ‘La cooperazione decentrata oltre Vaiuto : gli attori locali nella ridefinizione dei rapporti Nord-Sud 
‘Torino: L'harmattan Italia, specially thè preface by Eduardo Missoni
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development, what factors explain the internalisation, from the part o f  regional politicians, 
o f these changes?
In this dissertation I propose to devolve the analysis o f decentralized aid to the realm o f  
Comparative Regional Studies. As is shown in this dissertation, this theoretical realm, b y  
putting regions at the centre o f the stage, permits a better assessment o f the motivations 
behind regions’ engagement in decentralized aid policies.
11.2.2 The domestic determinants of regions’ projection abroad
Devolving the analysis o f decentralized aid for development to the realm of Comparative 
Regional Studies take us into the field o f analysing the international projection of sub-state 
governments and the changing value of agency in the realm of international politics.
There is nothing radically new in sub-state units’ projection in the international sphere. 
Even in the time when scholars thought o f the international system as an arena in which the 
will o f States was dominant over any other kind o f authority (being supra-national or sub­
state), international activities on the part o f sub-state units could be easily tracked down.
Since the seventies a body o f literature, initially heavily influenced by International 
Relations theory, has tried to offer a theoretical account of what at that time was perceived, 
as the advent of transnational politics (as opposed to state-centred international relations).
During the nineties the literature analysing the international activities of regions and local 
governments evolved in parallel to the increasing relevance (quantitative and qualitative) o f 
regions’ involvement abroad. This ever-expanding body of literature, while agreeing on the 
nature of the phenomenon, diverged on the way in which it tackled the origins o f the 
phenomenon. Initially the Paradiplomacy School sought regions’ activities in the 
international sphere as the result o f the interaction o f domestic and external factors. Yet, , 
by the mid-nineties, a number o f researchers had begun to emphasize the impact o f 
globalisation and supra-national integration on sub-state units’ involvement abroad, re­
assessing sub-state units’ international projection in the broader context o f a Copemican 
Revolution in the practice o f diplomatic relations.
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According to this research agenda, globalisation has blurred the frontier between domestic 
and international politics creating a kind o f  “intermestic” political space. This intermestic 
political space is not hierarchically structured, but is fundamentally defined by horizontal 
co-ordination and the creation of spheres o f governance in which different tiers of 
government are integrated.
In more recent times the debate on the international projection o f constituent units has 
incorporated the distinction between the structure o f  opportunity, in which sub-state units* 
foreign activities take place, and the structure o f  determinants. My suggestion in this 
dissertation is that this agenda offers an interesting avenue o f research for reassessing 
regions* engagement in decentralized aid for development policies.
After incorporating the debate on the distinction between the constituents and the 
determinants of political action, this dissertation re-elaborates the distinction between 
opportunity structure and determinants so as to differentiate between the origins of 
decentralized aid as a political practice and the determinants o f region’s engagement in 
decentralized aid for development policies. As it is argued later on, this differentiation 
allows us to better assess the limits of our research question (that is, Why do regions 
engage in overseas aid?) focusing attention on the domestic determinants o f a region’s 
projection abroad.
11.2.3 Cross-national case-oriented comparison and the study of decentralized aid 
policies
The third shortcoming o f the specialized literature on decentralized aid refers to the way in 
which the problem has been approached methodologically. Studies on decentralized aid had 
traditionally focused on static descriptions o f the phenomenon in a single country. The 
literature has lacked both appropriate in-depth analysis of relevant cases and in particular 
the use o f cross-national comparisons to test the validity o f its conclusions.
Consequently, the literature on decentralized aid is scattered in a multiplicity o f nationally 
oriented reports which tend to confine the policy field in the reality o f national overseas aid 
programs, not permitting an exchange between different experiences as to distil the
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common factors behind regions’ engagement in decentralized aid policies in different 
countries.
In this dissertation I suggest exploring a different methodological approach to decentralized 
aid, namely a cross-national case-oriented comparison. This methodological approach i s  
consistent with addressing the shortcomings identified above in the existing literature. 
Firstly, a case-oriented approach permits a comprehensive analysis o f  a number o f cases 
which are first identified as relevant to our research topic. As a  result we might be able t o  
account for internal variance in the selected cases and structure our empirical evidence to  
show a dynamic picture o f the evolution o f decentralized aid policies in the cases analysed.
Secondly, cross-national comparison resolves the problems o f nationally oriented studies, 
since it permits us to individuate the relevance o f  national context in the definition of o u r  
policy outcome, permitting more generalizable statements on the determinants of regions’ 
engagement in overseas aid for development.
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III. A brief introduction to the argument and structure of the thesis
This dissertation explores regions’ engagement in foreign aid policies from the point of 
view o f the regions themselves. In doing so, I expect to reveal the politics behind 
decentralized aid for development policies. This aspect has been systematically neglected 
by the literature on decentralized aid. The main argument o f this dissertation is that 
regions * engagement in decentralized aid fo r  development policies can only be understood 
in the context o f a broader process o f region-building which increasingly entails an 
international dimension.
In order to develop this argument the dissertation is divided into four major parts which are 
subdivided into different chapters. Part I  is devoted to a theoretical discussion of regions’ 
engagement in decentralized aid.
At the outset, a literature review is presented. This literature review is structured along two 
major bodies of literature. Firstly, I summarize the major contributions to the debate on the 
determinants of foreign aid for development This debate is a common feature of the social 
sciences since the 1950’s. Structured along the works o f political scientists, sociologists, 
economists and scholars of international relations, the debate has offered a myriad o f 
explanations for state engagement in foreign aid policies. Y et as is argued later on, the 
debate has not been able to offer a definitive answer to the so-called foreign aid puzzle. 
Firstly, the combination of different research traditions makes scientific exchange much 
more difficult. Secondly, the lack of conceptual rigour makes it very difficult to properly 
establish the terms of the foreign aid puzzle.
Secondly, I summarize the literature on regions’ projection abroad. Starting in the 1970’s 
very much under the auspices o f the agenda o f Transnational Relations in International 
Relations theory, the debate on the international activities of regions has gained its own 
stance in the realm o f regional studies. As I will try to show later on, later contributions 
distinguishing between the opportunity structure for regions’ involvement abroad and their 
actual motivations, strategies and styles open up an interesting avenue of research.
Part I o f this dissertation continues by trying to offer a theoretical framework for the 
analysis o f a region’s engagement in decentralized aid. The argument distinguishes between 
decentralized aid as a political practice and decentralized aid as policy process. I then focus
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on an analysis of the process of supply and demand structuring as a means of explaining 
regions’ motivations to engage in decentralized aid politics.
Thirdly, a discussion o f  the methods is presented. The main argument is that a m o s t 
different case oriented comparison is the most suitable way of testing the validity o f th e  
argument structuring this dissertation.
In Part II  and Part III, theoretical argument is reassessed under the light of the analysis o f  
two case studies. First, P art I I  analyses decentralized aid policies in the Basque Country. 
The Basque Country's international co-operation programs are the result of complex 
interactions between a structured system of social actors and the political program o f  
Basque institutions.
The nature of these interactions change over time leading to three major phases being 
distinguished. The first phase, ranging from 1985-1989, is marked by intense mobilization 
on the part of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The second phase ranges 
from 1990-2001 and witnesses an intense process o f institutionalization of the policy. The 
process of institutionalization is marked by three major features. Firstly, the Basque 
administration would try to create a regional system of international co-operation with the 
participation of other institutions in the territory. Secondly, decisional capacities would be 
increasingly concentrated in the hands o f institutions, progressively relegating NGOs out o f  
the decisional phase into the implementation phase. Thirdly, this period is marked by the 
construction of a proper discourse around the Basque administration’s engagement in 
decentralized aid schemes, which is consistent with a new way o f understanding the 
international projection o f the region. The third phase begins in 1998 and is marked by 
important changes in the political agenda of Basque regional administration.
From 2001 to 2005, changes in the structure o f inter-coalition relations resulted in the 
concentration of international aid, together with the rest of social policy, in the hands o f IU, 
a non-nationalist left-wing party. In line with the new distribution o f competences, a major 
change in the patterns of political discourse has taken place.
Secondly, Part III analyses decentralized aid policies in Tuscany. Tuscany’s first activities 
in the realm of decentralized aid can be traced back to 1990, when the regional government 
passed the first regional law on international co-operation. Yet, it must be said that by this
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time international co-operation activities were not a novelty in Tuscan territory. Since the 
mid-eighties local institutions, in co-operation with local NGOs, had developed several co­
operation schemes. Tuscany’s legislation echoed the reality in the territory of trying to 
integrate pre-existing activities in the restrictive normative framework of the Italian State.
However, in 1999 a new system was established. The new system conferred a greater deal 
o f autonomy on the regional administration to operate, not only as a coordinator, but as the 
central piece o f  a regional international co-operation system. This major change marked the 
response o f regional authorities to a new political situation in Italy that affected both centre- 
periphery relations and Italy’s overseas aid policy. Since 1999 Tuscany has established an 
international co-operation system which is structured along a broad interpretation of the 
principles o f territoriality and decentralization.
In Part IV  development aid policies in Tuscany and the Basque Country are reassessed in a 
comparative fashion. The main scope is to put together all the relevant elements to come up 
with a discrete set of explanatory factors that can account for the origins of regional 
engagement in decentralized aid policies. After summarizing the major features of both the 
Basque Country and Tuscany’s decentralized aid for development policies, I try to 
distinguish a common set o f elements behind both regions’ engagement in foreign aid 
policies. It could be summarized as follows. Firstly, the capacity of NGOs to translate 
rather abstract considerations on human development into an issue o f regional politics is an 
important element in both our cases. Secondly, the existence in both cases o f a context o f 
institutional uncertainty created a window of opportunity that was seized by regional 
administrations in both Tuscany and the Basque Country. Thirdly, in both regions domestic 
political agendas perceived the internationalisation o f the region as conditio sine qua non 
for furthering the scope of regional political autonomy. As a result both regions had 
incorporated the constitution o f a decentralized aid system into the broader process o f 
regional building by linking decentralized aid policies with the specific notion o f the region 
as political space.
Last but not least, a caveat on the consistency between the empirical and theoretical parts o f 
this dissertation has to be included. In the following pages, the attentive reader may observe 
that there is a lack o f consistency between the theoretical analysis presented in Part I  and
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the cases narratives developed in Part I I  and Part IIL Particularly, narratives seem t o  
overflow the limits imposed by our theoretical model, thus breaking-up the mould o f  a  
deductive logic o f inquiry.
I acknowledge the existence of a lack of consistency between empirics and theory in th is  
dissertation. Yet, there is a reason that might explain why at a certain point I’ve decided 
that a pure deductive logic o f inquiry could (actually should) be sacrificed in the altar o f  a  
better understanding of the origins of decentralized aid for development policies.
The argument can be summarized as follows: both deduction and induction, w hereas 
ensuring a greater degree o f consistency between the different parts o f the thesis, may yield 
important problems given the constraints imposed by the inexistence o f an appropriate body 
o f positive theory sustained on empirical analysis regarding the analysis o f  decentralized 
aid for development policies.
Firstly, implementing a pure deductive logic o f  inquiry, without having at hand the 
appropriate instruments to build and check for counterhypothesis, may yield a problem o f  
ad-hocness in the way theory and empirics are articulated in this dissertation. Pure 
deductive logic of inquiry, given the limitations faced by this dissertation makes it very 
difficult to control for determinism. We cannot be sure that the narratives presented are not 
tailored as to ‘ rather than to falsify the theoretical framework presented in Part 1.
Secondly, an inductive logic may yield problems of generalization and comparability, since 
unbounded narratives would have made even more difficult to find elements for building 
comparative analysis and further distil the factors explaining regions’ engagement in 
decentralized aid.
Therefore, I’ve chosen a via media, which requires going back and forth from theory to 
empirics, as to structure the exchanges between theory and empirics. My intention is to 
provide for theoretical elements which might set the limits of what can be considered the 
politics o f decentralized aid, yet conceding great relevance to the narratives o f the cases, 
which in many occasions overflow the limits established by the theoretical framework.
, „  „  .M j!.... J , 1111^11 usi HI
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In doing so, this dissertation sides with a case-oriented comparative analysis strategy. This
*
strategy puts cases and not variables at the centre . The interaction between theory and 
empirics is multidirectional rather than unidirectional. Part I  presents the decentralized aid 
puzzle and tries to define the theoretical limits of the research question as well as a broad 
framework of analysis is advanced. The dominant strategy in this part is deduction. In Part 
I I  and Part III  the cases are presented. The narratives are structured as to deal with the 
complexities of the cases analyzed and as a result they tend to overflow the limits imposed 
by theory. Thus, Part I I  and Part III are somehow inductively driven. Part IV  has been 
oriented to reframe the narratives within the limits o f  theory through comparative analysis. 
Yet, given the limited character of the theoretical framework I’ve permitted a broad 
exchange between what we have learnt from the analysis of the cases and what we have 
established in the theoretical part.
I believe this strategy, whereas it might affect the consistency between Part I  and Part I I  
and Part III, it might yield some important benefits: Firstly, the theoretical framework 
presented in Part I  limits partially the scope of the narratives presented in Part II  and Part
III. As a result the comparative analysis presented in Part IV  might produce empirically 
sustained and generalizable statements on the origins o f decentralized aid.
Secondly, an inductively oriented presentation o f our narratives might yield an 
improvement of the analytical instruments presented in Part I. In other words, theory might 
leam from the cases. The lack o f positive theory on the field makes it hard to trace the 
appropriate counterfactuals in order falsify our hypotheses. Inductively oriented narratives 
might help us (in a very rudimentary way and to limited extent) to test the validity of the 
theoretical framework proposed in Part I. 2
2 The logic of Case-oriented comparison and why it is particularly suitable for this dissertation is explained in 
section V.2 pp. 114-118
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PART I: IN SEARCH OF THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZED AID FOR
DEVELOPMENT
I. Introduction
Despite the bulk of publications dealing with decentralized aid in many European countries, 
the determinants of regional engagement in decentralized aid for development policies have 
received little attention. A region’s engagement in foreign aid is either taken as a given, 
from which to structure a descriptive analysis o f the policy, or it is assumed th a t, regions’ 
engagement in decentralized aid policies should somehow occur automatically as a result o f 
changes in the agenda o f international development
However, I contend that the nature of regions’ engagement in decentralized aid policies 
poses important questions to our understandings of decentralized aid schemes. 
Decentralized aid is conceived in the literature as a step forward in ameliorating the 
instruments of international development co-operation. It is normally described as the 
quintessence of participatory development and democratic enhancement as well as being 
seen as a more efficient and transparent mode o f implementing development aid. 
Furthermore, decentralized aid is seen as a new way o f structuring north-south relations, 
moving away from the donor-recipient dichotomy towards the idea o f partnership and 
mutual advantage.
Yet, all these virtues are attributed without questioning the actor’s own motivations to 
engage in these policies. The literature has shown little about the politics behind 
decentralized aid for development. As a consequence, they miss important opportunities to 
evaluate the real nature o f decentralized aid for development.
This dissertation examines decentralized aid for development from the viewpoint of the 
regions and tries to reveal the politics behind regions’ engagement in decentralized aid. In 
doing so, this part will try to bridge the existing gap between two major bodies o f literature: 
the literature on the determinants of foreign aid, and the literature on the determinants of 
regions’ projection abroad. This dissertation contends that, in order to understand the 
politics behind decentralized aid, we have to differentiate between the analysis of 
decentralized aid as a political practice and the analysis of decentralized aid as a policy 
process. This dissertation mainly concentrates on the second type of analysis and tries to
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present some theoretical hunches regarding a region’s motivations to trigger decentralized 
aid programs. As we will see later, decentralized aid can be understood as the result o f  t h e  
combination of a process o f demand structuring and supply structuring in which d iverse  
institutional and non-institutional actors have an impact. Demands are structured by n o n ­
governmental institutions (NGOs) and organizations, which nevertheless respond to th e  
logic o f  interaction with other actors, such as the State or EU institutions. Regions respond 
to these demands. Yet, the way in which supply is structured is affected by a region’s  
interactions with the State and the EU, which constrains its decisional capacities. T h is  
dissertation contends that, within these frameworks o f interactions, regions would engage 
in decentralized aid for development as a means o f responding to specific issues o f th e ir  
domestic political agenda, which increasingly require the region’s projection abroad.
The argument is structured as follows. First, we summarize the major contributions to th e  
debate on the determinants o f foreign aid for development. This debate is a common feature 
in the social sciences since the 1950’s. Structured along the works o f  political scientists, 
sociologists, economists and international relations scholars, the debate has offered a  
myriad o f explanations for state’s engagement in foreign aid policies. Yet, as argued later, 
the debate has not been able to offer a definitive answer to the foreign aid puzzle. Firstly, 
the combination o f different research traditions makes scientific exchange much more 
difficult. Second, the lack o f conceptual rigour makes it very difficult to properly establish 
the terms o f the foreign aid puzzle. Nevertheless, recent contributions might open an 
interesting avenue o f research. Firstly, scholars, such as Marijke Breuning, have sought to  
clarify various issues at stake within the so-called foreign aid puzzle, thus proposing a  
distinct analytical framework for the analysis o f the origins o f foreign aid programs. 
Secondly, the procedural approach to the aid relationship presented by Paul Mosley seems 
to be an interesting point o f  departure for the analysis o f the decentralized aid puzzle.
Secondly, I will summarize the literature on regions’ external projection. Beginning in the 
1970’s, very much under the auspices o f Transnational Theory in international relations, the 
debate on the international activities o f regions has gained its own stance in the realm o f  
regional studies. As I will try to show, later contributions that distinguish between the 
opportunity structure for regions’ involvement abroad and the actual motivations, strategies 
and styles open up an interesting avenue o f research.
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Thirdly, drawing on the above mentioned elements o f the literature, this dissertation tries to 
offer a theoretical framework for the analysis of regions* engagement in decentralized aid. 
As explained before, it takes as its point of departure the distinction between decentralized 
aid as a political practice and decentralized aid as policy process. Then, as previously 
explained, I focus on analysing the process o f supply and demand structuring as a means o f 
explaining regions* motivations to engage in decentralized aid politics.
Finally, 1 discuss the methods employed in this dissertation. I contend that a comparison o f 
the most different cases is the most suitable way to test the validity o f the argument 
exposed so far. Case-oriented comparisons allow a better assessment o f the process of 
conjunctural causation and might help the researcher to build up better informed theories. 
Furthermore, the ‘most different cases’ research design is pursued as a means of covering 
the widest range of variation, thus permitting an enhanced assessment o f the impact o f 
different factors on our policy outcome.
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II. The debate on the determinants of foreign aid
The debate on the origins o f international aid policies has been a long standing feature in 
the social sciences, at least since the end of the Second World War, when the Marshall Plan 
gave birth to international economic assistance as we know it today3. Economists, political 
scientists, international relations theory scholars, moralists, philosophers and practitioners 
have discussed whether the final motivations of state engagement in foreign aid policies 
were to be found in economic interests, international policy strategic considerations, the 
capacity o f recipient countries to make their case vis-à-vis donor institutions or in a true 
commitment to a distinct set o f moral values.
11.1 Idealists vs. realists: the origins of the debate on the determinants of foreign aid 
in the fifties and sixties
Most of the elements of the current debate on international aid were settled during the 
fifties and sixties. According to David E. Baldwin, the two major strands o f  the debate on 
the determinants of foreign aid policies were, on the one hand, economic, mostly 
preoccupied with technical issues associated with economic development and the 
implementation of aid, and, on other hand, political -  trying to ‘bring politics back in’ or to 
offer a ‘Political theory o f Foreign Aid’4. Yet, according to Baldwin, most of this 
distinction was artificially constructed, since economists involved in the debate 
acknowledged the political nature of foreign aid. Moreover, he further argued that the plea 
for a ‘political approach’ to foreign aid lacked a definition o f the political, thus obscuring 
rather than clarifying the stances for the scientific debate5.
Nevertheless, despite observers’ criticisms, political science and international relations 
theory were largely contributing to the establishment o f distinct scholarly thought on the 
determinants o f foreign aid policies. Hans Morgenthau, in his article ‘A Political Theory o f 
Foreign Aid’, defines foreign aid as a necessary foreign policy instrument, since *tke
3 Concessional transfers of money from rich to poor areas of the world have been a substantive feature of 
world politics ever since the nineteenth century, when colonial powers established the first ‘grant in aid’ or 
‘budgetary subsidies’ schemes. Yet it is in early 1950’s that one sees the beginning of aid in its present-day 
sense, that is, as transactions between sovereign states.
4 See David A. Baldwin: ‘Analytical notes on foreign aid politics’: Background Vol. 10, No. 1 May 1966 pp. 
66-90
s See David A. Baldwin: ‘Analytical notes on foreign aid politics’ pp. 66-71.
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United States has interests abroad which cannot be secured by military means and fo r  the 
support o f  which the traditional methods o f  diplomacy are only in part appropriate^. Yet, 
following Morgenthau, after more than two decades, an intelligible theory o f foreign aid 
‘providing fo r  the standards o f judgement fo r  both opponents and supporters o f a single 
measure’ has to be developed6 7 8.
Morgenthau thus offers a typology of the different type o f activities that can be defined as 
foreign aid. These activities are not exclusive but they might be in many ways compatible 
and complementary, depending on the situation. Thus, the appropriate type o f aid to be 
employed must be determined Un view o f the overall goals offoreign policy**.
Morgenthau argues that given its political nature, foreign aid is too important a matter to 
be left only in the hands o f economists’9. As he further argues, foreign aid is not a science 
but an art. That art requires by way o f mental predisposition a political sensitivity to the 
interrelationship among the facts, present and fu ture ends and means. [...] Here as 
elsewhere in the form ulation and conduct o f  foreign policy, the intuition o f the statesman, 
more than the knowledge o f the expert, w ill carry the day*10.
Morgenthau’s proposal situates foreign aid under the overarching umbrella o f  international 
politics and consequently under the aegis o f  the national interest principle. As clearly 
evident from the article, the definition of a foreign aid strategy must take into account the 
conditions for its implementation. These include not only the political conditions and the 
economic needs o f the recipient countries11, but first and foremost the national interest o f 
the donor country and how it is defined through foreign policy strategy12. In Morgenthau’s 
analysis this is indeed the ultima ratio determining the political nature of aid.
6 See Hans Morgenthau: ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’; The American Political Science Review Vol. 56, 
No. 2, June 1962 p. 301.
7 idem.
8 Hans Morgenthau: ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’ (op. cit.) p. 308.
9 Hans Morgenthau: ‘A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’ (op. c it) p. 309
10 Idem.
11 According to the author, conditions in the recipient country must be correctly assessed to ensure the 
efficiency of the policy implementation.
12 See Hans Morgenthau: ’A Political Theory of Foreign Aid’ (op. cit.) pp. 308-309.
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Yet, Morgenthau’s argument faced the opposition o f the idealist school o f foreign policy 
analysis. Scholars such as Herbert Feis tried to explain how superior moral concerns rooted 
on the notion of ‘Hum ani tari anism’ had inspired foreign aid policies13.
The notion o f humani tari anism stresses our obligation as human beings to aid other human 
beings living in the worst conditions. It introduces the idea o f a strong moral obligation 
based on the notion o f shared humanity. According to this theory, each human being would 
have a moral duty to help his fellow beings. Thus, there would be a moral obligation for 
developed societies to act as far as possible in order to eliminate poverty in underdeveloped 
countries14 15.
Works of the idealist school sought to argue that these moral considerations permeated the 
definition o f foreign aid policies in the United States, somewhat conflating scientific 
analysis with moral views on the issue. In Morgenthau’s words: ‘The very assumption that 
foreign aid is an instrument o f foreign policy is subject to controversy. For [...] the opinion 
is widely held that foreign aid is an end in itself carrying its own justification both 
transcending and independent offoreign policy. In this view foreign aid is the fulfilm ent o f 
an obligation o f the few  rich nations toward the many poor,15.
11.2 Empirics meets the realist vs. idealist controversy on the origins of aid 
programs
As Packenham notes in his 1966 article, the debate between idealists and realists has 
provided little empirical evidence to support either position16. In his words, the debate 
between realists and idealists could at best offer some plausible hypotheses and at worst 
largely meaningless polemic17.
Packenham’s article presented an empirical test for both theories based on a number of 
personal interviews with aid agents. The results obtained showed the primacy of the realist
13 See Feis, Herbert (1964): * Foreign aid and foreign p o lic y New York: St. Martin’s Press.
14 See Singer, Peter: ‘Famine, affluence and morality* Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No.3,1972 pp. 
229-243.
15 See Hans Morgenthau: ‘A Political Theory o f Foreign Aid’ (op. cit.) p. 301.
16 Robert A. Packenham: ‘Foreign Aid and the National Interest’; Midwest Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 
10 No. 2 May 1966 pp. 214-215.
17 See Robert A. Packenham: ‘Foreign Aid and the National Interest’ (op. cit.) p. 215
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notion o f  national interest as the main verbal justification for foreign aid. According to 
Packenham, while national interest justifications were present in agent’s discourse, both in 
the absence and in the presence of humanitarian considerations the reverse relationship 
could not be asserted18. In addition, Packenham's analysis showed how Morgenthau’s 
realism was the most widespread and well-known body o f theory among US foreign aid 
practitioners, thus certifying somehow the death of the idealist argument on the relevance 
of moral values in defining foreign aid policies.
Yet, Packenham’s article only preliminarily resolved the controversy between idealist and 
realist. As the empirical evidence presented in his article shows, despite the primacy role 
played by considerations of the national interest, the subsidiary role played by humanitarian 
consideration needed to be explained, since one would expect that at the level o f ‘verbal 
justification’, normative values would come first and calculation after.
The complex interrelationship between humanitarian and national interest arguments 
implied in Packenham’s work partly devaluated trench warfare as a useful strategy for 
understanding the determinants of foreign aid. In other words, Packenham’s article showed 
implicitly how more integrative approaches were needed in order to understand the 
determinants o f  foreign aid, rather than one-dimensional explanations based either on 
national interests or idealist hypotheses.
Gilbert R. Winham’s 1970*s article re-assesses the terms o f the debate between national 
interest proponents and idealists19. His analysis of the determinants of the Marshall Plan 
showed how different considerations o f  the nation’s economic interests alternated with 
concerns about national security and more normatively oriented arguments in practitioners* 
discourse.
The article studies the frequency o f a number of themes in the political discourse o f 
decision makers engaged in constructing the Marshall Plan. The major conclusion o f  this 
part o f the analysis is that the notion o f  domestic interest played a major role in the 
definition of the Marshall plan.
18 See Robert A. Packenham: ‘Foreign Aid and the National Interest’ (op. cit.) p. 219
19 Gilbert R. Winham: ‘Developing Theories of Foreign Policy Making: A case study of Foreign Aid’; The 
Journal o f  Politics, Vol. 32 No. 1 February 1970 pp. 41-70.
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Yet, as Winham’s article shows, there were several dimensions to the notion of domestic 
interest. Moreover, the article shows the important role played by a consequentialist vision 
o f the policy on the part o f policy makers. According to the evidence presented in the 
paper, policy designers had a clear idea of the limits and the consequences o f  both 
engagement and isolationism. Finally, the argument is completed by the diachronic analysis 
of the interaction o f distinct discursive elements, showing how the pattern o f political 
discourse adapted to the changing political scenarios o f  post-Second World War 
international relations.
Winham’s article tried to establish new bases for the debate on the determinants o f foreign 
aid. First, in opposition to the debate between realists and idealists in the 1950’s and early 
1960*s, the major focus of his research is empirical, rather than theoretical. Second, as a 
result o f this empirical focus, the research tended to assert the relative explanatory power of 
both realist and idealists hypotheses in an aggregated fashion rather than understanding it as 
a zero sum game. Third, Winham’s argument on the determinants of aid is inclined to be 
more nuanced than the contributions o f pure realists or idealists’ to the debate. He was able 
to show not only the relative explanatory weight of every single hypothesis, but the overall 
structure o f a long a complex decision-making process.
11.3 Beyond idealist and realists disputes: political economy and the second image 
in International Relations
The seventies bore witness to new developments in the scientific debate on the 
determinants of foreign aid programs. The changing conditions of the international 
environment had substantially altered the dynamics o f foreign aid. Three of these changes 
deserve explicit attention: first, the increasing number of donors. Many countries that had 
benefited from the Marshall Plan in previous years achieved donor status during the sixties 
and seventies. A second factor was the changing nature o f recipients. The process of 
decolonisation turned many former colonies into independent states, thus increasing the 
number o f  countries that could apply for foreign aid. A third significant element was the 
growing internationalisation and multilateralisation o f development co-operation.
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These transformations had important qualitative implications. The increasing num ber o f  
both donors and recipient countries and the incipient multilateralisation o f the aid regime 
changed the way foreign aid was defined and implemented as well as its normative 
significance.
As noted by R.D. McKinlay, ‘Me transfer o f  economic assistance from  high to low-income 
countries had developed into an institutionalised aid relationship*20. All throughout the 
1950’s and 1960’s, aid had acquired an increasingly good reputation as a policy instrument 
that could enhance recipient economies* capacity to accelerate growth. As stated in an 
article published in 1966, ‘Me possibilities o f  securing rapid and sustained development by 
effective use o f foreign assistance have been strikingly demonstrated in the past decade by 
such countries as Greece, Israel, Taiwan and the Philippines'21.
The ‘impressive* record o f foreign aid before the ‘first decade o f  development’ triggered a 
wave o f optimism about the implications o f its extension towards the newly independent 
countries. This wave o f optimism resulted in a  revival o f the ‘humanitarian or w elfarist 
interpretation o f  aid '12.
Mainly constructed according to the works o f economists from the Modernization school, 
the idea was not only that foreign aid was the appropriate instrument to trigger economic 
growth , but also that it provided appropriate motives, that is, promoting economic and 
social development in least developed countries (LDCs). As Chenery and Strout comment, 
‘donors and recipients now agree that economic and social development is their prim ary  
objective*2*.
Sec R.D. McKinlay: ‘The aid relationship: A foreign policy model and interpretation of the distributions o f 
Official Bilateral Aid o f the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany 1960-1970’; 
Comparative Political Studies, Voi. 11 No. 4 January 1979. p. 411.
31 See Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout: ‘Foreign assistance and economic development’; The American 
Economic Review, Voi. LVI No. 4 Part 1, September 1966. p. 679.
”  As McKinlay refers to the branch of theories that sustained the humanitarian foundations of foreign 
assistance. See R.D. McKinlay: ‘The aid relationship: A foreign policy model and interpretation of the 
distributions of Official Bilateral Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany 1960- 
1970’ (op. ciL) p. 412
33 Understood as a unilinear path. See Sylvia Maxfield, ‘International Development* in Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simons (eds.) 2002: ‘Handbook o f International Relations' London: Sage 
Publications p. 464.
34 See Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout: ‘Foreign assistance and economic development’ (op. cit.) p. 
679
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At the same time, the increasing amount o f aid managed by multilateral organizations was 
perceived as the seed of a major change from a donor-oriented (which was identified with 
bilateral aid) to a  more recipient-oriented policy. According to Roy Blough, 'there has 
certainly been a great increase in the recognition that the problem o f  economic 
development threatened the peace and security o f all countries'25 26.
Nevertheless, the recognition of development as something more than a domestic problem 
was not accompanied by a *proper use’ through multilateral institutions' . As Blough notes, 
the strategies of donor and recipient countries in multilateral fora reflected the differences 
between rich and poor countries’ perceptions of economic development and foreign 
assistance. The increasing power of LDCs in the context of the UN system resulted in the 
partial abandonment o f these institutions on the part o f donor countries. Thus, multilateral 
aid began to be mainly channelled through donor controlled institutions, such as the 
OECD/DAC or the World Bank27.
In addition, by the mid 1960’s the impetus of modernizers started to wane. Firstly, the 
analysis of the results o f international economic development showed that the gap between 
developed and under-developed countries was increasing. Secondly, Modernization 
Theory’s incapability to account for international inputs on domestic economic 
development, such as the impact of the so-called foreign exchange gap, gave way to 
increasing disillusionment28 29. As Millikan states: 'the major characteristic o f the past 
decade in the evolution o f our perception o f the nature o f  the economic and social 
development problem has been an increasingly realistic recognition o f both the complexity 
o f the problem and o f  the length o f time necessary to make significant progress towards its 
solution ^9.
The rise of Transnational Relations literature in the early seventies somehow helped to kept 
alive some o f Modernization Theory’s premises in the scientific debate. Modernization 
Theory’s teleological vision of development was imported into Transnational Relations
25 See Roy Blough: The furtherance of Economic Development’, International Organization, Vol. 59 No. 3 
‘The United Nations: Accomplishments and Prospects’ Summer 1965 p. 577.
26 Idem.
27 Roy Blough: The furtherance of Economic Development’ pp. 577-579.
28 See Max F. Millikan, ‘An introductory essay’; International Organization Vol. 22, No. 1 ‘The global 
Partnership: International Agencies and Economic Development’ Winter (1968) p.12.
29 Ibid. Idem.
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Theory, to claim that *modem societies are interdependent ones’. Moreover, for 
Transnationalists ‘all modem societies in interdependent situations acquire certain 
common political characteristics such as strong welfare pressures, bureaucratisation... ’ 30.
Transnationalists’ emphasis on the impact of international economic actors in the domestic 
sphere added to Modernization Theory. It was assumed that growing transnational 
connections propelled modernization and that international economic relations were 
salutary for developing nations31 *3.
11.4 Dependency Theory, post-colonialism and the birth of the foreign policy model
The rise of Dependency Theory broke explicitly with the analytical framework of 
Modernization Theory, Transnational Relations and Complex Interdependence schools. 
According to James A. Caporaso, the Transnationalists’ analysis o f international economic 
transactions had focused on the importance o f complex patterns o f Interdependence. Yet 
the notion o f complex interdependence should be distinguished from that o f dependency. 
The former would include ‘patterns o f external reliance o f  well integrated nation-states on 
one another* ^ while the latter would refer to the ‘ complex set o f  relations centring on the 
incorporation o f  less developed societies into the global division o f labour1212,
Dependentistas stressed the unrepeatable nature o f development. Conditions for economic 
development are settled by advanced capitalist countries. Since *capitalorganization, 
technology and m ilitary preponderance are in the hands o f the core, the core countries are 
able to set the terms under which skill, capital and markets will be provided to the 
periphery. ’3\  Developing countries would be unable to allocate resources according to their 
internal needs or following an alternative vision o f development As a result they would be 
locked in a structure where benefits from growth would accrue disproportionately to the
30 Edward Morse, quoted in Peter Gourevitch: ‘The Second image reversed’, International Organization Vol.
32 (4) 1978 pp. 881-912.
31 See Sylvia Maxfield, ‘International Development’ (op. cit) p. 466
3‘ See James A. Caporaso: ‘Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System: A structural and 
behavioural analysis’, International Organization Vol. 32 No. 1‘Dependence and Dependency in the Global 
System’ Winter 1978 pp. 18-20
33 See Peter Gourevitch: ‘The Second image reversed’ (op. cit.) p. 888
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core. In sum, for Dependentistas, ‘developing countries had much to lose and very little to 
gain from furthering international economic relations'^.
Increasingly systemic variables seemed to be at the core o f  international policy. In many 
ways, the impact o f the international system was regarded by social scientists as an 
explanatory variable for domestic policy outcomes. In the case o f north-south relations, the 
matrix of core-periphery capitalist relations was perceived more and more as a determinant 




11.4.1 R.D. McKinfay and the foreign policy model
In 1979 R.D. McKinlay proposed his influential foreign policy model for understanding 
bilateral aid. In essence McKinlay’s proposal does not particularly differ from the realist 
proposals of the sixties. Basically, the model stresses the preponderance of the donor’s 
foreign policy interests in constructing foreign aid, vis-à-vis humanitarian explanations. 
Yet, the novelty resides in the combination of a behaviouralist kind of analysis and the 
systemic-oriented implications of his argument
Robert D. McKinlay’s contribution to the debate on foreign aid determinants expanded 
throughout the seventies. In a number o f case-study analyses, the author tried to show the 
plausibility of his foreign policy model. However, we had to wait until 1979 to see all these 
case-studies merged into a broader comparative study.
The argument can be summarized as follows. To understand the foreign aid relationship we 
have to evaluate its utility to the aid donor. According to McKinlay, aid *provides the 
utilities o f commitment and dependence, which the donor can employ in the pursuit o f  its 
foreign policy*34 5. Firstly, commitment is defined as the *process by which a state attempts 
to register its support fo r  another state*36 37. Donating aid provides a 'clear demonstration o f  
commitment to the recipient . Moreover, since demand for aid exceeds supply, the 
restricted allocation o f aid would reinforce the idea of a special significance or commitment
34 See Sylvia Maxfield, ‘International Development’ (op. cit) p. 466
35 See R.D. McKinlay ‘The aid relationship: A foreign policy model and interpretation of the distributions of 





attached to the aid recipient. Secondly, dependence is defined as ‘a  relationship where o n e  
party relies upon the other without the reliance being reciprocated’ . According t o  
McKinlay, four factors determine the relationship between aid and dependence: 'first, th e  
donor is in a dominant position because it can terminate aid with little or no cost; seco n d  
the excess o f  demand places the donor in an advantageous bargaining position; third, th e  
form  o f  aid allows donor to intervene in the internal affairs o f the recipient; fo u r th , 
repayment difficulties often require that the recipient reschedule its debts, which a g a in  
places the donor in an advantageous position*38 9 40.
Then, McKinlay enunciates his foreign policy model. According to the author, the level o f  
commitment and dependence established through the aid relationship is *a positive fu n c tio n  
o f the level o f interest which the donor has in that recipient’*®. The model’s rationale i s  
explained as follows: ‘all states are concerned wherever possible to promote and p ro tec t 
their interests. The commitment and leverage potential inherent in aid provides the donor 
with a capacity to promote its interests. On the grounds that a sta te’s desire to promote a n d  
protect its interests in any state w ill increase with its level o f  interest in the other state, w e  
would expect the relationship outlined in the hypothesis’41.
In other words, a donor’s foreign policy interests are regarded as determinant for th e  
establishment of an aid relationship. Given the characteristics of the aid relationship, 
namely commitment and dependence, foreign policy interests (which are the following: 
trading interests, security interests, power-political interests, development and performance 
interests and political stability and democracy interests) should explain a state’s 
commitment to another state, (measured both as gross aid allocation and gross aid 
allocation/per capita GDP o f recipient country), as well as a state’s influence in that state, 
(measured by the recipient’s bilateral aid receipt as a percentage o f the GDP).
The empirical part of the article employs regression analysis to show the consistency of the 
model and validate the expected relationship between the identified dependent and
38 Idem.
39 ‘The aid relationship: A foreign policy model and interpretation o f the distributions o f Official Bilateral Aid 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany 1960-1970’ {op. cit.) pp. 413-414.
40 ‘The aid relationship: A foreign policy model and interpretation o f the distributions o f Official Bilateral Aid 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany 1960-1970’ {op. cit.) p.414.
41 Idem.
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independent variables for four major donors, that is France, Germany, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.
However, as stated before, the major consequences o f McKinlay’s analysis operate at a 
systemic level. According to the author, iour proposition that aid provides the donor with 
commitment and dependence utilities is compatible with the imperialism assertion that 
dominant states employ control and influence strategies. Our proposition that donor 
interests underlie and structure the distributions o f  commitment and dependence is 
compatible with the imperialism argument that, in an environment o f  essentially 
unmoderated competition, states employ control and influence strategies in order to protect 
their interests and thereby preserve their dominance. Furthermore the interests profiled by 
our model accommodate both the political and economic interpretations'4,1.
This is an unexpected turn in McKinlay’s argument for one could certainly expect from the 
foreign policy model to sustain different normative implications. Yet the link between 
donor interests and imperialism is certainly interesting.
The ‘aid relationship’ is perceived as part of the broader matrix of core-periphery relations. 
Dependentistas, and more radically neo-imperialism theorists, had claimed that increasing 
interdependence only served the interests of those who controlled the matrix, that is the 
core.42 3. In similar vein, McKinlay’s foreign policy model aims to show that at the last 
stance the aid relationship is an instrument of domination (this being o f an economic or 
political character). As he states in the conclusion to the article: *while there are important 
differences in the types o f interests pursued and in how systematically and comprehensively 
the foreign policy orientations are developed, the aid relationships o f  each o f  the four  
major Western donors are compatible with the foreign policy interpretation o f  aid. Thus, in 
rather more general terms, the major Western bilateral aid programs can be seen as 
dimensions o f  different manifestations o f contemporary imperialism'’44.
Ultimately, for R.D. McKinlay it is the system of domination known as imperialism that 
explains the aid relationship beyond the donor’s immediate foreign policy interests.
42 ‘The aid relationship: A foreign policy model and interpretation o f the distributions o f Official Bilateral Aid 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany 1960-1970’ (op. cit.) p. 450
43 See Peter Gourevitch: ‘The Second image reversed’ (op. cit.) pp. 888-891
44 See ‘The aid relationship: A foreign policy model and interpretation of the distributions of Official Bilateral 
Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany 1960-1970’ (op. cit.) p. 452.
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McKinlay’s model finally stresses the systemic conditions under which the donor’s 
interests are the ultima ratio for the aid relationship.
As a result, McKinlay’s model seems to assume an extremely critical normative position 
regarding the aid relationship. Yet the author himself does not explore this question in 
depth, leaving only a few hints o f the normative underpinnings o f his research.
On more theoretical grounds, McKinlay’s work not only provided a rather stylised model 
but also introduced new methodological elements to the study o f  foreign aid. In opposition 
to more qualitatively oriented research which has been previously analysed, McKinlay’s 
work embraced a purely quantitative analysis As we have seen, McKinlay builds a number 
of indicators or proxies with which he intends to operationalise a set o f previously defined 
variables. On the dependent side, proxies measure the distribution o f bilateral aid. On the 
independent side, the author employs different indexes which account for trade flows or the 
distinct position o f countries in the world system. These measures are then correlated 
through regression analysis45, McKinlay’s work has in fact emerged as one o f the most 
important contributions to the donor interests model for the analysis o f foreign aid 
allocations rather than a major contribution to the study of domination relationships in the 
context of contemporary international relations.
45 This methodology is consistent with the main proposals of the so-called Behaviouralist revolution in Social 
Sciences, which took place in the 1950’s and 1960’s, and the parallel debate between traditionalists and 
scientists in International Relations Theory. For an examination of this debate see Hedley Bull ‘International 
Theory: The case for a Classical Approach’ and Morton A. Kaplan: ‘The new great debate: Traditionalism vs. 
Science in International Relations’ both in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.) 1969: ‘Contending 
approaches to international politics' Princeton: Princeton University Press. See also: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr.: 
‘International Relations Theory: Retrospect and Prospects’; International Affairs (Royal Institute o f 
International Affairs) Vol. 50 no, 1 January 1974 pp. 28-48.
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11.4.2 An early revision of the foreign policy model? Albert O. Hirschman and the 
notion of asymmetry46 47
Hirschman’s contribution to analysis o f foreign aid expands all throughout his work on the 
process o f economic development. In 1957 Hirschman included foreign aid is part o f the 
development process being its role ‘to enable and to embolden a country to set out on the 
path fo r  unbalanced growth'*1. Though, from this initial claim, Hirschman’s contribution 
to the analysis o f foreign aid may seem limited (or even naïve), hints of Hirschman 
preoccupation for the impact of foreign aid on development, particularly in context of 
asymmetric political and economic relations, can be traced in all his work, particularly in 
his book A bias fo r  Hope and in other articles such as Beyond Asymetry published in the 
midst of the debates on Dependencia.
In Beyond asymmetry: critical notes on M yself as a Young Man and on Some Other Old 
Friends, Albert Hirschman defines himself as the founding grandfather o f the dependency 
school. Particularly he refers to his book National Power and the Structure o f Foreign 
Trade published in 1945. In this book, by focusing on the “structural characteristics o f  
international economic relations that make the pursuit o f pow er a relatively easy task" 
Hirschman anticipated for more than twenty five years the major contention of dependency 
theory48.
However, Hirschman contribution to the debate on dependency goes beyond claiming the 
paternity o f the notion o f dependencia. In this article he revises the notion of asymmetry
46 Though most of Hirschman works referred in this section were published much before McKinlay’s foreign 
policy model was published, 1 believe Hirschman’s contribution has to be analyzed within the context o f the 
debates raised by die Dependencia School in the seventies, and particularly as a critique to the limits o f the 
foreign policy model, for a number of reasons. First, because, as Hirschman himself recognises in an article 
published in 1978, he can be consider one of the founding grandfathers of the Dependencia school, which 
major contentions can be found in his own work already in 1945. Second, because as a founding grandfather 
of the dependencia school, his analysis of the aid relationship is heavily influenced by elements of the foreign 
policy model. Third, because despite his alignment with the critical visions uncovered by dependentistas 
analysis of international economic relations as an instrument of domination, his work goes a step forward 
offering analytical instruments which overcome the limits imposed by dependentistas views on the nature of 
asymmetry in the international economic realm, which anticipates once again critiques that have been posed 
(in the realm of foreign aid) to the almighty foreign policy model.
47 See: Albert O. Hirschman 1958: 'The Strategy o f EconomicDevelopmen? New Haven: Yale University 
Press p. 205.
48 See: Albert O. Hirschman: ‘Beyond Asymmetry: Critical Notes on Myself as a Young Man and on Some 
Other Old Friends’ International Organization Vol. 32 No. 1‘Dependence and Dependency in the Global 
System’ Winter 1978 p. 46.
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and its implications for the structure international economic relations including foreign aid 
relationships. Hirschman’s (self-) critique to the idea of dependencia resides on the fact that 
once dependency theorists have invoked it in the analysis o f international economic 
relations, they hardly ever explore whether that system might contain the “seeds fo r  its own 
destruction”49.
Summarizing his argument, Hirschman contends that asymmetric relations, particularly 
trade and investment relations, which may led initially to dependence o f  country B on 
country A, by increasing the resources at B’s command, made it possible for B to pursue, 
by diversification and other means, a policy of lessening dependence, be it at the cost o f  
some of these welfare gains50.
This argument had been already taken into consideration in the book A bias fo r  hope: 
essays on development and Latin America published in 1971, with particular references to  
the foreign aid regime. Albert Hirschman defines foreign aid as a Janus-faced phenomenon. 
First, it is an instrument for income redistribution from rich to poor countries. Second, in a  
world formed by sovereign nations, some o f which are rich while others are poor, aid is a  
foreign policy instrument, which might be used to increase one nations’ power in the 
international arena. Yet, as Hirschman further argues, the lack of institutionalization o f  
foreign aid limits its scope both as an instrument for wealth redistribution and as an 
instrument for protection of national interest51.
In the chapter The Stability o f Neutralism, which has been already published in 1964 as The 
Stability o f Neutralism: a Geometrical Note in the American Economic Review, Hirschman 
resumes the dialectic nature o f asymmetry and explores its implications for a Janus-faced 
foreign aid regime. The main contention o f  this article can be summarized as follows: the 
interaction between the political facade o f aid and the economic redistribution fa?ade 
cannot be resumed into a unidirectional process by which the donor state gains influence 
and allegiance from the weaker part in exchange of economic resources.
49 Idem. p. 47.
50 Idem. p. 49.
il See: Albert O. Hirschman 1971: *A Bias fo r Hope: essays on development and Latin America’ New Haven: 
yale University Press. Quoted from the Spanish translation: Albert O Hirschman 1974: * Desarrollo y  América 
Latina: obstinación por la esperanza’ Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica p. 191.
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On the contrary, Hirschman’s model shows how aid recipient strategies and preferences 
have an input in the process by which the aid relationship is constituted. In his own words: 
in contrast to the usual assumption o f economic theory, the shapes o f the [...] curves 
(which represent actors’ preferences) are not independent, [...] they belong together and 
generate each other'52. Thus, weak parties in the aid relationship might take advantage of 
the characteristics o f the system as to change the patterns o f  domination and maximise their 
own preferences. This argument is very much in line with Hirschman’s revision o f the 
notion o f asymmetry as defined in Dependentistas’ work.
The complexity o f the politics o f foreign aid as shown in Hirschman’s geometrical note 
leads to a  revision of the consequences o f the interaction between politics and the economy 
as it is presented by the foreign policy model (i.e. the establishment and perpetuation of a 
system o f domination or colonialism) much before the foreign policy model has even been 
formulated.
However, Hirschman contributions passed quite unnoticed. A brief analysis o f  the 
references quoted by McKinlay shows how any o f the abovementioned articles is ever 
cited. What is more, a similar malady can be observed in later influential contributions 
(which will be analyzed in the forthcoming sections) such as Paul Mosley’s revision o f  the 
foreign policy model in the eighties53.
As a result, by the end of the seventies, the foreign policy model had strengthened the 
position o f those so-called realists, who claimed that, at the end of the day, foreign aid 
served exclusively the foreign policy interests of the donor countries, whether in the form 
o f a construction o f a neo-colonialist system of domination, or on its more humble version, 
which included the protection o f security and economic interests. As we will see in the next 
section, these positions remained unchallenged up to mid eighties.
52 See: Albert O. Hirschman: ‘The Stability of Neutralism: A geometrical note’ American Economic Review 
Vol. 54, No. 2. Part I (March 1964) p. 97.
53 It should be noted that in a review of Hirschman’s book a Bias fo r Hope, André Gunder Frank, labelled 
Hirschman’s critiques and appeals to the rich countries a naïve appeal men of good will pointing out that 
Hirschman persists against all evidence and scientific analysis in his bias for reform mongering. See: André 
Gunder Frank: ‘Review Article: A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America; Politics and 
the Stages of Growth’ The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (November 1973) p. 665
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11.5 Contemporary approaches to the ‘foreign aid puzzle1
The donor interest model (foreign policy model) turned out to be the dominant school for 
understanding the foreign aid puzzle from the eighties onwards. The consensus constructed 
around the donor interest model permitted the growth of scholarly thought trying to further 
validate empirically the main theoretical propositions of the foreign policy model, and also 
provided a major argument for discussion by practitioners o f foreign aid.
Practitioners would employ the donor interest model as the point o f departure for criticising 
the foreign aid regime as excessively mediated by political considerations beyond the 
alleviation o f poverty. This might be perceived in the following passage extracted from 
Roger Riddell’s ‘Aid in the 21st Century’: ‘since the end o f  the Cold War political and  
strategic reasons fo r  providing aid have not disappeared but they have changed. The core 
challenge therefore lies in narrowing the gap between the significant medium and long 
term strategic political arguments fo r  providing aid and the political will to do so.’54.
Yet, throughout this period a number o f critical voices tried to bring new elements to the 
discussion of the foreign aid puzzle. In the nineties especially, authors have tried to 
overcome preponderance o f the donor interest model by showing a different vision o f  
foreign aid. The following sections show how contemporary scholars have tried to resolve 
the so-called foreign aid puzzle.
H.5.1The recipient’s need model revisited
As we have seen in the previous sections, the recipient's needs had been perceived as the 
underlying rationale o f aid programs by a number o f scholars. A recipient bias was 
identified in the works of humanitarianists or welafarists in the sixties and seventies. In 
addition, a recipient needs-oriented analysis was implicit in the humanitarian claims o f the 
idealist school in the fifties.
The mid-eighties and the nineties witnessed a revival o f such arguments. The increasing 
relevance of multilateral institutions as well as major changes in the structure of aid donors 
forced researchers to question some o f the assumptions of the foreign policy model. *46
54 See Roger Riddell, 1996: 'A id in the 21st Century’ United Nations Development Programme, Office of 
Development Studies Discussion Papers Series No. 6. p.2.
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According to John Ravenhill, EU aid policy formulation greatly corresponds to the 
necessities of the recipient countries.55. ACP countries would adopt a clientelistic position 
during the negotiations of aid programmes at European level, so they could redirect the 
outcomes of the negotiation process towards the satisfaction o f  their collective interests.
Ravenhill differentiates between two different strategies in the negotiations o f  aid 
programmes within multilateral organisations. First there is what Ravenhill calls horizontal 
collaboration, where the recipient countries gain relative weight in the multilateral forums 
by sharing a common position during the bargaining process vis-à-vis the donor countries. 
This horizontal collaboration turns into a very important weapon in global fora.
Second, the collective clientelism strategy takes place in more reduced decisional arenas. 
The LDCs combine their efforts to exploit the special links that connect them with the 
donor countries, trying to constitute an exclusive regime in which to establish and maintain 
relative advantages that are not available to non-member countries.
The collaborative strategies among the weaker parties within the framework o f  the 
multilateral decision process enables the LDCs to redirect its outcomes to a position that is 
more connected to their interest vis-à-vis the donor countries’ interests.
In similar vein, Enzo Grilli’s work supports the case for a recipient needs model56. 
According to this author, aid flows are cyclical and depend on the budget and the balance 
o f payments of the donor country. Yet, following Grilli, these elements can only explain 
variations in the amount of aid, or the main implementation features of a given aid policy, 
but cannot explain the motivations for aid, which, following this author, are to be found in 
the recipient countries’ needs. Grilli analyses the aid policy of the European Union, 
concluding that there has been a clear change in the patterns o f bilateral aid from donor 
interest to a more recipient need-oriented policy.
Yet, these approaches, even if  they identify policy outcomes that cannot be understood 
following the dictates of a pure foreign policy model, leave untouched essential elements of 
the model's rationale. The recipient needs model, as it is defined in the previously analysed
55 John Ravenhill 1985: * Collective clientelism: The Lomé Conventions and North-South relations'\ New 
York. Columbia University Press.
s6 E1120 Grilli 1993: '‘The European Community and the developing countries' ; Cambridge. Cambridge 
University Press
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works, does not question the major role played by the notion of interest in the foreign aid 
relationship.
Foreign aid is still considered an instrument in the service o f national interests. The novelty 
o f these contributions resides in the identification of a new set of interests that might 
determine the aid relationship and the causal mechanism through which these interests 
operate. For instance, in the case o f  John Ravenhill’s work, it is the collective bargaining 
capacities o f  LDCs that explain recipient-oriented policy outcomes, not a change in the 
logic of collective action underpinning the policy making process.
As a matter o f fact, the debate between foreign policy and the recipient’s needs models 
turns casuistic, or is at its best (if the scholar tries to evaluate the explanatory power of both 
hypotheses) a matter of degree. For instance, David Halloran Lumsdaine has claimed that 
*probably about one third o f aid can be attributed to direct donor self-interest.’51. If this 
information is correct, that would leave the other two thirds o f aid to be distributed 
according to recipient’s needs.
In the following sections, we explore contributions that sought to add new insights on the 
rather spurious debate between donor interests and recipient’s needs models. These works 
problématisé the notion of interests as it is presented in both models and stress the 
relevance o f domestic politics in the definition of aid policies.
11.5.2 Overcoming the donor vs. recipient’s interests controversy: foreign aid 
provision as a political process: Paul Mosley’s contribution to the debate on the 
foreign aid puzzle
In 1987 Paul Mosley published his influential work ‘Overseas aid, its defence and reform’. 
This book was intended as a response to the critiques posed to foreign aid throughout the 
eighties. Furthermore, the book is a major contribution to a better understanding of 
international aid as a  policy outcome, the functions it fulfils and how it should be reformed. 57
57 Sec David Halloran Lumsdaine 1993: 4M oral Vision in International Politics. The foreign aid Regime 
1949-1989' Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 41. Lumsdaine’s statement should not be 
misunderstood however, since, as we will see later, he argues for a major change in our understanding of 
foreign aid. To Lumsdaine, recipient-oriented aid can be equated to humanitarian inspired aid.
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Mosley’s analysis points at two different but interrelated problems. First, he provides 
empirical evidence for a better understanding o f the foreign aid regime, its record as a 
wealth re-distribution policy and the rationale behind it. Then, using the empirical 
evidence, he builds a threefold normative case for foreign aid policies as well as pointing 
out paths for further policy reform.
Mosley’s analysis of the *International politics o f aid* represents an attack on the 
predominance o f  McKinlay’s foreign policy model. According to Mosley, ‘Governments* 
own motives fo r  fulfilling these functions [providing for foreign aid] go well beyond the 
desire to pu t leverage behind the compassionate motives fe lt by individuals*58. Yet, there is 
no empirical evidence to support that foreign aid serves the puiposes o f a neo-colonialist 
political program59. First, aid is characterized as a weak instrument forging a case for 
political change in recipient countries. This is not to say that aid conditionality does not 
impose burdens on recipient countries’ policies. Yet Mosley shows how the diversification 
of foreign aid has limited the real impact of political conditionality. Furthermore, according 
to Mosley’s analysis recipient countries seldom undertake political reforms that do not 
already enjoy domestic political support60.
Second, aid is shown as a weak instrument to gamer political support for donor countries in 
multilateral fora. As a comparison o f the aid records of major donors and the patterns of 
voting o f major recipient countries in the UN Assembly shows, there is little correlation 
between the amount of aid received by a single country and the orientation o f voting to 
favour one or the other donor country’s initiatives. Finally, aid as an instrument o f export 
promotion is no more effective. ‘Aid seldom seems to induce follow-up orders or a lasting 
increase in market-share: the benefits it confers on the companies which it subsidises are 
transient and hence do not justify government intervention*61.
58 See Paul Mosley 1987: ‘Overseas aid: Its defence and reform’ Sussex: Wheatsheaf books Ltd. p. 5
59 Paul Mosley 1987: ‘ Overseas aid: Its defence and reform’ {op. cit.) p. 45.
60 A similar argument has been posed by Thomas Risse-Kappen in his book ‘Bringing Transnational 
Relations Back-in\  According to him ‘differences in domestic structures determine the variation in the policy 
impact o f transnational actors’ See: Thomas Risse-Kappen: ‘Bringing Transnational Relations Back-In: 
Introduction’ p. 25 in Risse-Kappen »Thomas (ed.) 1995: 'Bringing Transnational relations back-in: Non- 
State actors, domestic structures and international institutions’ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
61 See: Paul Mosley 1987: ’Overseas aid: Its defence and reform’ {op. cit.) p. 233
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At this point, Mosley’s analysis shows how aid might be portrayed as a double-edged 
relationship. First, aid is determined by internal pressures in the donor countries from socia l 
actors, institutions and government departments, private actors and so forth. The impact o f  
these actors determines decisions on the geographical allocation and sectoral distribution o f  
resources as well as on the very definition o f the overall aid budget. Second, the a id  
relationship is determined by non-domestic actors. In Mosley’s words, Un the past a c lea r  
perception o f  the aid process has been made difficult by the tendency o f  many authors to  
portray one or another actor as the sole controller o f  the manner in which a id  is used. T o  
do this is, o f  course, as misleading as to represent a child as being made exclusively by th e  
mother or by the father’ . According to Mosley, the recipient administration might be ab le  
to bias the implementation o f aid as well as lobby donor countries to change their priorities 
on the geographical distribution o f aid.
Then, after assessing the actual conditions under which international aid is issued, th e  
author justifies aid on the ground o f its record as an instrument of wealth redistribution 
among nations. Aid is portrayed as a public good, for which market provision alone is  
insufficient He identifies a redistributive case, an allocative case and a stabilisation case 
for aid. The redistributive case is based on the ‘value judgm ent that the conditions o f life  
available to poorer people are not acceptable and should be relieved by transfers o f  
income from  those who have more*62 3 64. The allocative case is built upon the *m ultiple 
imperfections in the market o f  capital investment and loan finance in developing 
countries'**. Finally, the stabilisation case for aid is based on Uhe proposition that aid flow s  
can augment world aggregate demand and relieve unemployment, particularly in  
developed countries ' 6S.
Mosley’s analysis incorporates some o f the critiques we have posed before to the different 
strands o f the literature on the determinants of foreign aid. First, he criticizes the unjustified 
emphasis o f the foreign policy model on donor interests. According to him the foreign 
policy model might be at best a historically restricted phenomenon which cannot be 
imported into the understanding o f  contemporary international aid. Second, Mosley
62 Paul Mosley 1987: 'Overseas aid: Its defence and reform* (op. cit.) p. 85.




devolves the analysis o f foreign aid policy to the realm of domestic politics, by 
emphasizing the role of domestic actors in the policy making process. At the same time, he 
avoids the reductionist effects of donor interests vs. recipient needs debate by enlarging the 
range of the actors involved in the policy process to include recipient countries.
Mosley’s understanding o f the aid relationship is procedural. The procedural vision has a 
number of advantages vis-à-vis other modes o f reasoning. First, it is more sensitive to 
changes in the context of foreign aid as political practice. As Mosley shows in his analysis, 
the practice o f foreign aid has suffered substantial changes since the 1950*s to the present 
day. Therefore, models willing to asses the nature o f the foreign aid puzzle must 
acknowledge the changing conditions under which the aid phenomena takes place and the 
impact o f these conditions on the decisions taken by agents.
Second, Mosley’s procedural approach tends to be more sensitive to the way in which 
agents establish their policy preferences and the processes through which they alter them. 
As we saw when analysing McKinlay’s foreign policy model, donors were mainly 
portrayed as power-maximizers, not including the constraints imposed by the nature of 
historical relations between donor countries and former colonies, or even the terms in 
which the power-broker identity was constructed. Mosley’s procedural analysis, by 
identifying the different political agendas pursued by agents, should permit us to trace the 
patterns of policy preferences formation.
The following sections explore recent contributions to the debate on the foreign aid puzzle, 
which somehow have come to fill the path of research opened by Mosley’s procedural 
analysis of the foreign aid relationship. Recent scholarly work has tried to link the rise of 
foreign aid regimes to the emergence of contemporary welfare systems, through the 
analysis of common ideological backgrounds underpinning the process o f setting up both 
regimes. The work o f Keohane and Goldstein and David Halloran Lumsdaine has in 
particular tried to incorporate this agenda of research into the analysis o f foreign policy and 
more specifically the underpinnings o f foreign aid policies. Finally, the so-called 
Constructivist Turn in International Relations (IR) Theory has reassessed the relationship 
between ideas and foreign aid by pointing at the process o f  mutual constitution and the role 
of identity in shaping policy preferences. The work o f Marijke Breuning has tried to
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illuminate the impact o f role conceptions in the definition o f foreign aid regimes. The n e x t  
sections explore these issues at some length.
II.5.3 The domestic determinants of aid
The late eighties and the beginning of the nineties witnessed the emergence o f a body o f  
literature which tried to trace a parallel between domestic welfare provision and the State’s  
engagement in foreign aid policies. According to Alain Noel and Philippe Therien, 
‘Scholars often have interpreted the establishment and development o f  aid program s as an  
international projection o f  the income redistribution mechanisms that characterise th e  
organization o f social relations in developed countries'66. These authors maintain that bo th  
welfare policies and foreign aid responded to the same rationale o f alleviating inequalities 
between rich and poor created and maintained by the market economy.
The link between domestic welfare institutions and foreign aid has been defined in three 
different ways. First, scholars sought to measure the relationship between a state’s  
generosity ad intra and what was given ad extra. In order to do that, scholars compared a  
state’s total expenditure on welfare policies measured in terms o f the percentage o f GDP 
with total disbursement o f aid measured as an ODA/GDP ratio. Data for the years 1965- 
1988 for the members of the OECD showed a significant relation between both indicators.
This argument rested on the assumptions that the State is a  consistent expender regardless 
o f the policy field, on the emphasis of early research on the welfare state, and on the  
importance o f modernization and industrialization as factors triggering the growth o f the 
public sector. However, research on the birth and expansion o f  the welfare state has proven 
insufficient to understand variations in welfare state provision.
According to Castles and McKinlay, these hypotheses failed to incorporate the decisive 
impact o f politics on social processes in general and on policy outcomes in particular. 6
66 See Alain Noel and Philippe Therien: ‘From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign 
aid’; International Organization 49,3, Summer 1995 p. 524.
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According to them party ideology (specifically the size o f the major party on the right) was 
a relevant factor determining welfare provision67.
The second strand of the debate aimed at assessing the impact of party ideology on foreign 
aid provision. Analogous to the alleged impact o f left-wing ideology on welfare provision, 
left-wing ideology should favour greater foreign aid expenditure. As Olav Stokke explains, 
Nordic countries, where social democratic parties have been in power for a long time, rank 
among the leading development assistance contributors68.
More recently, the analysis of the relationship between the colour of the party in office and 
foreign aid provision has been expanded to include Christian democratic parties. As Stokke 
argues, the norms in which Christian democracy is rooted are conducive to a generous 
stance towards the Third World because ‘these norms are universal and do not stop at the 
borders o f nation-states’69.
Yet, quantitative analysis has shown that these correlations are less consistent than it may 
first appear. As Louis-Marie Imbeau’s work shows, the correlation between the strength of 
the party on the left and the volume o f aid provision is less significant than might be 
expected. According to him, 'what is important seems not to be which ideology is present 
but rather how is it translated into policy. *70. Imbeau further argues that the role played by 
the ideology o f the party in office has to be understood as complementary to other factors, 
such as inertia, the donor’s interests and the donor’s perceptions of recipients’ needs.
The uncertainty o f the direct correlation of the ideology o f the party in office and the 
provision of foreign aid led scholars to question whether ideology itself, or something 
deeper in the way the welfare state is constructed could account for the relationship 
between domestic welfare provision and the levels o f international development assistance.
67 See Francis G. Castles and R.D. McKinlay ‘Public Welfare provision, Scandinavia and the sheer futility of 
the Sociological approach to politics’ British Journal o f Political Science Vol. 9 No. 2 April 1979 pp. 157- 
171
68 See Olav Stokke (ed) 1989: ‘ Western M iddle powers and Global poverty: The determinants o f the Aid 
policies o f Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden' Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of 
African Studies, in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute o f International Affairs; Stockholm: Almqwist & 
Wiksell International pp. 9-33 and 275-317
69 See Olav Stokke: ‘Foreign Aid: What Now’ in Olav Stokke ed. 1996: * Foreign Aid towards the year 2000: 
Experiences ami Challenges' London: Frank Cass p. 22
70 Louis-Marie Imbeau 1989: * Donor Aid, The Determinants o f  Development Allocations to Third World 
countries: A Comparative Analysis' New York: Peter Lang p. 155
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Noël and Thérien sought to show, in an article published in 1995, ‘political values a n d  
practices central to domestic politics as having a growing impact on international politics. ' 
More specifically, the aim was *to establish how certain values and principles 
institutionalised within the states are reflected in the organization o f  relations between 
states According to both authors, foreign aid is particularly affected by ‘the capacity o f  
a society to accept and institutionalise non-market principles o f  income red istrib u tio n f 2.
Drawing on the literature on the ‘types o f welfare capitalism’71 *3, these authors sought to  
establish a relationship between the type o f foreign aid provision and the kind o f  values 
structuring each o f the models. Following Esping-Andersen, these authors believed that 
within ‘each model, welfare programs are designed according to particular principles that 
were imposed though decisive conflicts over market and political processes.'74. Thus, 
belonging to one or another type o f welfare capitalism should initially be a good predictor 
of a country’s involvement in foreign aid policies. Moreover, Noel and Thérien claim that 
understanding the nature o f  the values asserted for each type o f welfare state might help us 
to assess the qualitative differences between donors.
Following Esping-Andersen, both authors explore the attributes o f the different types o f  
welfare capitalism. These attributes are then correlated in the empirical analysis with 
foreign aid. Their results show how ‘the more welfare states have socialist attributes, the  
more generous are their development assistance polices’ .
According to Noel and Thérien, these results are consistent with the claims made by an 
increasing body o f the literature which studies the correlation between ideas, values and 
foreign policy. The next section will explore in greater detail the works o f these new 
‘idealists’.
71 See Alain Noël and Philippe Thérien: ‘From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign 
aid’ (op. cit.) p. 524.
" See Alain Noël and Philippe Thérien: ‘From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign 
aid’ (op. cit.) p. 549.
73 They draw heavily on the seminal work o f Gosta Esping-Andersen: ‘ The three worlds o f welfare 
ca p ita lism Princeton: Princeton University Press
74 See Alain Noël and Philippe Thérien: ‘From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign 
aid’ (op. cit.) p. 538
See Alain Noël and Philippe Thérien: ‘From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign 
aid’ (op. cit.) p.540.
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11.5.4 'Ideas and Foreign Policy’: can values, ideas and beliefs explain foreign policy 
outcomes?
In 1993 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane co-edited a volume whose main scope 
was to explain how Hdeas help to explain political outcomes, particularly those related to 
foreign policy*76 7.
Both authors identified the necessity o f overcoming the narrow views of certain economists 
and political scientists to whom * ideas are unimportant or epiphenomenaV11. This problem 
was even more evident in foreign policy analysis where, according to the authors, both 
realism and liberal institutionalism take rationalist models as their starting points. Thus, 
they claim to appropriately seize the role of ideas and identities in foreign policy.
Assuming reflectivist critiques on the role of values and identities in foreign policy, the 
scope o f their research is to explain ‘not whether identities matter; hut how they matter and 
how their effects can be systematically studied by social scientists*78. Goldstein and 
Keohane try to define an analytical framework for the study of the impact of ideas on 
policy. In order to do so, they establish three different kinds o f beliefs and outline three 
causal pathways by which ideas can affect policy.
Goldstein and Keohane’s ‘three types o f  beliefs’ would be the following. First, there are 
‘world views’. These are embedded in the symbolism o f  a culture and deeply affect the 
modes o f  thought and discourse. They are not purely normative since they include views 
about cosmology and ontology as well as about ethics. The second category would be that 
o f ‘principled beliefs’, which consist o f  the normative ideas that specify right from wrong 
and just from unjust. Finally there are ‘causal beliefs’. These are beliefs about cause-effect 
relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus o f recognised elites.
Yet, the main question in Goldstein and Keohane’s research is the conditions under which 
ideas might have an impact on policy outcomes. As they put it, ‘the central issue o f  this
76 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane: ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: An analytical framework* in 
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) 1993: ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change\  Ithaca: Cornell University Press p.3.
77 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane: ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: An analytical framework’: {op. 
cit.) p. 4
78 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane: ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: An analytical framework*: {op. 
cit.) p. 6.
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volume concerns causality: Do ideas have an impact on political outcomes, and i f  so u n d er '  
which conditions?*19.
According to both authors, one o f  the most common problems in assessing the role o f id e a s  
in policy making is that scholars tend to claim the existence o f a causal link between t h e  
ideas held by a politician and policy choices. As they further claim, 'it is crucial fo r  a n yo n e  
working on ideas and policy to recognize that the delineation o f  the existence ofparticular" 
beliefs is no substitute fo r  the establishment o f their effects on policy.’79 80 8123Furthermore, b o th  
authors defend the necessity o f providing evidence about the conditions under which cau sa l 
connections exist between ideas and policy outcomes.
Goldstein and Keohane offer three different pathways through which ideas are expected t o  
affect policy. First, ideas might *serve as road maps\  Individuals would use ‘ideas to  
determine their own preferences or to understand the causal relationship between th e ir  
goals and alternative political strategies.’*1 Second, ideas might operate 'as fo ca l points o r  
g lu e ’ *Ideas would alleviate co-ordination problems arising from  the absence o f  unique  
equilibrium solutions.’*2 Finally, institutionalisation o f ideas determines a third avenue of* 
influence. According to Goldstein and Keohane, *once ideas have influenced the p o lic y  
design their influence would be reflected in the incentives o f  those in the organization a n d  
those whose interests are served by it’s i.
Following this path of argumentation David Halloran Lumsdaine claims that foreign a id  
cannot be accounted on the basis o f  economic and political interests o f the donor countries 
alone; the essential causes lay in the humanitarian and egalitarian principles o f  the donor 
countries and their implicit belie f that only on the basis o fju s t international order in which 
all states had the chance to do well was peace and prosperity possible '84.
79 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane: ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: An analytical framework*: (op. 
cit.)  p. 11
80 Idem.
81 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane: 'Ideas and Foreign Policy: An analytical framework’: (op. 
cit.) p. 12
82 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane: ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: An analytical framework’: (op. 
cit.) p. 17
83 See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane: ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: An analytical framework’: (op. 
cit.) p. 20
84 See David Halloran Lumsdaine 1993: *Moral Vision in International Politics. The foreign aid Regime 
1949-1989' (op. cit.) p.30
56
Lumsdaine’s work combines the analysis of the reasons provided by those people 
advocating for aid with the analysis o f  policy implementation for the OECD/DAC countries 
for the period 1949-1989.
The author argues that ‘the character o f  international politics is not wholly determined in 
advance by an unvarying human nature or international system, but reflects moral choices 
which become embodied in the regular patterns o f international affairs'. [...] Individual 
national policies and the international system reflect moral choices, good and bad, which 
are bound up with differing outlooks and interpretations o f  what international politics is 
about.'*5. Moreover, ‘calculations are social products that draw upon and interpret 
existingpractice^.
Lumsdaine presents three interrelated arguments on the impact of ideas and values on 
international politics. First, a country’s international politics will be linked to the values and 
assumptions and practices of its domestic politics. Second, a  country’s international politics 
will reflect the international society in which it finds itself. Third, the practices of 
international politics are meaningful actions whose logic influences and modifies a state’s 
goals and vision.
Following from these general considerations, the author identifies three major hypotheses 
to be applied to the foreign aid puzzle. Firstly, domestic values influence the values states 
adopt in international politics. The author claims that extended support for foreign aid in 
donor countries and the limits o f the domestic debate might seriously confine the 
explanatory value o f the existence o f a distinct set o f motivations on the part of politicians 
rooted in the notion of national interest. Furthermore, in line with the ‘domestic 
determinants o f aid school’, he insists on the existing link in the arguments o f  those 
supporting domestic redistribution and those supporting foreign assistance .
Secondly, the author claims that the process of establishing foreign aid regimes reflected 
the growth of internationalism and the desire to construct a better international order. 8567
85 See David Halloran Lumsdaine 1993:4Moral Vision in International Politics. The foreign aid Regime 
1949-1989* (op. cit.) p. 62
86 See David Halloran Lumsdaine 1993:4Moral Vision in International Politics. The foreign aid Regime 
1949-1989’ (op. cit.) p. 63
87 See David Halloran Lumsdaine 1993: 4M oral Vision in International Politics. The foreign aid Regime 
1949-1989’ (op. cit.) pp. 63-64
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According to Lumsdaine, the power o f  these ideas is reflected by the growing importance 
of arguments o f enlightened self-interests which sought to establish a case for aid rooted on 
the necessity o f establishing a more secure and prosperous international society. At the 
same time, Lumsdaine claims that aid became a mark o f proper participation in the 
responsibilities o f developed countries88.
Finally, Lumsdaine argues that the aid practice helped the progressive institutionalisation o f  
both domestic values and those held at the international level as determinants o f  the aid 
regime. Meanwhile, following Lumsdaine, change in the aid regime seems to be essentially 
norm-oriented89.
Lumsdaine’s work, inspired by Goldstein and Keohane’s ‘new idealism’, illuminates some 
of the pathways identified by the later authors as determinants in the causal relation 
between ideas and policy making. Yet, Lumsdaine’s argument is deeper. Rather than 
checking the impact of ideas on a specific policy issue, he claims a radical change in our 
vision o f politics. As he states, ‘despite ever-present flaw s o f  human character and the 
pressures o f  the international system, it is sometimes possible fo r  moral principle and  
human fellow -feeling to have a consistent effect on foreign policy  [...] the larger argument 
o f the book is that moral vision shapes international politics. How states act often reflects 
the values and principles they hold. While we are not in fu ll control o f events, our choices 
accumulate and help shape the kind o f  world we live in, and fo r  which we then bear 
responsibility,9°.
This argument opens up the Pandora’s box of the origins of moral choice. Yet, nothing in 
Lumsdaine’s work nor the analytical framework proposed by the ‘ideas matters school’ can 
help us to evaluate the conditions under which moral choice is constructed.
Ultimately, both the research programs of the ideas matter school and the work o f 
Lumsdaine tend to reify ideas to  an extent. Ideas about the common good and how it should 
be implemented through specific policy schemes are taken as exogenous to the decision
88 Sec David Halloran Lumsdaine 1993: *Moral Vision in International Politics. The foreign aid Regime 
1949-1989' (op. cit.) pp. 65-68
89 See David Halloran Lumsdaine 1993: ‘Moral Vision in International Politics. The foreign aid Regime 
1949-1989' (op. cit.) p. 68.
90 See David Halloran Lumsdaine 1993: ‘Moral Vision in International Politics. The foreign aid Regime 
1949-1989' (op. cit.) pp. 283-284
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making process. Both ideas and moral values have an impact on policy implementation, yet 
this impact is not independent from agents. As the research agenda of the ‘ideas matter 
school’ shows, politicians engage in political bargaining processes blinded by their 
conceptions about the adequate way o f distributing policy resources to fulfil normative 
requirements posed by moral concerns, ideology or policy paradigms.
Yet, nothing is said about the way in which these normative exigencies are shaped in the 
process. It is true that actors are moulded by normative considerations, yet, by the same 
token, actors are able to re-shape norms and values to make them fit with specific 
requirements o f  the b a rg a in in g  process. The impact of ideas on policy making has to be 
interpreted as a bi-directional process rather than as a unidirectional impact.
In similar vein, but dealing with impact of culture on regional economic policy outcomes, 
Michael Keating et al. have argued that ‘i f  we are to bring culture back in, we need to cast 
it in a more sensitive way’91. According to him, the word culture has been used to cover a 
myriad of social phenomena and it has been too often ‘invoked as a deus ex machina, to 
explain whatever cannot be explained by other more concrete social and economic 
variables'92. Culture and identity are perceived as important elements in regional 
mobilisation. Yet this does not preclude treating culture as a residual or something that 
itself cannot be explained. As he further claims, culture, values and social norms cannot be 
assumed to be primordial. ‘Culture and identity, rather, are being made and remade*93.
A perennial view o f culture is therefore discarded. In this author’s words, ‘values identity 
and self-understandings can, in fact, change very rapidly at key historical junctures, and 
they remain fixed  fo r  long periods as the lessons from  history are relearned and simplified 
to sustain dominant self-images'94. Therefore, culture and identity are both the conditions 
under which political leadership operates and the product of that leadership.
The next section will offer a review o f the work of constructivists in IR, or as they have 
been labelled by Goldstein and Keohane, the reflectivist school. In opposition to the ‘ideas
91 See Michael Keating, John Loughlin and Kris Deschouwer 2003: ‘ Culture, Institutions and Economic 





matter school’ constructivists have sought to explain the conditions under which norms, 
values and identities shape the process o f  constitution o f agency at the international level.
11.5.5 The reflectivist school approach to the ‘foreign aid puzzle’: the social 
construction of policy preferences
The constructivist turn95 in IR Theory represented a reaction against the reifying research 
program of realism and liberal institutionalism. Structured along Alexander Wendt’s claim 
‘anarchy is what the states make o f  i t '95 6, it challenges the realist notion o f an unchanging 
reality in international politics, emphasising the role o f communicative action and discourse 
and the effect o f identities and norms in defining the actor’s behaviour97 98.
Constructivism, in any o f its multiple versions, contends assumed preferences o f political 
actors in the international arena: specifically, the problems posed by the notion o f  national 
interest protection as the sole basis for an actor’s behaviour in the international realm. The 
constructivist research program tries to show the contingency o f these elements and shed 
light on the processes of preference formation as the result o f  multifaceted processes o f  
social interaction.
Constructivism has deep philosophical roots in the “science wars” (otherwise called 
“culture wars” or “Freud wars”) between “realist” and “relativist” in the philosophy o f  
science . Yet, in Hacking’s words, ’talk about social construction has become common
95 This label is borrowed from Checkel. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘The constructivism turn in International 
Relations Theory’, World Politics 50 1998 pp. 324^48.
96 See Alexander Wendt ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, 
International Organization 46, no. 2 1992 pp. 391-425
971 acknowledge that this might seem a rough caricature of a rather complex and extensive body o f literature. 
Indeed, scholars such as Maja Zehfuss have claimed that this way o f understanding the constructivist turn in 
IR is misleading since it over-stresses the relevance of what she considers the non-existing debate between 
rationalist and constructivist in International Relations Theory. See Zehfuss, Maja (2002): ’Constructivism in 
International Relations: The politics o f Reality Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. C h.l. Yet, I 
reckon it somehow reflects some of the most valuable characteristics of constructivism in the social sciences, 
namely, its capacity to contend the necessity o f a given phenomenon, or at least to question the normative 
underpinnings o f commonly accepted interpretations on the nature o f social phenomena.
98 See Ian Hacking 1999: ‘ The Social Construction o f  What?' Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 
P-4-
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coin, valuable fo r  the political activist, and fam iliar to anyone who come across current 
debates about race, gender, culture or science'99.
According to Hacking social constructivist’s that talk about X tend to hold that:
1 ‘X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X  or X as it is at present, is not 
determined by the nature o f things; is not inevitable’
As Hacking further argues, they often urge that:
1. ‘X is quite bad as it is*
2. ‘We would be much better off if  X were done away with, or at least radically 
transformed’100.
This way of structuring the normative and the philosophical roots o f the argument has an 
intense revolutionary effect Yet, as Ian Hacking recognizes, there are different degrees of 
commitment to the normative project o f social constructivism. In fact, as he points out quite 
clearly, one can contend the contingency of X at step 1 without embracing propositions 2 
and 3.
However, more relevant for our purposes in this section than the revolutionary character of 
social constructionists work, is the fact that social constructionists* arguments about X 
needs from X tend to be taken for granted. In Hacking’s words, *people begin to argue that
X  is socially constructed precisely when theyfind that:
0. In the present state of affairs, X  is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable’101.
This statement works as a precondition for a social constructionist thesis about X. As 
Hacking states, contractual or institutional objects need not be questioned on the grounds of 
the constructionist thesis since everybody acknowledges that these objects are the result of 
historical events and various social processes102.
In the specific realm of international development, aid authors such as Marijke Breuning 
have contended against the donor interests model that the origins of the State’s policy
99 See Ian H acking 1999: * The Social Construction o f What?* (op. cit.)  p .2 .
100 See Ian H acking 1999: 'The Social Construction o f What?* (op. cit.) p . 6
101 See Ian H acking  1999: 'The Social Construction o f What?* (op. c i / . ) p  12.
102 Idem.
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preferences in the aid realm are to be located in a broader understanding o f  the international 
role of a given State.
According to Breuning, the study o f  the processes of issue categorization, ‘the manner in  
which groups o f decision makers configure issue areas in foreign p o l i c y represents an 
interesting avenue of research103. Yet, as she further argues, showing the differences 
between the representations o f decision makers in different states does not explain the  
origins of such differences in categorization.
Following Breuning’s analysis, individual ontology constrains the manner in which 
problems can be represented and, consequently, the choices that are judged to be adequate 
responses. Yet, representations are regarded as social phenomena which have their roots in  
historically developed practices. As she further states, *certain historical experiences 
extend their grasp across time and shape the social context within which decision makers 
are embedded”104. Thus, understanding the roots o f the processes o f issue categorization 
entails systematic comparison o f what is common and what is distinct in the historical 
experience o f the cases analysed.
According to Breuning, perceptions o f  the historical past o f the polity, especially polity 
defining moments, determine the w ay in which the international role of the polity is 
perceived and, consequently, the questions to be faced and possible responses to those 
questions105.
Breuning’s comparison o f the Netherlands and Belgium shows how the existence o f a 
heroic perception of national history in the former, vis-à-vis the perception o f a long 
colonial past and a paternalistic sense o f responsibility in the latter, would better explain,
103 Sec Marijke Braining: ‘Configuring Issue Areas: Belgian and Dutch representations of the role of Foreign 
Assistance in Foreign Policy1 in n Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss (eds) 1998: * Problem representation 
in Foreign Policy Decision Making’ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p.303.
104 See Marijke Breuning: ‘Configuring Issue Areas: Belgian and Dutch representations of the role of Foreign 
Assistance in Foreign Policy’ {op. cit.) p.304
105 Theories stressing the relevance of cognitive processes factors for understanding the international policy o f 
a given unit have a long tradition in International Relations Theory. See for instance K.J. Holsti, ‘National 
Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’; International Studies Quarterly No. 14 1970 pp. 233-309; 
and N. B. Wish, ‘Foreign Policy Makers and their National Role Conceptions’; International Studies 
Quarterly 24 1980 pp. 532-54. The constructivist turn in I.R. Theory has tried recently to reassess its value as 
explanatory factors for actor’s behaviour in the international arena See Lisbeth Aggestam 1999: ‘Role 
Conceptions and the Politics o f Identity in Foreign P o lic y Oslo. ARENA Working Paper no. 8. pp. 1 -15
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the differences between Belgian and Dutch foreign assistance policy than other structural 
factors (such as party coalitions and institutional structures)106 1078.
The emphasis on problem representation and role conceptions introduces some concerns on 
the role o f identity in analysing a political actor’s behaviour in the international arena. As 
we have seen, Breuning’s analysis stresses the importance o f cognitive frameworks in the 
definition of policy preferences. Actors are portrayed as interpreting political reality in 
terms o f specific conceptions of their historical past, as well as their political role given the 
current state o f affairs. An actor’s identity turns out to be a  fundamental explanatory factor 
for its behaviour in the international arena. A given actor’s behaviour can be explained by 
analysing the way in which identity shapes its understanding o f the environment in which it 
has to operate, and consequently the responses to the challenges posed by this environment.
Yet Breuning’s analysis tends to reify the notion o f identity, somehow *undermining the 
possibility o f proper constructivist analysis'101. Breuning’s article utilises the history o f her 
two case studies from where she chooses a number of specific identity markers. These are 
later used as explanatory variables for the differences in self-perceptions put forward by 
Belgium and the Netherlands.
This method o f  structuring the argument tends to forget the contingent nature of the factors 
that she claims determine an actor’s self-perception and consequently its behaviour. As 
Maja Zehfuss points out, ‘Identities depend on concrete articulations' . Conversely, 
Breuning’s analysis seems to take identity markers as a given.
The result, as has been pointed out before, is that Breuning is unable to explain the politics 
o f construction o f an actor’s self-perception. Consequently, she is not able to check the real 
explanatory power o f her argument.
106 See Marijke Breuning: ‘Configuring Issue Areas: Belgian and Dutch representations of the role o f Foreign 
Assistance in Foreign Policy’ (op. cit.) pp. 326-327.
107 See Maja Zehfuss: ‘Constructivism and Identity: A dangerous liaison’ European Journal o f International 
Relations 2001 vol.7(3) p. 316
108 See Maja Zehfuss: ‘Constructivism and Identity: A dangerous liaison’ (op. cit.) p. 347 As Zehfuss further 
argues: 'the fascinating, subtle creation o f the subject in the process o f telling history, and thus identity, is not 
part o f an analysis which starts by postulating subjects. Hence, political questions, fo r instance about how 
subjects come to be in the first place, are ig n o re d See Maja Zehfuss,: ‘Constructivism and Identity: A 
dangerous liaison’ (op. cit.) p. 342.
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The result would have been rather different if she had remained with the analysis o f the co ­
variation between actor’s self perceptions and policy outcomes. Yet, as we have seen, sh e  
claimed to be able to offer an account o f the social origins o f an actor’s self­
representations. I contend that it is not enough to examine national histories searching fo r  
identity markers in order to explain an actor’s self-perceptions. On the contrary, a proper 
analysis o f the processes o f identity construction is needed.
Breuning’s analysis begins from a misleading understanding o f the distinction between 
structural variables and cognitive factors. Instead of articulating them in a unique 
explanatory framework, she sets up one type o f factors against the other. As a  result, she 
fails to offer an account o f the process of identity formation which proves critical to h e r 
analysis o f the co-variation o f role conceptions and international policy outcome.
However, constructivism, and particularly Breuning’s analysis o f the aid policies o f the 
Netherlands and Belgium, has opened interesting avenues o f  research in order to resolve the  
so-called foreign aid puzzle. Firstly, questioning the origins o f  actors* preferences, in other 
words emphasizing the constructed nature of policy priorities in the aid realm is an 
important step forward in order to overcome the spurious debate between the donor interest 
and recipient needs model. Moreover, it should permit a better assessment o f the role o f  
ideas and values in policy-making.
Secondly, at a methodological level, as Marijke Breuning has claimed convincingly, 
constructivist analysis applied to the foreign aid puzzle has shown the need for new 
categories in order to understand the origins of agency in the realm of foreign development 
assistance.
As Marijke Breuning has argued, the analysis o f foreign aid policies had traditionally used 
indicators such as the geographical allocation of aid or the total amount o f funds to validate 
claims on the preferences o f actors. It is assumed that by describing what has happened we 
can understand why it did happen. Yet these two types o f questions entail rather different 
analytical strategies. Analysing the construction o f policy preferences requires a two-step 
analysis of the policy process, first, an analysis o f the policy making process. Marijke 
Breuning proposes the use o f factors such as role conceptions or agents’ self-perceptions, 
which can be traced through the use o f different discourse analysis techniques. Second, the
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results o f this kind of analysis can be further tested against indicators o f policy 
implementation, which might show the consistency between policy preferences put forward 
by actors and the process of policy implementation, where actors’ preferences meet each 
other in complex bargaining processes.
Whereas one can agree more or less with the array of factors and the analysis put forward 
by Marijke Breuning, it is clear to me that the deeper critique put forward by constructivism 
to the foreign aid puzzle remains valid. Constructivism poses interesting questions on the 
origins of policy preferences. It may also permit a better assessment o f the process of 
mutual constitution between ideas and agency. Yet, it should be noted that despite the 
promising avenue of research opened by social constructivism for the analysis o f the 
origins o f aid programs, much remains to be done in order to come up with a  broad 
explanatory framework for the foreign aid puzzle.
11.6 The unresolved foreign aid puzzle
As we have seen in previous sections, the debate on the so-called foreign aid puzzle is a 
long standing feature of the social sciences. Scholars from multiple fields have questioned 
the rationale behind aid-giving since the early fifties. Yet as clearly emerges from the brief 
summary of the literature presented so far, the debate on the foreign aid puzzle has not 
reached a satisfactory conclusion.
First, it seems that the debate involves too many disciplines each of which claim to have 
privileged access to the rationale of foreign aid. Since the early fifties a great deal o f the 
scientific debate on foreign aid has tried to resolve matters o f disciplinary boundaries. On 
one side, economists have offered stylised models that account for the so-called foreign aid 
relationship. On the other side, political scientists and International Relations Theory 
scholars claimed the political nature o f foreign assistance, thus trying to drag the foreign 
aid puzzle out of the hands of economists. The problem o f boundaries delimitation led to 
spurious exchanges among scholars who sought to tackle similar questions when they were 
looking at the same phenomenon from rather different points o f view.
This led to the second problem of the debate on the origins o f foreign aid, namely that it 
conflates too many dimensions of the phenomenon o f foreign aid in a single question, or a
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single set o f questions. As we have seen, foreign aid can be studied from a multiplicity o f  
angles. McKinlay’s work focuses on the aid relationship and tries to unfold the rationales 
behind the patterns of aid allocation; whereas, for instance, Paul Mosley looks at the aid 
puzzle by focusing on the agents and the decision-making processes underpinning 
development aid schemes. Noël and Thérien look at the co-variation between values 
informing the constitution o f  domestic welfare structures and the degree o f  state 
engagement in foreign development assistance, whereas Marijke Breuning sees aid as the 
result o f broader processes of identity construction.
All this scholarship is seen as a contribution to the foreign aid puzzle debate. Yet, my 
contention here is that the debate is quite artificially created, since the works mentioned 
above contribute to the understanding o f different dimensions o f the aid phenomenon, 
which cannot always speak to each other. Returning to the examples mentioned before, 
McKinlay’s contribution seems to illuminate much o f the rationale underpinning aid 
allocation decisions, yet is far less clear how can we connect this to the rationale behind the 
very act o f giving aid. Yet, as we have seen most of the contemporary debate on the origins 
of foreign aid policies is structured as a  response to the ‘donor’s interest model’. The debate 
among scholars is rather ill-defined, precisely because the foreign aid puzzle is seen as a 
one-dimensional phenomenon. As a  consequence, everyone dealing with political 
phenomena related to foreign aid seems entitled to claim to hold the solution to the puzzle 
itself.
In addition to the above mentioned problems, the debate on the origins of foreign aid (ill- 
defined as it is) has provided a huge amount o f scholarship that has to be taken into account 
in this research for a number o f reasons. Firstly, it reminds us o f the necessity o f properly 
defining our research questions. This requires, when dealing with multi-dimensional 
political phenomena such as foreign aid or decentralized aid for development, the careful 
selection o f which dimension within the broad puzzle we are trying to analyse.
Secondly, on more substantive theoretical grounds, contributions from the debate on the 
foreign aid puzzle might help us to better define our theoretical instruments for the analysis 
of the origins o f  decentralized aid. M osley’s analysis of the decision-making process 
underpinning foreign aid policies seems to be very much in line with the scope o f this
dissertation, whereas a constructivist analysis seems to offer an interesting avenue of 
research for questioning our understanding of the processes o f policy making.
As we have said before, Mosley’s emphasis on the procedural elements through which the 
aid relationship is established opens up an interesting avenue o f research. Firstly, it is more 
sensitive to changes in the context o f foreign aid as political practice. As Mosley shows in 
his analysis, the practice of foreign aid has suffered substantial changes since the 1950’s to 
the present day. Therefore, models willing to asses the nature o f  the foreign aid puzzle must 
acknowledge the changing conditions under which the aid phenomena takes place and the 
impact of these conditions on the decisions taken by agents.
Second, Mosley’s procedural approach tends to be more sensitive to the way in which 
agents establish their policy preferences and the processes through which they alter them. 
As we saw when analysing McKinlay’s foreign policy model, donors were mainly 
portrayed as power-maximizers, not including the constraints imposed by the nature o f 
historical relations between donor countries and former colonies, or even the terms in 
which the power-broker identity was constructed. Mosley’s procedural analysis, by 
identifying the different political agendas pursued by agents, should permit us to trace the 
patterns of policy preferences formation.
What is more, as we already saw, constructivist analysis, by emphasising the constructed 
nature of policy priorities in the aid realm, is an important step forward in order to 
overcome the spurious debate between the donor interest and recipient needs model.
As Marijke Breuning has argued, the analysis of foreign aid policies had traditionally used 
indicators such as the geographical allocation of aid or the total amount of funds to validate 
claims on the preferences of actors. It is assumed that by describing what has happened we 
can understand why it did happen. Yet these two types of questions entail rather different 
analytical strategies. Analysing the construction of policy preferences requires a two-step 
analysis of the policy process, first, an analysis of the policy making process.
As we have already seen, Marijke Breuning proposes the use o f factors such as role 
conceptions or agents’ self-perceptions, which can be traced through the use of different 
discourse analysis techniques. Second, the results o f this kind o f analysis can be further 
tested against indicators of policy implementation, which might show the consistency
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between policy preferences put forward by actors and the process o f policy implementation, 
where actors* preferences meet each other in complex bargaining processes.
Yet, these or other theories must be applied carefully. The debate on the origins o f foreign 
aid is very much a state-oriented debate. Thus, we cannot simply transpose a theory which 
is designed to deal with state rationales into the analysis o f sub-state units’ rationales. The 
problem here is one of level o f analysis but it also relates to more substantive problems on 
the characteristics of our units of analysis. One could argue that, whereas the state is a  
sovereign unit, regions are simply autonomous units. This has an impact on the modes and 
capacities for political action, and therefore on our scientific categories. Thus, before 
moving to the construction o f an analytical framework o f regions* engagement in 
decentralized aid policies, we have to come to terms with the contributions o f the literature 
on the international activities o f  sub-state unit’s.
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The debate on a region’s involvement in foreign policies has been a long and fruitful one. 
Starting in late seventies and heavily influenced by International Relations Theory, it has 
come to a point in which the international activities o f the regions are understood, not only 
as part o f broader changes in the structure of international politics but also a part of a 
process o f territorial politics restructuring. The following sections would try to offer a 
picture on this debate. As we will see later, exploring the nature of a region’s involvement 
in the international arena is extremely useful if  we are to understand the politics behind 
regional engagement in decentralized aid for development policies.
III. The debate on the determinants of constituent units’ involvement abroad
111.1 Transnational politics, complex interdependence and the rise of the research 
agenda on constituent units’ involvement abroad
In the early seventies the scientific agenda of international interdependence offered a 
theoretical framework for understanding the increasing participation of non-state actors in 
international relations. In their seminal work, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye 
claimed the incapacity of the realist paradigm in International Relations Theory to explain 
the emergence o f new systems of governance at the international level.109
According to them, the political agenda of international relations could be split into two 
major realms: first, the realm of high politics, centred on security issues, where the role of 
the states is central; second, the realm of low politics, which included most issues of 
economic governance, where actors other than the State played a relevant role in the 
definition and the implementation o f the political agenda.
The breach between high and low politics was brought by the increasing 
internationalisation o f economic and social exchanges. As a consequence, many o f the 
issues included in the agenda o f low politics could not be managed without the assistance 
o f private actors, such as multinational corporations, or international organizations, which 
began to gain weight as counterparts in different decisional arenas.
109 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye 1977: * Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
T ra n sitio n Boston: Little Brown.
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At the same time, the increasing technical complexity o f the agenda o f low politics 
reinforced the role of specialized departments and advisory committees which lay beyond 
the limits o f traditional State bureaucracy110.
The agenda of interdependence helped the development o f a research agenda centred on the 
international activities o f constituent units. In the seventies this agenda was mainly 
concentrated on the trans-border activities o f border regions and on the economic 
dimension of trans-sovereign contacts111.
111.2 The rise of paradiplomacy
Yet, despite the stimulating results o f the combination of both transnational politics and the 
complex interdependency agendas in International Relations Theory with comparative 
federal studies, the demise of the former in the early eighties results in the partial 
abandonment of the study of sub-state actor’s international activities.
The mid-eighties witnessed the re-emergence o f a body o f  literature, within the realm o f  
comparative federal studies and the renewed theory o f  federalism, devoted to the 
international activities of federated constituencies112. The theoretical debate was partially 
structured along the lines originally defined by the eruption o f transnational politics and 
complex interdependence in International Relations Theory, and its application to the realm 
of federal studies. Yet it introduced new elements for the analysis o f sub-state units’
110 See Dehousse, Renaud 1991: 'Fédèralisme et relations Internationales: Une reflexion comparative’ ; 
Bruxelles :Bmylant p. 92.
111 As shown by Renaud Dehousse, scholars paid increasing attention to trans-border relations as an example 
of the new conditions for governance at the regional level. See Dehousse 'Fédèralisme et relations 
Internationales: Une reflexion comparative’ (op. cit) p. 93-96. As has been stated elsewhere, 'necessity is the 
mother not only o f  invention but o f adjustment; [ . . . ]  Necessity in this case has to do with economic realities, 
ranging from metropolitan agglomerations that cut across state and national borders to economic 
development needs.* See p. XX of the Introduction by Daniel J. Elazar in Ivo. D Duchacek, Daniel Latouche 
and Garth Stevenson (eds.) 1988: 'Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations: Trans-Sovereign 
contacts o f Subnational Governments Connecticut Greenwood Press. This statement captures not only the 
state of mind among scholars about the international activities o f sub-state units, but also the increasing 
perception among practitioners about the increasing importance of an international dimension in sub-state 
domestic governance,
112 See Inaki Aguirre: ‘Making sense of Paradiplomacy? An intertextual enquiry about a concept in search of 
a definition’, in: Aldecoa, Francisco and Michael Keating (eds.) 1999: ‘Paradiplomacy in Action: The 
Foreign Relations o f  Subnational Governments'; London: Frank Cass. p. 187
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involvement abroad. These elements brought by scholars such as Ivo D. Duchacek or 
Panayotis Soldatos can be summarized under the concept o f paradiplomacy.
The concept o f  paradiplomacy first appeared in the works o f Ivo D. Duchacek113. The 
concept was used to describe the international activities of non-central governments114. The 
underlying assumption was that in order to grasp the nature of regions’ international 
activities, one must look to the realm o f domestic politics.
According to Daniel Latouche, the ‘foreign initiatives o f  subnational actors should be 
considered less a result than an illustration o f  a new interdependent international 
context, ’115 167. As he further claims when analysing the case of Quebec’s international 
politics, there are very few authors that attempt to link ‘Q uebec’s attempts at becoming an 
international actor with the on-going process o f  nation- and state-building which has 
characterized this province ever since the Quiet R evolution*^. He concludes that 'to 
understand Quebec foreign policy, we must take into account not only the internal 
articulation o f  its own state-building process (and the specific configuration o f  forces 
which gives it life) but also its position within the overall Canadian statist space*! 17 In sum, 
part of the new research agenda was preoccupied with the domestic sources o f sub-state 
units’ international activities.
Panayotis Soldatos and Hans Michelmann situate paradiplomatic activities in the broader 
context o f centre-periphery relations. According to these authors, paradiplomacy might be 
the result o f the major crisis at the federal level. In his own words, ‘territorial 
segmentation, as a phenomenon o f policy and actor segmentation, at the level o f the
113 Inaki Aguirre cites Duchacek’s book “The Territorial Dimension of Politics: Within, Among and Across 
Nations” as one of the first works mentioning the word Paradiplomacy. See Inaki Aguirre: ‘Making sense of 
Paradiplomacy? An intertextual enquiry about a concept in search of a definition* (op. cit.) pp. 187-188
114 Despite the efforts of authors such as Duchacek, Soldatos, Michelmann or Latouche, the real explanatory 
scope of the concept of paradiplomacy remains rather unclear. Much space from the above mentioned 
author’s work has been devoted to establishing a taxonomy of different paradiplomatic activities, yet clear 
definitions have not been achieved. In this respect, equating paradiplomacy with the international activities of 
sub-state units might seem a rather simplistic way of summarizing a rather complex debate. Yet, it can be 
argued that despite the many adjectives added to the concept o f paradiplomacy throughout the works o f the 
authors mentioned above, its essence always referred to the international activities of sub-state units.
115 See Daniel Latouche: ‘State Building and Foreign Policy at the Subnational Level’ p. 33 in Ivo D. 
Duchacek, Daniel Latouche and Garth Stevenson (eds.) 1988 'Perforated Sovereignties and International 
Relations: Trans-Sovereign contacts o f Subnational Governments '  (op. cit.)
116 Idem.
117 See Daniel Latouche: ‘State Building and Foreign Policy at the Subnational Level’ (op. cit.) p.34
71
federated units, represents in a sense a phenomenon o f  crisis o f the nation-state a n d  i t s  
federal government*118.
Yet, as he further recognises, paradiplomacy does not necessarily respond to a conflictual 
representation of centre-periphery relations since an actor’s segmentation in foreign p o lic y  
can result from co-ordinated decentralization rather than conflictive appropriation. A s  
Panayotis Soldatos claims, *decentralization could enhance the efficiency in ex tern a l 
relations and become a remedy fo r  the crisis o f  the nation-state in foreign policy [ ...]  in  
other words, the elites’ capacity to adapt and respond to actors’ segmentation, w ith a  
conflict-resolution mechanism, coherent machinery fo r  the articulation and aggregation o f  
interests and a process o f  development o f complementarities in foreign action co u ld  
transform the crisis into a process o f  rationalization, whereby actors * segmentation d o es  
not become policy segmentation and subnational Paradiplomacy helps to rationalize th e  
whole policy process’119.
Panayotis Soldatos concludes that the whole array o f  determinant factors for paradiplomacy 
is linked to the above mentioned crisis-rationalization process in a federal state. He presents 
a typology o f two different categories o f factors120. First, there are domestic determinants 
which can be subdivided in two different sub-categories, federated unit level determinants 
and federal-level determinants. Second, there are external determinants. According to the 
author these determinants are interrelated, yet they do not all need to be present at once. 
The whole list o f determinants, or causes as he further denominates them, can be  
summarized in the following figure extracted from the author’s work.
118 See Panayotis Soldatos: ‘An explanatory framework for the study o f Federated States as Foreign-Policy 
Actors* in Hans j. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.) 1990: *Federalism and International Relations: 
The role o f Subnational Units*; Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.41
119 See Panayotis Soldatos: ‘An explanatory framework for the study o f Federated States as Foreign-Policy 
Actors’ (op. cit.) p.42
120 See Panayotis Soldatos: ‘An explanatory framework for the study of Federated States as Foreign-Policy 
Actors’ (op. cit.) p.44
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Involvement of external actors
It is interesting to note however how the author, after presenting this taxonomy of variables, 
does not explore the alleged inter-relations among them by trying to establish different 
combinations o f domestic and external factors. Soldatos enumerates the possible influence 
o f every single variable in the constitution of his dependent variable, Le. paradiplomatic 
activities. Yet, it seems quite clear that the influence o f  regionalist and nationalist 
ideologies at the federated level might be dependent on the degree of completion of the 
nation-building process (and vice versa), or at least be related to it.
The problems for Soldâtes’ taxonomy do not finish here. The problems derived from 
unexplored inter-category relations are complemented by the existence o f intra-category 
patterns o f relation among variables, which question the alleged independency of many of 
the variables. For example, at the federated unit level set o f  causes, one could argue that 12
121 Extracted from Panayotis Soldatos: ‘An explanatory framework for the study of Federated States as 
Foreign-Policy Actors’ {op. cit.) p. 45.
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objective segmentation's (defined as the geographical, cultural, linguistic, religious and  
political characteristics distinguishing a federated unit from one or more others) impact o n  
the configuration of paradiplomatic activities is dependent on the existence o f  
regionalist/nationalist movements able to politicise these differences, thus creating a  
situation in which perceived segmentation necessarily has to mediate between objective 
segmentation and paradiplomacy.
In sum, despite the efforts o f the author, the enlisted variables seem to be anything but 
independent. Their impact on the dependent variable seems to be mediated by other alleged 
independent variables, thus providing an unclear account o f the patterns o f causation.
Even if the work of Soldatos et ah in the realm of the international involvement o f sub-state 
units does not provide us with a satisfactory taxonomy of the variables underpinning 
paradiplomatic activities, they managed to shift the emphasis from a research agenda 
almost exclusively centred on the effects of complex interdependency as an explanatory 
factor towards a more domestically concerned research program.
As we have seen, the work o f the Ivo D. Duchacek and his followers examining the concept 
of paradiplomacy somewhat devolved the study of the international activities o f constituent 
units to the realm o f regional and federal studies, separating it partially from the influence 
of International Relations Theory.
1(1.3 Globalisation and regions’ involvement abroad
The mid-nineties saw the emergence o f a new group o f scholars who understood regions’ 
engagement in foreign policy as part o f the broader changes brought about by the processes 
of globalisation and European integration. According to Brian Hocking, globalisation has 
blurred the traditional frontier between domestic and foreign politics. Instead of a clear-cut 
separation between these two realms, politicians face a reality which is characterised by the 
existence o f a continuum between the domestic and the international spheres. The question 
would not be whether sub-state units are developing new forms of diplomatic activities 
leading to a distinct foreign policy from that of the central government, but to what extent
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the changes brought by increasing globalisation are affecting the configuration of 
diplomacy and foreign policy .
In Hocking’s words, Wow Central Governments are located in a complex diplomatic milieu 
which does not recognise the exclusive territories o f the domestic and the international but 
blends both together in various ways here international diplomacy is regarded not as 
a segmented process presided over by undisputed gatekeepers but as a web o f  interactions 
with a changing cast o f players which will interact in different ways depending on the 
issue, their interests and capacity to operate in a multilevel political environment’ .
Sub-state actors operate in this intermestic (intemational/domestic) context, by engaging in 
multi-level decision making processes. Crucial decisions for domestic governance are 
increasingly taken in multi-level bargaining processes where the articulation of actors and 
preferences is not clearly defined ex ante, but changes according to the issue at stake. In 
this way, ‘diplomacy has assumed a domestic dimension which [...] is crucial to its 
success*12 324 *.
According to Hocking, the new research agenda proposed under the concept of 
multilayered diplomacy represents an attempt at fitting the international activities o f Non 
Central Governments into the changing patterns of world politics. Moreover, the concept o f 
Multilayered Diplomacy tends to emphasize the patterns o f linkage between levels of 
political authority and activity, by abandoning the image of conflict offered by the concept 
of paradiplomacy, Multilayered Diplomacy would operate a ‘ Copemican Revolution in 
relation to form er approaches to N C G ’s behaviour in foreign activities since these 
activities are no longer studiedfrom a purely state-centric poin t o f  view* .
Brian Hocking’s emphasis on multilayered diplomacy aims to change our frame o f  mind. 
Sub-state units’ activities in the international realm should no longer be interpreted as an 
anomaly. As Hocking claims, the international order is not determined by a single
122 See Inaki Aguirre: ‘Making sense o f Paradiplomacy? An intertextual enquiry about a concept in search of 
a definition’ (op. cit.). p. 198
123 See Hocking, Brian 1993: 'Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered 
Diplomacy’ ; New York: St. Martin’s Press p. 36
124 See Hocking, Brian 1993: *Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered 
Diplomacy* (op. cit.) p. 3
I2’ See Inaki Aguirre: ‘Making sense of Paradiplomacy? An intertextual enquiry about a concept in search of 
a definition’ (op. cit.). p. 201.
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gatekeeper any more, but is the result o f the conjunction o f a multiplicity of actors. In this 
context the international projection o f sub-state units can be only understood as paradoxical 
if we keep on believing in the existence of a state-centric order at the international level.
However, as Ngaire Woods states126, the impact o f globalisation varies according to the 
strength of domestic structures and the different issues analysed. Globalisation as such can 
not be conceptualised as more than a constraint influencing, but not determining, political 
decisions at the regional level, where other sets o f factors come into play.
It is true that globalisation has had an impact on the configuration of centre-periphery 
relations, as well as having altered the contemporary notion of boundary (from an 
impermeable barrier to a porous tissue), thus modifying the distinction between domestic 
and international orders. Yet Brian Hooking’s emphasis on these elements of change should 
be counterbalanced by an assessment o f the impact o f domestic structures on the 
multilayered diplomatic agenda. Moreover, it should be analysed why some regions are in a 
better position to take advantage o f the opportunities o f increasing globalisation and 
supranational integration whereas other regions don’t show such interests. As we claimed 
before when analysing the contribution o f the literature on paradiplomacy, domestic factors 
are important in the configuration o f sub-state units’ international profiles.
111.4 Opportunity structures, motives and strategies: a new research agenda for the 
analysis of constituent units’ involvement abroad.
In more recent times, John Kincaid’s work on constituent diplomacy presents a new way of 
understanding the challenges posed by globalisation as an explanatory factor and its impact 
on the establishment of sub-state tiers’ diplomatic activities. According to him, the rise of 
constituent diplomacy (i.e. foreign relations o f  sub-state units) can be attributed to the 
increasing economic interdependence associated with globalisation.
Yet, as he notes early on, this explanation is only partially correct. According to him, the 
first era o f  globalisation, which took place during the nineteen century until the First World 
War, did not result in the increasing participation of sub-state units in international affairs.
126 Ngaire Woods (ed.) 2000: ‘The political economy o f globalization* Basingstoke : Macmillan p.12.
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Rather this period witnessed a process o f  increasing concentration o f powers in the hands of 
the State’s administration127.
Stated in other words, it is true that increasing interdependence has favoured the sub-state 
actor’s engagement in international politics. However, as shown by the concentration of 
international relations in the hands o f  the State during the first era of globalisation, the 
effects of interdependence might or might not favour a sub-state unit’s engagement in 
international politics. Thus, the initial question for John Kincaid would be how can we 
qualify this new era o f  globalisation to explain the rather different impact it has had on the 
configuration of international politics?
The specific features o f our historical period allowing for constituent diplomacy would be 
the following: first, the staggered path o f  démocratisation since the Second World War. In 
a nutshell, democratic polities had allowed, even encouraged, sub-state tiers to develop 
international activities, whilst non-democratic regimes did not tolerate this practice. 
Furthermore, the rise o f social movements in the 1960’s and 1970’s turned sub-state 
political arenas into fora for both political debate and political activism. The second feature 
was the rise o f intergovermentalism . According to Kincaid, sub-state tiers o f government 
had sought to inter-govemmentalise international affairs as means of responding to the 
pressures of the economic and political affairs of sub-state units. Third, the rise o f  the 
human rights movement helped national, ethnic, religious and linguistic communities to 
assert communal rights as distinct societies deserving o f recognition, self-government and 
as distinctive voices in national and international affairs. The fourth element was 
decentralization, which in the context o f contemporary globalisation has been re-defined to 
include certain forms o f constituent diplomacy. Fifth, market liberalization compelled 
regional and local tiers of government to compete in the international arena. The sixth 
factor was the policies of the United States, which tried to build up international 
institutions, drive globalisation, support démocratisation and provide security for the 
construction of the EU. Seventh, technological innovation has spurred constituent 
diplomacy by blurring the physical limits of international communications. Finally,
127 See John Kincaid ‘Foreign Relations of Sub-national Units: Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Systems’ in 
Raoul Blindenbacher and Arnold Koller (eds) 2003 1Federalism in a Changing World- Learning from each 
other: Scientific Background, proceedings and Plenary Speeches o f the International Conference on 
Federalism 2002* Montreal: McGi 11-Queen’s University Press pp. 74-83.
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constituent diplomacy reflects the diffusion of innovation within and between federal 
democracies.
Yet, he further insists that the impact of these elements must be separated from the role 
played by the process of supranational integration, and the motivations o f constituent 
diplomacy. According to Kincaid, the process of European integration is so wide and so 
deep that the concept of constituent diplomacy might no longer apply to sub-state political 
activities within the EU. At the same time, he identifies four reasons why regions should 
have an interest in putting forward an international profile. These reasons are: first, 
problems derived from new issues in economic governance; second, the politics o f  regional 
culture and cultural promotion; third, political reasons such as the protection of a 
constituent community’s position or status in international arrangements or the assertion o f 
nationality and legitimacy; fourth, cross-border housekeeping, or the existence o f  specific 
issues that have a cross-border dimension and therefore cannot be tackled without the co­
operation of other sub-state partners.
In sum, Kincaid provides a complex explanatory framework for sub-state international 
activities. Kincaid’s analysis offers a three-fold explanation in  which globalisation, supra­
national integration and a region’s own motives would be the major factors. This 
explanatory framework adds to Brian Hocking’s process of localization o f foreign policy, 
the idea that despite all the changes taking place at international level, there is something 
inherently regional about regional engagement in international activities.
In similar vein, Michael Keating has offered a classification o f sub-state actors’ motivations 
to act internationally, distinguishing them from the opportunity structure and the strategies 
and styles in the policy field128. According to him, there are political, economical and 
cultural reasons that explain, from the point o f view of sub-state units, their involvement in 
foreign affairs. “Economically regions seek investment, markets fo r  their products and 
technology fo r  modernization [...] Regions with their own language or culture also seek 
resources and support in the international arena [...] Finally, regions have a variety o f 
political reasons fo r  entering in the international arena. For example those with nationalist
128 See Michael Keating: ‘Regions and International Affairs: Motives, Opportunities and Strategies’
Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating (eds.) 1999: *Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relations o f  
Subnational Governments' {op. cit.) p. 2
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Iaspirations seek recognition and legitimacy as something more than mere regions [...] 
External projection may also serve by a reverse effect to help nation-building “at home ” or 
fo r “internal region-building” 129 *13.
Both Kincaid and Keating introduce an important distinction between (using Kincaid’s 
words) factors that have given rise to constituent diplomacy ’I3° and the ‘motivations fo r  
constituent diplomacy,m . Sub-State actors interpret the political challenges posed by 
increasing globalisation and supranational integration to adapt them to the necessities of 
their domestic political agenda. At the same time, the way in which sub-state actors adapt 
to these challenges creates new conditions for political action as well as altering the 
structure o f incentives for further participation in specific policy fields.
This method of understanding constituent units’ engagement in international politics opens 
up an interesting avenue of research. Later sections will explore it in the context o f our 
research on the determinants o f a region’s engagement in decentralized aid policies.
129 See Michael Keating: ‘Regions and International Affairs: Motives, Opportunities and Strategies’ {op. cit.)
F'330 See John Kincaid: ‘Foreign Relations of Sub-national Units: Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Systems’
{op. cit.) p. 74
131 See John Kincaid: ‘Foreign Relations of Sub-national Units: Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Systems’






IV. The decentralized aid puzzle
IV.1 Introduction
So far we have looked at the different theories trying to account for the so-called ‘foreign 
aid puzzle’, that is, the determinants o f foreign aid. This section brings the discussion 
undertaken so far into our research question. The main task is to establish a theoretical 
framework for the analysis o f the ‘decentralized aid puzzle’. This theoretical framework 
tries to combine elements from the literature on the motivations for foreign aid provision 
with the literature on New Regionalism and regions’ involvement abroad.
In previous sections we have analysed the contributions o f two distinct bodies of literature. 
Firstly, we have analysed the contributions to the debate on the origins of foreign aid. This 
is a long standing debate in the social sciences; scholars from different scientific realms 
have tried to resolve the so-called foreign aid puzzle. That is, the paradox o f self-interested 
states transferring money and resources in concessional terms to poorer areas o f the world.
Secondly, we have discussed major contributions to the debate on the determinants o f  the 
foreign projection o f sub-state units. Initially circumscribed within the debates on complex 
interdependence and transnational politics, this debate has evolved towards the realm o f 
regional and federal studies, where scholars sought to provide explanatory models for the 
foreign projection o f sub-state units.
The analysis of both debates has helped us to contextualise better the nature of the research 
question we are dealing with in this dissertation, since the research question presents 
important commonalities with both the debates on the origins o f foreign aid policies and the 
debates on the origins of sub-state units* foreign projection.
Yet, as I have tried to argue in the previous section the analysis of the origins o f 
decentralized aid policies cannot be framed exclusively within any of these debates. The 
contributions to the debate on the origins o f  foreign aid policies have been centred on the 
analysis of state-level policies. Transposing these models to the realm of decentralized aid 
would imply assuming that regions and states “behave” following a similar rationale or, to 
put it in a different way, that states and regions face a similar structure of incentives and 
constraints.
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Similarly, recent contributions to the debate on the foreign projection o f sub-state units 
have opened-up an interesting avenue o f research. Yet, policy implications of the models 
distinguishing the opportunity structure from the motivations o f regional actors have not 
been fully explored in the specialized literature. Thus, careful operationalization of these 
contributions into the realm of decentralized aid for development is required.
The following sections try to apply the procedural approach to the analysis o f the 
‘decentralized aid puzzle*. I shall recall the distinction between the opportunity structure, 
the motivations and the strategies and policy styles, established in Michael Keating’s and 
John Kincaid’s works on the projection o f  sub-state units abroad.
The analysis o f  decentralized aid as a practice is disentangled from that of decentralized aid 
as a policy outcome. This will permit us to integrate findings from the literature on 
decentralized aid with a more region-focused analysis o f the politics of a region’s 
engagement in decentralized aid policies. As I will argue later, decentralized aid as a 
political practice is the result o f a major change in the way the relation of sub-state units to 
economic growth is conceived. This change is dependent both on a major process o f 
restructuring in the notion of regional autonomy, and on a different way o f  understanding 
the relationship of institutions and economic development. In the case o f  the European 
Union, these processes crystallized in the establishment o f decentralized aid schemes in the 
context of European development policy.
Regions’ engagement in decentralized aid policies, that is, decentralized aid as a policy 
outcome, is then explained as the result o f the interactions between a distinct set o f  
institutional and non-institutional actors within the above mentioned framework. As we 
will see later, regions face demands from actors in civil society. A  region’s response is very 
much mediated by its position regarding other actors, such as the State or the European 
Union. It is argued that the specific geometry of these interactions determine the different 
agendas o f decentralized aid in any given case.
82
IV.2 Recasting the research question: constitution and causation.
It is common currency in the social sciences to distinguish between descriptive inference 
and causal inference132. Both kinds o f  inference are supposed to play a major role in the 
social sciences’ endeavours. Descriptive inference has been related to what Hollis and 
Smith have called understanding a given social phenomena, whereas causal inference is 
part of the process o f explaining social phenomena133.
Explaining and understanding have been perceived by Hollis and Smith as diverse activities 
in social research. Explaining is understood as an approach to the social sciences by which 
one attempts to find causal mechanisms and social laws, whereas understanding aims to 
recover the individual and shared meanings that motivated actors to do what they did134.
As Alexander Wendt has correctly pointed out, both ways of approaching social 
phenomena tend to be cast one against the other in a zero-sum struggle for scientificity135. 
The question would be whether any o f  these forms is closer to the canon of scientificity o f 
the natural sciences and therefore is superior to the other. Yet, as he further claims, the 
difference between explaining and understanding resides in the nature o f the research 
question we are dealing with. Following David Sylvan, Alexander Wendt claims that we 
can take ‘explainers to be asking causal questions', basically ‘w hy’ type questions, whereas 
‘understanders ask constitutive ones', basically ‘what’ questions or ‘what-made-possible’ 
types of questions136. He therefore proposes a question-oriented approach to the distinction 
between constituents and causes, which does not prejudice the scientificity of one particular 
approach, but tends to cast both ways o f approaching social phenomena in an inclusive and 
pluralist manner.
The contemporary debate on the origins of foreign aid can be structured along the 
constituent vs. causality division. Marijke Breuning’s argument on the need for more 
accurate methodological instruments to analyse the foreign aid puzzle to some extent
132 See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba: ‘Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific inference in 
Qualitative Research' Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapters 2 and 3
133 See Alexander Wendt: ‘On constitution and causation in International Relations’ Review o f International 
studies Voi. 5 1998 p. 104.
134 See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith 1990: ‘Explaining and Understanding International Relations' Oxford: 
Oxford University Press pp. 3-7
135 Alexander Wendt: ‘On constitution and causation in International Relations Theory’ [op. cit.) p.102
136 Alexander Wendt :*On constitution and causation in International Relations Theory’ [op. cit.) p.103
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pointed to this problem. As we have stated before, Breuning criticises the donor interest and 
the recipient needs models on the basis that they sustained a causal link between interest 
and policy outcome in the analysis and description of the later. According to her, proper 
instruments for the analysis o f  motivations, which do not infer a causal link from the 
descriptive analysis of politics, were needed.
Studying the international projection o f constituent units, Michael Keating and John 
Kincaid have distinguished the analysis o f *the rise o f  paradiplomacy’ from the question o f  
'why regions go  abroad?' . The rise o f paradiplomacy has been explained as the result o f  
a major process o f change in the patterns of territorial restructuring and the new roles 
acquired by territories in the context o f global governance, whereas regions go abroad due 
to a set o f specific motivations. The distinction between these two realms o f  analysis 
somewhat reflects the above mentioned distinction between understanding a  region’s 
projection abroad and explaining i t  First, it proposes a descriptive approach to the broader 
phenomenon o f  the rise of paradiplomacy, whereas in a  second step it concentrates on the 
analysis o f agents’ rationale.
This dissertation aims to fulfil a  similar strategy. The following sections offer a theoretical 
framework for the analysis o f decentralized aid, which distinguishes the analysis o f  
decentralized aid as a political practice from the analysis o f decentralized aid as the result 
of purposeful action.
As we will see in later sections, decentralized aid, as a political practice, finds its origins in 
major changes occurring in three different areas. First, is not by coincidence that the 
decentralized aid for development talk emerges parallel to the rise of institutional 
economics in economic theory and its well known emphasis on the need for a ‘proper 
institutional setting’ before economic growth can take place. Scholars had emphasized the 
impact o f sub-state institutions and decentralization on economic growth. From Charles 
Tiebout to Barry Weingast, both economists and political scientists had stressed the 137
137 Both headings extracted from Michael Keating’s ‘Regions and International Affairs: Motives, 
Opportunities and Strategies’ {op. cit.) p. 2.
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wbenefiting effects o f  fiscal federalism, and more generally the effect of the decentralization 
o f economic policy decisions on economic performance and development138.
Second, development institutions started to tie development assistance to the existence of 
proper institutional schemes to implement it, or to the accomplishment o f proper policy 
reforms. Moreover, whereas development aid has been understood in the past as a state- 
development agency to state-development agency relation, from the early nineties onwards 
practitioners increasingly emphasized the role of civil society and local institutions as 
appropriate partners in development policy.
Third, the eighties witnessed a major process o f territorial restructuring. Political autonomy 
has been redefined and sub-state units’ capacities have been restructured in the context of 
increasing globalisation and supranational integration. Two apparently contradictory trends 
seem to be arising in contemporary European polities. Globalisation and supranational 
integration are driving political capacities out o f the State’s hands. Meanwhile a parallel 
process o f further territorialization of politics, in which territorially bounded identities and 
practices are more and more important, seems to be taking place.
From the point o f view of purposeful action, regions’ engagement in foreign aid policies 
seems to be the result of specific processes of interaction among a distinct set o f 
institutional and non-institutional actors. Regional governments, pushed by NGOs and 
social actors operating in the territory, would engage in multilevel processes of political 
bargaining that would result in a specific policy outcome, a regional policy o f decentralized 
aid139.
The main argument is that both levels of analysis, even if  they are mutually dependent and 
interlinked at a meta-theoretical level, can be separated at the level of meso-theory. 
Following Wendt, the distinction presented here is one between the analysis o f the
138 See among others, Charles M. Tiebout: ‘A Pure theory of Local expenditures’; Journal ofpolitical 
economy, vol. 64 1956, pp. 416-424; Oates, Wallace E. (1972), ‘Fiscal Federalism’ New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich; Barry R. Weingast: ‘The economic role of political institutions: Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development’; Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization vol. 11, Issue 1,1995 
pp. 1-31.
139 As we will see later on, the model presented here is inspired by Mosley’s procedural approach to the 
foreign aid puzzle. As in Mosley’s procedural approach we distinguish two major sub-processes. First, a 
demand structuring process where social actors play a major role in structuring demands at the regional level. 
Second, a supply structuring process by which regions put forward foreign aid schemes.
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constituents o f decentralized aid as a social kind (that is the response to the question o f  
what made decentralized aid possible?), and the analysis o f the causal mechanisms 
explaining a specific social phenomenon, a region’s engagement in decentralized aid 
schemes (that is, why regions engaged in foreign aid polices?).
The interests o f this dissertation are mainly concentrated on the latter questions, no t 
because we perceive that descriptive analysis is an inferior social science, but because the 
second kind o f  question, that o f the causal mechanisms explaining regions’ engagement in  
decentralized aid, has not been tackled by the specialized literature on decentralized aid 
which tends to infer causality from the analysis o f constituents.
IV.3 The constituents of decentralized aid as political practice.
There is a wide agreement among analysts that decentralized aid is a response to the crisis 
of centralist top-down approaches to development140. M oreover,4structural adjustment and  
démocratisation processes created space fo r  direct involvement o f  civil society*141. At the 
same time, globalisation has brought the increasing relevance of socio-economic 
interdependence and the dismissal o f the State’s steering capacities, as well as new links 
between the international system and the sub-state units142.
The origins o f decentralized aid as a practice are to be found at the juncture o f two different 
processes. On the one hand, a major process o f territorial restructuring has changed the 
architecture o f political authority and its inherent meaning o f political autonomy in Western 
Europe. On the other hand, changes in the development paradigm have brought institutions 
to the foreground o f research on economic growth and to the practice of economic 
development assistance. The conjunction of these two processes in the context o f the 
European Union resulted in the setting up of European decentralized aid schemes at the 
level o f EU development policy, thus opening a window o f opportunity for regions to 
participate. The following sections explore these issues at some length.
140 See Jean  B ossuy t 1995: 'Decentralized cooperation: Lessons from  EU  experiences under the Lomé 
Convention’ P ap e r p repared  for the  m eeting  o f  E u ro p ean  A dv iso ry  C o u n c ils  M allo rca  2-4 N ovem ber 1995. 
p .l
4’ Idem.
142 See A ndrea  S to cch ie ro  2001 'La cooperazione decentrata delie regioni italiane e i partenarati 
intemazionali per lo sviluppo locale’ R om a: L ab o ra to ri C E SPI p . 3
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IV.3.1 The changing conditions of regional autonomy
The late eighties and the nineties witnessed not only the increasing presence of sub-state 
tiers of government in political spheres traditionally forbidden to them, but also a major 
change in the way in which this presence is understood143 14. This reflects not only major 
changes in the articulation o f centre-periphery relations, but also a radical shift in the way 
regions are constructed.
Michael Keating shows how regions in Western Europe have undergone a major process of 
restructuring in the last half century. These changes are linked to the detour experienced by 
European States in the period after the Second World War, but also to regions’ re­
interpretation of these major changes and their capacity to mobilize political resources. 
According to Keating, from the 1980’s onwards ‘there is a new wave o f regionalism [...] it 
was impelled by a functional pressure combined with new form s o f political mobilization 
and a redefinition o f the social and economic meaning o f territory,144.
This new wave o f regionalism is marked by two linked features: first, 'it is not contained 
within the framework o f the State\  Second, it portrays regions as ‘pitting against each 
other in a competitive mode rather than providing complementary roles fo r  them in the 
national division o f  labour '145 146. As he further continues, the New Regionalism ‘is 
modernizing and forw ard looking, in contrast to an older provincialism, which represented 
resistance to change and defence o f tradition. Yet, both old and new regionalism continue 
to co-exist in uneasy partnership, seeking a new synthesis o f  the universal and the 
particular,146.
Processes o f supranational integration, and new conditions o f economic governance in the 
age of globalisation, determine the position o f the regions in our contemporary political 
landscape. As pointed out by John Loughlin, ‘new constraints are being imposed on all
143 A s D avid  M . D ym et show s, the  in ternational ac tiv ities  o f  regions can be  traced  back  to  1945 in  certain  
cases. See D avid  M . D ym et ‘T he O ntario  G overnm en t as an  International A c to r’ Regional and Federal 
Studies Vol. 11. No. 1 Spring  2001 pp . 57-79 . Y e t th is  d issertation con tends th a t the new  conditions im posed  
b y  globalisation and increasing  supranational in teg ra tio n  substantially  a lte r  th e  w ay  in  w h ich  w e understand 
these activities now adays.
144 See M ichael K eating  1998: ‘7%e New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and 
Political C h a n g eC heltenham , U .K .: E dw ard  E lg a r  p .72 .
145 See M ichael K eating  1998: ‘The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and 
Political Change’ (op. cit.) p . 73.
146 Idem.
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levels o f  government by economic globalisation and competition. But fo r  sub-national 
levels, this also represents a new window o f opportunity to increase their actual 
autonomy*147. He suggests that changes in the relations between society and the political 
system understood in broad terms in Western Europe have brought about changes in the 
way regional autonomy is conceived. Regions’ position in the context o f economic 
globalisation and supranational integration can be summarised in the following figures 
extracted from the work of Michael Keating148:










147 See Jo h n  L o u g h lin  ‘R egional A utonom y and  S ta te  Parad igm  S h ifts  in  W este rn  Europe*; Regional and  
Federal Studies, V o l. 10 N o. 2. Sum m er 2000 p . 33
148 See M ich ae l K ea tin g  1998: 'The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and 
Political Change’ (op. cit.) p, 77.
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Direct links and 
influence
As noted by Michael Keating in an early article, a 'tidy hierarchical order o f  continental, 
national regional and local authorities' cannot exist anymore. *Instead there will be in 
Europe a variable geometry State order’149. According to Keating, with the states losing 
their old monopolies and becoming mere actors in complex systems, territorial autonomy 
will depend less and less on the acquisition of state-like attributes150. In addition, as
149 S ee  M ichael K eating: ‘Regional au tonom y in th e  C hanging State O rd e r  A  F ram ew ork  o f  A nalysis’. 
Regional Politics and Policy, Vol 2. N o. 3  A utum n 1992. p . 60.
150 In  an interesting essay, Paolo  G rossi h as  d iscussed  the  significance o f  th e  co n cep t o f  autonom y fo r 
u n d erstand ing  th e  legal o rder o f  the  la te  M iddle  A ges. G rossi argues against a  legal v ision  that p laces 
sov ere ig n ty  at th e  centre o f  th e  legal ed ifice  o f  th e  la te  M iddle Ages, coun te ring  th a t it  is only th rough  
em p h asis in g  the  im portance o f  autonom y, as a  re la tional concept, tha t w e w ill b e  ab le  to  grasp th e  com plex  
n a tu re  o f  the entangled legal orders that struc tu red  socia l relations in  th a t period . S ee  G rossi, Pao lo  ‘U n d iritto  
s e n z a  Stato: La nozione di autonom ia com e fondam ento  della costituzione g iu rid ica  m edievale’; Quademi 
fiorentin i per la storia delpertsiero giuridico modemo no. 25 (1996) pp. 267-284 . A s Grossi fu rther argues, 
t h e  na tu re  o f  the  m edieval legal system  cannot b e  understood  with th e  in strum en ts a n d  concepts w e use to  
d e s c r ib e  ou r contem porary  legal system . A ccord ing  to  h im , contem porary legal ana ly sis  is very m uch 
d e p e n d e n t on the  figure o f  th e  State and th e  princip le  o f  sovereignty. Y et, as h e  fu rth e r argues, th ese  are  
re la tiv e ly  recent inventions th a t cannot g rasp  the  com plex  patterns o f  in terac tions th a t took p lace in  th e  la te  
M id d le  Ages. W ithout adhering  to those cla im ing  th e  death  o f  the S tate , I th in k  th a t  in  th e  actual cond itions, 
p o li t ic a l  analysis should recall the au tonom y p rin c ip le  a s  a  m eans o f  ba lancing  th e  effec ts o f  understanding  
th e  w o rld  in to m s  o f  sovereign units. In th is  respec t i t  can  be argued th a t th e  in c rea s in g  levels o f  
in te rd ep en d en ce  brought by  globalization  and supranational integration affect th e  w ay  in  w hich au tonom y is  
r e la te d  to  sovereignty. Sovereign ty  as an  a ttribu te  o f  a  specific  political form , th e  S ta te , has rem ained  
su b s ta n tia lly  unaltered. H ow ever, states a re  less au tonom ous in their function ing  th a n  they  used to  be, o r  a t 
le a s t  th an  w hat w e  used to  th in k  they w ere. T h e  re la tionsh ip , and the  effec ts th a t ch an g es  in the no tion  o f
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Michael Keating further states: 'the changing nature o f  both, the State and the international 
order does open up new possibilities andformulas fo r  territorial autonomy’,SI.
The process o f European integration has added a new institutional dimension to the 
definition o f regional autonomy. First, European regulation affects spaces o f  regional 
autonomy, as well as constraining regional capacities for autonomous policy design. 
Regions seek access to the new centre where decisions are taken in order to protect their 
autonomous decisional capacities.
Second, the process of European integration, by altering the borders o f state sovereignty, 
has also altered the way in which regional autonomy is defined vis-à-vis the State. Direct 
relations between EU institutions and regions make the latter go beyond the limits o f  
regional autonomy as defined by a State vs. sub-state unit relation. Moreover, in many 
cases it has altered the pattern of articulating political demands for increasing political 
autonomy of sub-state units vs. the State15 52.
Increasing economic globalisation has altered the role o f sub-state units in the economy. 
First, rigid State policies have shifted to more flexible schemes in orderas to permit 
adaptation to the conditions o f the global economy, where the mobility o f capital is a  key 
feature. A new tension is created between the global logic o f  capital seeking the most 
profitable location and the spatially-bound logic of territorial units which seek to tie capital 
down. As a consequence, policies now place less emphasis on investment incentives and 
more emphasis on endogenous growth, or the attraction of investment by qualities linked to 
the territory, leading to a new economic growth paradigm153.
Second, as showed by the comparison o f both figures represented above, regions have 
gained direct access to international markets. Thus, the old dyadic exchange between the 
state and the regions, with the state mediating regions’ relations with the global market, has
autonom y have fo r  o u r  understanding o f  the  no tion  o f  sovereignty  shou ld  th e n  b e  addressed carefully , ra th e r 
than a sse rtin g  th e  dea th  o f  a  w orld  o f  sovere igns. U ltim ate ly , actual po litics  h a v e  show n how  desp ite  severa l 
efforts to  d im in ish  th e  ro le  o f  th e  sovereign  s ta te , it con tinues to  b e  ex trem ely  re levan t in day to  day p o litic s  
and po litical d iscourse.
151 See M ichael K eating : ‘R egional autonom y in  th e  C hang ing  S ta te  O rd e r  A  Fram ew ork  o f  A nalysis’ p . 45
152 Idem.
153 See: M ichael K ea tin g  1998: ‘The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and 
Political Change’ {op. cit.) pp. 74-76.
90
given way to a more complex set o f relationships in which the regions operate within the 
State, but also within transnational regimes and the global economy154.
The decline in the mediating role o f the State exposes regions more directly to the effects o f 
the global economy, and forces them to seek opportunities to operate within it and within 
emerging transnational regimes.
Competition in global markets is structured along the notion o f  competitive advantage, by 
which absolute advantages accrue to regions with the appropriate characteristics, instead of 
the old idea of comparative advantage by which all regions might find their place in the 
global division o f  labour. Territories, partly due to functional changes in the global 
economy become a  key factor in the relationship between society and the global market and 
in the establishment o f  arenas for political debate and systems o f  collective action155.
The new conditions for regional autonomy affect ineluctably the patterns of regional 
political mobilization. Regions seek innovative ways to seize the opportunities and 
possibilities offered by economic globalisation and supranational integration (as well as 
dealing with functional constraints imposed by them). Yet, we have said very little on the 
process by which changes in the structure of territorial distribution of political power 
occurring in the last twenty years were translated into development co-operation practices.
It is widely agreed that changes in the patterns of territorial politics were assumed in the 
development co-operation realm and structured to provide a new development paradigm 
that stressed the role o f sub-state actors and the participation o f civil society agents156. The 
‘new development agenda* linked decentralization and participation to better development 
and governance practices. Moreover, these changes were soon internalised by European 
development policy.
The next section is structured to provide, in the first place, a brief picture o f significant 
changes in the realm o f development assistance through which major changes occurring in 
the realm of territorial politics were translated into a new development paradigm. Then I
154 S ee  M ichael K eating: ‘R egions and In ternational A ffairs: M otives, O pportun ities and S trateg ies’ {op. cit) 
d.3.
155 M ichael K eating: ‘R eg ions and In ternational A ffa irs: M otives, O pportun ities a n d  S trategies’ (op. cit) p . 2 .
156 See  am ong others, A n d rea  Stocchiero 2001 lLa cooperazione decentrata delle regioni italiane e i 
partenarati internazionali per lo sviluppo locale’ (op. cit,) pp. 3-5
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will explain briefly the establishment o f a decentralized aid policy at the level o f  EU 
development policy.
IV.3.2 Changes in the agenda of international cooperation for development.
In a  European Commission report from 1996, one can read: ‘Me concept o f  decentralized  
aid emerged and gradually took shape as part o f European Community policy a t the end o f  
the eighties in response to several different (but interconnected) phenomena: the growing  
importance accorded to grassroots social and economic development issues and  
participatory approaches to development among donors, especially the EC; the rise o f  
NGOs # activities and the general gradual crystallization o f  organized form s o f civil society 
in the south; and increased enthusiasm fo r  democracy and human rights in the early 
nineties which brought fresh insights into the role and importance o f civil society and its 
representatives in the development process’157.
It is widely accepted among practitioners that the end of the Cold War brought major 
changes in the way development aid was defined and implemented. First, the structure o f 
donors and recipients was widely affected by the demise o f  Communist regimes and the 
subsequent economic crisis. As a result, countries such as the USSR, which up to that 
moment had been giving aid, turned into aid recipients in the early nineties. Second, the 
early nineties witnessed an increasing process o f multilateralisation of international aid.
An important indicator of the impact of multilateral fora on the definition and 
implementation o f aid is the increasing activity developed by the UN system which in the 
nineties engaged in an intense agenda o f global conferences. In 1990, the UN held two 
conferences: one on education, and one on children. In 1992, the UN organized a 
conference on the environment in Rio de Janeiro. In 1993, a conference on human rights 
was held in Vienna. In 1994, the UN conference on population was held in Cairo, while 
conferences on social development and women were held in Copenhagen and Beijing 
respectively in 1995. In 1996, the UN organized a conference on human settlements in 
Istambul, and the UN conference on food security was held in Rome.
157 See C o m m u n ica tio n  from  the C om m ission o f  l*1 M arch  1996: ‘Implementation o f decentralized 
cooperation’ in http://euroDa.eu.int/comm/develoDment/bodv/legislation/recueil/en/enl9/enl9.htm
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The agenda o f global conferences paved the way for a new agenda of development. The 
new agenda of development cooperation is based on two major features. First, international 
development cooperation is considered as a means of ‘helping the international community 
to manage global challenges and problem s’I58. As stated in a document from the European 
Commission: ‘Europe has not neglected challenges fo r development policy arising 
globally. The marginalisation o f  many economies, the increase in poverty in the world, the 
need to better manage environmental interdependencies and the resulting challenge to 
Europe's own environment, the destabilising effects o f migration, the consequences o f  
armed conflicts and pandemics are major concerns fo r  a ll'159.
Second, development theory’s increasing awareness o f the fact that that free markets could 
not function effectively without an intricate web of institutions forced a major shift in the 
scope of development assistance policies, which began to consider the overall social and 
political framework. As a report of the OECD points out, there was ‘relatively more 
emphasis on “softw are” and less on “hardware”*160.
Donor institutions increasingly emphasised questions such as good governance, human 
rights, démocratisation, participatory development, sustainability, transparency and 
accountability as important elements o f the aid relationship. Development policy started to 
be considered as a multidimensional process that covers broad-based equitable growth, 
social services, environment, gender issues, capacity and institutional building, private 
sector development, human rights and good governance*161. Yet, as Raffer and Singer 
stated, the emphasis on the socio-political conditions of development has altered the 
patterns of the aid relationship’s conditionality. As they put it: *conditionality became 
increasingly elaborate, interfering more and more with recipient's political decisions*162.
m  Sec Raffer, K un ibert an d  H ans S inger 2001 'The economic north-south divide: Six decades o f Unequal 
Development’ C heltenham : E dw ard E lg a r p . 95.
159 See C om m ission o f  th e  European C om m unities 2000: ‘Communication from  the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: The European Community’s Development Policy'  C O M (2000)212 
final, p.4
160 See O EC D /D A C  rep o rt 1999 *A comparison o f management system for development co-operation in 
OECD/DAC members' B y  H yun-sik  C hang, A rth u r M . Fell and M ichael L aird  w ith  the assistance o f  Ju lie  
Seif. D evelopm ent C o-operation  D irectorate D C D  (99)6 . p.14.
161 C om m ission o f  the E u ropean  C om m unities 20 0 0  (op. cit.) p. 7
162 See Raffer, K un ibert and  H ans Singer 2001 * The economic north-south divide: Six decades o f Unequal 
Development* (op. cit.) p. 95
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In this context, decentralization was sought as an important ingredient o f the recipe for a 
successful transition towards a more integrated and participatory mode of development. 
Decentralization was perceived as inextricably linked to practices o f better governance, 
participation, transparency and accountability. For instance, in a  paper issued by  the UN, 
one can read: *Decentralizing governance, from the centre to regions, districts, local 
govemments/authorities and local communities can be an effective means o f  achieving 
critical objectives o f the sustainable human development vision. * .
What is more, as the same document further argued, ‘the main challenge now in discussions 
o f local governance is to ensure that the strengthening o f  local government through 
decentralization moves hand in hand with a deliberate effort to mobilize and strength civil 
society structure, processes and institutions at lower levels in a manner that would allow  
their relationship with subnational authorities be more interactive and mutually 
reinforcing’16*.
Decentralized aid appeared in the international debate on development in a context both o f  
increasing concern for the social and institutional conditions o f development and more 
specifically, thanks to the increasing perception that a successful development strategy 
should count on all the stakeholders in the territory, those being local NGOs, small and 
medium sized enterprises and other private actors, or local authorities and communities.
IV.3.3 The constitution of a European system of decentralized aid within the 
framework of European co-operation
In Europe, the first explicit reference to decentralized aid goes back to 1989, in the context 
of the Fourth Lomé Convention EEC-ACP163 465. Art. 20 o f the ACP-EEC convention defines
163 U N D P ‘N ew  G lobal Program  fo r D ecen tra lized  G overnance’
164 U N D P /U N E C A  F ifth  A frica G overnance F o ru m  2002  ‘Local Governance fo r  Poverty Reduction in Africa 
Concept Paper ’ p . 10
165 N evertheless, it  has to  be  noted tha t som e observers  challenge th is  w id esp read  idea . A ccord ing  to  Jacques 
Ziller, th e  m ajo r p u rp o se  o f  the  above quo ted  a r tic le s  w as  to  en ab le  po licy  in strum en ts  w h ich  w o u ld  a llo w  fo r  
ou term ost te rrito rie s’ be tter in tegration  w ith in  th e  econom ic  and  so c ia l env ironm en ts  w ith in  w h ich  th ey  h av e  
to  operate. E nab ling  a  decentralized  co -opera tion  c lau se  w ould p e rm it the  estab lishm en t o f  b e tte r  tran sb o rd e r 
co -operation  schem es betw een  ou term ost territo ries an d  the  A CP coun tries  in  th e ir  surroundings. T h is  
in terpretation  seem s to  b e  consistent w ith  the eco n o m ic  nature o f  th e  L om é C onven tions. T h e  E E C -A C P  
agreem ents sough t, am ong  other th ings, the estab lishm en t o f  p referen tia l trad e  agreem ents be tw een  th e  E E C  
and coun tries  in  A frica , the C aribbean and  the P ac ific  w ith  w hich  E u ro p e  h a s  h a d  an  intense econom ic
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decentralized aid as follows: *[...] in order to encourage a ll parties from the ACP states 
and the Community which are in a position to contribute to the autonomous development o f  
the ACP States to p u t forward and implement initiatives, cooperation shall also support 
within the limits laid down by the AC P States concerned, development operations pu t 
forward by economic, social and cultural organisations in the framework o f decentralised 
co-operation, in particular where they combine the efforts and resources o f organisations 
from the ACP states and their counterparts from  the Community. This form o f cooperation 
shall be aimed in particular a t making the capabilities, original operating methods and 
resources o f such parties available to the development o f the AC P States'166 1678. Furthermore, 
paragraph two o f Art. 20 specifies that the *parties referred to in this article are 
decentralised public authorities, [...] and a ll the groups and parties which are able and 
wish to make a their own spontaneous and original contribution to the development o f  the 
ACP states'161.
In addition, the participation of decentralised parties from the ACP countries is emphasised 
in Art. 21, *[...] cooperation shall support either the independent activities o f ACP parties 
or the activities o fA C P  parties which are combined with support from  similar parties from  
the Community which make their capabilities, experience, technological and organizational 
capacities orfinancial resources available to them 'm .
The normative framework created by the fourth Lomé Convention was enshrined in further 
European legislation. In 1991, Council Decision no. 91/482/EEC of 25 July regulation 
cooperation between the European Economic Community and Overseas Countries and 
Territories included a whole chapter devoted to decentralized cooperation. In Art. 7, it 
states that ‘cooperation shall also support, within the limits laid down by the appropriate 
authorities, development operations p u t forward by economic, social and cultural
re la tion  in the past. Y et, the  L om é C onventions a re  ex trem ely  com plicated d o cu m en ts , since they  have been  
a lso  interpreted as the foundations o f  th e  E uropean  U n io n ’s international co -o p era tio n  edifice. A s a 
consequence it  is  very d ifficu lt to  estab lish  a  u n ique  in terpretation o f  the  tex t. In  th e  rem ainder o f  th is sec tion  
I  w ill follow cautiously  th e  interpretation  that the  m a jo r  purpose o f  the  above q u o ted  articles w as to  estab lish  
a  ‘d ifferent approach to  developm ent’. I  w ould  lik e  to  thank  P ro fessor Jacques Z il le r  fo r d irecting m y 
a tten tion  to th is question.
166 ‘Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on the 15th December 1989'; L uxem bourg : O ffice  for 




organizations in the framework o f decentralized co-operation, in particular where they 
combine the efforts and resources o f organizations from  LDCs and their counterparts from  
the Community,169. All parties from recipient countries and also from the Community are 
encouraged to put forward and implement initiatives that might contribute to the 
autonomous development o f LDCs.
Art. 8 o f the Council Decision further supports the initiatives o f LDC parties. These 
initiatives might respect the overall cooperation framework, guidelines and development 
methods adopted by the relevant authorities in LDCs.
The position o f  decentralized aid in the overall European development policy framework 
was enhanced through the introduction of decentralized cooperation provision in the 
different area programs. This is the case o f Art. 3 o f the Council Regulation no. 443/92 o f 
25 February 1992 in which it is stated that ’'the recipients o f  aid and partners in co­
operation may include not only states and regions, but decentralized authorities, regional 
organizations, public agencies, local traditional communities, private institutes and 
operators including co-operatives and non-governmental organizations.,17°.
As shown by the different documents quoted before, throughout the nineties decentralized 
co-operation has permeated different EU co-operation schemes, in particular EU programs 
in the Mediterranean and in the ALA countries (Asia and Latin America) Moreover, in 
1992 budget heading B7-5077 (Decentralized co-operation w ith the developing countries) 
was created within the context o f  the European Development Fund.
The variety o f  programs and legal and institutional frameworks has determined different 
modes o f  implementing decentralized aid schemes. According to the European 
Commission, three major ‘schools’ can be identified169 7071:
The first school, drawing upon the experience of European integration, sees decentralized 
cooperation as horizontal cooperation between sections of civil society in the Member 
States and third countries (local authorities, economic groups, higher education institutions,
169 Sec C ouncil D e c is io n  N o . 91/482/E E C  o f  25  Ju ly  1991 on  the  a sso c ia tio n  o f  th e  overseas countries an d  
territories w ith  th e  E u ro p ean  E conom ic C om m unity . A rt  7 . O ffic ia l Jou rnal L  263 ,19-9 -1991  pp. 0001-0153 .
170 C ouncil R eg u la tio n  (E E C ) N o . 443/92  o f  25  F e b ru a ry  1992 o n  financia l an d  technical assistance to , and  
econom ic co o p era tio n  w ith , th e  developing co u n tries  in  A sia and L a tin  A m erica . O fficial Journal L  0 5 2 , 27- 
02-1992 pp . 0 0 0 1 -0 0 0 6 .
171 See E u ro p ean  C o m m iss io n  1996 Communication (op. cit) p . 4
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etc.)* According to the same document, 'the instruments o f  decentralized cooperation 
developed in the Mediterranean (under the MED programmes), and more recently in Latin 
America aim mainly at the establishment o f closer and more balanced political, economic 
and cultural relations, based on either economic reciprocity or political or cultural 
nproximity", the latter being particularly relevant fo r  aspiring EU candidates.'m . This 
form of cooperation involves mainly cultural, economic, technological and scientific 
exchanges, with an element o f "democratic engineering", with countries which are 
generally at an intermediate development level or undergoing economic transition.
The second ‘school*, 'the participatory model o f decentralized cooperation'> finds its 
origins in more traditional conceptions o f development aid, i.e. oriented towards least 
developed countries and those undergoing démocratisation processes. Following the 
Commission’s argument, ‘It emphasizes the need to give civil society a voice and a role in 
the development process. In treating civil society as a principal - an agent, not ju s t a 
"beneficiary " o f  development -, decentralized cooperation calls into question both 
traditional development aid instruments and the relationship between civil society and the 
public authorities in developing countries' .
The third ‘school’ is defined in the document as the ‘surrogate model.'* 174. This model 
comes into play precisely in countries where, for various reasons, official cooperation has 
been suspended and aid is maintained only for priority needs and channelled by 
decentralized agencies.
All these three models can be found in the different co-operation schemes established by 
European legislation. They have been interpreted by the European Commission as an asset, 
but also as a constraint. On the one hand, diversity in the modes o f implementing EU co­
operation policy shows the capacity o f decentralized actors to adapt to a multiplicity of 
situations. Institutional constraints, the strength o f counterparts in LDCs and the availability 
o f resources limit partners’ capacity to establish decentralized co-operation schemes. Thus, 
the multiplicity o f forms in which aid is implemented reflects the capacity of decentralized 









On the other hand, diversity has been interpreted by the Commission as a limit to the future 
expansion o f decentralized aid. Variation between the three schools comes to the point o f  
referring to different notions o f decentralized aid. Common ground does not exist between 
these three schools, besides the fact that non-central governments are the relevant agents.
The EU has progressively pushed towards the establishment o f a clearer conceptualisation 
of decentralized aid, increasingly concentrated on the sponsorship o f the first and second 
schools’ type o f decentralized co-operation where the creation o f  partnership structures and 
participatory development are fundamental features.
The Cotonou Agreement, a substitute for the Lomé Convention system, contains innovative 
provisions to promote participatory approaches that ensure the involvement o f civil society 
and economic and social players. First, regional and local governments are included in the 
agreement at the same level as the State. Second, non-State actors are included in the new 
programming process leading to the establishment o f country strategies and sector priorities 
as well as being allowed to participate in the evaluation o f a country’s performance.
This new system seeks to provide a better institutional basis for the establishment o f  
partnership agreements among North and South societies. Yet, as the specialized literature 
in the field shows, it is still too early to evaluate the implementation of this new agenda175.
IV.3.4 Decentralized aid as a political practice
Decentralized aid as a political practice is a broad and complex phenomenon. It involves a 
number of different practices by rather distinct actors whose only common feature is not 
being part of the state administration. Part o f this complexity can be reduced by focusing on 
specific agents, such as the regions or local governments and applying the notion o f 
decentralized aid in a way which is reductive of complexity. Given the interests o f this 
dissertation I have followed this strategy, applying the concept only to regions’ 
international aid programs.
I7S F o r a  p re lim in a iy  assessm ent o f  non-S tate ac to rs  in  the  E U ’s d ev e lo p m en t p o licy  under C o tonou  see: Jean 
Bossuyt: ‘In vo lv ing  N on-S ta te  A ctors and  L ocal G overnm en ts in A C P -E U  d ia lo g u e ’ in Policy Management 
BriefSo. 13 D ecem b er 2000 . European C entre fo r  D evelopm ent P o licy  M an ag em en t 
h ttp ://w w w .onew orld .org
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Yet, understanding the rise of regional governments’ international aid polices as a political 
practice is not an easy task either. As we have seen in the previous sections, its origins are 
to be found at the juncture o f both the process of territorial politics restructuring and a 
major change in the political and normative agenda o f international development. This can 
be represented by figure 3.
As we have already seen, regional autonomy had undergone a process of major 
restructuring in Western Europe. Sub-state actors direct access to international markets and 
supranational fora affect the way in which we can understand regional autonomy. As we 
have seen in the previous sections, autonomy is a multidimensional process in which the 
processes o f supranational integration and economic globalisation operate both as enabling 
clauses and constraints for regional autonomy. In this context regions seek innovative ways 
to profit from the challenges posed by globalisation and supranational integration.
These major changes, as we have tried to show in previous sections, influenced the 
formation o f a new international agenda o f development. As we have seen, sub-state 
governments started to be perceived as important stakeholders o f development. What is 
more, they are regarded as promoting better development practices, as well as facilitating 
the development o f  democratic institutions.
As a result, EU development policy structure incorporated the international agenda o f 
decentralized aid creating an opportunity structure for European regions, local governments 
and organizations. As we have seen, this opportunity structure consist not only o f  funds, but 
also clearly structured programs for different areas of the world where non-state actors can 
participate, implementing the European Union’s agenda o f international cooperation..
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Figure 3: Decentralized aid as political practice
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Nevertheless, the analysis of the constituents of decentralized aid as a political practice tells 
us only part o f the story. It has to be complemented by a process-oriented analysis o f 
decentralized aid for development. As we have seen when analysing the distinction 
between causation and contention, explaining a region’s engagement in decentralized aid 
policies might require from us to tune our analytical instruments in a key which permits us
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to account for the process of policy making. Thus, the following sections are devoted to 
present a theoretical framework for the analysis of what I’ve called (not very originally 
though) the politics o f decentralized aid for development.
IV.4 The politics of decentralized aid: a procedural analysis of the origins of 
decentralized aid for development policies at the regional level
In this dissertation, as I have stated before, I intend to present a procedural approach to the 
origins of decentralized aid programs in European regions. As we have seen in the previous 
section, the origins o f decentralized aid as a political practice can be understood as the 
result of the interaction of two broad processes. First, a major process of territorial 
restructuring and second, a major process o f agenda restructuring in the realm o f 
development co-operation. As we have repeatedly claimed, the analysis of these processes 
has been the path undertaken by the literature on decentralized aid in order to explain the 
origins of such a political practice.
The procedural approach presented here tries to complement this vision of the origins o f 
decentralized aid by unfolding the patterns of interrelation among institutional and non- 
institutional actors underpinning regions* decisions on whether or not to engage in 
decentralized aid schemes.
This procedural approach aims at furthering the path recently embarked upon by the work 
of Antoine Vion and Emmanuel Négrier. Both authors regret the practical inexistence o f 
theoretical analysis in the literature o f decentralized aid. As they state, ‘L ’abondante 
littérature sur la coopération décentralisée reste une littérature grise dont la 
caractéristique majeure est de problêmatiser, pour la légitimer, une pratique d'échanges 
internationaux faisant intervenir des collectivités et associations locales, des ONG, des 
administrations centrales, groupes d'intérêts, entreprises, e tc '176. As they further argue 
within this body of literature, 7c chercheur, au mieux à dresser des typologies descriptives, 
au pire à dresser un inventaire à la Prévert faisant voyager le lecteur de Knokke-le-Zoute à 
Bandiagara en passant par des considérations sur le développement, la participation
1 ? f i  *
See Antoine V ion and  Em m anuel N egrié r 2 0 02 : ‘La cooperation décentralisée, un étage du jeu  
diplomatique’ C ontribution  à  l ’a te lie r  Les nouvelles formes de la diplomatie, C ongrès AFSP L ille , 21 
Septem bre 2002. p. 2
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démocratique, l'effondrement du cours du tabac, la constitution d'un fro n t anti­
globalisation, e tc .^11.
They try to develop an integrative theoretical model in which decentralized aid would be a 
stage within the new modes o f multilayered diplomacy. According to both authors, major 
changes in the practice o f  diplomacy brought by globalisation and supranational integration 
permit sub-state units to participate in broader co-operation schemes. Constituent unit's 
participation is rooted on processes o f mutual recognition among different institutional and 
non-institutional actors both in the north and in the south which change the face o f  agency 
in the international system17 78.
However, the problem with Négrier’s and Vion’s argument is that it is very much oriented 
to the analysis o f the French case. As they show, in the case o f  France, decentralized aid 
practices had been structured along state instruments o f international representation and co­
operation. This process o f policy structuring results in a system of interaction among 
different actors in which co-operative arrangements play a  major role. However, for the two 
cases later analysed in this dissertation, national governments did not offer any kind o f 
structure for the integration of incipient decentralized aid schemes. Rather, decentralized 
aid programs in both our cases arise in the midst of a  broad institutional conflict on sub­
state units’ capacity to act internationally.
My contention here is very simple. Given the multiplicity o f interactions involved in the 
definition o f decentralized aid schemes, it is very problematic a priori to understand 
decentralized aid only as a stage in a broader system o f diplomatic relations. Conversely, 
this dissertation tries to offer an overarching theoretical framework that permit us to asses 
the different modes o f  interaction that might lead to the establishment of decentralized aid 
policies. We may also structure our empirical evidence according to this framework.
Decentralized aid is presented as the result o f a major process o f  multilevel bargaining in 
which NGOs, regional institutions, the State and the HU play major roles. The bargaining 
process is divided in two major sub-processes: first, one o f demand structuring. As we will 
see in the following sections, NGOs structure political claims vis-à-vis regional institutions.
177 Idem.
178 See A n to in e  V io n  an d  E m m an u el N eg rié r  2002: ‘La cooperation décentralisée, un étage du jeu  
diplomatique’ (op. cit.) p p . 8 -15
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Yet, the process o f  demand structuring is one in which NGOs interact with other agents 
such as the European Union or the nation-state. This process results in the construction o f a 
specific case for decentralized aid. Second, there is a process of supply structuring. Regions 
engage in pro-active roles in the field o f  development aid, yet the nature of this process will 
be also dependent on the interaction o f regions with other institutional actors, such as the 
EU and the State as well as with NGOS and civil society actors operating in the territory.
This proposal for the study o f  regions’ engagement in decentralized aid can be summarized 
in the following figure:
Figure 4: Decentralized aid as a policy process
State —  European
Union
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Organizations in civil society operate within a complex milieu of political authority. 
Development NGOs act in front of national institutions; they also structure demands vis-à- 
vis supranational agencies. Finally they orient part o f their activities to lobby sub-state tiers 
of government. The milieu o f multiple authorities configures what the literature has defined 
as a multilayered opportunity structure.
The impact o f  multilayered opportunity structures on the process o f demand structuring is 
twofold. On the one hand, NGOs operating at the regional level learn from past bargaining 
experiences at different levels so they can better shape their instruments and strategies 
when dealing with different tiers o f government. That is, NGO experiences in different 
arenas assist them in the process o f structuring policy demands.
On the other hand, NGOs might employ the multilayered opportunity structure as a proper 
asset in the negotiation process. Firstly, NGOs might align at the discursive level with other 
institutional tiers discourse as a means of vesting their claims with a broader allure o f  
legitimacy. Constant references to the UN in NGOs* discourse would account for this use 
of intellectual alignment as an asset Second, NGOs might also establish an alliance with 
specific institutional tiers as a means o f reinforcing their bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
targeted institutional tiers. The existence of co-operation schemes between NGOs and 
supranational institutions might facilitate the construction o f a case for regional 
engagement in aid politics. Finally, NGOs might use the story o f past negotiations with 
other institutional tiers as a means of reinforcing their case. In the context of institutional 
conflict, NGOs might refer to past negative negotiation experiences at the state level as a 
way o f triggering the interest o f sub-state units in the development policy field.
At the same time, NGOs act as ‘moral entrepreneurs’. Their ability to influence politics is 
based on the use o f information, persuasion and moral pressure. A significant amount of 
social movements’ activities is directed at ''the creation, institutionalisation and monitoring 
o f norms' . According to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, movements help to create 
meanings through framing processes, that is, 'the strategic efforts by groups o f  people to 179
IV.4.1 Demand structuring and the politics of decentralized aid
179 See S an jeev  K hag ram , Jam es V. R ik e r and  K ath ryn  Sikkink: * Restructuring world politics : transnational 
social movements, networks, and norms' M inneapo lis: U niversity  o f  M inneso ta  P ress, 2002 p . 12
104
fashion shared understandings o f the world and o f themselves that legitimate and motivate 
collective action ’180.
The process o f framing might take place at different levels. On the one hand, NGOs are 
expected to talk about moral values, norms and principles. The discourse o f NGOs should 
be laden with references to widely accepted norms and values. References to values such as 
peace, solidarity, charity, equality and a more even redistribution of economic resources are 
constantly intermixed in the discourse o f  NGOs. Yet, NGOs are expected to combine these 
value references with widely accepted political declarations uttered at major international 
fora. This would be the case, for example, o f NGOS insistence on the need to reach the 
limit of 0,7% o f GDP as development aid expenditure.
On the other hand, NGOs’ claims might be structured along localized values, norms and 
practices. NGOS might make reference to problems which are very much familiar to the 
local community they are targeting, such as the integration o f  immigrants, and link it to the 
broader justification of international development assistance. Moreover, NGOS might refer 
to more generalizable values, such as the value of solidarity or charity, which nevertheless 
are defined in a local key.
Moral entrepreneurship and framing would normally tend to combine the internationalist 
patterns of justification for mobilization and political action, with local understandings of 
norms, values and practices in a process that leads to the territorialization o f demands and 
mobilization.
Finally, NGOs possess certain technical knowledge in the field. In the specific case of 
decentralized aid for development schemes, it can be argued that regional administrations 
are not very familiar with administering development aid programs whereas NGOs have 
lengthy experience as practitioners o f  development, placing them in a better position to 
negotiate specific policy outcomes. Thus, NGOs are key actors in the process o f structuring 
demands, but also might play a relevant role in the process o f reaching policy outcomes.
180 See: Doug M cA dam , John  D . M cC arthy, M ay e r N. Z ald  eds. 1996: ‘Comparative perspectives on social 
movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural fram ings' C am bridge: C am bridge  
U n iversity  Press, p . 6 . A ccording to  S ikkink et al. th is capacity fo r ‘fram ing ’ is  s im ila r to  w hat in  
In ternational R elations theory  has been  defined strategic social construction . See: Sanjeev K hagram , Jam es V . 
R ik e r  and K athryn S ikkink: ‘Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and 
norms' (op. cit.) p. 12
NGOs are key in the process o f structuring political demands vis-à-vis regional institutions. 
These demands will be constructed in a complex milieu of institutional relations. NGOs are 
sought to establish a general moral case on foreign aid at the regional level, profiting from 
previous experience o f specific bargaining processes both at the state level and the 
supranational level. Development NGOs operating at the regional level would control both 
the normative and the technical resources o f the policy.
IV.4.2 Supply structuring: institutions and the politics of decentralized aid
The process o f  supply structuring also takes place in a complex setting of both inter- 
institutional and institutions-organizations relations. Within these complex patterns o f 
relations, regions define policy schemes that reflect interactions with NGOs operating in 
the territory, but which are also restricted by multilevel processes of institutional political 
bargaining in which State institutions and the European Union play a major role. This 
section aims to identify a  set o f different roles for each of the institutional tiers involved in 
the definition o f  decentralized aid policies.
For the sake o f clarity, at this stage we regard the process o f demand structuring as constant 
even if, we will show in our empirical analysis how demand structuring and supply 
structure are mutually interdependent processes. Firstly, I will look at the different roles 
played by the State. State institutions are sought to act as a gatekeeper. Either they try to 
deter regions to engage in foreign aid policies or they try to co-ordinate regions’ efforts in 
broader national development schemes.
Secondly, I will look at the roles played by the EU. The EU is basically defined as 
providing an opportunity structure for regions to engage in decentralized aid policies. Yet, 
the EU is regarded as holding specific policy preferences in the field of development that 
determine the nature of a region’s engagement in European decentralized aid schemes. The 
EU thus has direct influence on the design o f the policy outcome at regional level.
Finally, I look at the regions, as both the target o f NGOs’ demands and as the key suppliers 
for decentralized aid schemes. Regions’ roles are primary reactive to political demands. 
They have to face NGOs’ demands and integrate them into a policy scheme. Regions then 
proceed in a creative manner, since they have to structure demands in the broader system of
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constraints and opportunities defined by both the State and the EU. Here regions might 
proceed following diverse political strategies depending on the nature of their interactions 
with the State and the EU. Let us see this process in more detail.
1V.4.2.1 Decentralized aid and State’s policy resources
It can be said that at the level o f policy definition, the state controls two key resources: the 
allocation o f competencies among different tiers o f government, and the formation of a 
national strategy for international development co-operation.
The State’s institutional architecture and policies affects the domestic opportunity structure 
for a region’s mobilization abroad. The principle o f  distribution of competencies might 
guarantee constituent units the capacity to act internationally in those matters related to the 
sub-state units’ sphere o f government. What is more, the Constitution might recognize the 
right of federated units to participate in the formation o f foreign policy decisions. This 
institutional structure ensures opportunities for co-ordination between the State level and 
constituent units' policies, as well as permitting regions to act autonomously. Conversely, 
at the other extreme o f the continuum, the state might retain the capacity to act 
internationally. Sub-state tiers are sought to act within their sphere of competences, which 
is defined only in terms of domestic politics. In this context, sub-state projection abroad 
would be severely scrutinized by State institutions, which would try to limit regions’ 
international activities.
The State’s development aid policies might encourage sub-state tiers of government to 
participate, as is the case in federal polities such as Germany and Austria. As we have seen 
before, this may also be the case in countries that are not federal polities, such as France. 
Conversely, the State might define its international development co-operation policy in 
strict state-to-state terms, not allowing sub-state units’ participation or establishing tight 
legal frameworks for the development o f sub-state units’ development policy.
The interaction of these two major resources defines four different strategies. They can be 
represented in the following figure:
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Figure 5: State’s resources and strategies.
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Each o f the four regions defined by the intersection o f these two axes determines a policy 
strategy vis-à-vis regions* attempts to engage in decentralized aid schemes. In the N orth- 
West comer, the state would permit the regions to participate in international development 
schemes. However, they would tend to supervise regions* international activities to ensure 
that the State’s rights to act internationally are not affected by regions’ activities in the field 
of international aid. In the North-East comer, the State plays the role o f the gatekeeper. 
Regions are not part o f the broad design o f  international co-operation schemes and they are 
not entitled to act internationally. Thus, in the event o f a regional attempt to form proper 
international co-operation schemes, the State would try to oppose or at least to impose 
severe burdens and controls on the region’s movements. The South-West comer opens the 
way for soft co-ordination strategies. Here the State might leave room to regions to act 
autonomously within the realm of international co-operation and develop their own 
schemes. Soft-coordination might aim to ensure policy effectiveness, but would not 
establish a hierarchical relation among the State and the regions. Finally, the South-East
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comer defines a situation in which regions would act autonomously but the State will not 
integrate region’s international co-operation schemes into broader national policy schemes. 
The State would remain in a rather passive position neither aiming to co-ordinate policy 
initiatives nor exerting controls on regions’ international activities.
Nevertheless, the State’s position vis-à-vis regions’ engagement in decentralized aid 
policies should not be taken as a static feature. States might learn from experience and 
evolve from restrictive to more open-minded positions regarding a region’s decentralized 
aid schemes. Firstly, a State might alter the structure of its international aid system to 
include the participation of sub-state governments, or to co-ordinate already existing policy 
initiatives at the regional level in broader national programs. Secondly, states might 
redefine the entitlement to act internationally. These reforms are much more traumatic 
since they normally involve constitutional reform, or at least the participation of the 
Constitutional Court as the main interpreter of the Constitution, thus requiring extra 
resources. Normally, in the event of a broad questioning of the State’s entitlement to be the 
sole actor with capacity to go abroad, and after a period of institutional struggle, the State 
might recognize de facto  institutional practices on the part o f  sub-state units, rather than 
engaging in a process of constitutional reform or taking a case to the Constitutional Court.
IV.4.2.2 The European Union
As we have already seen, the EU has created its own international aid for development 
polices in which decentralized aid plays an important role. The EU has created a number of 
programs in which European regions are invited to participate. These programs make funds 
available and encourage the establishment o f partnership agreements between regions in the 
north and in the south.
Participation in broader European initiatives and programs in the development co-operation 
sphere might be perceived by regions as an easier way to ensuring the establishment o f a 
decentralized aid system at regional level. First, European programs provide a solution for 
the problem of economic resources. Regions might lack the necessary funds to develop a 
decentralized aid system. Yet, European programs might ensure that regions have enough 
resources to satisfy NGO demands.
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Second, participation in European co-operation initiatives might be an indirect way o f 
overcoming the State’s controls on a regions’ involvement abroad. Regions might see the 
European Union programs a way of engaging in international aid policies without directly 
questioning the State’s dominant position either in international politics or in the field o f 
international co-operation.
Yet, regions’ participation in European decentralized aid schemes comes at a price since it 
forces regions to adapt their policies to European Union priorities in the field o f 
development and international policy. An example o f this might be the EU changing its 
policy emphasis on distinct geographical areas, according to the needs established by the 
European and international political agenda.
Furthermore, regions are normally forced to comply with policy styles and procedures 
which might impose a burden on their autonomy and their capacity to define their own co­
operation schemes. For instance, EU emphasis on monitoring, or the need to integrate 
NGOs and institutions in broad partnership schemes, would limit a regions’ capacity to 
define their development aid schemes in a different way.
Therefore, the European Union’s influence in  the definition o f  the policy outcome might be 
perceived as a function o f a region’s need for institutional support to satisfy NGO demands. 
Thus, the more regions manage to territorialize the policy outcome, the less the European 
Union’s policy would have an impact on the policy outcome.
IV.4.2.3 Regions as international development co-operation policy providers. Why 
do regions engage in foreign aid?
We have already seen how a regions capacity to engage in foreign aid policies is 
constrained by its position vis-à-vis both the demand structuring process and the other 
actors* strategies affecting the supply structuring process. Firstly, regions are constrained 
by the way in which NGOs structure their demands. Secondly, the State’s position 
regarding international politics and development co-operation affects the way in which 
regions might define their own decentralized aid programs. Finally, regions have the chance 
to profit from the opportunities offered by  the European system of international co­
operation. In this context of constraints and opportunities, regions might engage in foreign
A
aid policies for a number o f motives. This dissertation contends that these motives are 
related to the capacity of regional governments to link NGOs’ claims to broader elements 
o f the regional political agenda.
As we have already seen, Michael Keating distinguished a number of economic, political 
and cultural reasons for which regions might engage in international politics. This 
dissertation contends that, in the specific realm of decentralized aid, the link is to be 
established between the nature of NGO demands and the regional domestic political 
agenda.
NGO demands in the realm o f development assistance are structured along normative 
values and principles. This process o f  framing demands entails the integration o f  a 
generalist moral case on the necessity o f  aid with communitarian values and practices or 
with pressing issues in the domestic agenda, such as immigration. Aid policy is thus 
perceived as implementing demands rooted in superior moral values or pressing agenda 
concerns.
At the same time, as we have previously seen, regional governments face increasing 
pressure to develop innovative ways o f approaching the international political arena. This 
entails a process of political recognition on the part of other actors involved at international 
level..
The argument here could be summarized as follows: In the event o f social demands fo r  
decentralized aid explicitly addressing the regional level, regional governments would 
*instrumentalise ’ the symbolic value o f  decentralized aid politics to serve issues in the 
domestic political agenda, which increasingly require the region’s international projection 
and recognition.
Firstly, decentralized aid could fulfil a number o f functions that might be connected with a 
broad process of identity construction. Regions* engagement in decentralized aid can be 
linked to wider processes of communitarian identity formation. Decentralized aid might 
help to build up the community inside regional borders by establishing ties with other 
communities in the developing world, or by reinforcing the links with members of the 
community living abroad (the diaspora).
I l l
Secondly, it can be also said that regions engage in decentralised aid programs as a means 
of reinforcing their presence in the international arena or in specific institutional settings, 
such as the EU. This process might lead to the foundation o f  a  regional institutional profile 
at international level.
Thirdly, decentralized aid might help the regions to gain saliency in institutional 
competitive environments, where the distribution o f competencies is not clearly defined or 
at least is contested by one or many o f the actors involved. Success in developing their own 
international aid schemes gives regions new space to project their autonomy vis-à-vis State 
institutions. These gained spaces might be very important in the context o f state-regions 
conflict on the nature of the division o f power. The argument o f this dissertation may be 
represented in the following figure:
Figure 6: Domestic political agenda and  NGOs* demands.
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Finally, it should be noted that this process is by no means automatic. Specific 
configurations o f the domestic political agenda and the demands put forward by NGOs are 
also dependent on the structure o f  agents within the limits of the regional political system.
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Issues o f the political agenda are channelled not only through the activities of regional 
institutions, but also through the activities of actors intimately related to the everyday life 
of regional political system, such as parties or bureaucracies. At this point o f the analysis, 
for the sake of clarity, we must talk about the region in institutional terms. Moreover, we 
have taken the region as a unitary actor focusing on the motivations o f the regional 
government to engage in decentralized aid programs. Yet, I acknowledge that, given the 
diversity o f actors involved in regional politics, we cannot confine ourselves to institutional 
actors or to the analysis of the role o f  institutions on the process o f agenda accommodation 
presented above.
For instance, the structure of the coalition in government might determine which issues o f 
the domestic political agenda are given preference and how are they mobilized in the 
creation o f a decentralized aid program. In this case, whereas the final policy outcome can 
be interpreted as part of the implementation o f the regional government’s political program, 
it is seems relevant to keep in mind the subtleties of inter-party accommodation within the 
governing coalition.
Nevertheless, given the limitations imposed by the scarcity o f theoretical explanations on 
the origins of decentralized aid programs, we cannot offer a better theoretical assessment o f 
the impact that the structure o f  agents within the regional political system might have on 
the configuration o f  decentralized aid programs. I believe that through an analysis o f  the 
two case studies presented here, we will be able to put forward empirical evidence that 
might help us in the task of theorising the politics of decentralized aid and the impact o f 
actors operating within the institutions’ black box.
The empirical part o f  this dissertation will try to explore at length the validity o f the 
theoretical argument sketched so far, through the comparative analysis of two cases, the 
Basque Country and Tuscany. Yet, before presenting our empirical evidence, we will 
briefly present some considerations on a number of methodological decisions, such as the 
selection o f a case-oriented approach, the case selection criteria and the specific methods o f 





This dissertation presents a comparative case-study approach to the analysis of the origins 
of decentralised aid for development. As stated by a number of scholars, case-study 
analysis is a widely used strategy in social research, yet it is one that traditionally has been 
accused o f  lacking methodological and conceptual rigour181 18234.
Firstly, case-oriented strategies are criticized for overstressing the uniqueness of the case 
rather than attempting to construct valid generalizable statements. Kitschelt has argued that 
case-oriented research must end up revolving ‘around descriptive diachronic 
reconstructions o f  individual cases with very little systematic comparison * and presenting 
such a complex narrative of causality that the only possible generalizable conclusion is that 
our case study represents an «reproducible rara avis .
Secondly, case studies had been accused of a lack o f  methodological rigour: ‘too many 
times, the case study investigator has been sloppy and has allowed equivocal evidence or 
biased views to influence the direction o f the findings and the conclusions' . Yet, as 
Charles C. Raging points out, comparative case-oriented investigation is ‘often both 
historically interpretive and causally analytic'1*4.That is, case-oriented comparative 
analysis not only serves the case o f theory validation and the historical account o f specific 
phenomena, but also might be an important device in establishing generalizations 
concerning the causes of theoretically defined categories o f empirical phenomena common 
to a set of cases.
The following sections would explore the nature of case-oriented comparative analysis. As 
it is argued, case-oriented comparison rather than variable oriented comparison is selected
181 See H arry E ckstein: ‘C ase-study an d  T heory  in  Political Science’ in  F. G reenste in  and N . P olsby  (eds) 
1975: ‘Handbook o f Political Science Vol. 7'. R ead ing , Mass.: A dd ison  W esley  Publishers pp. 79-81; C harles 
C. R agin  1987: ‘The Comparative Method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies' Berkley: 
U niversity  o f  C aliforn ia  P ress Ch. 3 an d  m ore specifically  p. 34; R o b ert K . Y in  1994: ‘Case-Study research' 
L ondon: Sage pp. 9-11.
182 See H erbert K itschelt: ‘Political reg im e change: Structure and p rocess-d riven  exp lanations’ American 
Political Science Review V ol. 86 No. 4  D ecem ber 1992. p. 1028
183 See R obert K. Y in 1994: ‘Case-Study research ’ (op. cit.) p. 9.
184 See C harles C. R agin  1987: ‘The Comparative Method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative 
strategies' (op. cit.) p. 35.
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as the method of analysis for this dissertation. We then proceed by defining the level o f 
analysis and the criteria followed for the selection of cases.
V.2 The logic of comparative analysis: variable-oriented vs. case-oriented 
comparisons
In an article published in 1991, David Collier claimed that 'the idea that comparison is a 
“good thing ” is built into our intuitive sense o f  how we understand the world’1*5. As he 
further argues, ‘comparison sharpens our powers fo r  description and can be an invaluable 
stimulus to concept formation’185 I86. Yet, within the subfield o f comparative politics a  lively 
debate concerned with the techniques o f  comparison has been taking place ever since, in 
the lead article o f the first issue o f the journal Comparative Politics in 1968, Harold D. 
Lasswell argued that comparative method is so central to good analysis that the scientific 
method is unavoidably comparative187 18.
Part o f the debate on the comparative method has been related to the distinction between 
case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches. To put it roughly, comparative case- 
oriented approaches look at cases as wholes, providing contextualized analysis o f  the 
political phenomena, whereas variable-oriented comparisons disaggregate cases into 
variables which are later compared as predictors o f the scores o f  dependent variables.
A variable-oriented approach has been defended by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune. 
They suggest that the real distinction between the assumption that observations o f  social 
reality are relative to particular social units and the one disregarding social relativism is that 
‘social units are treated as predictors in the same manner as variables are used as 
predictors in general theories’1**. In their view, the role of the social sciences is that of 
substituting the names of social systems by variables. The underlying logic o f comparative 
analysis, according to Przeworski and Teune, is stated clearly in the following passage: 
*Social phenomena are not only diverse but always occur in mutually interdependent and
185 See D av id  C o llie r  ‘T he C om parative M ethod : T w o  D ecades o f  C hange’ in  D ankw art A . R ustow  an d  
K enneth P au l E rickson  (eds) 1991: 'Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Perspectives on Research7 N ew  
York: H arp e r C ollins p . 7
186 Idem.
187 H arold  D  L assw ell, ‘T he  fu ture o f  the  C o m p ara tiv e  M e th o d ’ Comparative Politics 1. N o. 1 O ctober 1968, 
quoted in D av id  C o llie r {op. cit) p. 7.
188 See A d am  P rzew orsk i an d  H enry T eune 1970: ‘The logic o f comparative social inquiry’ N ew  Y ork: 
W iley-In terscience p . 8
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interacting structures possessing a spaciotemporal location. I f  stable these patterns o f  
interaction can be treated as systems [...] Systems with which we ordinarily deal are 
organized in terms o f several levels o f  components and the interactions within these 
systems are not limited to any particular level but cut across levels.[...] I f  social 
phenomena are treated as components o f  systems, two major implications follow. The firs t 
is that the behaviour o f any component o f  a system is determined by factors intrinsic to the 
system and is relatively isolated from  influences outside o f  the system. The fa c t that 
behaviour takes place within a relatively isolated context may mean that a certain 
proportion o f the explanation may be found  among factors extrinsic to all systems and a 
certain proportion may be found among factors that are intrinsic to particular systems and 
not generalizable across systems. [...] Our proposition is that characteristics o f  the 
particular systems can be expressed as variables, and as such would be applicable across 
the systems. In fact, whenever there is a system specific factor that seems to be necessary 
fo r  explanation, the conclusion should not be that systems are unique but rather that it is 
necessary to identify some general factors so fa r  not considered?1**.
Przeworski and Teune’s logic o f social comparative research is operationalized in two 
different research designs: the most similar systems research vs. the most different systems 
research design. The ‘most similar systems* design would be rooted in the belief that 
‘systems as sim ilar as possible with respect to as many features as possible constitute the 
optimal samples fo r  comparative inquiry*189 90. As they further argue ‘common systemic 
characteristics are conceived as "controlled fo r ”, whereas intersystemic differences are 
viewed as explanatory variables*191. Yet according to Przeworski and Teune, the most 
similar systems may present problems o f  overdetermination, in that this design will fail to 
eliminate many rival explanations, leaving the researcher with no criteria to choose among 
them. Thus they proposed the ‘most different systems’ design, which ‘takes as a starting 
po in t the variation o f  the observed behaviour at a level lower than that o f the systems. M ost
189 See Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune 1970: lThe logic o f comparative social inquiry' (op. cit.) pp. 12- 
13
190 See Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune 1970: '‘The logic o f comparative social inquiry* (op. cit.) p. 32.
191 See Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune 1970: 'The logic o f comparative social inquiry' (op. cit.) p. 33.
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often this will be the level o f the individual actors, but it can be the level o f  groups, local
1Q7communities, social classes or occupations* .
Nevertheless, the logic of Przeworski’s and Teune’s most different systems research design 
was severely criticized by Arendt Lijphart in 1975. Lijphart claimed that Przeworski’s and 
Teune’s ‘most different systems’ design should fall on a different methodological stance 
than that of the comparative method192 93. Following Lafferty, Lijphart stresses that it *is not 
clear why this design is labelled most different systems, since its overriding purpose is to 
explain away system-level variables as either irrelevant or residual ’194. Lijphart proposed 
the comparable-case strategy as a kind of most different systems design in which 'the  
cases are selected in such a way as to maximise the variance o f  the independent variables 
and to minimize the variance o f  the control variables' 195.
As Dietrich Rueschemeyer has pointed out, the above mentioned discussion on the nature 
of the most different cases approach is very much embedded in the vocabulary and 
scientific goals o f systems theory196. As David Collier further claims, since the seventies a 
growing interests in interpretive social sciences, concerned with deciphering the meaning o f  
behaviour and institutions, has strengthened the justification for ‘advancing cautiously’. 
“Thick descriptions”, concerned with revealing the underlying meaning of political 
phenomena and with seeing how this meaning is rooted in particular contexts, became more 
and more common in the practice of social sciences, leading to an emphasis on richly 
contextualized small-N comparative-oriented research designs that might account for 
complex problems of “conjunctural causation”197.
192 See A d a m  P rzew orsk i and  H enry T eu n e  1970: 'The logic o f comparative social inquiry’ (op. cit.) p . 34 .
193 See A re n d t L ijphart: ‘T h e  C om parable-C ases stra tegy  in  C om parative  R esea rch ’ Comparative Political 
Studies V o l. 8. N o. 2 Ju ly  1975 p. 164.
194 See A ren d t L ijphart: ‘T he  C om parable-C ases s tra teg y  in  C om parative R esearch* (op. cit.) p . 165.
195 See A ren d t L ijphart: ‘T h e  C om parable-C ases s tra teg y  in  C om parative R esea rch ’ (op. cit.) p . 164.
196 S ee D ie tr ic h  R ueschem eyer: ‘C an O n e  o r  F ew  C ases  Y ie ld  T heore tical G a in s? ’ in  Jam es M ahoney  an d  
D ietrich  R u esch em ey er (ed s) (2003): ‘Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences ’ C am bridge: 
C am bridge U n iversity  P re ss  p . 320.
197 See D a v id  C o llie r  ‘T h e  C om parative M ethod: T w o  D ecades o f  Change* (op. cit.) pp. 14-15
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In this vein, Charles C. Raging has argued that the logic o f analysis of variable-oriented 
comparisons, as is the case o f Przeworski’s and Teune’s Logic o f Comparative Social 
Inquiry, ‘disembodies and obscures ca ses'19*. As he further states, ‘in most variable 
oriented work, investigators begin by defining the problem in a way that allows the 
examination o f many cases (conceived as empirical units o f observation); then they specify 
the relevant variables, matched to theoretical concepts; and fina lly  they collect information 
on these variables, usually one variable a t a time, not one case a t a time. From that poin t 
on the language o f  variables and the relations among them dominate the research
,199process .
According to Ragin, the alternative case-oriented approach places cases, not variables, at 
the centre. Case-oriented methods force the investigators to consider their cases as whole 
entities, not as a collection o f variables. iAn interest in pin-pointing the combinations o f  
conditions, the causal complexes, that produce specific outcomes encourages investigators 
to view cases as wholes'198 200.
Cases are considered together as composing a single situation. Furthermore, according to 
Ragin, case-oriented approaches stimulate a rich dialogue between ideas and evidence. 
Because these methods are flexible in their approach to evidence, they do not force the 
investigator to view causal conditions as opponents in the struggle to explain variation. 
Rather they provide a basis for examining how conditions combine in different contexts to 
produce different outcomes201.
This dissertation embraces a comparative case-oriented approach. The reason for that is 
very simple. Case-studies have proven extremely suitable in the process of developing new 
theoretical ideas and generating hypotheses202. This dissertation aims to bridge a gap in the 
literature of decentralized aid for development, that o f analysing the origins o f regional
198 See Charles C. Ragin: ‘Introduction: Cases of “What is a Case”’ in Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. 
Becker (eds) 1992: ‘ What is a Case? Exploring the foundations o f social inquiry ’ Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 4.
199 See Charles C. Ragin: ‘Introduction: Cases of “What is a Case’” (op. cit.) p. 5.
200 See Charles C. Ragin 1987: '‘The Comparative Method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative 
strategies’ (op. cit.) p. 52
201 Idem.
202 From Eckstein to Rucschemeyer, scholars have accepted the capacity of case studies to generate 
hypotheses. Yet, they contend with the * conventional methodological wisdom’ that the function o f case-study 
analysis should not be reduced to that o f generating hypotheses.
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decentralized aid programs. In doing so, this dissertation brings together insights from two 
major realms: first, the literature on foreign aid and international relations and second, the 
literature on the so-called ‘New Regionalism’ and the international activities of constituents 
units. Yet this operation must be implemented carefully.
In this context o f  a lack of thick theoretical propositions and the cross-fertilization among 
different research realms, case-oriented comparison seem to be the most appropriate 
instrument, precisely because through the combination o f  induction and deduction it 
facilitates the exchange between theory and empirical evidence. As Dietrich Rueschemeyer 
claims, comparative case-oriented analysis can be very rewarding in the process o f building 
substantive theoretical c l a im s 203.
However, as we have said in the introduction, the capacity o f case-oriented comparisons to 
yield sound basis for the analysis o f complex causal patterns with small-N o f cases, might 
come at the cost of parsimony and consistency between evidence and theory and the 
possibility of building a controlled comparison o f the cases. The reasons for this, as we 
explained before, are obvious. Case-oriented approach requires going back and forth from 
ideas to evidence and at certain point, narratives might overflow the limits imposed by 
theory. My contention is that this problem is satisfactory counterbalanced by the theoretical 
gains that a case-oriented comparison might yield. Therefore, given the constraints faced by 
this dissertation, case-oriented comparison, seems to me the most suitable strategy to 
conduct this research.
Anyway, following a comparative case-oriented strategy gives rise to a number of 
questions. First, we still have to decide how we define a case in the context o f this 
dissertation, which cases might be analysed, and why. Then we should think about the 
possibilities for generalizable causal statements. The following sections are devoted to 
resolving these questions.
203 See Dietrich Rueschemeyer. ‘Can One or Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?’ {op, cit.) p.307
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The basic aim o f this dissertation is to discover why regions decided to engage in 
decentralized aid politics. As result o f the our theoretical analysis o f the question we have 
proposed a procedural view as the most suitable approach to uncover the complexities o f a 
region’s engagement in foreign aid polices In this process, a number of agents such as 
NGOs, the European Union, State institutions and regional institutions are supposed to 
have an impact on the final outcome.
At the same time, decentralized aid is understood as having specific territorial implications 
(i.e. up to this moment we have talked about the Basque Country’s decentralized aid policy 
or Tuscany’s decentralized aid policy). Moreover, as we have claimed before, it is precisely 
the territorial implications of the policy outcome (the impact o f  a territorially bounded 
political agenda in a broader multilevel process of decision making) that informs the 
research question o f  this dissertation.
Therefore, the question arises as to how can we conceptualise our units of observation 
(cases) to account for the interaction o f  these dimensions, without discarding one of the 
dimensions of analysis? My contention here is that a definition o f  both the region and the 
regional level can be useful in identifying our units o f observation and therefore how are 
we to constitute our cases.
V.3 Can the region be a comparable unit of analysis?
V.3.1 Diversity, interdependence and the contested nature of the region as a unit of 
analysis
Identifying our unit o f  analysis is not such an easy task. Intuitively we can agree that, 
despite the alleged impact of exogenous agents, this dissertation focuses on the realm o f 
regional politics. Yet, using the region as the level of analysis poses certain problems that 
tend to be ignored by scholars dealing with other analytical levels such as individuals or the 
State. To put it bluntly, the problem is that the region is not an evident unit o f analysis, 
since it can be argued that it is too diverse and it is not integrated by independent units.
Critics of the notion o f region had traditionally pointed out that this term covers wide and 
diverse social realities, which to some extent are hardly comparable. Their remarks point to 
the comparability of, for example, a German Länder and an ordinary region in Italy or a
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French département. They assume that given the diversity of socio-economic structures and 
political autonomy in European regions, it is very difficult to cast regions alongside each 
other as i f  they conespond to a single level of analysis.
Patrick Le Gales and Christian Lequesne have argued that despite the prospects fifteen 
years ago, regions do not constitute a homogeneous level o f government in Europe. 
According to them, the term region is a ‘blanket term which refers to different realities 
according to country and historical diversity'1®*.
Similarly, regions as an institutional actor are perceived in permanent relation to other 
levels o f  government. Regions are part o f the broad design o f vertical distribution o f power 
within the State. Regions are seen as occupying a subordinate position vis-à-vis the State. 
Patrick Le Galès has defined this relationship almost in terms o f a zero sum struggle for 
political power. The lack of independency affects the way in which we might look at the 
region as a level o f analysis. As he further insists, ‘nation-states reorganize according to 
logics which seem more comparable even though their capacities vary considerably’205.
At a methodological level, Patrick Le Galès* framework o f analysis has important 
implications. First, neglecting the existence o f a regional level of analysis implies that 
regional politics are seen as part of broader analytical construct: for instance, as part o f 
process o f multilevel political bargaining, or embedded into the broader framework o f 
centre-periphery relations.
The notion o f level o f analysis is thus contested, at least in the realm of regional politics 
and substituted by governance structures in which regions are merely an actor. Second, the 
possibility to engage in region to region comparisons is also questioned. Regions, 
according to Le Galès, are too diverse on the basis a number of socio-political and *20
204 See Patrick Le Galès: ‘Conclusion: Government and Governance of Regions: Structural weaknesses and 
new mobilizations’ in Patrick Le Galès and Christian Lequesne (eds.) 1998: ‘Regions in Europe1 London: 
Routledge p. 248. It is worth noting that the French version of the same book published a year earlier seems to 
be more openly critical of the notion of region, beginning with its title 'Les paradoxes des régions en 
Europe’.
20i See Patrick Le Galès: ‘Conclusion: Government and Governance of Regions: Structural weaknesses and 
new mobilizations’ {op. cit.) p. 251. This declaration is by no means surprising. The State has been 
traditionally understood as “the level of analysis”, as a self-evident unit of analysis. As R.B.J Walker states, 
the I.R. theory’s consensus on the Westphalian system of states introduced implicitly the State as an 
independent unit of analysis, and to some extent as the sole unit of analysis in I.R. Theory. See RB J .  Walker, 
1993: "Inside-outside: international relations as political theory Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
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economic characteristics. He even comes to the point o f neglecting the possibility of using 
the word region as a catch-all word for referring to distinct constituent units. As a matter o f 
fact, given the diversified nature o f the regional level within Europe, it is veiy difficult to 
establish a common ground that permits effective cross-national comparisons between 
regions.
Yet, one can argue the existence of the region is implicitly acknowledged in Le Gales’ 
argument.206. Patrick Le Galés basically structures his claims along the diversity showed by 
regions according to a set of indicators. These might include economic performance, 
constitutionally guaranteed political autonomy, institutional structure, etc. At this point the 
wide diversity of European regions is clearly evident. Yet, it can be argued that the fact that 
all these indicators can be collected and compared presupposes the existence of entities that 
are somehow comparable. Regions, as is also the case for States, do not perform in the 
same way. One could equally argue whether the United States o f America can be compared 
to, let’s say, Togo or Liechtenstein. Acknowledging diversity in the characteristics shown 
by our units of analysis should not entail denying the existence o f the category itself. On 
the contrary the way in which we construct our categories must be very much aware of this 
diversity and therefore must provide the elements to reconcile it in broader theoretical 
constructs.
Nevertheless, the constructed nature of the notion of region as a scientific category can be 
employed as an argument against the possibility of comparative analysis o f regions. 
Regions as social categories are sought as the unrepeatable construction o f those looking at 
them. The constructed nature o f  social categories, understood in this radical way, cast 
doubts on the possibility of achieving a generalizable notion of region, beyond the limits 
imposed by the lens o f the single social scientist looking at it. Let us tackle the 
constructionists’ argument in more detail.
206 This is a phenomenological approach to the notion o f Region. Yet, precisely because it points to the 
existence of some essences behind the measurement o f certain characteristics, it is rather incomplete and 
requires further analysis o f the major features of the region.
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According to Allen, Massey and Cochrane, the manner o f conceptualising the region is 
intimately bound up with the wider debate about the conceptualisation of space and place. 
According to these authors the notion o f region might be captured by two principles. First, 
it embodies a strongly relational approach to thinking about space and place. It understands 
both space and place as constituted out o f spatialized social relations -and narratives about 
them- which not only lay down ever-new regional geographies, but also work to reshape 
social and cultural identities and how are they represented. Second, it acknowledges that 
such studies are always done for a purpose, with a  specific aim in view. Whether 
theoretical, political, cultural or whatever, there is always a  specific focus. One cannot 
study everything, and there are always multiple ways o f seeing a place: there is no complete 
‘portrait o f the region’. Moreover, ‘regions’ only exist in relation to particular criteria. They 
are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; they are our (and others’) construction207.
Put simply, as they further argue, regions are not given to us; they come with a particular 
set of economic and social legacies and a particular geography, thus setting, in a very real 
sense, the context for how can we re-imagine the region and its relations to other actors.
Spaces/places are constructed both materially and discursively, and each modality o f this 
construction affects the other. Moreover, every place or region ‘arrives’ at the present 
moment trailing long histories: histories o f economics and politics, of gender, class and 
ethnicity; and histories too of the many different stories which have been told about these. 
The complex ways in which a region is constructed and read at any time is the result o f 
these histories and o f  what is made of them208.
As a result, bounded regions/places cannot be taken as given to the analysis. Rather, they 
should be questioned in the process o f casting adequate definitions to our object o f  study. 
As Allen et a l puts it, *it is impossible to take existing bounded regions/places as simply 
given to the analysis. This is not to say that such boundaries w ill never adequately define a
V.3.2 The region as a constructed unit of analysis
207 Sec John Allen, Doreen Massey and Allan Cochrane 1998: * Rethinking the Region* London: Routledge 
PP-1-2.
~08 See John Allen, Doreen Massey and Allan Cochrane 1998: ‘Rethinking the Region' (op. cit.) p. 9.
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region, nor that they can be assumed not to be important; rather is merely to stress that 
they should never be taken unquestioningly as adequate definitions'209.
Categorization and classification through concepts and definitions are means o f 
constructing the social reality. Categories are the cognitive lens through which we might 
connect the level o f  epistemology with the level of ontology. As Friedrich Kratochwil has 
argued, epistem ological and ontological levels might not be that independent o f each 
other, but are probably *tightly linked through the mediating lens o f  the 
linguistic/conceptual structure* o f  the discourse in afield*210.
The notion o f region as a scientific category is determined by a set of shared 
representations of what a region is in the specific linguistic domain o f the field, that goes 
far beyond the limits o f  the story aimed at being told. Thus, in a sense the object of our 
theoretical inquiry is not a ‘thing* in the world but a more or less coherent combination o f 
different ways of seeing places and space.
Moreover, shared representations of what a region is determine our ways o f approaching 
the region and the analysis o f regional politics. As Kratochwil further argues, ‘social 
objects are not simply describable in terms o f purely observational categories or 
measurement procedures. Rather their description must make reference to the shared 
representations underlying the actions o f  actors*211 21.
The analysis of an specific issue of regional politics entails the existence of shared 
representations of what a region is, which help us to classify disperse reality into broader 
linguistic/conceptual structures. W.V. Quine puts it in the following terms: ‘Recursion is
209 See John Allen, Doreen Massey and Allan Cochrane 1998: ‘Rethinking the Region '  (op. a t.) p.137.
" ,0 See Friedrich Kratochwil: ‘Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of the International 
Politics’ and the Constructivist Challenge’ Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1,2000 
73-
_11 See Friedrich Kratochwil: ‘Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of the International 
Politics’ and the Constructivist Challenge’ (op. cit.) p.74. The problems of defining the object o f study in the 
social sciences can be redirected to the problem of the independence o f the language of science. Giovanni 
Sartori argues that the object of study o f political sciences is in primis the language of practical politics. At 
this point, the question arises as to what extent the language o f political sciences can be different to that of 
politics. See Giovanni Sartori 1980: ‘La politico: Logica eMetodo in Scienze Sociale' Milano: SugarCo 
edizione pp, 44-45.
212 A recursive definition according to the Oxford Companion to Philosophy would be the one that proceeds 
by fir s t specifying a special subclass o f the item it applies to in terms o f a relation which any such item bears 
to an item to which the expression already applies. Thus the term ancestor may be defined recursively as 
fo llow s: (1) Both o f a person's parents are ancestors o f that person; (2) any parent o f an ancestor o f a
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vital to one’s command o f language [in this case the language o f regional politics]. There 
are countless sentences, never y e t uttered, that we stand ready to utter i f  occasion arises, 
and countless sentences as yet unheard that we would understand i f  we heard them; and the  
key to this infinite store is recursion'213 214.
At the same time, our analysis o f specific issues in regional politics contributes to the 
creation o f new narratives on what the region and regional politics are all about. The 
construction o f  the region as a scientific category seems to be a function of the very process 
of social construction o f the region as a  social category, and the mediating effects o f  the 
language o f different scientific domains in which regions become an object o f  study.
Claiming the constructedness o f categories does not imply that we should not define it 
properly, or make an explicit statement on the underpinnings o f the notion of region and 
regional politics implicit in our analysis. On the contrary, taking the constructionist 
argument on the constructedness o f regions seriously implies an explicit account o f the 
implicit meanings attached to the notion o f  region in this dissertation.
V.3.3. The region as a unit of analysis
In a recent publication Michael Keating et a l. have defined regions as ‘systems o f  social 
regulation and o f  collective action, built by political and social actors in given contexts, 
reflecting the balance o f  social and economic forces and open to change,214. According to 
these authors, these systems emerge at various spatial levels. One o f these would be the 
intermediate or meso level.
L.J. Sharpe claims that the European political scene is witnessing the emergence o f a new 
‘decision space’ which might be labelled meso-level. The adjective meso refers to its
person is also an ancestor o f that person; (3) nothing else is an ancestor o f a person. See Ted Honderich (ed.) 
1995: '‘The Oxford Companion to Philosophy’ Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 749.
213 See W.V. Quine 1987: ‘Quiddities: An intermittently Philosophical Dictionary* Cambridge Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press p. 174. As argued before, formal legalistic criteria or economic 
indicators do not allow us to construct such a level o f analysis; it might be precisely because we are asking the 
wrong informants for the characteristics of the regional level. In other words, those criteria, that in the hands 
of Patrick Le Gales served to point out the radical differences among regions in Europe, presuppose the 
existence o f a regional level of analysis, but cannot explain what it consists of since they apprehend only a 
small portion of the broad phenomenon.
214 See Michael Keating, John Loughlin and Kris Deschouwer 2003: ‘Culture, institutions and economic 
development: a study o f  eight European regions’ {op. cit) p. 30.
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position between the national (central) and the local levels215. In this way the author avoids 
(and he makes this concern explicit) referring to the regional level, an expression that he 
regards as unnecessarily conflating the notion of region with the notion of an intermediate 
level of government. Regions would be part of these meso-decisional spaces grouped in the 
notion of meso-level. According to Shaipe, the determinants of the rise of the meso-level 
are to be found principally in the rise o f new forms of ‘regional nationalism,’ which are 
scattered throughout Europe.
Stefano Bartolini has pointed out that the eighties witnessed a further wave of demands for 
territorial representation which were attached to new forms of territorial politics216 217*. He 
takes the view that this latter wave of territorial politics differs in many ways from previous 
historical phases and examples o f territorial resistance.
First, it is based on a ‘new form  o f nationalism or cultural identity which no longer aims at 
the establishment o f  its own independent statehood but at a change and revision o f the form  
o f  the state which can provide new opportunities o f local autonomy,217.
Second, it is developing in the context of creating new centres and new types of centres in 
the international environment. *The relationship between the centre and periphery is no 
longer based on the dyadic relationship between the state and the regional distinctive 
community. Therefore it can no longer be only or exclusively dealt with within the nation 
state through its policy o f concessions or administrative reforms'1™.
Third, it is based on and articulated by new types of local political mobilisation.
Fourth, ‘it is based on a new perception o f the institutional competition among territories 
within, as well as outside, the nation state fo r  the accession and acquisition o f resources 
which are no longer exclusively dependent from the centre o f the State. This also implies 
that it is based on the perception o f communality ofinterests and problem-pressures among
215 See J.L. Sharpe: ‘The European Meso: An appraisal’ in JL. Sharpe (ed.) 1993: '‘The rise o f the meso- 
government in Europe’ London: SAGE publications pp.1-36.
“16 See Bartolini, Stefano (2000): 'Old and New Peripheries in the European Processes o f territorial 
expansion* Estudio/Working Paper 2000/153; Fundación Juan March, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en 
Ciencias Sociales: Madrid, p. 2.
217 See Bartolini, Stefano (2000): 'Old and New Peripheries in the European Processes o f territorial
expansion’ (op. cit.) p.3 
2xi Idem.
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territories which are neither belonging to the same nation-state, nor are they necessarily 
contiguous in territorial terms219.
Fifth, it is likely to create new types o f ‘constitutional and political strains within the 
nation-state as its claims may determine differential attitudes on the extent and deepness o f  
the participation into supra-state integration processes'22®.
Regions can to be characterized as the crystallization of a special kind of territorial 
relations. As Robert D. Sack states, territoriality is primary a geographical expression o f  
social power. It is the means by which space and society are interrelated221 2. Thus, he 
defines territoriality as *the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or control 
people, phenomena and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a 
geographic area,Z2Z. This area will be called the territory.
Territoriality has three major effects. First, it involves a  classification by area. Second, by 
definition, territoriality must contain a form o f communication. This may involve a marker 
or sign such as is commonly found in a boundary. A  territorial boundary may be the only 
symbolic form that combines a statement about direction in space and a statement about 
possession and exclusion. Third, each instance o f territoriality must involve an effort at 
enforcing control over access to the area and to things within it, or things outside o f it by 
restraining those within. More generally, each instance must involve influencing 
interactions: transgressions of territoriality will be punished and this can involve other non­
territorial and territorial action223.
These three major functions o f territoriality delimit what Anssi Paasi has called the process 
of regions’ spatial institutionalisation. According to him, the region seems to be the 
‘meeting point o f various concepts o f space'224. These concepts o f space are interrelated in 
a broader process of spatial institutionalisation that can be subdivided analytically into three
2,9 Idem.
220 Idem.
221 See Robert David Sack (1986): *Human Territoriality: Its theory and history* Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 5.
222 See Robert David Sack (1986): ‘Human Territoriality: Its theory and history’ (op. cit.) p. 19
223 See Robert David Sack (1986): ‘Human Territoriality: Its theory and history* (op. cit.) pp. 21-22.
224 See Anssi Paasi 2001: ‘Europe as a Social Process and Discourse. Considerations of Place, Boundaries and 
Identity’; European Urban and Regional Studies vol. 8 n.l p. 16.
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main sub-processes: first, a process o f territorial shaping; second, a process o f symbolic 
shaping; third, a process o f institutional shaping225 267.
According to Paasi, the ‘region’ always requires ‘some kind o f borders, even i f  these don’t 
need to be exclusively physical lines'126. He suggests that the notion of border operates at 
many different spatial scales. Streeck and Schmitter had defined regions as ‘a territorial 
society without control o f  its borders’221 .Y et, as Paasi further argues, the border cannot be 
inteipreted just as a fixed passive line (somehow imposed by the states). The border is the 
result of a process o f  social construction in which territories and their meanings are 
contested. As Rose has argued, boundaries have a dual role in the construction of a ‘sense 
of place’, which basically consists o f defining those who are members of the group and 
those who do not belong to it228. Yet, borders not only separate but also mediate exchanges 
and contacts between social groups. The notion o f the region as a bounded space delimited 
by specific borders is quite an intuitive idea. The notion of border itself, however, should 
not be taken as a given, but as the expression of *power structures and social division o f  
labour’229 230.
Symbolic shaping is also a crucial process in the institutionalisation of all regions. 
According to Paasi, ‘political elites have p u t labels on concrete and symbolic landscapes to 
divide and control space and people.’™ . Spatial labels are crucial in signifying 
territoriality. Symbols might be the expression of the territorialization of memory and the 
past, but others might emerge from current life.
Finally, institutional shaping refers to the process by which institutions maintain and 
reproduce both the territorial and symbolic nature o f  the regional space. Institutional 
shaping is a relational process. Regions are autonomous units, not sovereign units. 
Sovereignty is a characteristic that belongs to a specific legal edifice, the state legal system. 
Whereas sovereignty defines spaces o f exclusion, autonomy merely determines rules for
225 Idem.
226 idem.
227 Streek W. and Schmitter P.: ‘From national corporatism to transnational pluralism’, Politics and Society 
vol. 19 1992 p. 153
228 Rose G. ‘Place and Identity: a sense o f place* in D. Massey and P. Jess (eds) 1995, ‘A place in the -world?' 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. Quoted in Anssi Paasi 2001 (op. cit) p. 17.
229 See Anssi Paasi 2001: ‘Europe as a Social Process and Discourse. Considerations of Place, Boundaries and 
Identity’ {op. cit.) p. 17.
230 Idem.
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agents’ interrelations. As we have seen in previous sections, regions’ autonomy can be 
predicated vis-à-vis a number o f different instances. Regions might be autonomous vis-à- 
vis the state, but they also are autonomous vis-à-vis supranational institutions or the market. 
Changes in the regime o f autonomy might alter the detour of spatial institutionalisation in a 
single region, triggering new processes o f symbolic or territorial shaping that might change 
the dynamics o f institutional reproduction and the patterns of relation with other 
institutional structures. Moreover, as we have previously discussed, autonomy beside its 
relational characteristics is above all a fluid concept, that is, it is subject to a constant 
process o f restructuring through social and political mobilization from below, but also from 
above.
As Michael Keating has argued, Ht is in the combination o f these various [spatial] logics 
that the phenomenon o f regionalism can be understoodr’231. Regionalism can be perceived 
as a project to construct a new system of social regulations, drawing in existing elements o f 
the social structure, mobilizing cultural and political symbols for particular purposes and 
constructing institutions in government and civil society232 23.
In sum, our way o f treating the regions takes into consideration the following features. 
Firstly, following Sharpe’s work, we identify the ‘meso’ as a decisional level located (in the 
spatial distribution o f power) in an intermediate space between the centre and the local. 
Secondly, this level is integrated by territorial units, which, according to Sack, perform 
functions of classification, communication and enforcement Third, territoriality resumes, 
as Michael Keating’s and Anssi Paasi’s works quoted above have highlighted, into a 
process of spatial institutionalisation (integrated by processes o f  territorial, symbolic and 
institutional shaping) that influence day to day political practices and the imaginary o f  the 
agents operating within this constituent units. Finally, this process takes place in a context 
of relationships which are regulated by the autonomy principle. As Michael Keating argues, 
* regions are not closed systems, but embedded in wider State and European networks' .
231 See Michael Keating: *Is there a regional level of government in Europe?’ in Patrick Le Gales and 
Christian Lequesne 1998 1 Regions in Europe’ {op. cit.) p. 11-12.
232 See Michael Keating, 2001: Rethinking the region: culture, institutions and economic development in 
Catalonia and Galicia; Florence: EUI Robert Schuman Centre Working Papers : RSC 2000/43.
233 See Michael Keating, John Loughlin and Kris Deschouwer2003: ‘ Culture, institutions and economic 
development: a study o f eight European regions1 (op. cit) p.39.
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Thus, the process o f  spatial institutionalisation takes place in relation to similar processes 
occurring at different spatial levels, such as the EU, the State or the local level.
V.4 Identifying the cases
So far we have discussed the notion of region as the framework in which our analysis will 
unfold. Characterized as the territorial units resulting from a process of spatial 
institutionalisation, the regions constitute a  specific category integrated within the broader 
notion of the meso-level of government.
Regions are defined as having constructed (as opposed to fixed) and relational (as opposed 
to sovereign) characteristics. The proposed constructed nature o f the region as a space is 
consistent with the procedural analysis o f  decentralized aid proposed earlier. Understanding 
the region as a system o f social regulation defined by processes o f political mobilization 
both from above and from below can help us to better understand the regional politics of 
decentralized aid, as part of a broader process of social construction. The relational 
characteristics of our concept o f region might help us to better integrate the politics o f a 
region’s decision making into a broader context of governance without diluting the identity 
o f  the region as a political actor, yet without reifying the region as a political actor.
Having determined the characteristics o f the political units we are looking at, we can now 
distinguish the criteria for selecting the cases. Before undertaking this task, we should 
briefly discuss the logic of the ‘most different cases’ approach to case-oriented research 
employed in this dissertation. Then we will be able to trace the patterns of differentiation 
among the cases and explain why Tuscany and the Basque Country fit these patterns.
V.4.1 Identifying the logic of comparison and the problems of finding two most 
different cases
As Charles Raging argues, the logic o f comparative case-oriented strategies is roughly 
articulated along John Stuart Mill’s presentation of the canons o f experimental inquiry in A
System o f  Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive234. John Stuart Mill defines four different 
methods o f  experimental inquiry. These are: the method o f agreement; the method of 
difference; the method o f residues, and the method o f concomitant variation235. Yet the 
logic o f comparative analysis in social sciences focuses on the application of either the 
logic o f the method o f agreement or the logic of the method of difference.
The underlying logic of the method o f agreement can be summarized in the following 
statement: *if two or more instances o f the same phenomenon under investigation have only 
one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone a ll the instances agree, is 
the cause (or effect) o f the given phenomenon*236 237. Applied to comparative case-study 
inquiry, the logic of the method o f agreement would be that o f looking for two cases that, 
sharing the same value on the dependent variable, would differ in all possible conditions 
but one.
In the opposite sense, the logic o f the method o f difference would be the following: ‘iIf an 
instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs and an instance in which it 
does not occur have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the 
former; the circumstance alone in which both cases differ, is the effect or the cause, or an 
indispensable pa rt o f the cause, o f the phenomenon*1*1. Applied again to a comparative 
endeavour, the logic of the method o f difference would be to compare two cases that, 
holding different values on the dependent variable, share all the possible conditions but one 
that would be the efficient condition.
These two logics o f  inquiry lead to two different ideal approaches to comparative analysis. 
The logic o f  the method of agreement results in a most-different cases approach, whereas 
the logic o f  the method of difference leads to a most-similar cases approach.
Yet, any o f  these logics o f inquiry present an obvious problem when applied to social 
research, that is it is very difficult to find in social reality two cases that differ in all the 
possible instances but one (and vice-versa: cases that are similar in all possible instances
234 Sec Charles C. Ragin 1987: 'The Comparative Method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative 
strategies’ (op. cit.)p. 36
235 See John Stuart Mill (1973): 'A system o f Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. [1843]’ Toronto: University 
of Press. Book III, Chapter VIII.
236 See John Stuart Mill (1973): *A system o f Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. [1843]’ (op. cit.) p. 390
237 See John Stuart Mill (1973): 'A system o f Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive. [1843]’ (op. cit.) p. 391
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but one). Instances in the social sciences share many characteristics and differ in many 
other characteristics, thus the selection o f the cases is obviously theoretically determined. 
Cases must be selected according to the set of instances identified as relevant in theory. 
Yet, the interaction of theory and empirical analysis might present some problems. Let us 
examine this more carefully.
As we said before, social reality does not provide for such a thing as two cases that differ 
only in terms o f a single variable. ‘Most different cases’ is thus a relative assertion that 
must refer to something else. That is, these are the most different cases according to an X 
set o f characteristics, which we understand as relevant to our analysis. Theory and case 
selection are therefore related, because it is only through proper theory that we can decide 
what are the characteristics of the cases that we might take as relevant for establishing our 
research design.
The problem arises when one tries to implement this simple statement. Ill-defined theory 
might lead us to erroneous case selection and to wrong conclusions. One way of 
overcoming the problem in case-oriented comparison lies in taking cases as wholes, not as 
collections of variables. Taking cases as wholes reduces the problem of defining the 
relevant set of criteria for case selection since the aim is to offer a detailed and 
contextualized appraisal o f the issue at stake. Yet, this might create a problem when trying 
to offer generalizable statements of causal process. Too rich or too much contextualized 
research might end up at best asserting the uniqueness o f the causal pattern in each o f  the 
cases analysed; at worst offering a more or less detailed description of a succession of 
historical events.
Therefore, a compromise must be reached between taking cases as wholes and explanation. 
This compromise can be defined in terms of the exchange between theory and empirics 
which characterize case-oriented comparisons. For the case selection strategy we might rely 
on theoretical considerations, whereas the confirmation of case-selection criteria arises 
from a wider knowledge of the social reality to which we are going to apply them. Here are 
some criteria that have limited the universe o f possible cases.
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In this dissertation, we have chosen a most different two cases comparison design. The 
major advantage o f this design is that it permits the researcher to assess a great amount o f 
variation by dealing only with the analysis o f two cases.
According to the theoretical premises, our cases should show diverse patterns o f 
interrelations among the different actors identified before. They should show a distinct 
geometry o f the procedural elements behind regions’ engagement in decentralized aid for 
development, whereas they should positively engage in decentralized aid for 
development238. In this way we should be able to evaluate the explanatory power o f the 
geometry o f the supply-side triangle, and within it the interaction between demands and the 
process o f  region building239.
The selection o f cases has been bounded within the limits o f  the EU (fifteen member 
states). The reason for that is to control for the impact of European decentralized aid 
schemes in the development of decentralized aid programs at the regional level. The impact 
of EU policy is not homogeneous all along the EU regions. In the realm of foreign aid, as 
we have already seen, whereas EU policy has encouraged sub-state units participation since 
very early, not all EU regions have responded positively to the impact o f EU policy 
schemes. Thus, selecting a non EU region would have led either to  overstress the impact o f 
EU programs on regional domestic politics, or, on the contrary, neglect this impact. 
Choosing two EU regions might yield for a more nuanced assessment of the impact o f  the 
EU in the constitution o f  decentralized aid schemes at the regional level.
On top o f that, in the cases analyzed in this dissertation the capacity of constituent units to 
go abroad has not been decentralized. Going back to Figure 5 representing State’s resources
238 In early phases of the research deign it was decided that only those cases that would show a positive score 
on the dependent variable, that is the existence of decentralized aid for development programs, will be 
selected. The reason for that is obvious, even if  it would have been interesting, in terms of research design to 
analyze a negative case, the constraints imposed by qualitative research and case-oriented comparisons make 
it unfeasible. Five years ago there were not that many European regions that have engaged in decentralized 
aid for development programs. To my knowledge, only the Italian and Belgium regions, the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities and the German and Austrian Lander have developed such policy schemes, 
whereas in France and countries such as Sweden or Denmark decentralized aid is implemented at the local 
level.
239Only pioneer regions are taken into consideration since it is by choosing pioneer regions we avoid the 
problems derived from the practices of institutional isomorphism and imitation o f  successful policies, and we 
can control for the explanatory power of the different geometries identified in earlier sections.
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and strategies, this dissertation explores cases which are situated in the Northern regions of 
the figure240.
Polities in which constituent units got recognized the capacity to develop their own foreign 
projection schemes, as it is the case o f Germany or Austria, but also the case o f  Belgium, 
fall off the empirical puzzle tackled in this dissertation for the simple reason that there is 
very little to be explained from the point of view of the regional politics if the federated 
level has established constitutional provisions to facilitate constituent units’ projection 
abroad. Actually, those cases in which coordination between centre and periphery is 
ensured by means of recognizing a particular sphere where the constituent units’ have the 
entitlement to pursue their own foreign policy schemes, as it is the case of the Southern 
regions of figure 5, would be more interesting from the point of a negative score in the 
dependent variable. Yet, to my knowledge such a case does not exists within the federal 
states of the European Union241.
Last but not least, given the methods selected, the universe of possible cases had to be 
constrained to those countries in which it was possible for me to conduct interviews and 
analyse documents. Interviewing and document analysis require absolute command of the 
language spoken in the regions we are dealing with. Interviewees express differently when 
forced to speak in a different language than their mother tongue. What is more, the use of 
an interpreter or a translator seems to present more problems than what it resolves since it 
implies introducing a mediator between the source o f evidence and the researcher, which 
has to interpret it.
Consequently the universe o f cases has been reduced to a comparison between Italian 
regions and Spanish autonomous communities. In France decentralized aid for development 
policies are carried out at the local level, whereas in the case of the United Kingdom 
decentralized aid for development schemes have not been implemented yet242. My 
proposal is a comparison between the Basque Country and Tuscany. Both regions respect 
the limits we have imposed to our universe of possible cases, whereas I believe that they
340 Sec: Figure 5: State’s resources and strategies in p. 108
341 In three out o f the three EU member States in which constituent units got recognized a specific sphere in
which the might pursue their own foreign projection, foreign aid schemes are developed by constituent units. 
These are: Austria, Belgium and Germany. This reduces the number o f possible cases from 66 cases in which 
we have a positive score in the dependent variable within the limits o f  the European Union to some 37 cases
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can be taken as an example of most different cases, within the limits established in earlier 
paragraphs.
V.4.2 Basque Country vs. Tuscany
As we anticipated in the previous section, this dissertation compares the political processes 
leading to the establishment o f decentralized aid policies in the Basque Country and 
Tuscany. The Basque Country and Tuscany are constituent units o f what we had previously 
termed the European ‘meso-leveT. Both regions enjoy a  middle position within the spatial 
distribution o f power in their respective states. In both cases, we can find traces o f the 
process o f  spatial institutionalisation, yet these processes determine different geometries in 
the patterns of relations that, according to our initial analysis, lead to a regions’ engagement 
in foreign aid. The differences between the Basque Country and Tuscany’s patterns o f 
interaction can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, both cases are located in different national contexts which determine a different 
status of autonomy. The Basque Country enjoys a high level of political and fiscal 
autonomy within the Spanish State, whereas Tuscany is among the ordinary statue regions 
in Italy which means it has a lesser degree o f political autonomy and almost no fiscal 
autonomy. At the same time, Spain is considered an almost-federalized regional state. 
Regions in Spain enjoy a wide sphere o f political and administrative autonomy, while the 
State retains some functions. The pattern o f  State-Regions relations is very much casuistic. 
In the case o f the Basque Country, it entails major conflict about the status o f the region 
within the Spanish institutional structure.
Italy is a regionalized state, yet decentralization has traditionally been restricted by the 
politics o f national party confrontation and therefore, local and regional powers have to be 
understood in the broader structure determined by the party system. Yet, these 
characteristics o f Italy’s structure of vertical distribution of political power might be 
changing recently, thanks to a number o f political reforms intended to enhance regional 
autonomy and install a  federal style regime. State-region relations have been very much 24
242 Actually, the Scottish Parliament is working out a new scheme of foreign projection for Scotland that in a 
nearby future might include foreign aid. Yet, to my knowledge this initiative has not been approved yet
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mediated in the past by party structures. Yet the direct election of regional presidents, 
approved after constitutional reform could result in the constitution o f a proper regional 
elite with their own priorities beyond party directives, and enjoying greater democratic 
legitimacy.
Secondly, both regions show distinct patterns of interaction with European institutions. The 
Basque Country has been a very active region in the European field since Spanish accession 
to the CEE and has maintained its own representation office in Brussels. Tuscany’s 
relations with the EU have been traditionally mediated by the Italian State; it is only 
recently that a number of regions from centre Italy managed to open a representatives’ 
office in Brussels, which limits Tuscany’s own role vis-à-vis the European institutions.
Thirdly, the structure of social mobilization in both regions seems to be rather different. In 
the Basque case, a number o f highly active religious organizations interact with left-wing 
organizations in a  very much territorially bounded system. In Tuscany, organizations tend 
to be more dispersed, they operate at different institutional levels and are scattered along a 
white vs. red ideological axis in which peculiar forms of ideological syncretism take place. 
This causes very different patterns o f social mobilization in the field of international 
economic co-operation. Organizations’ mobilization strategies tend to be more intensive in 
the case o f Basque organizations, whereas NGOs in Tuscany tend to integrate their efforts 
in multilevel strategies combining different institutional tiers.
These set of elements can be summarized in the following table:
Table 1: Tuscany vs. The Basque Country
Tuscany The Basque Country
Relations with the State Traditionally mediated by 
national party politics. 
Recently gained some 
autonomy. Yet, very much 
dependent on the state for 
fiscal resources
Since 1978, enjoys a special 
status within the Spanish 
State. High level o f political 
and fiscal autonomy.
Ongoing conflict with the 
Spanish state on the status o f 
the region within the 
institutional architecture o f  
the country.
Relations with the European 
Union
Mediated by the State. 
Recently Tuscany has joined 
other regions from centre 
Italy opening a joint 
representatives* office in 
Brussels.
Has developed an intense 
political activity since 
Spanish accession to the 
EEC. Holds its own 
representatives* office in 
Brussels.
Type ofN G O  mobilization Disperse. Includes a 
multiplicity o f institutional 
levels
Intensive. Very much 
concentrated in the territory 
o f  the Basque Country
Engagement in 
Decentralized aid fo r  
development schemes
Yes Yes
As a result the Basque Country and Tuscany seem to fulfill the requirements for a  most 
different cases approach comparison. Both cases show a priori different patterns regarding 
the interactions with NGOs, State administration and European institutions. In Part II and 
Part III the politics o f decentralized aid in the Basque Country and Tuscany are analysed. 
Yet, before getting there, I enlist the sources over which this analysis is constructed.
V.5 Sources of empirical evidence.
There are three major sources of empirical evidence for this dissertation: first, documents 
analysis. These include political programs, regional laws* political discourses, NGOs 
leaflets, national laws, international organizations documents. Second, in-depth interviews 
with informants from the regional administration and NGOs. Third, secondary literature.
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PART II: TH E  POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZED AID IN TH E BASQUE COUNTRY
I. Introduction.
In 1985 the Basque Government allocated a symbolic sum, (ten million ptas around sixty 
thousand euro), to finance local NGOs’ international co-operation initiatives. This pioneer 
initiative was the beginning of Basque administration’s engagement in decentralized aid for 
development policies.
The aim of this chapter is to asses the historical evolution of Basque government’s 
international aid schemes from 1985 to the present day. The empirical evidence presented 
here, suggests that Basque international co-operation programs are the result of complex 
interactions between a structured system of social actors and the political program of 
Basque institutions.
The nature of these interactions has changed in time, leading to the three distinct phases. 
The first phase, 1985-1989, is marked by the intense mobilization of local NGOs. The 
second phase, 1990-1998 witnesses an intense process of institutionalization of the policy. 
The process of institutionalization is marked by three major features. First, the Basque 
administration would try to create a regional system of international co-operation with the 
participation of other institutions in the territory. Second, the decisional capacities would 
be more and more concentrated in the hands of institutions, progressively relegating NGOs 
out of the decisional phase into the implementation phase. Third, this period witnesses the 
construction of a proper discourse around the Basque administration’s engagement in 
decentralized aid schemes, which is consistent with a new way of understanding the 
international projection of the region. The third phase begins in 1998 and is marked by 
important changes in the political agenda of Basque regional administration. From 2001 to 
2005, changes in the structure of inter-coalition relations resulted in the concentration o f 
international aid (together with Social Policy) in the hands o f IU, a non-nationalist left- 
wing party. In line with the new distribution of competences, a major change in the patterns 
o f the political discourse has taken place.
The structure o f this chapter aims to reflect this pattern o f evolution. Thus, empirical 
evidence will be structured diachronically. The first section presents the period 1985-1990, 
concentrating on the political mobilization of NGOs. I will try to show how NGOs
succeeded in incorporating international development into the regional political agenda. 
Then the Basque administration, even though it lacked the appropriate expertise in the field, 
managed to put forward a political program that would link somehow NGOs’ demands with 
specific issues o f the domestic political agenda. The Basque administration linked NGOs 
demands to a  foreign policy agenda centered on the relations with Basque emigrants 
communities and the process o f institution building within the newly-coined Estado de las 
Autonomías.
The second section o f the chapter deals with the period 1990-1998, The main scope o f this 
section is to understand the evolution o f the process o f policy institutionalization and the 
creation of a political discourse for Basque international aid. As we said before, this process 
is defined by the progressive centralization o f decisional capacities in the hands o f  the 
Basque government vis-à-vis both organizations in the civil society and local institutions. 
Yet, this process was not without problems. As I will try to show, at a certain point in 1998 
NGOs would try to recover a substantive role in the decision-making process. Evidence 
from this period shows how, despite the NGOs’ efforts, the Basque government managed to 
maintain control over the policy, while restructuring the relationships with NGOs. It is at 
this point that the Basque administration defined a new discursive pattern which was 
centered on the reinterpretation o f Basque emigration as a phenomenon and social 
mobilization in the period 1985-1989.
The third section o f this chapter focus on the major changes affecting Basque politics since 
1998 and their impact on international co-operation policy. From 2001 the formation o f a 
new governing coalition in the Basque Country forced the redistribution o f competences 
among the parties o f the coalition leading to a reconfiguration o f the way in which the 
Basque administration understands international co-operation for development.
Finally, in the conclusions I will try to offer a broader interpretation of the most relevant 
questions addressed throughout these sections.
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II 1985-1990: The initial steps. NGOs mobilization and regional administration’s 
response.
From 1985 until 1990 it can be said that NGOs managed to control, not only the policy 
implementation, but also the process o f policy definition. The 1988 campaign had a strong 
impact on regional institutions as it aimed to change what could be perceived as an act of 
institutional charity, into a real policy243.
As has been stated elsewhere, the extraordinary input of NGOs into the decision-making 
process was the result o f a unique combination of specific mobilization strategies with a 
favorable opportunity structure. NGOs managed to raise the debate on international 
development into political arenas which were traditionally exempt from those questions.
In the following sections we will try to explain how the Basque international aid system 
during this period is mainly the result o f the response o f the Basque administration to social 
mobilization. This response was mediated by Basque Administration’s concern on the 
importance of enhancing the relations with the Basque Diaspora and the main effects that 
engaging in decentralized aid might have had for the center-periphery relations within the 
Spanish state
11.1 The solidarity movement and international co-operation policy before 1988.
Organizations concerned with international development issues had been working in Spain, 
and also in the Basque Country, long before Basque international aid programs 
crystallised244. Following the description by Ibarra et. al., solidarity movements emerged in 
the context of the democratic opposition in francoist Spain and were linked to left-wing 
forces. All throughout the seventies and early eighties, solidarity committees sprung up in 
Spain. These committees were mainly constituted by left-leaning political groups, which
243 Basque administration allocated ten million ptas, (aprox. 60.000 euro) to development aid initiatives from 
1985 to 1988.
244 For a description of the solidarity movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia from a comparative 
perspective from the beginning of the 80s see: Gomá, R., R. González, S.Martí, LL. Peláez, M.Tniño, P.Ibarra 
M.J. Monteserin and A. Bias: ‘Participation, Public policies and Democracy: International Solidarity and 
Anti-militarism in the Basque Country and Catalonia* in Pedro Ibarra (ed) 2003: * Social Movements and 
Democracy’ New York: Palgrave-McMillan pp. 177-183.
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supported revolutionary processes in Central America, specially the Sandinist revolution in 
Nicaragua.
On top o f that, a number of organizations, intrinsically connected to the Spanish Church, 
had been developing solidarity activities mainly focused on co-operation activities with 
Latin America. Up to 1961, most of the activities were channelled through the misiones 
diocesanas and caritas diocesanas which, especially in the Basque country, inherited a 
long standing tradition of missionary activities245. From 1961 onwards, the overhaul o f the 
structures o f the Church brought about the decline of the missionary enterprise246. A 
number o f newly-created solidarity organizations, connected to the Church, but in many 
cases not belonging to the dioceses, emerged. Some of these organizations arose from left 
wing sectors of the Catholic Church and the Liberation Theology247.
According to Ibarra et al., before 1981 the record of activities o f the solidarity associations 
in Spain shows a number of scattered initiatives. These activities lay half-way between 
political mobilization and protest in the context o f post-transition Spain and proper 
solidarity activities with less developed countries. Campaigns to increase public awareness 
and denounce human rights violations were combined with brigadiers expeditions to 
countries in Central America. Concerns about the problems o f economic development were
245 An important flow o f religious exchanges between the Basque provinces and Latin America have taken 
place since the very beginning of the colonial enterprise in the XVI century, up to the 60’s of the twentieth 
century. Basque missionaries have developed at different points in time a relevant role in the evangelization 
of indigenous populations but also in the provision of social services such as education and health care, 
mostly in areas where the State administration was not able to develop these activities. The impact of Basque 
missionaries was specially intense during the XIX and the first half o f the XXth century, once the Spanish 
colonies in America turned into liberal republics.
246 For a summary of the rise and decline o f misiones diocesanas in the sixties see: Oscar Alvarez Gila 1998: 
'‘Misiones y  misioneros vascos en Hispanoamérica (1820-1960)’ Bilbao: Labayru Ikastegiapp. 88-95.
247 Some of the organizations arising in the context o f re-definition o f the social and charitable activities o f the 
Church were very relevant in the process o f demand structuring in 1985. The Memoria de la Cooperación 
Vasca mentions the following organizations: Justicia y  Paz was established by the Spanish Episcopal 
Conference in the sixties. Caritas Diocesanas has a longer pedigree. It was established in the early fifties in 
order to channel the charity of the Spanish Catholic Church. This organization has evolved from being almost 
exclusively concerned with poverty in Spain, to international co-operation activities. Manos Unidas was 
established in Euskadi in 1960 and defines itself as an independent religious organization connected to the 
Catholic church. See *Memoria 1988-1997 Cooperación pública Vasca. Ayudas al tercer Mundo’. Vitoria- 
Gasteiz: ServicioCentral de publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco, p. 22. Paz y Tercer Mundo (Hirugarren 
Mundua ta Bakea), established in 1988, is an interesting example of an independent organization set up by 
people arising from the labor movements, pacifist movements and the comunidades cristianas de base, which 
represent a left-leaning socially oriented sector of the Catholics.
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somehow played down by the political conditions in which these activities took place (i.e. 
post-transition Spain and the framework of social revolutions in Latin America)248 249.
In 1981 the first nation-wide mobilization of DNGOs to push the Spanish government to 
allocate 0,7% of the GDP to assist development took place. The campaign had a very little 
impact on the public opinion. As Koldo Unceta states *[.,.] in these years, the debate on 
international co-operation was confined to limited sector o f the civil society,249. Yet, as 
Ibarra et al. has pointed out ‘the 0 ,7 campaign had consequences within the very network o f 
organizations'250. In 1982 the Coordinator of DNGOs was established. The Coordinator 
enhanced the capacity of DNGOs to pressurise institutions, thus introducing the problem of 
poverty and international development in the political agenda. As a result, in 1982 Spanish 
DNGOs undersigned an agreement with the political parties with parliamentary 
representation by which the latter compromised in order to fulfil U.N. 0,7% objective.
Nevertheless, despite the increasing activities of DNGOs and solidarity committees during 
the early eighties the possibilities for having a real impact on the attitude o f the Spanish 
government towards international cooperation were very limited251.
By 1981 Spain was still considered by the IMF a middle income developing country, 
whereas for the Development Assistance Committee Spain was a potential aid recipient up 
to 1985. As a consequence the development of a system o f international co-operation in 
Spain is a relatively recent phenomenon. The first International co-operation plan dates 
from 1985 and runs parallel to the creation of the Secretariat for International co-operation 
and cooperation with Latin America (SECIPI).
Observers had noted how up to the 1990’s the functioning system was rather erratic. It 
lacked an overarching legal framework and most of the time it operated on an ad-hoc
248 See Gomé, R., R, González, S.Martí, LL. Peláez, M.Truño, P,Ibarra M.J. Monteserin and A. Bias: 
‘Participation, Public policies and Democracy: International Solidarity and Anti-militarism in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia’ (op. cit.) p. 177
249 See Koldo Unceta Satrústegui: ‘La cooperación para el desarrollo: España y el 0,7%’ Iglesia Viva. No. 
184-185 July-October 1996 p.326.
250 See Gomá, R., R. González, S.Martí, LL. Peláez, M.Truño, P.Ibarra M.J. Monteserin and A. Blas: 
‘Participation, Public policies and Democracy: International Solidarity and Anti-militarism in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia’ (op. cit.) p. 178
251 In 1984, in the context of Ethiopia famines, DNGOs raised an aggressive campaign claiming for a 
substantial increase of Spanish international co-operation.
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basis252. By 1983 the ratio ODA/GNP in Spain amounted to the 0.04%, whereas six years 
later, by 1989 it has not gone beyond the frontier of the 0,1%253.
Despite the compromise of the Socialist Party, in office since 1982, changing the 
international co-operation system, as it had been devised during UCD’s period in office 
(1977-1982), was not an easy task. Spain’s international relations had been almost 
completely re-built after the collapse o f Franco’s regime. The new international agenda 
included, not only a new approach to America and the Mediterranean, but also the 
accession to the EEC and a compelling security agenda structured alongside the problem o f 
the relationship with the United States and the accession to NATO254.
The combination o f  policy priorities had ambiguous effects in the development o f  an 
international co-operation system. On the one hand, the security agenda compromised the 
possibilities for an expansion o f cooperative schemes with certain states in Latin America 
or the Mediterranean. Co-operation with Cuba or Nicaragua, compromised the relationship 
with the United States and the scheme for a new international security policy. On top o f 
that, as Celestino del Arenal has pointed out the economic crisis o f the early eighties and 
the restrictive economic policy schemes implemented by the socialist governments, cut- 
down the international co-operation budget, which was, by then, already very limited255.
On the other hand, the emphasis put by the socialist government in re-establishing normal 
political and diplomatic relations with Latin America during the eighties facilitated the 
constitution of a proper international co-operation system. Following Celestino del Arenal, 
the constitution o f the SECIPI settled the institutional framework for enhancing the 
relationships with Latin America, providing the institutional framework for the 
establishment o f the first international co-operation programs256. On top of that, the process 
o f accession to the EEC pushed the constitution of a system of international co-operation
~52 See Neil Huges 2000: 'The Spanish International Development Co-operation Law: A step in the right 
direction or the consolidation o f an inadequate model'. European Development Policy Study Group 
Discussion Papers No. 13. Development Studies Association, Manchester Metropolitan University p.2.
253 See Mariano Aguirre and Francisco Rey: ‘Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Action in Spanish 
Foreign Policy’ in Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs (eds) 2001: 'Spain: The European and 
International Challenges' London: Frank Cass p. 197.
254 See Javier Tusell, Juan Avilés and Rosa Pardo (eds) 2000: 'La política exterior de España en el siglo X X  
Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva pp. 413-547
255 Celestino del Arenal: ‘La política exterior de España’ in Ramón Cotarelo (ed.)1992: ‘ Transición y  
consolidación democrática. España (1975-1986)' Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas p. 427
256 Celestino del Arenal: ‘La política exterior de España’ (op. cit.) p.425
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that could take part in broader international agreements and institutions (such as the 
OECD/DAC committee or the various international cooperation policy schemes o f the 
EEC) higher in the political agenda257.
Movements and DNGOs profited from the saliency o f certain issues on the international 
political agenda, mainly ECC and NATO accessions and pushed for further reform o f the 
international co-operation policy. As it has been put by one informant, *the campaign 
against Spanish permanence in NA TO triggered a process o f political mobilization from  
different left-leaning organizations. Pacifist movements, solidarity committees with Latin 
America and left wing groups actively campaigned fo r  the ‘NO ' in an unprecedented spring 
o f  social mobilization regarding international issues'25*.
Movements profited from the increasing saliency of the international agenda in Spanish 
politics and media259. The accession to EEC before 1985 and the NATO referendum had 
brought to the front of the political debate the normalization of Spain’s foreign policy. 
Furthermore NGOs’ initiatives, such as the North-South Conference organized in 1986, 
emphasized the necessity of normalizing the situation o f international co-operation with the 
third world.
During this period NGOs introduced into the Spanish media the 0,7% of GNP objective put 
forward by U.N. in the seventies. They also insisted on the necessity of normalizing the 
expenditure on international co-operation at the expense of military expenditure and
07 Celestino del Arenal: ‘La política exterior de España’ (op. cit.) pp. 426-428
258 Interview with Iñaki Markiegui ONG Paz y Tercer Mundo. Conducted on the 17,h March 2003. The 
literature pointed to the Spanish accession to NATO as one of the most controversial issues o f Spanish 
foreign policy since the advent of democracy. See Anthony Gooch: ‘A surrealistic referendum: Spain and 
NATO’ Government and Opposition Vol. 21 No. 3 Summer 1986 pp. 300-31; Inocencio Félix Arias: ‘Spanish 
Media and the two NATO campaigns’ in Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (eds) 1988: ‘Spain’s entry 
into NATO: conflicting political and Strategic Perspectives' London: Lynne Rienner Publishers pp. 29-4; 
Michael P. Marks 1997: 'The formation o f European Policy in post-Franco Spain' Aldershot: Avebury 
Ashgate publ. pp.43-76.; Florentino Portero: ‘La política de seguridad 1975-1988’ in Javier Tusell, Juan 
Avilés and Rosa Pardo (eds) 2000: 'La política exterior de España en el siglo XX* (op. cit.) pp. 480- 
499;Ricardo Martín de la Guardia y Guillermo A. Pérez Sánchez: ‘Opinión pública y medios de 
comunicación’ in Juan Carlos Pereira (ed) 2003: *La política exterior de España (1800-2003)' Madrid: Ariel, 
pp. 166-167.
259 Beside the debate on both accession to NATO and to the EEC, mass media in Spain begin to devote 
special attention to the problems of underdevelopment. The newspaper El Pais issued on 29th July 1986 a 
paper on international co-operation and the new economic order. The initiative was undertaken by a number 
o f newspapers all over the world and was entitled Un solo mundo. Suplemento mundial para un Nuevo orden 
económico internacional (On world: International paper for a New International Economic Order) See El Pais 
29th July 1986.
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diminishing the returns of Spanish aid, which up to that moment had been structured along 
the so-called FAD credits.
However, despite some small victories, the growth of the solidarity movement didn’t have a 
substantial impact in the configuration o f the system of international co-operation in Spain. 
Between 1985 and 1988 Spanish co-operation policy didn’t experience any major change, 
either at an institutional level or in the amount o f resources allocated260.
In 1988, profiting from an initiative o f the Council o f  Europe, a new campaign was 
launched261. The objective was twofold. First, it aimed to force institutions to enhance the 
Spanish international co-operation record. Second, make constituencies further aware o f  the 
necessity o f  a major change in the Government’s approach to development. Learning from 
the experience of past years DNGOs embraced and overarching strategy that targeted not 
only national level administration, but also the regional and the local levels.
As has been said before, the mobilization in the Basque country was especially relevant in 
terms of both intensity and impact. A  group o f  eleven NGOs, laic and religious, managed to 
mobilize regional constituencies so as to force the engagement o f  regional, provincial and 
local institution’s in international co-operation schemes. The next section explores the 1988 
campaign, focusing on NGOs’ strategies and discourses in the Basque Country.
11.2 Establishing the preconditions for the policy: NGOs mobilization and the 
perception of underdevelopment in the Basque Country.
As has been pointed out in the specialized literature on social movements, one o f the main 
features of DNGOs and solidarity movements is that ‘solidarity is not only a form  o f  
collective action, but also the scope o f process o f mobilization'262. Solidarity movements 
tend to act in the name o f other collectivities. The process is one o f  discursive identification 
rather than one o f  political intermediation. The narratives o f  DNGOs and solidarity
260 Pedro Ibarra et al. highlight the impact o f the solidarity movement upon Catalan institutions. Similarly in 
the Basque country, as we have already seen, mobilization of religious organizations in 1985 was echoed by 
regional institutions. See Gomá, R., R. González, S.Martí, LL. Peláez, M.Truño, P.Ibarra M.J. Monteserin 
and A. Bias: ‘Participation, Public policies and Democracy: International Solidarity and Anti-militarism in the 
Basque Country and Catalonia’ (op. cit.) p. 177.
261 Council of Europe: European Campaign on Interdependence and North South Solidarity.
262 See Pedro Ibarra: Los movimientos por la solidaridad; ¿Un nuevo modelo de acción colectiva? Revista 
Española de investigaciones sociológicas No. 88 Octubre-Diciembre 1999. p.235.
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movements offer a new vision of the world in which those 1other collectivities' gain 
visibility thanks to a major change in the value of solidarity. As a matter o f fact, the very 
success of the movement itself relies partially on its ability to portray the necessities o f 4 the 
other’ as if they were part of a broader notion of justice, which also includes the problem of 
redistribution of resources within the addressed community.
In the case of NGOs’ mobilization in the Basque Country in 1988 in favour o f solidarity 
towards the Third World, the problem of identification structured very much the strategy of 
NGOs’ when approaching sub-state institutions.
According to the documents analysed, for the NGOs the main cause of the persistence o f 
underdevelopment was that societies in the north have not internalised the problems derived 
from the uneven distribution of economic resources. Thus, a change in the way 
underdevelopment was perceived was needed since these problems would never be 
resolved unless they started to exist in the collective consciousness of ‘northern 
societies’263 264.
The main aim of the NGOs’ campaigning activities in these years was to translate 
development aid into a societal enterprise. Development aid policies should be freed from 
the monopoly of the state agencies, leaving room for other societal actors and institutional 
layers to cooperate with the third world. In other words, the main idea was 'to engage the 
civil society in development issues, as well as all the institutions at different layers in order 
to make development aid policies both more visible and closer to the citizenry ’
The strategy of NGOs at this stage was one of raising consciousnesses. The needs of the 
represented collectivities (underdeveloped countries) are portrayed as having a social 
dimension as opposed to an institutional one. The problem o f  underdevelopment is 
constructed through the notion of invisibility. Opaque institutions isolate wealthy societies 
from the consequences o f underdevelopment. To a certain extent, northern societies are 
represented as if they were deprived o f a natural sense o f responsibility towards ‘the other’ 
by the blinding activities of obscure institutions and agencies. Thus, devolving solidarity to
263 See Organizaciones No Gubernamentales 1988: * Norte y  Sur: Un futuro común Amado, Bilbao.
264 Interview with Andrés Basauri, former director o f the Coordinadora de ONGDS de Euskadi. Conducted on 
the 24th of March 2003.
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the civil society would foster the development o f a new moral vision on the problem o f 
economic resources' redistribution.
Pedro Ibarra et al. claimed that the solidarity movement in the Basque country had a ‘great 
impact trough its discourses, where it has made adequate use o f  pre-existing cognitive 
frames and has created new frames, enjoying a relatively good coverage from  the media 
[...] The movement has not only constructed a coherent and credible discourse fram e but 
has managed in a certain way to insert that fram e within the dominant system o f beliefs9265.
Basque NGOs managed to build up a convincing case on the origins of underdevelopment 
and inequality, so as to forge a moral compromise from which regional and local 
institutions could not remain apart. The new moral compromise was rooted on a clear 
conceptualisation o f the problems of underdevelopment and an efficient use o f  the 
institutional and non-institutional opportunity structure. We will now examine this process 
in more detail.
11.2.1 Identifying the problem.
Organizations in the Basque Country claimed that in order to resolve the problems in the 
distribution o f economic resources a main change in the way development problems were 
perceived was needed. For them, these problems would never be resolved unless they 
started to exist in the collective consciousness o f ‘northern societies’.
For NGOs the main cause of the persistence o f  underdevelopment was that societies in the 
north have not internalised the problems derived from the uneven distribution o f  economic 
resources. The origins o f the inability of northern societies to internalise these problems 
are to be found in their ethnocentric self-perception and representation of the world265 66 267.
This tendency is sophisticatedly illustrated in a leaflet that compares two different ways o f 
representing the world . The first representation tends to place Europe in the centre and 
the size of the so called ‘first world’ tends to be at least equal to that of the areas belonging
265 See Gomá, R,, R. González, S.Martí, LL. Peláez, M.Truño, P.Ibarra M.J. Monteserin and A. Bias: 
‘Participation, Public policies and Democracy. International Solidarity and Anti-militarism in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia’ (op.cit.). pp. 181-182
266 See Organizaciones No Gubernamentales 1988: 'N orte y  Sur: Un futuro com ún ' (op. cit.)
267 See Annex I: Picture I: Underdevelopment. Two representations of the world
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to the second and third worlds together. The second map, through the use o f a more 
accurate scalar representation technique, shows how the underdeveloped areas of the world 
share a bigger proportion of the territorial surface of the globe. Thus, it shows the real 
geographical dimension of underdevelopment. Moreover, Europe is no longer in the centre 
o f the world. The second map thus abandons the euro centric view o f the world.
The message put forward by the abovementioned leaflet could be summed up as follows.
4 Territorial representations are the expression o f  the mindset o f  a given society. Therefore, 
no real solution for the problems o f  poverty and unequal distribution o f resources will be 
attained unless the mindsets are changed in the societies that control the vast majority o f  
economic resources'2*'*. Northern societies must be warned of the dangers of the euro­
centric view of the world.
To NGOs, the first cause of underdevelopment was the fact that this goes unnoticed in 
developed societies. The creation o f new consciousness towards underdeveloped countries 
in ‘northern societies' constitutes a precondition for effective redistribution of economic 
resources.
The second problem, according to NGOs, was to identify the main reason behind the fact 
that a large portion o f  the world’s population lives in such conditions of poverty and 
deprivation. For the NGOs the problem was about distribution, not about scarcity o f 
resources. Following different International organisations’ reports, NGOs claimed that the 
amount of resources available were enough to maintain the whole world population. 
However, they claim that these resources are unevenly distributed. This claim is 
represented as follows in one of the NGOs leaflets268 69.
The upper part of the figure depicts a fat man dressed-up in a nineteenth century style 
tuxedo, eating a big cake, drinking champagne and smoking a cigar. The lower part 
represents a number o f people from different countries sitting around a small slice of the 
same cake. They are all dressed in shabby clothes but they appear content. The picture is
268 See Organizaciones No Gubernamentales 1988: ‘Norte y  Sur: Un futuro común ’ {op. cit.)
269 See Annex I: Picture 2: Representing the uneven distribution of economic resources.
151
completed with the following statement: ‘the richest 30% o f the w orld’s population shares 
75% o f the global food  production, while the poorest 70% shares the remaining 25% a10.
This way of representing the problem is quite effective. Firstly, the symbolic 
representations o f the richer 30% and the poorer 70% are chosen as to give a clear cut 
picture. On the one hand, the traditional image o f the nineteenth century capitalist 
introduces the idea of the lack o f both compassion for and solidarity with the developing 
world existing in developed societies. At the same time, it introduces a very satirical image 
of capitalism to ensure that no representative o f the developed societies would identify with 
it270 71. This image clearly introduces the idea that it is the greed o f  ‘northern societies’ which 
explains the uneven distribution o f resources. The way in which the image is composed 
with a person sitting down with a large portion o f a cake in between his legs, clasping the 
fork, smoking a cigar, while drinking two bottles of champagne, is clearly meant to face the 
addressee with their own sins. At the same time, the satirical character o f the whole picture 
makes the criticism easy to bare.
On the other hand, the subtle representation o f poverty is used to show the seriousness o f 
the problem without shocking the viewer with drastic images272. The combination o f 
figures used to represent poverty (mostly kids) stresses the injustice that underdeveloped 
countries are forced to bare. At the same time, the picture uses monographic representations 
of certain underdeveloped nations, such as Mexico or Peru, which can be easily identified 
by the viewer.
The aim o f this image is to trigger a double process o f self-identification and detachment. 
The process o f identification corresponds to the lower part of the picture, where symbols 
are used in order to familiarise the viewer with the problem o f  poverty. The process o f 
detachment corresponds to the upper part o f  the picture where the symbols are used to show
270 Organizaciones No- Gubernamentales 1988: (op. c it)
271 Note that these documents were distributed in schools, seminars, universities etc. therefore, they were 
destined mainly to a non-institutional public. The degree o f message sophistication is counterbalanced by the 
effectiveness of the means utilized to represent the problem of redistribution.
272 Analysing Basque NGOs’ mobilization strategies Pedro Ibarra et al. have claimed that NGOs managed to 
present their case using a pragmatic style based more on persuasion than on confrontation. The use of the 
above described kind of symbolic devices to represent underdevelopment can be understood in line with this 
non-confrontational strategy. See Gomá, R., R. González, S.Martí, LL. Peláez, M.Truño, P.Ibarra MJ. 
Monteserin and A. Bias: ‘Participation, Public policies and Democracy: International Solidarity and Anti­
militarism in the Basque Country and Catalonia’ (op. cit.) p.182.
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a satiric representation of the greed of ‘northern societies’. At the same time, information 
about the uneven redistribution of resources is presented in a very clear way. Thus, the 
viewer, when facing the picture, is supposed to internalise that bit of information, as well as 
to have a clear cut picture of the north-south divide.
To sum up, we can say that for NGOs the problems of underdevelopment were the result o f 
two main elements. First, the invisibility of the third world and second, the uneven 
distribution o f resources as a result of northern societies greed. These two elements operate 
as preconditions for underdevelopment to persist. However, nothing, or very little, has been 
said about the main mechanisms through which these two preconditions operate.
11.2.2 The mechanisms of underdevelopment: Dependency and the problem of 
military expenditure.
The paragraphs above indicated that the NGOs identified ‘greed’ as the main cause for the 
uneven distribution o f resources. However, very little has been said about the origins o f 
northern societies ‘greediness’. A clear response to that question is provided in a pamphlet 
from I98 927\
In this pamphlet both the dependency structure created by the world trade system and the 
military expenditure at a global level are blamed of drying-out resources that could be used 
to alleviate the situation of many people in the ‘third world’. This is clearly stated in a 
figure which represents the equivalence of the expenditure on tanks, destroyers and fighters 
in schools, hospitals and electricity provision273 74.
For NGOs, the scope o f the military expenditure in developed countries has it origins in the 
bi-polar confrontation that dominated international relations from 1945 to 1989. In the 
Spanish case, this argument is illustrated in the figure presented above in the following 
manner: *In 1982 Spain's military expenditure represented the 44% o f the total state 
expenditure. This represents five times the investment on transportation infrastructures.
273 Sec Campana 0,7% ¡tienen derecho!.
274 See Annex I: Picture 3: Military expenditure and underdevelopment
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three hundred and seventy seven times the investment in environmental protection and 
thirty times the investment in culture’21$.
At the same time, NGOs argued that ‘this degree o f military expenditure represents a heavy 
burden fo r  the developing countries fo r  several reasons. First, because they have been the 
theatre o f the vast majority o f the east-west confrontations. Second' because it represents a 
drain o f both human and economic resources. Third, because it shapes the contours o f  the 
economic policy in the third world countries. Finally, because it prevents the establishment 
o f both deep cooperation relationships and a new international economic order’275 76 27.
The second mechanism identified by NGOs is the situation o f economic dependency 
suffered by third world countries. The case against economic dependency is summed up as 
follows, * the problem is not the existence o f  rich and poor nations, but that poor nations 
support the rich nations’ .
In this context the dependency mechanism is claimed to operate in two different ways. 
First, through aid conditionality. Aid is supposed to benefit the donor countries since it 
impose heavy burdens on the recipient countries, therefore creating a situation o f 
dependence. This argument is illustrated on the lower-left part o f  picture four278. Again the 
same symbolic representations of the northern capitalist is used. Again the effect on the 
audience, is supposed to be a twofold feeling o f identification and detachment. However, 
the way in which the Third World is represented is different with regard to other pamphlets 
and documents. In this document the Third World is represented by a black figure 
stumbling under the weight of both aid and the debt. The use o f a black figure could also 
represent the black peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa, an image that has traditionally used to 
represent extreme poverty.
Second, the economic specialisation o f the Third World countries reinforces this situation 
o f dependency. Actually, Third world countries are specialised in the production o f  raw 
materials. However, the international market for raw materials is quite unstable. Demand 
fluctuates dramatically for certain products, while the third world countries cannot diversify
275 See Organizaciones No Gubernamentales 1988: * Norte y  Sur: Un futuro común ' (op.cit.)
276 Idem.
277 See Annex I: picture 4: Dependency and underdevelopment
278 See Annex I: picture 4: Dependency and underdevelopment
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their production. Therefore, they are completely dependent on the fluctuations o f the 
international markets. Finally, NGOs argue that northern societies need to control the prices 
o f the raw materials since their economies are still heavily dependant on them (mostly 
energy related imports such as coal or petroleum). The system is unfair since the developed 
states control the decisional forums where decisions pertaining to raw materials markets are 
taken. This vicious circle is identified by the NGOs as the logic o f  developmentalism279.
Thus, NGOs present the following proposals in order to change this pattem o f  
developmentalism:
• First, to reduce the military expenditure both in the developed and underdeveloped 
countries. This would lead to more peaceful relations between the two blocs and 
therefore to new opportunities for cooperation.
•  Second, to redefine the international trade system by:
o Establishing of an international system of prices for raw materials
o Increasing of the number o f export licenses
o Expanding of the industrial sector in the South
o Improving the access o f third world countries to international markets.
o Reforming of the international markets and global networks for products 
distribution.
11.2.3 A new development paradigm? What can regions and municipalities do to face 
the problem of underdevelopment?
For the NGOs the agenda was clear. As we have seen in the previous sections turning 
development into a social question far beyond the control o f political institutions was a 
precondition for finding a solution to the problems o f poverty and economic 
underdevelopment. I f  the task was to engage civil society in the development debate, or 
make economic development o f the south a social question in the North, then all 
institutional levels should be engaged. In fact as one NGOs* document puts it *Institutions
279 See Organizaciones No Gubernamentales 1988: * Norte y  Sur: Un fitiuro común ’ (pp.cit.)
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must be exemplar vis-à-vis society*280. Institutions, therefore, must be the avant garde of 
societal involvement in development issues.
This argument is even more relevant at the regional and the municipal level. Those levels 
are supposed to operate closer to the citizenry, therefore they are supposed to have much 
more influence on citizens’ behaviour, while at the same time they are more open to 
citizens’ demands. Thus, the regional level is an especially sensitive case for the NGOs’ 
strategy281.
However, this strategy was not as straightforward as it might seem from the analysis o f the 
documents. As many informants stressed in the interviews there was a sort of 
4 ingeniousness or naivety in the way NGOs managed this agenda*282. In fact as Andrés 
Basauri puts it, *we were really willing to do things, it d idn’t really matter how or with 
w/tom*283.
Actually, an argument can be put forward that the NGOs* strategy towards the subnational 
levels was partially determined by the response o f other institutional addressees. In most o f 
the NGOs* documents analysed, there is a clear sense o f failure o f  the strategies developed 
at the national level. As we have seen before, the first national-level failure occurred in 
1982. Political parties with representation at the national parliament and NGOs undersigned 
a political compromise which included the following points284:
• To attain gradually the U.N. target o f 0,7% o f the GNP in terms of public aid to 
the underdeveloped countries, according to the U.N. resolutions.
• To increase significantly the amount of funds devoted to development aid in the 
1983 National Budgetary Act.
•  To approve, during the next parliamentary term, the International Cooperation 
Law.
280 See Organizaciones No Gubernamentales 1988: * Norte y  Sur: Un futuro com ún ' (op. cit.)
281 See Coordinadora de ONGDS de Euskadi 1993: ‘Los municipios vascos con el Tercer Mundo. Campaña 
de las organizaciones no gubernamentales vascas para la cooperación al desarrollo ’ pp. 6-7
282 Interview with Andrés Basauri, (cited)
283 Idem.
284 Agreement between NGOs and political parties Madrid 14th of October 1982. Reproduced in:
Coordinadora de ONGDS de Euskadi 1988: * Dossier presented before the Diputación Foral de Alava ' 11th of 
November.
156
This agreement has been described, by the NGOs, in the following terms: ‘...as we know  
paper will accept anything and nothing can make it blush'2*5.
The second national-level failure happened in 1984, when due to the dramatic situation in 
Ethiopia, NGOs developed an aggressive campaign, again claiming increases in the 
development aid rates. As is stated in the document Norte y  Sur: un futuro común, ‘the 
negative reaction o f  the Spanish government to the 1984 campaign made us rethink our 
strategy*285 86. Later on, they add that ‘...even though the Spanish government has signed a 
political compromise, positive action from  an Autonomous Community would be exemplary 
fo r  other autonomous governments and would help initiate the path towards a greater level 
ofpublic political compromise with the less favoured peoples o f  the world*2*7.
The use of the rhetoric of decentralisation can only be understood in the context o f the 
small policy impact o f mobilization at national level. The aim o f  engaging civil society, 
expressed by the NGOs in all the documents does not preclude binding specific institutional 
layers. In other words, although all the institutional layers could be engaged in aid policies 
the NGOs* project was specifically aimed at the civil society. This made regional 
institutions an attractive partner but not a necessary one in the mindset o f  NGOs. At the end 
o f the day, the demands put forward by the NGOs were clearly meant to attain a moral 
compromise that would be binding for society as a whole as opposed to a political 
compromise only relevant at the institutional level288 289.
This search for the moral compromise turned out to be an efficient strategy since it 
provided NGOs with a special allure o f legitimacy vis-à-vis both the citizenry and the 
administration. First, citizenry perceived NGOs as the portaparola o f  the third world. Their 
campaigns were structured along mottos such as: *We are sure that anybody who has a
4 Q A
minimal sense o f justice and solidarity would support this campaign* ; or, 4There is a
285 Idem.
286 See Organizaciones No Gubernamentales 1988: ‘ Norte y  Sur: Un futuro com ún ' {op. cit.)
287 Idem.
288 This emerges clearly from the interviews with members of NGOs in the Basque Country. All of them 
stressed the idea that the main objective of the different mobilisations was to force a moral compromise. 
Therefore, single institutional layers were not targeted since the compromise was aiming at binding the whole 
society. Interview with Alfonso Dubois UPV/EHU and HEGOA Conducted on 10th o f March 2003; Interview 
with Iñaki Markiegui (cited); Interdew with Belén Rodero ONG Caritas Diocesanas Conducted on the 20th o f 
March 2003. Interview with Andrés Basauri (cited)
289 See Campaign 0,7% ¡tienen derecho!
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relationship between the material deprivation o f the poorest people in this planet and the 
moral deprivation o f  those who are mutilated by egoism’290.
Second, those big appeals made NGOs appear as the pure incarnation of social justice and 
solidarity. This incarnation is pure as far as it had not been contaminated by politics which 
was perceived as impure or corrupted. The case for purity was reinforced through 
references to the promises broken by the politicians and the political parties. Furthermore, 
they evidenced the inherent corruption o f a political-economic system that allows an 
important part of the world’s population to die from starvation while resources are 
employed in the reinforcement o f military structures. As it is read in the leaflet 0,7%  
¡Tienen derechol, 'Very few  countries comply [with the 0,7% objective]. However, a ll o f  
them participate in the armament race'291.
This legitimacy allure gained through appealing to the moral values of the citizens provides 
the NGOs with special weapons vis-à-vis the institutions. Moreover, in the case we are 
analysing, the fact that organisations linked to the Catholic Church in the Basque Country 
cooperated with the newly-created NGOs, which emerged from a leftist internationalist 
tradition made their accession to the institutions much easier292.
The efficiency o f the rhetoric strategy combined with their capacity to spread the word 
produced the incredible results of the 1988 campaign, when the Basque Coordinator o f 
NGOs manage to put forward a petition, soliciting the 0,7% o f  the regional budget to be 
destined to development co-operation, undersigned by more than 50.000 people.
11.3 Demand structuring and the politics of Basque decentralized aid.
So far we have discussed the normative frame and the strategies pursued by local 
development NGOs in building up a case for decentralized aid in the Basque Country. 
NGOs managed to create a discourse very much in line with major elements o f  the
290 Pablo VI cited in the leaflet for the Campaign 0,7% ¡tienen derecho!
291 Idem.
292 Most of the informants have highlighted the important role played by religious NGOs in facilitating the 
channels of communication with the regional institutions. In many cases this is explained through the 
existence of personal contacts between civil servants and NGOs representatives. Other informants tend to 
stress the importance of the ideological commonalities among religious organisations and the PNV (Basque 
Nationalist Party). In both cases it is clear that religious organisations in the Basque country enjoyed a high 
degree of legitimacy that facilitated the communication between institutions and organisations.
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dominant system of beliefs profiting from a well rooted structure o f  religious and left-wing 
organizations which facilitated access to the public and to the institutions. This has been a 
common feature in all the interviews analysed, which stressed the existence o f personal 
contacts between leaders of religious organizations and regional and local politicians, 
which were facilitated by the existence o f a shared catholic framework.
At the same time, the rapid constitution o f  a Co-ordinator of Basque NGOs ensured the 
construction o f a single discourse which encompassed the ideas o f  catholic organizations 
and left wing organizations. The result was a pragmatic but nevertheless efficient moral 
case on the need for transforming development into a societal enterprise and the importance 
o f  regional institutions’ participation.
The rhetoric strategy is very much influenced by the institutional opportunity structure in 
which demands were structured. First, declarations of international organizations such as 
the U.N.’s 0,7% target are used as major claims along which to structure NGOs particular 
demands. What is more, the Coordinator o f NGOs managed early on to profit from the push 
o f  a specific campaign sponsored by the European Council in 1988 and bring it down to 
regional arena. Thus, international organizations serve as a source for rhetoric elements, as 
well as for material resources for mobilization and campaigning.
Basque NGOs defined their strategy in terms of the result o f the failure of previous 
mobilizations at the national level. NGOs learnt from the experience of bargaining at the 
state level, but they also use this experience as a rhetorical device vis-à-vis regional and 
local institutions.
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Figure 7 summarises the process o f  demand structuring: First, the single headed arrow 
defines a line o f influence. As we have discussed before, NGOs echoed the discourses o f 
European Institutions and other International Organizations. What is more, they profited 
from the European Institutions campaigns bringing to the regional and local level the 
international development agenda.
Second, the double headed arrow represents a line o f confrontation. The negative 
experiences o f DNGOs in previous bargaining process with the State determined their 
strategy in 1988. They used the State as a negative point of reference. The idea that the 
State was the locus o f obscure politics reinforced their case for the necessity of further 
societal involvement in international co-operation. Finally the dotted line signal a weak 
connection between the Spanish State and International Organizations and the EEC. As we 
have said earlier, accession to the EEC forced Spanish State to establish an international co­
operation system compatible with European co-operation policy. The process o f adaptation 
to the European standards, since it affected the State’s aid provision can be considered a 
precondition of the DNGOs-State conflictive line. Yet, it doesn’t have a direct impact on 
the process o f  demands structuring.
NGOs took advantage of the impact of social mobilization for to put a convincing case vis- 
à-vis regional institutions. What is more, as it is shown in the figure, NGOs didn’t limit the
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range of their activities to the regional administration, but decided to include other 
institutional tiers, such as the Diputaciones /orales (provincial administration) or the 
Municipalities.
The following sections explore the process o f supply structuring for the period 1985-1989. 
Yet, it is important to bear in mind that in these years NGOs, due to the control over 
symbolic resources and the political agenda, were in an better-off position to control the 
institutional outcome.
11.4 Facing the challenge: Basque international co-operation 1985-1989
The Basque administration recognized the relevance o f  the challenge posed by the 
mobilization o f NGOs in 1985 and 1988. Two different ways o f structuring the political 
response by the administration can be identified. In 1985 the personal commitment of the 
Lehendakari (regional president), was enough to trigger the regional administration’s 
disbursement in favour o f the NGOs. Yet, in 1988, the regional administration was asked 
for something more than a charitable solution.
In 1988, the regional parliament approved a legal initiative which introduced an 
amendment in the regional budget in order to allocate 300 million ptas. (1.800.000 euro) for 
development assistance programs giving birth to the Basque Country’s decentralised aid 
policy293.
The new program was ascribed to the Lehendakaritza (Regional Government) while the 
Commission on Human Rights at the Basque Regional Parliament would be responsible for 
evaluating the different projects presented by the NGOs294.
At the same time, the Diputación fora i de Alava and a number of municipalities responded 
favourably to NGOs demands, giving way to a situation in which three autonomous 
international co-operation policies were established simultaneously. From 1988 to 1990, all 
three institutional tiers (i.e. region, provinces and municipalities) developed their own
293 With the support of the parliamentary groups of the Basque Socialist party (PSOE-PSE), the Basque 
Nationalist party (PNV) and Euskadiko Eskerra (EE)
294 See Jose Antonio Alonso 1998: ‘Sistema vasco de cooperación al desarrollo: Diagnóstico y  propuestas \ 
Secretaría de General Acción Exterior del Gobierno Vasco. Dirección de Cooperación al Desarrollo p. 17. 
Secretaria de Acción Exterior del Gobierno Vasco 1997 p.23
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programs in an autonomous way leading to a situation o f  institutional uncertainty and to a 
lack of coordination among donors.
The Basque regional administration’s engagement in international aid programs, as well as 
local and provincial co-operation schemes, at this stage, had been interpreted as a response 
to social mobilization. Informants both in the administration and in local NGOs had 
reduced the role o f the Basque administration so that it merely reacted vis-à-vis NGOs’ 
demands. In the words of one informant, 'the Basque administration never controlled any 
kind o f normative agenda. The role o f  institutions was merely reactive when faced with 
structured social demands*295. What is more, according to a different informant the ‘at the 
very beginning institutions were completely ignorant o f the development agenda, as well as 
o f the possibility ofgenerating their own international aid programs*296.
However, evidence extracted from documents at the regional level shows that the regional 
administration was not completely unaware of the pay-offs derived from engaging in 
international aid politics.
Basque international co-operation emerges in a context o f  progressive territorialization of 
politics. As we will see in the following sections, in the Basque Country this process of 
territorialization took a distinct shape. Démocratisation and decentralization offered new 
political instruments to deepen the construction of the Basque nation. At the same time, 
uncertainty in the early phases o f the construction of the Estado de las Autonomías offered 
interesting possibilities for expanding the limits o f regional autonomy. Yet, both the 
precarious political equilibria in the nationalist front, which led to the constitution o f  a 
governing coalition which included non-nationalists forces and the leading role o f Non 
Governmental Organizations in this period counteracted the possibility of Basque 
nationalists to fully impose their political agenda over the incipient international co­
operation schemes.
As we will see later on, considerations about the incorporation o f  Basque emigration to the 
nation-building project were downplayed in the discourse underpinning Basque 
international aid, whereas, the problem o f  the limits o f regional autonomy (specially
295 Interview with Igor Irigoyen General Director o f International Cooperation at the Basque Government. 
Conducted on the 21st o f March 2003.
296 Interview with Andrés Basauri (cited).
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regarding the issue o f region’s projection abroad) would be more explicitly addressed in 
Basque foreign aid.
11.4.1. New politics, old issues: decentralization, nation-building and politics in the 
Basque Country 1980-1988.
The Estado de las Autonomías as defined by the Constitution of 1978 can be interpreted as 
the first attempt in Spanish constitutional and political history, to implement an ambitious 
project of generalized decentralization of political and administrative capacities.
In the context o f new democratic rules, decentralization created a new territorial dimension 
for politics, the Comunidad Autónoma. Decentralization of Political autonomy and 
decisional capacities permitted the development, not only o f a meso-level of administration, 
but first and foremost a meso-level o f politics.
This is specially relevant for those regions which enjoyed since the very beginning a higher 
degree of political autonomy. The constitutional text foresaw the immediate concession o f 
the highest degree o f political autonomy to a number of historical territories, such as the 
Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and Navarre, due to specific characteristics of these 
territories. In the case o f the Basque Country and Catalonia, the concession o f a higher 
degree of political autonomy coincided with the re-structuring o f  the nationalist cleavage 
within the new politics of democracy, giving way to an unprecedented degree o f 
territorialization of politics in these regions.
The problems derived from the instutionalisation of reforms and the tight agenda o f 
economic restructuring at the national level were combined with old questions related to the 
recognition o f Basque and Catalan nationalities, which had been severely repressed under 
Franco’s dictatorship. This is especially relevant in the case of the Basque Country, where 
nationalist political elites embraced a diffident strategy towards the process o f  
démocratisation and the decentralization brought about by the constitution. Thus, polity 
construction in the Basque Country was a very intense process, since the early years o f 
democracy leading to a set of clearly distinguishable dynamics in which the old cleavages 
were mobilized through the new instruments and opportunities provided by democracy and 
decentralization.
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Elíseo Aja has pointed out that, since the advent o f democracy the process o f  polity 
construction in the Basque Country can be subdivided into different stages. One stage 
would range from 1976-1986; the second from 1986-1998; The last period would expand 
from 1998 to 2005. According to Aja whereas the first and the third period are 
characterized by the radicalisation of nationalist discourse, the second phase witnessed the 
moderation of nationalists’ claims297.
The period we are analysing in these sections, that is from 1985-1989 would fall in between 
two o f Aja’s major phases. Following Aja’s description, the years before 1986 were 
characterized by a radical nationalist discourse, which considered that ‘only nationalists 
were good Basques’. Regional media and television praised traditional cultural values and 
practices, whereas the Basque Nationalists Party (PNV), which controlled institutions from 
1980 to 1986, attempted to merge their nationalist political message with the image of the 
new regional institutions.
The early years o f Basque autonomy are defined by the relative absence o f international 
activities by the Basque administration. These activities were mostly oriented towards the 
incorporation o f the Basque Diaspora into the agenda o f construction o f the Basque 
polity298. In the mindset of Basque nationalist elites the Diaspora had kept alive the 
memory o f Basque political autonomy and Basque culture and language, supporting the 
activities of Basque government in the exile during the dictatorship.
However, the intense process o f  nationalization of the polity was abruptly put to an end by 
divergences within the nationalist front. The PNV was divided on the issue o f the 
distribution of power between institutions within the autonomous community, and more 
specifically between the Diputaciones foraies and the Regional institutions. On the one 
hand, the so-called fondistas, which were structured along the political program put 
forward by head o f the Basque Nationalist Party, Xabier Aizallus, defended the primacy of 
the Historical territories and the Diputaciones foraies. On the other hand, the president of
297 See Elíseo Aja 2003: * El Estado Autonómico: Federalismo y  hechos diferenciales1 Madrid: Alianza 
Editorial pp. 295-296
298 See Pérez de Armiño, Karlos and Irantzu Mendia: ‘Las comunidades autónomas españolas y  América 
Latina: Una nueva dimensión de la conexión iberoamericana. El país vasco. ’ Unpublished paper. p. 13.
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the regional government, Carlos Garaikoetxea, claimed the supremacy of Regional 
institutions.
As a  result of the crisis between the foralistas within ruling structures o f the Party, and the 
president of the Regional government, which according to Aja reflected a deeper 
ideological confrontation among the two leaders, Garaikoetxea resigned and founded a new 
party Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), which gained many o f PNV supporters in the elections of 
1986.
The division in the nationalist front benefited the Partido Socialista de Euskadi PSE, 
(Socialist Party) which won the elections and configured a government coalition with the 
Basque Nationalist Party, giving way to the second phase o f construction of the polity. At 
this stage the presence o f a non-nationalist force in office watered down the conflictive 
relations between nationalist and non-nationalists, as well as the tone of the political 
discourse of the Basque Nationalist Party.
Furthermore, the ongoing process o f institutionalisation o f the Estado de las Autonomías 
added an extra dimension of uncertainty to the process o f territorialization of politics, and 
the way in which old issues could be framed within the new politics o f democracy. Despite 
the exhaustive inclination o f Title V o f the Spanish Constitution, the formula for the 
distribution of functions between different tiers of government offered many questions, 
which required the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, leaving the limits of regional 
autonomy unclear.
A major issue in the debate surrounding the construction o f the Estado de las Autonomías, 
regarded the capacity o f substate units to go abroad. Elements o f this debate had been 
introduced during the constitutional debate, yet the final formula adopted in the constitution 
reserved foreign policy to the State. The constitutional Court initially, protected the 
exclusivity of State’s capacities to command foreign policy. Yet, by 1989 it realized that 
the full development o f  much of region’s capacities included a foreign projection element, 
which could not be curtailed in order to protect the State’s exclusive faculties in the realm 
o f  foreign policy.
The next sections explore how these issues affected particularly the structuring of a 
regional response to the demands of NGOs in 1988, leading to a particular understanding o f
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the pay-offs o f engaging in decentralized aid policy in the context o f a highly politicized 
region building process. First, as we have said before the relations with the Diaspora had an 
important role in early attempts at the configuration o f an international projection scheme 
from the part o f the Basque regional administration. The window of opportunity opened by 
the mobilization o f social actors recast the way in which the relations with the Diaspora 
were to be understood within the frame o f the Basque incipient international co-operation 
schemes.
Second, we analyze the impact of the debate on the foreign projection of constituent units 
in the articulation o f the international co-operation of the Basque Country for the period 
analyzed. As we will try to show, Basque authorities were well aware of the problems o f 
accommodating a international co-operation policy within the restrictive framework o f  the 
Estado de las Autonomías. Yet, as an informant form the regional government puts it *we 
wanted to push our autonomy as fa r  as possible'299. As we will try to demonstrate, the 
Basque government found the formula that allowed for engagement in International co­
operation policies without being scrutinized by the Spanish government.
11.4.2 The ‘Latin-American connection': The link of the Basque territories with Latin 
America and the origins of decentralized aid for development
The relationship between the historical territories, which are part of the actual Autonomous 
Community o f the Basque Country, and Latin America is a long standing feature in the 
politics, the sociology and the economy o f the region.
The literature has stressed the existence of an intense flow o f exchanges between Latin 
America and the Basque Country at least since the beginning o f the sixteen century300.
299 Interview with José Maria Munoa Scretariat o f Foreign Affairs o f the Basque Government conducted on 
the 5* o f March 2003.
Basques participated actively in the colonization o f the Americas, through direct involvement in the 
military campaigns, as well as in the administration and organization o f the colonies. What is more, the 
participation of Basque ship-builders, sailors and merchants was fundamental for the realization o f the 
colonial enterprise between 1492 and 1800 in a context of monopolistic trade practices between the Monarchy 
and the colonies.
The nineteen century witnessed major changes in the sociological structure o f Basque emigration to Latin 
America. The independence o f the colonies altered the patterns of emigration. America was not any longer 
perceived by Basque elites and merchants as the land o f opportunities where one could build a political career 
in the colonial administration. America begun to attract different strata of the population such as peasants and
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These exchanges are mainly structured along a remarkable flow of emigrants from the 
Basque territories towards the Americas.
Yet, the exchange between America and the Basque Country has also an important political 
dimension. From late nineteen century up to the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War in 1939 
Basque emigration (both religious and laic) was increasingly politicised.
This process is intense and complex. The last seventy years of the nineteen century 
witnessed the outburst o f  two civil wars (Carlist Wars) which were especially felt in the 
Basque provinces. The defeat of Carlism forced many Basques into exile. The expansion of 
nationalism, which in many respects resumed the political claims of Carlism, permeated the 
structures of emigrant communities in Latin America. In this period we see the emergence 
o f  a Basque cultural movement among emigrants which resulted in the constitution of the 
first Laurak Bat and the blossoming of a number of publications that dealt with Basque 
culture and language. With the advent of the Spanish Civil War and the defeat of the 
Republican side, many Basques (including Basque institutions) emigrated to America, 
initiating the opposition to the Francoist regime. However, from the sixties onwards the 
Diaspora would play a minor political role in structuring Basque opposition against Franco.
lower urban classes, for whom America offered land, job opportunities and greater possibilities for upward 
social mobility.
Emigration from the rural areas to Latin America is explained as a combination of ecological problems of 
subsistence and a reaction against the process of modernization and the proletariatization of labour attached 
to it. Following William Douglas and Jon Bilbao, Azcona stresses that the role of etxekojaun (or lord of the 
house) was a highly prestigious one whereas those living in the urban areas were referred to as the kalekuak 
(those living on the streets) or herrikuak (those who live in the village), terms that included pejorative 
connotations in the mentality of Basque rural culture. This resistance to urbanization and modernization, 
brought about by the industrialization of Basque economy, would explain why, when the population from 
these areas faced the problem of reproduction and sustainability of their traditional ways of life, in a 
geographical context that didn’t allow for the constitution of new Caseríos, they decided to emigrate to 
America where it was still possible to reproduce the traditional ways of living of the small owner community 
o f  the Basque countryside.
Yet, this explanation has to be taken cautiously for it is unclear the degree to which degree the system of 
patrimonial transmission was extended in Basque provinces. As it has been pointed out by Fernández de 
Pinedo within the province of Biscay different systems of land transmission applied, including the Castilian 
system that distributed equally the land among the heirs300. As he further explains, within the Basque 
provinces there was still an important number of emigrants that choose the incipient industrial areas as their 
final destination. See among others: José Manuel Azcona: ‘La participación vasca en la empresa colonial y 
migratoria Americana (1492-1992)’ in AAW  1992 ‘Historia general de la emigración española 
Iberoamérica vol. 2 ’ Madrid: Historia 16 pp.469-499; and Emiliano Fernández de Pinedo: ‘Los movimientos 
migratorios vascos, en especial hacia América’ in Nicolás Sánchez-Albomoz (ed.) 1988: 'Españoles hacia 
América. La emigración en masa, 1880-1930' Madrid: Alianza Editorial pp. 105-122; Javier Corcuera 
Atienza 1979: * Orígenes, ideología y  organización del nacionalismo vasco: 1876-1904' Madrid: Siglo XXI p. 
65
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TWith the advent o f democracy, the Diaspora was recalled into the politics o f the Basque 
Country as a symbolic representation o f the liberties lost in 1876.
The next sections will explore briefly the role that Basque Diaspora played in the 
constitution o f the early system o f  international co-operation for development. The impact 
of the ‘Latin-American connection’ in the constitution of the early international co­
operation policy is somehow paradoxical. In 1988, when the Basque government 
established the first international aid program, one would expect to find international co­
operation defined as a instrument for deepening the symbolic role of the Diaspora in 
Basque politics. Yet, as the analysis o f the evidence at hand shows, this was not exactly the 
case. Basque emigrant communities were included as an important element in the definition 
of the international co-operation policy o f the Basque Country. Nonetheless, they were not 
the repositories o f  the sacred liberties lost in 1876, but represented a long lasting history o f 
relationships between the Basque Country and Latin America that laid its roots far beyond 
the strict limits o f the political construction of the Diaspora as a symbol. The role o f 
Basque emigration to Latin America was de-consecrated.
My contention here is that in order to understand this phenomenon we have to bear in mind 
the important role played at this stage by NGOs, which retained the political initiative as 
well as most of the symbolic and material resources. In understanding the paradoxical role 
played by the ‘Latin-American connection’ in the definition o f Foreign aid we will proceed 
as follows: First we analyse the process o f  construction o f the Diaspora as a political 
subject. As I will try to show, the evolution from Basque emigration towards the notion 
Basque Diaspora is the result of a slow process of politicization o f Basque emigration. This 
process started in the aftermath o f the second Carlist W ar (1874), reaching its peak during 
the years of the Dictatorship when Basque emigrants were transformed in the repositories 
of the values o f the Basque nation.
Second, we will analyse the incardination o f  the Diaspora in the framework of democratic 
politics in the Basque Country. We will show how in the aftermath of Franco’s dictatorship 
the Diaspora was mobilized as an instrument in the construction o f a diverse symbolic 
temporality, in which the Basque Diaspora incarnated both the liberties lost and an ongoing
168
process o f political repression o f the Basque nation since 1876301. As a result the linkage 
w ith the Diaspora played a major role in the early attempts at structuring a foreign policy 
for the Basque government before 1986.
From 1988, demands from NGOs introduced a major change in the way the relations with 
the Diaspora were to be understood. Basque authorities, in the context o f general restraint 
in  the tones o f  the nationalist discourse, sought the establishment o f a permanent linkage, 
not only with the emigrant communities but also with the countries hosting Basque 
emigrants, and thus leading to a different accommodation o f the Diaspora within the 
discourse of institutions.
11.4.2.1. The construction of Basque Diaspora 1876-1960302.
a. Excursus: revolutions and counterrevolutions, Spain 1808-1936.
Nineteenth century Spain witnessed the advent o f the liberal revolution, as was the case for 
the rest o f Europe’s monarchies. 1808 witnessed the rise o f  the nation in arms against the 
French invader303.18 1 2 saw the birth o f  the first liberal constitution in Spain’s 
constitutional history and one of the first in the European context. The three years between 
1820-23 saw the first attempt at establishing a constitutional monarchy as a form o f 
government. Throughout the century the political institutions o f a more or less restricted 
liberal political system progressively gained political space beyond the limits of the 
collapsing Ancien Régime, In sum, political history of the liberal revolution in nineteenth 
century Spain does not differ from that o f other European States.
301 See Laura Desfor Eldes (1998): 4Symbol and ritual in the New Spain: The transition to democracy after 
Franco’ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 129-138.
302 It should be noted that the analysis of the impact o f the Diaspora in Basque politics during the years of 
transition and the early years of democracy (roughly 1975-1990) could be on its own the topic for a  whole 
PhD dissertation. For this reason in the sections devoted to the analysis of the construction of the notion of 
Basque Diaspora and its impact on Basque politics o f the early eighties I ’ve relied mostly on secondary 
sources.
303 This is the interpretation o f most traditional historiography. As José Alvarez Junco has pointed out, the 
popular upsurge o f 1808 is basically an outbreak o f xenophobic violence. At the same time the conflict is the 
direct result of a dynastic conflict and involved the most important foreign powers, who fought a pan- 
European war in the Iberian battlefield. Yet, liberals in 1808-1812, engaged in the construction of the new 
sovereign political body, mystified the conflict interpreting it as a “national independence war”. See José 
Álvarez Junco: ‘La nación en duda’ in Juan Pan-Montojo (coord.) 1998: *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 
1898 y  la crisis de fin  de siglo’ Madrid: Alianza Editorial pp. 426-427.
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The nineteen century was also the age o f counterrevolution. Traditionalist forces aimed 
throughout the century to bring back the system o f privileges o f the Ancien Régime. 
Fernando VII, who ruled after the defeat of the Napoleonic forces, didn’t implement the 
Spanish Constitution o f 1812 after vowing to it, despite a short constitutional interlude 
between 1820 and 1823, re-installing in post 1808 Spain an old fashioned absolutist regime. 
What is more, two civil wars in 1833 and 1872 were fought by Carlists allied with other 
traditionalists forces against the liberal revolution (not to speak o f the Civil War in 1936- 
1939). In the context o f nineteen century European monarchies this was not uncommon 
either.
The specific marker o f Spanish political history for the nineteenth and the early twenty 
century is the implicit weakness o f both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements 
and their incapacity to implement their political programs. The Traditionalists’ world o f 
privileges, moral archaisms, overlapping jurisdictions, economic disintegration and 
ruralization could not compete with the modem machinery o f the liberal-rationalized- 
bureaucratised State, positivistic reformism and an integrated capitalist market. At the same 
time, the extremely weak implantation o f  the administrative structure of the liberal state 
(which was practically unable to develop any function other than the preservation o f order) 
and the difficulties for the development o f  an integrated capitalist market economy in Spain 
kept alive the dream o f traditionalists’ Arcadia304.
This revolution vs. counterrevolution dialectic extends all throughout the nineteen century 
and up to 1936, through a process o f difficult accommodations and political exchanges, that 
more often than not resorted to (and were the result of) political violence, insurrections and 
warfare, which were seen as the only means of the resolving conflicts in a politico- 
institutional context that lacked the adequate institutional channels305.
304 See Julio Aróstegui: ‘Introducción. El Carlismo y las güeñas civiles’ in Julio Aróstegui, Jordi Canal and 
Eduardo G, Calleja (coords.) 2003: 'E l Carlismo y  las guerras carlistas. Hechos, hombres e ideas* Madrid: 
La Esfera de los Libros p.21.
305 Julio Aróstegui: ‘Introducción. El Carlismo y las guerras civiles’ (op. cit.) pp. 21-28
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b. The antecedents of the construction of the Diaspora 1872-1936.
The revolution/counterrevolution dialectic especially permeates the socio-political history 
o f the Basque territories306. In 1808 the Basque provinces enjoyed a special political status 
within the Hispanic Monarchy as a result o f  the implementation o f the Fueros. In 1939, that 
is, a century and thirty years after, the Basque provinces had lost their special political 
status in response to their co-operation with the Republican side during the civil war. In 
between two Carlists Wars had been fought in 1833 and 1872 and the privileges conceded 
by the foral law had been re-drawn due to the allegiance o f  Basque territories to the 
traditionalist cause (mostly after 1876).
Basque rural elites were, all throughout the nineteen century on the side of traditionalism. 
What is more, when the Carlist cause was defeated in the 1870’s part o f these traditionalists 
elites recycled into proto-nationalists constituting the embryo o f  the Basque Nationalists 
Party.
On top of that, the Basque territories were the scene for the conflict between the rural world 
and the development of a modem urban world spurred by the industrial revolution. 
Economic and social changes, brought about by the process o f industrialization, were 
particularly felt in the Basque Provinces, where the early development of mining and heavy 
industry, menaced the traditional ways o f  living both in urban and rural areas.
The political history of the Basque provinces is caught between two opposing forces. On 
the one hand, the Basque provinces were embedded in the system of privileges and 
traditional mores of the Ancien Régime. On the other hand, an incipient industrialized 
capitalist economy, brought about urbanization and intense immigration flows from other 
parts of Spain, as well as the emergence o f mass politics and workers associations and 
parties linked to an developing class cleavage.
The special virulence of the revolution/counterrevolution dialectic in the Basque Country 
explains the intense process of politicisation of emigrant communities from 1875 onwards. 
Emigrants established an entrenched network of self-help organizations and cultural
306 Javier Real Cuesta ha pointed out that during the nineteen century and the early years of the twentieth 
century the cleavage traditionalism/liberalism structured the dynamics of political participation and 
competition in the Basque Provinces. See Javier Real Cuesta 1991: ‘Partidos y  bloques depoder en el Pais 
Vasco 1876-1923' Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto pp. 11-29.
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associations which worked in favour o f the maintenance of Basque culture and language 
among Basque emigrants. The figure o f the political refugee started to be more and more 
salient among Basque emigrants in America. This process started after the second Carlist 
war, which forced the exodus o f many traditionalists and reached its peak in the aftermath 
of the Spanish Civil War in 1939. On top o f that, the intense flow of religious emigration 
had an important input in the process o f ‘nationalization' o f Basque emigrants in Latin 
America all throughout the period between 1872 and 1939.
The following sections explore the antecedents o f the constitution of the notion of Basque 
Diaspora between 1872 and 1939. First, we analyse briefly the expansion o f nationalist 
ideals among Basque emigrant associations in Latin America. The latter years o f the 
nineteen century witnessed the expansion o f an intense associational thrust, especially in 
the Southern Cone o f America. The establishment o f these associations responded mainly 
to the needs of emigrants in the new societies, but also were the result of what have been 
defined elsewhere as a process o f cultural identification. From 1903, these structures and 
the spirit o f cultural identification would be used by nationalists to expand Sabinian ideas 
among Basque communities abroad.
Second, we explore the contribution o f the religious emigration to the process of 
constitution of the Diaspora. Basque religious and missionary emigration to Latin America 
had been remarkable from 1830’s up to 1960’s. Nineteen century religious exiles, but also 
the missionaries and the clergy-men who opted for developing their religious career in the 
Americas, contributed to the institutionalisation o f the Basque Diaspora in the Americas 
along the principles and values o f  the catholic church, which increasingly were translated 
into a political credo.
The link established between the catholic mores and the defence o f the traditional mores of 
Basque society heavily rooted both in Carlism and Nationalism, pushed many priests into 
an intense political and cultural activism which had an impact on the constitution o f the 
Diaspora. At the same time the activities developed by missionaries and clerics in the 
newly-established American republics triggered an intense relationship between the Basque 
Church and these territories which lays at the roots of many o f  the activities o f Basque 
religious associations in these countries in more recent times.
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• Emigrants and exiles: The political activities of Basque emigrants in Latin 
America.
The impact o f the confrontation between traditionalism (mostly Carlists) and liberalism, on 
the configuration o f  a new type o f emigrant (the exile) has been emphasized in the literature 
on Basque migration.
As Azcona has pointed out, between 1833 and 1872 many inhabitants o f the Basque 
provinces were forced to emigrate, both because of the devastation brought by the war and 
because they were the losers of the conflict As he further stresses, the historical events o f 
the nineteen century, give way to increasing political mobilization that was projected into 
the emigrant communities in Latin America307.
Before 1875, Basque emigrants had joined Spanish or French associations in the 
Americas308 309.Yet, from 1876 (coinciding with the end o f  the Second Carlist War) onwards 
they begun to develop their own associations .
The first Basque centre (Laurak bat) was established in Montevideo in 1876. In 1877 the 
Basque community o f Buenos Aires established the Basque centre of Buenos Aires, 
whereas in 1895 it the French-Basque centre was established. In 1899 the mutual-help 
society Euskal Echea was founded. In 1878 the Basque community of Havana established 
the Basque-Navarre Charity Association whose main task was to provide for economic 
assistance to poor Basque emigrants and funding repatriations310. Later on during the 
twentieth century the associational spirit would extend to the Basque communities in 
Mexico (1907) United States (1938), Chile (1941), Dominican Republic (1940), Colombia 
(1958).
A s it is shown by Oscar Alvarez Gila, the existence o f  a common language and mores 
triggered a process o f  osmosis between French-Basque and Spanish-Basque emigrants,
307 See José Manuel Azcona: ‘La participación vasca en la empresa colonial y migratoria Americana (1492- 
1992)’ (op. cit.) p. 481.
308 An important exception is the Brotherhood of Our Lady of Aranzazu, a charity association constituted by 
the Basque community living in Mexico in 1761.
309 See José Maria Tápiz Fernández: ‘La actividad política de los emigrantes vascos (1903-1936)’ in Óscar 
Alvarez Gila and Alberto Angulo Morales (eds.) 2002 *Las migraciones vascas en perspectiva histórica 
(siglos XVl-XX). Bilbao: Servicio Editorial. Universidad del País Vasco/ Euskal Heiriko Unibertsitatea. p.l 81*
310 See José Manuel Azcona: *La participación vasca en la empresa colonial y migratoria Americana (1492- 
1992)’ (op. cit.) pp. 487-497.
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which found an institutional reflection in the constitution o f  Basque centers from 1876 
onwards. Yet, as he further states, the frontier between cultural identification and political 
mobilization o f the Basque identity was not to be trespassed before the beginning o f  the 
twenty century31 *.
For example, the foundational act o f the Laurak Bat stated that the ‘critical situation in 
which the Country was to be found after the last Carlist War and the loss o f the Fueros' 
laid the roots for the establishment o f the Laurak Bat ‘as a means o f  showing their 
solidarity with a ll the Basques from  the Iberian Peninsula,312. Yet, it was not before 1902 
that the Statute o f the association established the obligation for the directive commission of 
the center to protest against the laws that had abolished the Fueros in 1876. From 1903 up 
to 1939 the center published every year a political manifesto claiming for the restoration of 
the Fueros and Basque liberties.
By 1877, much o f the aforementioned common cultural ground had found in the principles 
defended by Carlism a way o f expressing politically. In the case of the Laurak Bat o f 
Buenos Aires, the defense of the Fueros, abolished in 1876, was part of Carlist’s defense o f 
the traditional arrangements o f the Ancien Regime. Foralism, as defended by Carlists didn’t 
incorporate notions such as nation or people in their contemporary political meaning. For 
Carlism, Basque traditions and liberties were to be respected within a more general process 
of restoration o f the traditional values and mores within the Spanish monarchy. The 
restoration o f the Fueros represented the retrieval o f  the old legal arrangements o f the 
Ancien Regime rather than the implementation o f the nationality principle. Nevertheless, as 
Oscar Alvarez Gila argues, the defense of Basque traditional institutions and culture, 
operated as a kind o f pre-condition for the diffusion of Nationalism among Basque 
emigrants in Latin America31 213.
311 See Óscar Alvarez Gila: ‘Vascos y vascongados: luchas ideológicas entre carlistas y nacionalistas en los 
centros vascos del Rio de la Plata 1900-1930* in Ronald Escobedo Mansilla, Ana de Zaballa Beascoechea and 
Oscar Alvarez Gila (eds.) 1996: 'Emigración y  redes sociales de los vascos en América’ Vitoria-Gasteiz: 
Servicio Editorial Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea p. 178
312 See Reyes Marquez Ortiz: ‘Colectividad Vasca y  asociacionismo en Argentina* in Ronald Escobedo 
Mansilla, Ana de Zaballa Beascoechea and Oscar Alvarez Gila (eds) 1996: 'Emigración y  redes sociales de 
los vascos en América* (op. cit.) p. 128.
313 See Óscar Alvarez Gila: ‘Vascos y vascongados: luchas ideológicas entre carlistas y nacionalistas en los 
centros^ vascos del Rio de la Plata 1900-1930’ in Ronald Escobedo Mansilla, Ana de Zaballa Beascoechea and 
Oscar Alvarez Gila (eds.) 1996: 'Emigración y  redes sociales de los vascos en América’ (op. cit.) p. 179
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José María Tápiz argues that, since the beginning of the XX century, the nationalist 
movement took advantage of the structure o f emigrant associations to penetrate the Basque- 
American community. Following Tápiz, the expansion of nationalism among emigrant 
communities in America presents the following characteristics314:
•  It was an imported phenomenon. That is, Basque nationalism was introduced into 
the B asque-American communities, rather than built-up from inside.
•  It followed a slightly different path and chronology with respect to the process o f 
nationalist movement structuring in the Basque territories.
•  The expansion of nationalism began very early, profiting from the existing 
associational structures in the emigrant community.
•  It is not a linear phenomenon. It was severely contested in specific periods by 
Carlists and other traditionalists, especially during the Civil War and in the period 
1910-1920.
The expansion of nationalist ideology among the Basque communities in Latin America 
can be subdivided into three main stages. First stage covers the period 1903-1910. This is a 
period of rapid expansion in which the groups of nationalists who landed in America gained 
control over Basque emigrant associations, using their publications for political propaganda 
and spreading Sab ini an ideas among Basque emigrants.
The second stage extends from 1910 to 1920. This is a period o f a downturn o f the 
nationalist impetus. Nationalists were contested by non-nationalists Basques, which 
managed to gain back the control of the associations and their publications. As we have 
said before, the Basque-American population was not ready for this new independentist 
ideology. Even if in the early years nationalism had gained supporters among immigrants, 
mostly among second generation immigrants, there were many others for whom the 
Sabinian precepts were not that appealing. Particularly important were the exiles from the 
last Carlist war who despite their allegiance to traditionalists values, similar to those 
defended by Sabinian nationalism, were essentially Spanish nationalists.
314 José María Tápiz Fernández: ‘La actividad política de los emigrantes vascos (1903-1936)’ (op. cit.) p.182- 
183.
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The third stage 1920-1936 witnessed the second upsurge of Basque nationalism among the 
Basque communities in America. Basque nationalists gained, once again, the control of 
Basque emigrants associations, whereas non-nationalist Basques formed their own 
associations.
According to Tapiz, the re-emergence o f nationalism among emigrant communities is co­
related to the position that the Basque Nationalist Party has achieved by 1920 in the Basque 
provinces315. From 1906 to 1918 the Basque Nationalist party extended its political 
presence in Biscay and Guipuzcoa, whereas it slowly penetrated into Alava and Navarra. 
During these years the party established a new organizational structure. It was divided into 
four regional committees and a National Council (the Euskadi Bum  Batzar). During this 
period it progressively gained institutional presence, mainly at the local level, as well as 
creating a dense network of cultural associations and sport and social clubs316 317.
The expansion of the Basque Nationalist Party in the Basque provinces was projected into 
Basque-American communities by two different means: First, through generational 
replacement among emigrants. Newcomers that is, the new generation o f emigrants, had 
been more exposed to nationalist ideology and therefore were more prone to embrace 
nationalist ideology in America; second, the slow process o f  assimilation o f  traditionalist 
and Carlists, due to the increasing emphasis of Basque nationalism on two ideological 
elements that they shared with Carlists, that is, radical Catholicism and the emphasis on the 
restoration o f the Fueros2]7.
Nationalists re-gained control o f many o f Basque emigrant associations. Profiting from its 
increasing salience among Basque emigrants communities, the Basque Nationalist Party
315 See José Maria Tápiz Fernández: ‘La actividad política de los emigrantes vascos (1903-1936)' (op. cit.)
p.186.
316 See José Luis de la Granja: *E1 Nacionalismo Vasco* in José Luis de la Granja and Santiago de Pablo 
(coords.) 2002: 'Historia del Pais Vasco y  Navarra en el siglo XX7 Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, p. 252.
317 José Luis de la Granja has stressed that the during the period 1906-1918 the Basque Nationalist party 
decided to re-formulate its ideology around the motto Jaungoika eta Lagi Zarra (JEL) that is, God and Old 
Laws. The God clause indicated their catholic heritage and the respect for the traditional catholic values 
against the mores brought by liberalism and the industrial revolution. To Sabino Arana the defence o f the 
Basque nation could only be done from a radical catholic perspective. The Old Law clause, is an explicit 
reference to the full restoration of the Fueros, which had been a Carlist claim since 1833 and specially in 
1872. As he further states the structuring political discourse along the JEL motto, permitted the legalization of 
the Party in 1906, yet it left unresolved the question of whether the Basque Country could remain in Spain or 
it should seek its independence. See José Luis de la Granja: ‘El Nacionalismo Vasco* {op. cit.) p. 251-252.
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established during the early thirties three extraterritorial local assemblies (at Santiago de 
Chile, Montevideo and Buenos Aires) and further developed the structure of batzokis318 and 
Basque Young associations in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.
By 1936, Basque nationalists had developed an intense organizational structure. Even 
though support for nationalist ideas among Basque emigrants was far from being 
majoritarian, Basque nationalist created a structure o f organizations and lobbies which 
permitted them to manage the exile of more than 10.000 Basques in the aftermath o f the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). What is more, from 1939 onwards, the Basque Nationalist 
Party and the Basque Government in the exile profited from this structure to keep the flame 
o f Basque nationalism and the memory of Basque political autonomy alive, not only among 
Basque-American communities, but also among exiles in Europe.
Yet, before analysing the constitution o f Basque Diaspora in the aftermath o f the Spanish 
Civil War, it is important to analyse the role o f Basque priests and missionaries in the 
expansion of the nationalist ideals among Basque emigrants communities in Latin America.
• 1872-1936: From Carlist clergy to Nationalist clergy: The politicisation of the 
Basque Clergy and its role in the expansion of Nationalism among emigrant 
communities in America
The relationship between Basque clergy and Latin America has been a long standing 
feature in the history o f  Basque provinces since the sixteen century. The nineteen century, 
witnessed the so-called ‘second missionary thrust*319. According to different statistics, from 
1820 to 1960, approximately 7000 Basque missionaries moved to Latin America. Yet, the 
activities and motivations of missionaries during the nineteen and twenty centuries differed 
radically from the earliest phase, in which religious emigration was mainly connected to the 
colonial enterprise. *19
318 Structure of associations dependant of the Basque Nationalist Party which offer recreational as well as 
political activities oriented to the socialization in die principles of Basque Nationalism.
19 See Oscar Álvarez Gila 1998; ‘Misiones y  misioneros vascos en Hispanoamérica (1820-1960)* (op. cit.) p.
23 .
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Carlism and Basque retigious emigration to Latin America 1876.
Oscar Alvarez Gila has identified Carlism as the most important element for understanding 
the evolution o f the Church in the Basque provinces after 1S68. According to him, Carlism 
was widespread among clerics not only in the Basque country, but also in the rest o f the 
Spanish territories320.
Following Oscar Alvarez Gila, we can agree there was a general perception, which linked 
the clergy from the Basque provinces with the Carlist upheaval. Already in 1869, three 
years before the Carlist upheaval, the Ministry for Grace and Justice warned the Hierarchy 
of the Spanish Church, about the activities of some clergy who, profiting from their sacred 
ministry, were *[...] lightning with criminal ardour the flam e o f conflict\  making it 
necessary *[...] both in order to keep the dignity o f the clergy and to preserve the security
320 See Oscar Alvarez Gila 1998: 'M isiones y  misioneros vascos en Hispanoamérica (1820-1960)' (op. cit.) p. 
51. The Carlist movement was the meeting point o f a set of conservative groups, which shared the defense o f 
institutions and privileges menaced by the liberal revolution. The social diversity inherent to Carlism explains 
the use of a merely anti-liberal rhetoric which lacked more general references to social change. Yet, the 
Church’s support for Carlism in the Basque Country was not as straightforward might appear initially. Taken 
as a corporation the Church never supported Carlism. Vicente Cárcel Orti has claimed that *Spanish clergy 
taken as a whole, was neither revolutionary nor counterrevolutionary. Neither it supported liberalism nor it 
supported Carlism. I t was simply clergy. ’ We can distinguish between the attitudes of the Hierarchy o f the 
Church and those o f the lower strata o f the Clergy.
From 1835 onwards successive liberal policies had limited the power o f the Church in Spain. In 1835 the first 
secularisation process took place. The concordat o f 1851 put an ease to the tense relationships between the 
Church and the State, up to the ‘glorious revolution’ of 1868 and the Constitution of 1869, which brought 
about a new secularisation process and further auctions of the properties o f the Church. On top o f that, the 
freedom o f religion was recognized, even if  the Spanish State remained catholic. These events, and Carlist 
emphasis on the restoration of lost catholic values pushed the Hierarchy o f the Church towards a ‘benevolent 
neutrality' in 1872.
Conversely, low clergy supported actively Carlism both in 1833 and in 1872. The relation of the low-clergy, 
can be understood in the context of an anti-liberal reaction of the lowest states of the Church. Data collected 
for the case of Navarre for the period 1833-1839 show how in the countryside more than the 10% of overall 
Cariists supporters were clergymen, whereas in Pamplona Cariists supporters recruited among the clergy 
mounted to the 22%. The situation in 1872 was slightly different due to the incorporation to the ranks of 
Carlism o f laborers, unskilled workmen, artisans, small owners and merchants, students and liberal 
professionals, which might indicate a process o f urbanization of the sociology of Carlism. Yet the proportion 
of clergymen supporting Carlism remained high in Navarre and the Basque provinces. See among others: 
Eduardo González Calleja: ‘¿Quiénes eran los Carlistas?’ in Julio Aróstegui, Jordi Canal and Eduardo G. 
Calleja (coords.) 2003: ‘E l Carlismo y  las guerras carlistas. Hechos, hombres e ideas' (op. cit.); Julio 
Aróstegui ‘La crisis y la segunda guerra Carlista (1840-1876)’ in Julio Aróstegui Jordi Canal and Eduardo G. 
Calleja (coords.) 2003: ‘El Carlismo y  las guerras carlistas. Hechos, hombres e ideas' (op. cit); Javier 
Corcuera Atienza 1979: ‘Orígenes, ideología y  organización del nacionalismo vasco: 1876-1904' (op. cit.) 
pp. 38-39 and 40-47.Vicente Cárcel Ortí 1979: ‘Ig lesiay Revolución en España (1868-1874)' Pamplona: 
Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, pp. 493 and 508-512.
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o f  the State, to punish those clergy-men who, abusing o f  their ministry, try bring to us the 
horrors o f a disastrous civil war’321.
By 1875, a year before the defeat of Carlism, the relationship o f the clergy in the Basque 
provinces with the Carlist insurrection was even more clearly stated. As is written in a 
document from that period: ‘Los curas y  las mugeres: he aquí la personificación del 
carlismo vascongado. Sin la predicación político-religiosa de los unos [...] los generales 
carlistas no llegaron a acaudillar soldados’ [Clergymen and women: that is the 
impersonation of Carlism in the Basque provinces. Without the political-religious 
preaching o f the former, Carlist generals would have never commanded any soldiers]322.
Despite the propagandists and anti-clerical nature (not to mention the evident misogynic 
tone) of these documents, they show how the link between the Carlist upheaval and part o f 
the Basque low-clergy, was a common perception in the mindset o f pro-restoration elites 
and constituencies.
By 1874 the entente between the Alfonsine monarchy and the Hierarchy of the Church, 
(finally sanctioned in the Constitution o f 1876), reduced the support of the Hierarchy for 
the Carlist options. The restored monarchy could count on the allegiance o f the Church 
which had leaned in favor of Carlist insurrection, as long as its affirmation o f traditional 
values could offer a better position for the Church in the overall architecture o f the political 
system323.
Oscar Alvarez Gila claims that the emigration of regular and diocesan clergy from the 
Basque provinces to Latin America was very important after the Carlist defeat in 1876, yet 
he recognizes the inexistence o f direct sources, which could allow us to measure the 
quantitative impact o f the second Carlist war on Basque clergy’s’ emigration to Latin 
America. Nevertheless, as he further claims, the analysis of secondary sources points to an
321 See Preámbulo del Decreto de 5 de Agosto de 1869 quoted in Vicente Cárcel Ortí 1979:1 Iglesia y  
Revolución en España (¡868-1874)* {op. cit.) pp. 495-496.
322 Fidel de Sagarmínaga: 'Dos palabras sobre el carlismo vascongado* published in Bilbao in 1875, quoted 
in Oscar Alvarez Gila 1998: 'Misiones y  misioneros vascos en Hispanoamérica (1820-1960)* (op. cit.) p. 51.
323 Alfonsine monarchy, restored ecclesiastical finances to pre-1868 levels and abolished academic freedom 
in the universities, gaining once again the hearts and the minds of the Hierarchy and ensuring their support for 
the new King and the system of the Restoration. As a consequence, it was the lower-clergy who suffered the 
consequences o f the Carlists’ defeat in 1876. See William J. Callahan 2000: ‘The Catholic Church in Spain 
1875-1998’ Washington: The Catholic University o f America Press pp.20-25.
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important flow o f Basque clergymen, who choose the Republics of the southern cone,
A
mostly Argentina as their destination .
From Carlism to Nationalism: The politicization o f Basque Clergy from the 
Restoration to 1936.
From 1876 to 1936, nationalism progressively gained supporters among the ranks of 
Basque clergy. Yet, the relationship between the Basque clergy (especially the lower strata) 
and Basque nationalism is much more complex than a simple process o f substitution o f 
anti-liberal ideologies.
The analysis o f the data presented by Aizpuru and Unanue for the province of Guipuzcoa 
shows how young priests (between 30 and 41 years old) by 1931 were clearly filo- 
nationalist, whereas their older colleagues still embraced the Carlist traditionalism324 25.
The table below shows the ideological adscription o f the secular Clergy o f Guipuzcoa in 
1931, using a list published by the Dioceses o f Vitoria. The elder clergy, those between 61- 
80 years old when the list was issued, clearly supported for Carlism precisely because most 
o f them were exposed to the expansion o f Carlism in the Basque country and to the Second 
Carlist War in 1872. Yet, the percentage o f Carlist supporters among those between 41-60 
years old remains quite high, given that these priests were politically socialized in a context 
in which Carlism was declining as a political force.
324 See Oscar Alvarez Gila 1998: 'M isionesy misioneros vascos en Hispanoamérica (1820-1960)' (op. cit.) p. 
54.
325 See Aizpuru, M.X. and Unanue, D: ‘El clero diocesano guipuzcoano y el nacionalismo vasco: un análisis 
sociológico’ in J.G. Beramendi and R. Maiz (comp.) 1991: 'Los nacionalismos en la España de la II  
república' Madrid: Siglo XXI pp. 287-303. The data are gathered using the following methodology. Using an 
official list of the clerics of Guipuzcoa in 1931 published by the Dioceses o f Vitoria, a survey of 20 clerics of 
the dioceses was realized. In this survey the subjects were asked for the political allegiance of the rest of the 
clerics mentioned in the list (671). The inherent risks of the methodology employed by the authors and the 
problem of not using complementary sources, (for instance a documentary analysis of the correspondence or 
other kind of written material belonging to the enlisted clerics) to check the veracity of the results o f the 
survey, cast many doubts on the figures offered by the authors. Yet, the data presented can be used as an 
indicator o f major trends. To this respect, the distribution o f the priests in cohorts shows that the eldest 
clergymen of the list, those who most probably lived the Carlists war of 1872, were, to a great extent, 
identified as Carlist. Conversely, the younger the cluster analyzed, the less Carlists ideals seemed appealing to 
the clerics, who more and more tend to integrate the ranks of nationalism. These findings are (if taken as a 
general trend) consistent with the historiography, which has stressed how Sabinian Nationalism progressively 
substituted Carlism as the dominant ideology in the Basque territories.
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Table 2: Ideology of the secular clergy of Guipúzcoa in 1931 (by clusters of age)
Less
than
30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 Unknown
Nationalist 67,85 46,72 32,61 24,22 11,81 8,57 8,51
Carlist-
traditionalist 25 40,15 58,87 60,94 74,02 65,71 29,79
Other Right 
Wing forces 1,79 7,3 2,13 4,69 1,57 0 31,91
A-poliHcal 3,57 5,1 4,26 7,03 9,45 14,29 10,64
Unknown 0 0,73 1,42 2,34 3,15 11,43 17,02
Republicans 1,79 0 0,71 0,78 0 0 2,13
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Aízpuru and Unanue 1991 :‘E1 clero diocesano guipuzcoano y el nacionalismo vasco: un análisis 
sociológico’ ipp. cit) p. 292.
The comparison o f the evolution o f both Carlism and Nationalism shows how, at least since 
the early years o f the twentieth century, Nationalism can be considered the dominant 
ideology among the clergy of Guipúzcoa. The generation between 31-40 years old in 1931 
abandoned Carlism in favour of Nationalism. As shown in the figure, the increasing appeal 
o f nationalism is clear for the generation who were between 51-60 years old in 1931, 
whereas support for Carlism remained quite stable.
Figure 8: Distribution of Nationalist and Carlist ideologies among 
the secular clergy of Guipúzcoa (age-clusters)
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AThe concomitance between Carlism and Basque nationalism values might helps us to 
understand the prevalence of Carlism in clusters who were not politically socialized during 
the golden years of Carlism. Following Esnal, Basque clergy found in Aranian nationalism, 
an updated and more coherent version o f  old traditionalist ideas of Carlism326. The new 
ideology assumed the old claims integrating them into the socio-political context of late 
nineteen century’s Euskadi. According to her, Sabino Arana’s motto Jaungoikua eta Lege 
Zarra structured the religious, political and cultural beliefs o f part o f the clergy who 
traditionally had supported Carlism and traditionalism327 328.
Between 1870’s and 1936 part of Basque clergy engaged in an ardent defense o f the 
principles and mores of the traditional society, which included not only support for 
counterrevolutionary movements, such as Carlism, but also a defense of the local 
traditional culture in a context o f rapid social change and political instability. Basque clergy 
participated in the promotion o f Basque culture and literature as well as contributing to the 
development and diffusion of Euskera, giving way to what has been called the Basque 
Renaissance2S.
However, as Lannon has put it, ‘the relationship between such promotion o f  Basque culture 
and language and a political commitment to Basque nationalism is no easy matter to 
elucidate. They cannot, o f course, simply be identified the one with the other, but neither 
they can be realistically regarded as mutually independent, either in their historical 
development or in the actual people involved. Dedication to the one was often, though by
326 In a similar vein Femando García de Cortázar Ruíz de Aguirre states, * The political doctrine o f Sabino 
Arana possessed all the elements to stimulate the radical Catholicism o f Basque clergy. The intermingling o f 
religion and politics sanctioned by the nationalist credo, tempted part o f the clergy, who had already 
supported a similar institutional alliance between the Church and the State, that defended by Carlism. Yet, 
nationalism offered new elements: the road to the establishment o f  the Basque patria had to be walked hand 
in hand with religion and a feverous exaltation o fth e  virtues o f the oppressed nation. Thus, the 
spiritualization o f the notion ofpeople proposed by Basque Nationalism, offered newfields fo r  priesthood, to 
Basque clergy~men\ See Fernando García de Cortazar Ruiz de Aguirre: ‘Iglesia Vasca, religión y 
nacionalismo en el siglo XX1 in Juan Pablo Fusi and Femando García de Cortazar 1988: ‘Política 
nacionalidad e iglesia en el País Vasco’ San Sebastián: Editorial Txertoa p. 66.
327 See Mai tañe Ostolaza Esnal 2000: * Entre Religión y  modernidad: los Colegios de las Congregaciones 
Religiosas en la construcción de la sociedad guipuzcoana contemporánea, 1976-1931' Bilbao: Servicio 
Editorial Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea p. 275.
328 Even though the group of curas euskeristas represented a small proportion o f the Basque low clergy, they 
developed a  rather intense public activity, in order to make the public opinion of the time perceive an intrinsic 
link between nationalists aspirations and the activities of Basque clergy. See Maitane Ostolaza Esnal 2000: 
'Entre Religión y  modernidad: los Colegios de las Congregaciones Religiosas en la construcción de la 
sociedad guipuzcoana contemporánea, 1976-1931' (op. cit.) pp. 264-270
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no means always, a sign o f dedication to the other. And among the students fo r  the 
priesthood at Vitoria, enthusiasm was not running high only fo r  cultural
. . ,329experimentation
In many cases, as Goñi Gaztambide puts it, *siendo los sacerdotes, procedentes del país y  
de las bajas clases sociales y  fruto también de su educación antiliberal abrazaron e l 
nacionalismo para proteger la religión pero también porque vieron en él el medio más 
eficaz de impulsar la cultura vasca’ [...given the local social origins o f the clergy and their 
anti-liberal education, they embraced nationalism not only as a  means o f protecting religion 
but also as a means o f protecting Basque culture]329 30. As F. Lannon further argues, the 
Vitoria Seminary did not produced nationalists priests, as the myth o f the nationalist clergy 
seems to point out, nor did they converted the people to the new nationalist ideology. 
Rather, students and priests carried with them the aspirations and loyalties learned in their 
own family contexts or their villages, which they later on incorporated into the exercise o f  
their ministry331.
What is more, the use of Euskera by Basque clergy-men responded to practical 
considerations on the best method o f spreading the Word o f God among the 
constituencies332. Basque language was used by constituencies in rural areas, but also by 
clergy-men, who in many cases had been bom in these areas. Rough estimates put the total
329 See Frances Lannon: ‘A Basque Challenge to the Pre-Civil War Spanish Church’ European Studies 
Review  Vol. 9. Num 1. January 1979, p. 43
330 See Joseba M. Goñi Gaztambide:‘Eliza Euskal Herrian absolutismo antiliberalaren, liberalismo 
kaatolokoaren, nazionalismoaren eta social-demokraziaren garaian (1808-1936)’ in A A W  (1987): ‘Euskal 
Herriaren historiazlir Bilbao, p.169 quoted in Mikel Xavier Aizpuiu and Donato Unanue: ‘El clero 
diocesano guipuzcoano y el nacionalismo vasco: Un análisis sociológico* (op. cit.) p.288.
331 See Frances Lannon (1975): ‘Catholic Bilbao from  Restoration to República; a selective study o f 
educational institutions, 1876-193V  Oxford: Unpublished PhD dissertation p. 381. quoted in Maitane 
Ostolaza Esnal 2000: ‘Entre Religión y  modernidad: los Colegios de las Congregaciones Religiosas en la 
construcción de la sociedadguipuzcoana contemporánea, 1976-193V  (op. cit.) p. 275.
332 According to Esnal the defence of the vernacular language for utilitarian considerations should not be 
conflated with the promotion of Basque language and its codification through written texts and documents. 
Preaching in Basque had been a common practice since the times of the Concilium of Trento, which allowed 
the use of vernacular languages, as a means of counteracting the expansion o f Protestantism. See Maitane 
Ostolaza Esnal 2000: * Entre Religión y  modernidad: los Colegios de las Congregaciones Religiosas en la 
construcción de la sociedad guipuzcoana contemporánea, 1976-1931' (op. cit.) pp. 259-260.
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number o f Basque speakers somewhere in-between 400.000-600.000 by mid nineteen 
century that is, between the 55% and 84% o f the population333.
However, the progressive construction o f  a link between the promotion of Basque culture 
and language and Basque nationalism, resulted in opposition from the hierarchy to the use 
of Basque language, or to the activities o f  the priests in the promotion of the Basque 
culture. These activities were more and more perceived as a threat both to the political 
system o f the Restoration and also to die terms o f the relationship between the Hierarchy of 
the Church and the Alfonsine Monarchy334.
According to Óscar Alvarez Gila it is not before 1895 that the first, self-declared, 
nationalists students entered the Vitoria Seminar, yet, their activities are not very well 
documented. The first documented case o f an abertzale student who emigrated to the 
Americas to be ordained a priest is dated in august 1900335.
Oscar Alvarez Gila has described the activities of the first groups of exiled nationalist 
clergy-men. These voluntary exiles soon made contact with the incipient nationalist 
organizations in the exile, co-operating in their further establishment. Yet, it is not before
333 See Marianne Heiberg 1989: ''The making o f the Basque Nation’ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
p. 46.
334 Esnal quotes the following paragraph from the Real Orden de 30 de Septiembre de 1880 dirigida a los 
gobernadores de Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya y  Alava, which illuminates the increasing concern of the Spanish 
government, already by 1880, with the expansion of political dissidence in the Basque provinces and the 
involvement o f clergy-men: 'E l Gobierno de Su Majestad ha sabido con profundo sentimiento que algunos 
individuos pertenecientes a l clero de esas provincias olvidan a veces los sagraíbs deberes de su ministerio y  
que, prevalidos de la especialidad de las lenguas vascongadas, en las que se les consiente dirigirse a los 
fieles, suelen hacer desde el pulpito exhortaciones contrarias a la Constitución del Estado y  a las leyes 
vigentes [...] con tal motivo SM . el Rey se ha dignado a disponer que despliegue V.S. el mayor celo para 
inquirir los casos en que por parte de los eclesiásticos de esa provincia en general, y  señaladamente los 
oradores que predican en vascuence, se delinca contra la Constitución o las leyes del reino*, [The 
Government o f his Majesty, with great disillusionment, has come to the knowledge, that some individuals 
belonging to the clergy of these provinces, forget, from time to time, the sacred duties of their ministry and 
taking advantage of the Basque languages in which they are allowed to preach to their constituencies, they use 
the pulpit to speak against the Constitution of the State and the applicable laws [...] For this reason, his 
majesty the King graciously order the greatest contentiousness in order to investigate the cases of clergy-men 
in those provinces, and more specifically those who preach in Basque, who might act against the Constitution 
and the Laws o f the kingdom.]. See Maitane Ostolaza Esnal 2000: 'Entre Religión y  modernidad: los 
Colegios de las Congregaciones Religiosas en la construcción de la sociedad guipuzcoana contemporánea, 
1976-193V  (op. cit.) p.273.
335 See Santiago de Pablo: ‘La Iglesia’ in José Luis La Granja and Santiago de Pablo (eds) 2002: ‘Historia del 
País Vasco y  Navarra en el siglo XX* Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, p. 303; Oscar Álvarez Gila 2002: ‘Clero 
Vasco y  Nacionalismo: del exilio al liderazgo de la emigración* Alicante: Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de 
Cervantes, p. 2 Internet link: httD://www.cervantesvirtua1.com/FichaObra.html?portal=21&Ref=7740
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the decade 1911-1921 that Basque nationalist clergy-men were systematically forced into 
exile by the Hierarchy o f the Church.
The Hierarchy o f the Church attacked the expansion of Nationalism among the clergy by 
three major instruments: First, they conceded the Episcopal dignity to pro-monarchy priests 
in the Basque country, who were later on distributed throughout the Spanish geography, as 
a means of showing Basque Church fidelity to the Regime. Second, non-Basque bishops 
were assigned to Basque dioceses as a means o f  counteracting the perils of a Basque bishop 
building a common case with the lower-clergy on the nationalist issue336 37. Third, those 
clergy-men suspected o f  supporting nationalism, were forced into exile.
The most important prosecution of nationalist clergy-men was directed against the 
members of religious orders, such as the order o f the Capuchinos from Navane. Oscar 
Alvarez Gila has quantified the number o f Capuchinos, who emigrated to America in the 
years from 1900 to 1920. According to his data in 1900 only 23 Capuchinos where working 
in Latin America, whereas by 1920 the number of Capuchinos had raised to 95. The 
prosecution suffered by  the order o f the Capuchinos was recognized by the very Superior o f 
the order in Rome. According to him, *Basque superiors, in order to stop the expansion o f  
Bizkairritimo, fe lt fo rced  to extreme solutions, such as sending entire groups o f clergy-men 
to Argentina’321.
Exiles continued their integration into the already existing organizations o f Basque 
emigrants in Latin America. Oscar Alvarez Gila has shown how nationalist clergy-men 
participated in the establishment o f the mutual help society Euskal Echea of Buenos Aires 
taking care o f education, child and elderly care activities338. At the same time, nationalist 
clergy-men took part in the ‘nationalization’ o f Basque emigrants associations. As Oscar
336 Sec Sánchez Erauskin, Javier, ‘Obispos vascos del 18 de julio’, Muga, 84 (1993), Bilbao, pp. 36-43. See 
also Santiago de Pablo: *La iglesia* (op. cit.) pp 303-305.
337 Melchor de Benissa O. F. M. Cap. al Marqués de Villasandina, Embajador de España en el Vaticano: 
Roma, 9-1-1922. Quoted in Oscar Alvarez Gila 2002: * Clero Vasco y  Nacionalismo: del exilio al liderazgo de 
la  emigración’ (op. cit.) p. 7
338 Oscar Alvarez Gila 2002: ‘Clero Vasco y  Nacionalismo: del exilio a l liderazgo de la emigración* (op. cit.) 
p. 9.
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Alvarez Gila farther argues the nationalist clergy-men took part in the disputes between 
Carlists and Nationalists for the control o f the Basque centres in Latin America339.
By 1936, Basque religious exiles and missionaries were particularly well integrated in the 
communities of Basque emigrants, co-operating actively in the establishment of Basque 
centres, in the expansion and maintenance o f Euskera, and promoting of Basque culture and 
history through a number of publications and seminars. On top o f  that, they developed all 
the activities related to their ministry (Le. taking care o f the souls of the emigrant 
communities in Latin America). The advent of the Spanish Civil War increased 
dramatically the flow o f exiled Basque clergy-men to Latin America deepening the 
relationship o f  the ministries of the church with the construction o f  the Basque Diaspora.
c. The construction of the Basque Diaspora: The politics of exile after the Civil 
War 1939-1960.
As we have seen in previous sections, from 1872 onwards progressive politicization o f 
Basque emigration can be identified. This process begins with the incorporation o f Carlism, 
which settled the pre-conditions for the incorporation of nationalist ideals, which expanded 
rapidly among emigrants thanks to the activities of an entrenched network o f associations 
in the American territories.
On top o f that, the massive flow of clerical emigration contributed actively to the 
constitution o f Basque networks in Latin America and to the expansion of nationalist ideals 
among emigrants. The incorporation of Nationalism into the mindset of Basque clergy men 
and the division between lower clergy and the hierarchy along the bizkairrista question, 
pushed many clergy men to Latin America, where a number o f Basque religious orders had 
established been since 1820.
The Spanish Civil War and the advent o f  Franco’s dictatorship further structured, at a 
political level, Basque emigrant communities in two major ways. First, as Santiago de 
Pablo has shown, the Civil War exacerbated the division between nationalists and 
traditionalists among Basque emigrants leading to the rupture o f  Basque emigration into
339 Oscar Alvarez Gila 2002: * Clero Vasco y  Nacionalismo: del exilio a l liderazgo de la emigración’ (op. cit.)
p.10.
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two major groups. On the one hand, Carlists or ultra-Catholics welcomed the advent 
Franco’s victory and the new regime as a means o f restoring the traditional catholic values 
o f Spanish society menaced by the advent o f the II Republic340. On the other hand, 
Nationalists followed the path signaled by the Basque Nationalist Party supporting the II 
Republic, which had committed to Basque self-government in 1936.
The strict division between republicans and pro-Franco Basque emigrants facilitated a 
process of ideological cleansing among Basque emigration structures. Most of Franco’s 
supporters abandoned the associations o f Basque emigrants establishing new organizations, 
or merging into pro-Franco associations o f Spanish emigrants341.
A Republican oriented network of Basque emigrants associations (in most cases controlled 
by the structures of the Basque Nationalist party), together with the Basque government in 
the exile and the structures o f the Basque Nationalist Party facilitated the emigration o f 
more 10.000 people both by offering facilities for newcomers and lobbying governments to 
favor (even by issuing special immigration laws) the entry o f Basque people into their 
countries.
Second, the Basque Government in the exile paid, from 1939 onwards, increasing attention 
to emigrant communities both in France and Latin America, as the repositories o f  Basque 
liberties stolen by the military upheaval of 1936342.
W ith advent of the Second World War nationalists leaned on the allied side, thinking that 
an ally victory would mean the fall o f  Franco’s regime and the restoration of Basque self- 
government. The Basque government pushed itself into a frenetic collaboration with the 
allies and with other movements opposed to the forces of the Axis. The Basque government 
developed an independent agenda o f  diplomatic contacts as a means o f  taking the Basque 
cause out of the vortex o f division and confrontation within the rest o f  the republican exile.
340 See Santiago de Pablo: *La dictadura franquista y el exilio’ in José Luis de la Granja y Santiago de Pablo 
(eds) 2002 * Historia del País Vasco y  Navarra en el siglo X X  Madrid: Bibliteca Nueva pp. 89-115.
341 It should be noted that this process was by any means pacific.
342 See During the Civil War the Basque government in the exile developed propaganda activities in order to 
gain support for the republican cause abroad as well as to give Euskadi a distinguishable voice in the 
international concert See Xosé Manuel Nuñez Seixas: ‘Relaciones exteriores del Nacionalismo Vasco (1895- 
1960)’ in Santiago de Pablo (ed) 1995: ''Los Nacionalistas: Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco: 1876-1960’ 
Vitoria: Fundación Sancho el Sabio.
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This include also contacts with the government of the USA or other nationalities such as 
the Galician or the Catalans.
However, the aftermath of the Second World War witnessed a re-alignment of the allies 
regarding the so-called ‘Spanish question’, that is the survival o f  the Francoist regime in the 
context o f Post-Second World War international relations. The Trumann Doctrine, 
facilitated the re-integration o f Franco’s dictatorship into the international concert, since it 
was perceived as an instrument for counterbalancing the expansion of communism in 
Western Europe.
In this context, the international politics o f the Basque government in exile moved into a 
preservation-of-the-sacred-fire-strategy, giving way to the notion of Basque Diaspora. 
Many Basque nationalists, who had emigrated during the civil war years began to develop 
an increasingly active role within the network of Basque associations as well as co­
operating with the Basque government in the exile in the opposition against Franco’s
* 343regime. .
Yet, the dominant political role o f the Diaspora was not to last. The Basque National 
Congress organized in Paris in 1956, (an initiative from the Lehendakari destined to 
celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the constitution o f  Basque autonomous government) 
sanctioned both the strength of Basque exile as well as the death o f  its political role in the 
mobilization against Franco’s regime. In its address to the congress the Lehendakari 
highlighted the important role o f  the associations, both in France and Latin America in the 
preservation of the political memory o f  Basque autonomous government as well as the 
traditions, culture and language o f the Basque people, prosecuted by Franco’s regime. Yet, 
very little could be said about the impact of the different strategies o f international 
mobilization. As has been evidenced in the literature, the fifties witnessed a progressive 
detachment from the part of exiles from the opposition activities against Franco’s regime. 
In a political context in which Franco was sought as an important ally in the fight against 
communism, the politics of the exile which mostly consisted o f pressurizing western 
regimes, were rendered useless leading to the disillusionment o f most o f the activists 
abroad. 34
343 See Santiago de Pablo: ‘La dictadura franquista y el exilio’ (op. c it)  p. 110.
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After 1960, the rise o f ETA and the death of Aguirre, who was substituted by Leizaola, put 
the organization of anti-Franco resistance in the hands of the organization within the 
Basque Country from 1960 onwards344. Yet, the decline of the political role of the 
Diaspora was not accompanied by a lost in its symbolic value. As it is shown in the next 
sections, the recovery of the memory of the Diaspora in the early phases of 
constitutionalisation o f Autonomous Basque Government in 1978 and the return of exiles 
to the Basque Country from the American territories played a specific role in the 
construction of the symbolic discourse surrounding the transition in the Basque Country.
11.4.2.2 The mobilization of the Diaspora in Basque Country politics 1978-1983
As we have said before, Laura Destor Eldes has pointed out how the Basque Country 
represents an important exception in the overall process of reconciliation in Post-francoist 
Spain, brought about by the process of transition to democracy. According to her the 
symbolic memory of Basque political elites differed greatly from that of the rest of Spanish 
political elites, including other regions with nationalist aspirations such as Catalonia345.
Eldes states that rather than understanding Francoism as forty years disruption of 
authoritarianism that should be erased from the minds of Spaniards, Basque elites 
emphasized that the repression of Basque institutions, culture and liberties had occurred in 
a different time-frame, thus with rather different implications for the construction of the 
present system in 1978.
Following Eldes, Basque nationalism barely referred to the lost liberties in 1936 but to the 
death o f the forai system in 1876 as a result of the II Carlist War. This different time frame 
provided for a different symbolic framework of analysis of the Spanish transition to 
democracy and the institutional outcomes that should have come about after the completion 
o f  the process o f transition.
As a consequence, the role to be played by the Diaspora in the symbolic construction of 
Basque political autonomy after 1978 was not only to bring back the memory of the
344 See: José Luis de Castro Ruano and Alexander Ugalde Zubiri 2004: 'La Accción exterior dc! Pais I'asco 
(1980-2003y  Oñate: IVAP Instituto Vasco de Administración Públicas pp. 86-88
345 See Laura Desfor Eldes 1998: ‘Symbol and ritual in the New Spain: The transition to Democracy after 
Franco’ (op. cit.) pp. 129-138
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liberties lost in 1936 as it was the case for Catalonia, but one of re-construction of a longer 
nationalist Basque political history, in which emigration was the immediate consequence of 
the lost of the Fueros and a long period o f  political repression o f Basque liberties, which 
had lasted for more than a century. This way of understanding the role of the Diaspora as 
part of a broader time-frame o f Basque political history was very much related to the 
process o f de-intemationalization o f Basque resistance after 1960.
As we have said before, the rise o f ETA and the control o f the political activities against 
Franco by the Euskadi Burn Batzar, re-concentrating most o f the decisional capacities that 
up to that moment had been concentrated in the hands o f  the Lehendakari Aguirre and the 
Basque Government in the exile, implied the lost o f relevance o f the Diaspora as a political 
actor in the resistance against Franco, though it retained an important symbolic value as the 
incarnation o f the repression historically suffered by the Basque people.
The representation o f a longer history of lost rights and liberties, through references to the 
Diaspora, served well the political agenda o f the early Basque governments, which 
perceived enhancing the relations with the Diaspora as a way o f incorporating the symbolic 
value of emigration into the broader process of institutional construction in the Basque 
Country, which before 1986 is mainly oriented towards the construction of the nationalist 
arcadia of an independent Basque Country.
At the institutional level the agenda of enhancing the relations with the Diaspora, was 
implemented through an official trip of the Lehendakari Garaikoetxea to Panama 
Venezuela and Colombia in 1983.
11.4.2.3 Basque international co-operation and the Diaspora 1988-1990: The thrust of 
NGOs, the moderation nationalist discourse and the de-consecration of the 
Diaspora.
As we have seen before, the division o f the nationalist front and the participation o f the 
socialists in the governing coalitions after 1986 watered down the nationalist overtones in 
the political discourse o f Basque institutions. This process affected the way in which 
Basque administration structured NGOs demands with the question o f the relations with the
Diaspora, which up to that moment had played an important symbolic role in the politics o f 
the Basque Country.
The mobilization NGOs in 1985 and 1988 brought to the front o f the political debate the 
long-lasting tradition o f relationships between organizations in the Basque Country (mostly 
religious) and Latin America, as well as the increasing concern from the part o f newly- 
established left wing organizations with the political and economic situation in that area.
Most of the organizations, mobilizing in 1985 and 1988 had already developed co­
operation activities in Latin America. The intensity of the ties between Basque 
organizations and Latin America, which in most cases had been structured along the 
activities of missionaries and emigrants all throughout the XIX and the XX centuiy, had 
overridden the strict limits of the symbolic role given by Basque regional institutions to the 
Diaspora in the early years of transition.
Basque regional authorities driven both by the thrust o f social movements and the process 
o f normalization o f  the nationalist discourse at the institutional level, re-defined the 
symbolic role o f the Diaspora within international co-operation. Regional decrees 
regulating international aid funds in 1988 and 1989, understood Basque international co­
operation schemes as part of a ‘long tradition o f Basque international cooperation with 
other peoples, and more specifically with those areas o f  the world in which there is a 
strong presence o f  Basque emigrants'**6.
This way of structuring the role of the Diaspora within the political discourse underpinning 
Basque international aid, de-consecrated the role of the Diaspora. The references to 
emigration do not reflect the symbolic role of the Diaspora as the repository o f the main 
values of the Basque nation, but focus on the exchanges between the Basque country and 
the territories with which the Basque Country has developed links throughout history.
The tradition o f activities of international co-operation recalled in the documents analysed 
brought back the social dimension to the construction o f  the links between the Basque 
Country and Latin America, downplaying its symbolic meaning at the political level. This 
social dimension is structured along a long tradition of Basque missionaries1 activities as 346
346 See Decreto 223/1989 de 24 de Octubre por el que se regulan las ayudas para la cooperación y  el 
desarrollo. B.O.P.V. no. 203 27 de Octubre de 1989 pp. 7068-7078.
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well as through the recent links established by organizations from Basque civil society with j
specific underdeveloped areas that we have discussed in previous sections. |
Nevertheless, the de-consecration o f the Basque emigration did not imply that Basque j
emigrant communities abroad lost influence in terms o f Basque foreign policy and more |
specifically in regard to the definition o f decentralized aid for development policies. j
Basque emigrant communities in Latin America, and its networks of associations, j
continued to play a relevant role in facilitating the penetration o f the agents of Basque j
international co-operation initiatives in the social tissue o f  the recipient countries. I
I
Thus, Basque international co-operation established a  new sphere for the institutional |
relations o f the Basque Country with those countries which had hosted the Diaspora during ^
the years o f the dictatorship. The program continued the path opened in 1985 by j
Lehendakaritza’s earlier contributions to NGOs, enhancing NGOs activities in the countries |
o f the Southern Cone. J
The geographic distribution of aid for this period confirms this tendency. Basque co- I
operation concentrated its activities mostly in the Latin American territories. A  mean o f  the j
64% of the total aid funds between 1988 and 1990 were allocated to projects developed in |
Latin America. *
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Basque international co-operation programs at this early stage followed the path signalled 
by NGOs for whom the Latin American connection had a deeper meaning than the 
construction o f  the Basque Community. Latin America was present in the history and the 
activities performed by these organizations throughout the years. Therefore it is not 
surprising that in the event of greater implication in co-operation activities on the part o f  
the Basque Government, NGOs profited by enhancing their co-operation schemes with 
Latin America.
The only exception occurred in 1989 when, due to the famines in Africa, the percentage o f  
funds allocated to projects implemented in this area doubled (reaching the 30% of total 
funds allocated). Yet, this increase in the funds destined for Africa in 1989 further confirms 
the argument presented so far. That is, that the strong input o f Basque NGOs and the 
relaxation of nationalist discourse de-consecrated the role o f Basque emigrant communities 
in the context o f Basque international co-operation.
As we have discussed above, for NGOs international co-operation was structured along the 
lines of international solidarity and the fight against the uneven redistribution o f economic 
resources in the world. At the same time, most o f Basque NGOs had developed intense 
relations with countries in Latin America. The combination o f the Latin America agenda 
and the fight against poverty worked quite well for the regional administration which was 
interested in deepening the relations with the countries that hosted Basque emigrants 
communities.
Famines in Africa in 1989 slightly altered this virtuous circle. NGOs, led by catholic 
organizations, which were committed to emergency activities in Africa applied for regional 
funds and thus forced the regional administration to partially reconsider its preferences 
within the foreign aid policy realm347.
347 This is even more evident if  we take a look to the way in which the agenda of international development is 
included in the decrees regulating Basque foreign aid. As noted by all the informants, the commitment of the 
Basque administration to a specific development program was rather weak. References to a development 
agenda in the decrees for the period 1988-1990 are rather elusive and in some cases even contradictory.
As we have already seen, NGOs had been able to put forward a development agenda structured along a strict 
separation of international development from politics and institutions, transforming international co-operation
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11.4.3 Basque international co-operation and the debate on the capacity of 
constituent units to go abroad.
As we have said before, the capacities o f the Autonomous Communities to act 
internationally was an important issue during the debate on the decentralization process of 
the eighties and nineties.
During the constitutional debate the Basque Group in the Parliament had proposed an 
amendment to the provisional constitutional text by which the regional governments would 
have the capacity to establish international treaties in those areas in which the regional 
governments would have normative capacities. What is more, the amendment included a 
‘right of audience’ in favour o f regional governments in the event of an international 
agreement that would specifically affect them.
Nevertheless, the constitutional commission adopted a rigid view whereby the realm of 
international relations was exclusively reserved to the State348. This restrictive 
interpretation o f the entitlement to act internationally was further confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court began to settle doctrine in a number o f  Sentences in 1985 and 
1988 referred to activities which implied certain international projection of the autonomous 
communities (international trade, implementation of European law). Yet, the first doctrinal 
stand on international activities o f the autonomous communities was established in a 
sentence in 1989, where it is stated that 'the treaty-making pow er belonged exclusively to
in social enterprise. Regional administration pasted these principles in the first co-operation decrees alongside 
the reference to the Diaspora.
Basque administration summarized NGOs claims in two major points. In first place, the Basque 
administration committed to fund initiatives from NGOs located in the Basque territory. This implied an 
implicit recognition of the relevant role that NGOs were to play in the incipient policy. What is more, Basque 
NGOs were the only actors allowed to apply for funds for international co-operation activities. Thus, Basque 
administration recognized the leading role of organizations in the civil society. Finally, ensuring NGOs a 
proposal capacity and the implementation of projects without any distorting intervention from the 
administration, acknowledged NGOs claims for more participatory and transparent development schemes.
In second place, the Basque administration emphasised the principle o f non-inference in the recipient 
country’s internal affairs. They concentrate on projects related to the most immediate economic needs of the 
recipient societies, thus trying to separate development aid from international politics, as it has been claimed 
by NGOs. The incorporation of NGOs international co-operation agenda confirmed the leading role that 
NGOs had in this early phase of Basque international co-operation policy.
348 See Rafael Bustos Gisbert 1996: *Relaciones internacionales y  comunidades autónomas’ Madrid: Centro 
de Estudios Constitucionales, pp. 48-57
194
the State, which was the only institutional layer entitled to sign-up and enforce 
international treaties and agreements**49. Moreover, the same sentence clearly declares 
that, *the international activities reserved to the State via art. 149.1.3 o f the Spanish 
Constitution, cannot be interpreted restrictively but extensively, therefore, including a ll 
social, political and economic activities that have an international dimension * .
The regional administration was aware o f the consequences that an international co­
operation policy scheme from the part o f a regional government would have for the 
structure of centre-periphery relations in this constitutional framework. As expressed in a 
letter sent by one member of the Basque Parliament to the Coordinator of NGOs in 1988, 
'the legal formula chosen by the Basque administration should avoid any interference from  
the central administration, since the program will be defined as subsidies to NGOs to 
develop international co-operation activities*251.
This way of defining the policy shows that Basque politicians were aware of the need for an 
institutional shortcut to overcome the State’s intervention. Furthermore, it is clear from the 
tone o f the letter that for the Basque Administration, the policy at stake meant far more than 
merely subsidies to NGOs.
This perception is confirmed by the words of an informant from the regional 
administration, who, when evaluating Basque engagement in development co-operation in 
1988, stated: '‘the problem was that there was a high degree o f  uncertainty about the real 
possibilities o f  the decentralization model established by the Spanish Constitution. 
Therefore, we tried to push it as fa r  as we could, seeking fo r  innovative ways o f  
approaching the international realm as a means o f pushing forw ard our own political 
autonomy**52. 3495012
349 See STC 137/1989 de 10 de Agosto de 1989
350 Idem.
351 Letter from Manuel Eguiagaray to the Coordinadora de ONGDS de Euskadi. Quoted in Organizaciones No 
Gubernamentales 1988: * Norte y  Sur: Un futuro común ’ (op.cit.)
352 Interview with Jose María Muñoa, Secretario de Acción Exterior del Gobierno Vasco, (cited)
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11.5. Basque foreign aid 1988-1990.
The structuring of foreign aid policies for the period 1988-1990, is a complex process in 
which a highly structured social demand came up against an institutional structure trapped 
in the uncertainties o f the early phases of autonomous government. This permitted NGOs to 
take the lead in the process of foreign aid provision, not only at the level of implementation, 
but also in the decision-making phase. Regional government had an eminently reactive role.
As we have seen, it was not able to mobilize the symbolic value of the relations with |
Basque emigrants communities beyond the limits of the NGOs’ perception o f this process. I
I
Conversely, regarding issues of inter-institutional relations the regional government was |
able to overcome a predictable reaction from the part of the central government, structuring I
the response to NGOs’ demands in a way that could not be attacked by the State. j
The figure below represents the response o f the Basque administration to demands o f  the J
NGOs as the combination of two major agendas. |
Figure 10: Demand structuring and regional political agenda. \
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First, as demanded by NGOs regional response consisted o f a structured program of funds 
destined to favour co-operation activities, rather than a symbolic disbursement as had been
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the case in 1985. This program was mostly structured along the needs expressed by NGOs, 
such as the enhancement of the participation o f NGOs in the international co-operation 
system and the separation of the co-operation program from any kind o f political 
intervention in the recipient communities (both because o f  NGOs* capacity to spread their 
message and due to the regional administration’s lack o f knowledge of the realm o f 
international aid for development).
Second, the Basque administration managed to encompass its incipient efforts in the 
international aid realm, and the respect for NGOs* demands with the approximation to the 
Basque Diaspora. Yet, as we have seen in previous sections, this was done through a major 
change in the symbolic role played by emigrant communities. The Diaspora was de­
consecrated as a political symbol and had come to represent a broader set o f social 
exchanges. The value attached to the Diaspora went beyond the political meaning attached 
to  it in the early phases of the Nationalists project o f  construction of the Basque 
community. On top o f that, Basque administration co-ordinated aid efforts with a process o f  
enhancing regional autonomy in a context o f  high institutional uncertainty.
As is represented in figure 9 (below), the immediate result o f NGOs’ mobilization in 1988 
is the constitution o f three different foreign aid policies. The funds allocated by the 
Diputaciones ferales co-existed with the regional budgetary provisions and the aid 
initiatives of a number o f municipalities. These three systems were independent from each 
other.
As for the case o f supply structuring at the regional level, two actors play a significant role 
in 1988. First, NGOs had an important impact on the policy definition process. They 
ensured themselves a dominant role in the definition of policy priorities as well as exclusive 
functions in the implementation process. Second, the state was perceived as playing a 
negative or limiting role. In 1988 the constitution limited severely the region’s capacities to 
act internationally. The constitutional framework pushed the Basque administration to find 
a legal short cut to bypass the restrictive legal framework established by the Spanish 
constitution, and the doctrine of the Constitutional Court. As we have seen, Basque 
administration’s legal definition of the international cooperation program as subsidies to 
NG Os sought to limit the state’s capacity for inference.
197
- ---------------------------------------------- ------
Figure 11: Supply structuring process 1988-1990.
European
Economic
On top o f that, a highly underdeveloped international co-operation policy and the lack o f an 
adequate legal framework at national level, generated a high level o f institutional 
uncertainty. Even if  it was clear that international co-operation had important implications 
for the development o f Spanish foreign relations, the lack o f development of Spanish 
international co-operation, opened room for the initiatives o f other institutional tiers.
European institutions do not play a significant role in the supply structuring process. The 
evidence collected demonstrates how regional administration was unaware o f the existence 
of a favorable normative framework for the development of decentralized co-operation 
activities at a European level. At this stage, the impact of the EEC legal framework is 
reduced to the phase o f demand structuring and, in any case, it is always mediated by 
NGOs, as we have seen when analyzing the process o f  demand structuring, or the State. 
This is represented in figure 9 by the dotted line.
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III. 1990-1998: The road to policy institutionalisation.
By 1990, international co-operation policy in the Basque Country was far from being other 
than an interesting political experiment. The Basque international aid program lacked the 
necessary institutional structure to operate properly. As a consequence, the relations 
between the NGOs and the regional institutions operated in a context o f uncertainty.
The first years of the period 1990-1998 witnessed the institutionalisation of the Basque 
international aid system. During this process the Basque Government would try to attract, 
beside organizations, the participation o f other institutions (provinces and municipalities). 
The Basque government soon succeeded in creating an institutional structure, starting 
immediately a process o f reform destined to concentrate decisional capacities in the hands 
o f  the recently created Foreign Affairs Secretariat.
Yet, from 1995 to 1998 the path taken by the regional administration in the process o f 
policy institutionalisation would be contested by the NGOs, leading to a major crisis in the 
international aid system. As we will see in the following sections, the Basque government, 
rather than being weakened by this crisis, reinforced its position as dominant actor in the 
international aid realm.
As a  result o f all these changes, international aid would be reinterpreted. From 1998 the 
Basque Country would put forward a  much more elaborated discourse on the origins o f and 
the motivations for international aid policies.
111.1 1990 A second phase of Basque foreign relations
As Armiño and Mendia have pointed out, *1990 witnessed the beginning o f a second phase 
in Basque Government projection abroad,35\  This phase is characterized by four main 
features. First, it is more oriented towards Europe than the previous phase. Second, it is 
structured along the idea that the full implementation o f Basque political autonomy 
required the projection o f self-government abroad. As Ithurralde has argued, from 1990, 
Basque international projection was structured along the idea that the future of the Basque 
country was intrinsically related to its international projection and to its will to be 35
353 See Karlos Perez de Armiño and Irantzu Mendia: ‘Las comunidades autónomas españolas y  América 
Latina: Una nueva dimensión déla conexión iberoamericana. El país vasco. ' (op. cit.) p. 13
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protagonist within the process o f European construction354. Second, the emphasis put by the 
Basque regional administration on the development of a foreign policy profile, resulted in a 
process o f increasing institutionalisation, as well as a re-definition of policy priorities. 
Third, it takes place in a context o f political distension among nationalist and non­
nationalist forces in the Basque Country. As we have said before, from 1990 to 1998, 
governing coalitions included the Socialist Party and the Basque Nationalist Party.
The only exception to this rule occurred in 1990-91 when the governing coalition included 
only nationalist forces, PNV, Euskadiko Eskerra and Eusko Alkartasuna. The nationalist 
coalition experiment lasted only one year Eusko Alkartasuna co-operated with Hern 
Batasuna (radical left-wing nationalist party and political strand o f the terrorist group ETA) 
in a campaign in favor of Basque self-determination at the local level. As a consequence 
Eusko Alkartasuna was expelled from the governing coalition and substituted by the 
Socialist Party. According to Eliseo Aja, the Basque Nationalist party followed during 
these years a pragmatic path in the consolidation o f autonomy and self-government, 
pushing their political autonomy within the frame established by the Spanish 
Constitution355.
Fourth, as we have seen before, the attitude State’s towards the region’s engagement in 
foreign policy activities had relaxed considerably between 1989 and 1991 as a result o f two 
sentences o f  the Constitutional Court, which acknowledged that the State can not use the 
general competency o f  international relations to freeze every single regional initiative in the 
promotion of their cultural identity356. Following this doctrine the Constitutional Court 
asserted in 1993, the right of the Basque Country, and therefore of all the Autonomous 
Communities, to open a representation office in Brussels, validating ex post facto the 
agenda of Basque country’s internationalization357.
The Court claimed for a non-restrictive interpretation of the entitlement to act 
internationally. To this extent, the Court differentiated between the nucleus o f international 
relations and other international activities with an international dimension. The nucleus of
354 See Marianick Ithurralde 2002: ' Le Pays Basque, la Catalogne et l ’Europe: Stratégies politiques des 
Autonomies basque et catalane* Paris : L’Harmattan p. 192.
355 See Elísea Aja 2003: E l Estado Autonómico: Federalismo y  hechos diferenciales* (op. cit.) p. 298-299.
356 See STC 153/1989 de 7 de Noviembre de 1989 and STC 17/1991de 25 de Febrero de 1991
357 See STC 165/1994. de 25 de Junio de 1994
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international relations would be composed mainly by the ius ad  tractatum  and the ius 
contrahendi, that is the possibility o f signing treaties and agreements with other subjects o f  
international law (International organizations and independent states) and the right to 
acquire international obligations vis-à-vis those subjects. The so called ‘soft core’ would 
include promotion activities and institutional contacts as well as what the legal doctrine has 
labeled as ‘political acts’ whenever they respect the limits imposed by the responsibilities 
reserved to the State. International aid for development fell into the latter category, that o f 
the ‘political acts*. Those acts does not require an explicit legal entitlement, only they 
should respect, as the Spanish Supreme Court stated in a decision in 1988, the limits 
established by the State’s international activities358.
All these elements can be perceived in the political programs of the coalition in office for 
the period 1990-1998. In 1990, during the plenary session o f the Basque parliament for the 
election of the regional president, the former president and candidate José Antonio 
Ardanza, in his address to the regional parliament, defined the creation of the European 
common market and the process of furthering European political unity as the most 
important political challenges for the forthcoming term. Europe was perceived as a political 
space for further development of Basque political autonomy. Yet, according to Ardanza, 
regional sensitivities needed to be better represented in the European context.
The political program of the governing coalition included a number o f foreign policy 
initiatives designed to tackle the risks and opportunities of the process of European 
integration and the development o f regional autonomy. Among others, these initiatives 
included the alignment with other regionalists forces in Europe; pressurising both the 
Spanish and the European institutions for better institutional recognition o f  the regional tier 
at the European level; increasing the schemes o f co-operation with other European regions; 
establishing a permanent representatives office in Brussels to facilitate the participation o f 
the region in European policy-making359.
In 1994, in a new address to the regional parliament as a candidate for Lehendakari from 
the Basque Nationalist Party, José Antonio Ardanza, insisted on the link between regional
358 See Sentencia de la Sala de lo Contencioso Administrative de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. 18 de 
Septiembre de 1987 and Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 10 de Noviembre de 1988.
359 See Diario de Sesiones del Parlamento Vasco. IV Legislatura Num. 4. pp. 7,11,16-18
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projection abroad and regional self-government. The internationalisation o f the region 
included three main dimensions. First and foremost, the Basque government emphasises the 
process o f internationalisation o f Basque economy. This included promoting foreign 
investment in the region, but also, promoting Basque enterprises abroad. Ardanza’s 
discourse in the regional parliament was clear when it asserted that the regional government 
would develop a strategic plan for the promotion o f Basque foreign trade. This plan 
included the utilisation of all the foreign policy instruments at hand in order to encourage 
Basque entrepreneurial sector projection abroad. Special reference is made to the 
favourable impact that entrepreneurs participation in international aid schemes might have 
on the promotion o f  Basque industries in underdeveloped countries360.
The second dimension, recognized the relevance o f the process o f European integration, 
which was perceived as an opportunity for enhancing self-government, but also as a space 
for uncertainty.
Third, the discourse addressed the role o f the Diaspora in the process of 
internationalisation. The Diaspora was not perceived as a passive source of legitimacy, but 
was defined as an active agent in the process o f cultural, institutional and economic 
projection o f the region, deepening the tendency to de-consecrate the role o f the Diaspora 
in Basque politics
The implementation o f this agenda resulted in an intense process o f institutionalisation of 
Basque foreign policy. In 1990, the Basque government created the Secretariat of Foreign 
Affairs, so as to centralize the increasing international and European projection of the 
Basque government361. As Ithurralde has pointed out, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, 
which initially was oriented towards the implementation o f the European agenda o f the 
Basque government, soon included the international co-operation policy and the relations 
with the Diaspora362. These changes will be further analysed in the following sections.
360 See Diario de Sesiones del Parlamento Vasco. V  Legislatura Num. 4. pp. 10 and 17.
361 See Decreto 15/1991 de 6 de Febrero, de creación, supresión y  modificación de los Departamentos de la 
Administración de la Comunidad Autónoma del Pais Vasco y  de determinación de funciones y  áreas de 
actuación de los mismos, disposición transitoria tercera. B.O.P.V no. 29 ZX, Jueves 7 de Febrero de 1991.p 
1358.
362 See Marianick Ithurralde 2002; ‘Le Pays Basque, la Catalogne et VEurope: Stratégies politiques des 
Autonomies basque et catalane* (op. cit.) p. 192.
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III.2 Changing the nature of Basque international aid for development? Efficiency» 
visibility and the early stages of policy institutionalisation.
The Basque regional administration begun to institutionalise international aid policy in 
1990. The main instrument was the FOCAD (Development Assistance and Cooperation 
Fund), a fund established together with the three Basque provinces {Diputaciones /orales). 
The Regional Government was the major contributor; it provided 50% of the total amount, 
whereas the three Diputaciones together provided for the other 50%.
In order to administrate the fund a special commission was established. The Comisión 
Gestora was initially composed by members o f the Regional Government, the Commission 
on Human Rights o f the Basque Parliament and a representative o f  each historical territory 
(Diputaciones)363 364.
The Comisión Gestora enjoyed important political functions, among others, the design o f 
the policy criteria, the coordination and analysis of the projects, the distribution of 
resources among the different projects proposed and the control o f the implementation 
phase.
According to the text of the decree 18/1990, the main scope o f  the FOCAD and the 
Comisión Gestora was to put together the efforts of different institutions in the Basque 
Country. As it is stated *the traditional solidarity efforts to which the Basque People has 
historically been committed, had been reproduced in the different co-operation programs 
that the Basque government, as well as the Diputaciones Forales and local governments, 
had developed. A fter an initial stage in which those programs had been implemented 
individually but co-ordinately, it is now necessary to integrate them in a unique fund as to 
manage more efficiently the resources at h a n d ,364.
As we have seen, in 1990 there was a  multiplicity o f donors the Basque Country. 
According to one informant, at this point, a process o f progressive centralization of the 
management o f aid funds begun365.
363 See Decreto 18/1990 de 30 de Enero por el que se crea la Comisión Gestora del Fondo para la 
Cooperación y  Ayuda al Desarrollo del Tercer Mundo y  la Comisión Técnica de Apoyo y  Asistencia a la 
misma. B.O.P.V. no. 34. 15 de Febrero de 1990 pp. 1074-1076.
364 Idem..
365 Interview with Alfonso Dubois (cited)
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He argued that, the benefits of engaging in foreign aid policies could not easily be 
reconciled with an efficient management o f the resources, since this implied that some 
actors would enlarge their role while others would simply fade away. Institutions were 
reluctant to loose the recently gained visibility among constituencies. In fact, as he further 
argued, despite the constitution o f the FOCAD, both provincial and local administrations 
kept their own international aid programs.
The establishment o f the Autonomous Communities system introduced regional institutions 
into a centralized political system which traditionally has been divided into provinces and 
municipalities. It has been argued elsewhere that whereas the implementation o f the 
constitutional provisions favoured decentralization from State to the regional level, it re­
concentrated power and resources in regional institutions, drying the local and provincial 
levels out o f  capacities366.
The case o f  the Basque Country is different The Diputaciones forales, thanks to then- 
special constitutional status, enjoy a wider range of political functions and economic 
resources than any other province in Spain. What is more the Diputaciones have a longer 
historical pedigree vis-à-vis the regional government, which was established in the 
twentieth century367. The Basque-country operates internally as a quasi-federation of 
historical territories in which the Diputaciones forales enjoy important functions.
As we have said before, NGOs put demands in front o f all the institutional tiers. The 
regional government, the Diputaciones forales and municipalities implemented diverse 
political responses to those demands. Yet, the way in which this response was perceived 
differed radically from one institutional level to the other. Whereas, for the regional 
government, NGOs mobilization opened an opportunity structure to push forward the limits
366 See Elíseo Aja: ‘Spain: Nations, Nationalities and Regíons’ in John Loughlin (ed.) 2001: 'Subnational 
Democracy in the European Union' Oxford: Oxford Uníversity Press pp. 239-240
367 See Luis Elicegui Mendizábal: ‘Las instituciones forales’ in AA.VV. 1991: ‘Estudios sobre el Estatuto de 
Autonomía del País Vasco: Actas de las If*  Jomadas de Estudio sobre el Estatuto de Autonomía celebradas 
en Donosita~San Sebastián los días 11,12,13 y  14 de diciembre de 1990. Vol. III E l sistema institucional’ 
Oñati: Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública, pp. 1463-500 and Elíseo Aja 2003: *£/ Estado Autonómico: 
Federalismo y  hechos diferenciales’ (op. cit.) pp. 195-196
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o f  Basque political autonomy, for provincial and local authorities the issues at stake were 
related to political visibility and ad intra political action368.
Observers have pointed to a trade-off between visibility and efficiency in the configuration 
o f the Basque system of international co-operation. Whereas, according to the efficiency 
criteria, aid efforts should be unified in order to improve the implementation of aid 
programs, the visibility criteria put differentiation at the centre of the stage, in a political 
context in which foreign aid had gained saliency among constituencies.
The way in which different institutions within the Basque Country dealt with the political 
implications o f the above mentioned trade-offs is an indicator of the impact that the 
visibility criteria had for these institutions. Whereas, for provincial institutions, due to the 
important powers they enjoy, visibility was not a pressing issue in the political agenda, for 
local institutions, differentiating their political response to constituencies demands on 
international co-operation issues, from that of other tiers of government, implied an extra- 
injection o f visibility that could not be easily sacrificed in the altar of efficiency369.
Increasing interest from the part of regional institutions in the construction of an 
international profile implied the institutionalisation of the regional foreign aid system. The 
Diputaciones f orales, which controlled important economic resources in the Basque 
Country, could override the trade-off between efficiency and visibility, co-operating within 
regionally dominated structures, such as the FOCAD, while maintaining their own aid 
programs.
Conversely, the trade-off between efficiency and visibility was much more demanding for 
municipalities. Municipalities could allocate a very limited amount of funds, as subsidies to 
NGOs. Making the most out of them implied that local governments had to remain visible 
vis-à-vis local NGOs and other institutional tiers. Thus, this limited local governments 
capacity of participating in broader co-operation schemes such as the FOCAD.
368 This hypothesis is confirmed in the analysis of the decrees regulating aid activities at the provincial and 
local level. The documents from the three Diputaciones /orales as well as those of the major city councils 
(Vitoria, Bilbao and San Sebastian) show how both institutional tiers structured the political discourse along 
the lines of NGOs normative claims analyzed in previous sections, whereas there are no explicit or implicit 
references to other political issues, such as relations with the recipient countries, relations with emigrant 
communities or the identity o f the territories.
369 See Interview with Alfonso Dubois (cited)
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As a result, the situation o f international co-operation in the Basque Country from 1991 up 
to 2000 would be the following. First, an overarching program, structured along the 
FOCAD, which included the regional government and the Diputaciones forales. This 
program, controlled by the regional government which was the major partner, progressively 
gained saliency (so much so that generally speaking it has been identified with Basque 
Country’s international co-operation). Second, at the provincial level the Diputaciones 
forales, despite their contribution to the FOCAD continued to implement their own 
schemes o f subsidies to NGOs. Third, the local level, municipalities, which remained 
outside the FOCAD, maintained their own subsidies for international co-operation.
From 1991 onwards, the Basque Government’s role as the major aid donor within the 
FOCAD system, allowed it to progressively re-define the administrative structure in charge 
of international aid, making it more and more dependant on the Foreign Affairs Secretariat, 
the ‘Foreign affairs ministry’ of the Basque government. The next sections will illustrate 
this process in more detail370.
III.3 1991-1996: Asserting the centrality of Basque government.
As we have said before, from 1991 the Basque Government put international co-operation 
increasingly in the hands of the Foreign Affairs Secretariat. This was done basically 
through a number o f modifications that would progressively reduce the independence and 
the decisional capacities of the Comisión Gestora vis-à-vis the regional government.
The first o f these modifications took place in 1991. As stated in the Decree 411/1991371, 
broader reform of the Basque administration compelled an adaptation of the structure 
designed in 1990 to implement decentralized aid. More specifically, changes implied the 
participation in the Comisión Gestora o f the Directorate for Relations with the Diaspora 
and International Co-operation, as a  representative of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.
370 It is worth noting that 1990 establishes the landmark for further evolutions o f the Basque international aid 
system. Basque government international aid evolves from an initial phase in which, the policy can be defined 
mostly as a subsidising activity, towards a  more institutionalised structure o f implementation, thus plainly 
entering the realm of international politics. To this respect, the decrees we have just analysed represent the 
constitutive moment for the Basque system of international co-operation.
371 See Decreto 411/1991 de 9 de Julio de modificación del decreto por el que se crea la Comisión Gestora 
del Fondo para la Cooperación y  Ayuda al Desarrollo del Tercer Mundo y  la Comisión Técnica de Apoyo y  
Asistencia a la misma. B.O.P.V. no. 152 Julio 1991 pp. 6041-6042.
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This reform allowed the Basque administration to extend control over the works o f the 
Comisión Gestora, as well as helping to ensure further co-ordination with the rest o f the 
international activities of the Basque administration, mostly the co-ordination o f 
international aid and the relations with the Diaspora, since both activities were directed by 
the same person.
Yet, the Comisión Gestora kept its most important functions unaltered, remaining the most 
important organ in the definition o f Basque international co-operation policy. Indeed, it can 
be said that up to this moment the Comisión Gestora remained a separate organ from the 
administrative structure of both the Basque Administration and the Diputaciones 
F  or ales112.
The second reform affecting the Comisión Gestora took place in 1995 when the Basque 
government decided to split the Directorate for relations with the Diaspora and international 
co-operation, into two different organs372 73; one concerned with the relations with the 
Diaspora and the other in charge o f the international development co-operation policy. The 
specific competencies of the Directorate for Development Cooperation were defined as 
follows374:
•  Definition, coordination and implementation o f assistance projects in the following 
areas: economic development, culture and R&D,
• Realisation o f different initiatives o f cooperation with other public and private 
organisms inside and outside the Basque Country.
• Promotion and formation of specialized staff in international co-operation for 
development.
• Promotion o f coordination among different institutional layers.
• Design of instruments to improve policy efficiency.
372 See José Tomás Caipi, Luis Femando Colomer Queipo and Lucía Irusta Aguirre 1997: ‘La cooperación 
descentralizada al desarrollo desde los gobiernos regionales y  locales’ Valencia: Agencia Española de 
Cooperación Internacional pp. 98-103
373 See Decreto 305/1995 de 20 de Junio por el que se establece la estructura orgánica y  fimcional de la 
Presidencia del Gobiemo-Lehendakaritza. B.O.P.V. no. 132 12 de Julio de 1995 pp. 8204-8214.
374 See José Antonio Alonso 1998: 'Sistema vasco de cooperación al desarrollo: Diagnóstico y  propuestas1 
(op.cit)
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•  Elaboration o f the proposal for the decree regulating regional aid for cooperation.
•  Implementation of the approved decree.
The formal separation helped to further clarify, at least at the institutional level, the 
distinction between international co-operation and relations with the Diaspora, which, up to 
that moment, had been difficult to define in terms of institutional design and political will.
At the same time, the decree 223/1995 further extended the position of dominance o f the 
Foreign Affairs Secretariat with respect to the Comisión Gestora, since it reduced most of 
its functions to consultancy and proposal capacities, thus reserving the final decision to the 
Foreign Affairs Secretariat, and more specifically to the Directorate of International co-
. 37«
operation .
This evolution is further confirmed when the decree 57/1996 introduces the figure o f the 
perceptive report o f the Directorate o f  International Co-operation. According to the 
document, the Comisión Gestora, before proposing the distribution of funds among the 
projects presented, should attend the report o f the Director o f  international co-operation. 
Through this report the Directorate o f  Development co-operation, and indirectly the 
Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, would have an input into the deliberative process, settling 
the major priorities on which to base the distribution of funds.
However, it should be noted that the process o f concentrating the international activities of 
the Basque administration, and therefore international co-operation, in the hands o f a 
single organism was not as straightforward as it might seem from the analysis o f legal 
documents.
Parties o f the governing coalition raised up strong criticism on the way in which the Basque 
Nationalist party was using the Secretariat o f Foreign Affairs for its own political purposes. 
The debate was specially strong between the Basque Nationalist Party and the Socialist 
Party.
In 1992 the Socialist Party controlled the regional ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Consumption. The activities of this ministry had an obvious international dimension, since 375
375 See Decreto 233/1995, de 11 de abril, por el que se regula la Comisión Gestora del Fondo para la 
Cooperación y  Ayuda al Desarrollo del Tercer Mundo y  la Comisión Técnica de Apoyo y  Asistencia a la 
misma, B.O.P.V no. 90 Mayo 1995 pp. 5265-5267.
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they relied on the capacity o f the ministry to promote the Basque Country abroad in order 
to attract tourism to the region, or to develop an strategy o f  internationalisation o f  the 
Basque productive sector, in order to enhance the regional balance of trade.
The conflict arises, when the ministry o f Trade, Tourism and Consumption noted that 
important activities o f economic promotion of the region were undertaken by the Foreign 
Affairs Secretariat and the Lehendakari. According to Rosa Diez, minister o f Tourism, 
Trade and Consumption by that time, this implied that the activities of her ministry would 
be somehow conditioned by the political agenda of the Basque Nationalist Party and the 
Foreign Affairs Secretariat.
At the same time, the Foreign Affairs Secretariat claimed that, the many of the activities 
developed by the regional ministry o f  Trade, Tourism and Consumption, were not co­
ordinated with the rest o f the foreign activities of the Basque Government, thus, in order to 
keep the unity o f Basque foreign projection, it would be advisable that only one ministry 
should have the capacity to implement all the activities which implied foreign projection.
Yet, the socialists counter argued that trying to centralize all regional activities with an 
international dimension in a single regional ministry implied de facto  to empty out the 
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Consumption of a significant part of its most important 
functions, and accused the Basque Nationalist Party of trying politicise the foreign 
projection o f the region. The crisis reach to the top when the parliamentary group o f the 
Socialist Party, together with other parties from the opposition questioned in the Regional 
Parliament the foreign activities o f the Lehendakaritza.
The crisis was overcome in 1993 by the creation of a special Coordination Unit in which all 
the Ministries of the Basque Government were represented. The creation o f the 
Coordination Unit ease the relationships between the coalition partners, since it provided 
for an institutional space where the different ministries could discuss specific policy 
strategies and settle policy priorities for a number of activities, specially those related to the 
promotion o f the Basque Country abroad.
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111.4 1996-1998: A Revival of NGOs? Mobilization and crisis in Basque development 
co-operation.
The period 1996-1998 witnessed a remarkable increase in the amount of funds allocated by 
the Basque government and the Diputaciones Forales to decentralized aid for development 
schemes. As shown in the figure below, from 1996 to 1998 the total amount of funds grew 
steadily in this period, increasing from 2309 to 4500 million ptas. This progressive increase 
had already started in 1994. The period 1996-1999, witnessed the consolidation o f this 
trend.
However, 1996-1998 was also a period o f turbulences for Basque international 
development co-operation policy. These turbulences affected the relationship between the 
Basque Government and NGOs and were the result o f  NGOs’ negative reaction to a new 
decree o f the Basque administration which granted access to public funds for business 
associations in the Basque Country.
Figure 12: Evolution of total expenditure 1988-2002
Source: Basque Go
V em m « « ,D ir e ctorate o f Development Cooperation and AECI.
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111.4.1 Allowing for other actor’s participation. The link between foreign aid and the 
promotion of Basque entrepreneurial sector in underdeveloped countries.
The decree 58/1996376, in its article 2, granted other actors such as Universities, 
professional associations, co-operatives and business associations, the right to access public 
funds to develop international co-operation activities. The second paragraph o f art. 2 stated 
that in every case these juridical persons should use regional funds to develop non-profit 
activities. This was interpreted as an step forward in the process o f institutionalising a real 
international co-operation system. In the words of Josu Legarreta, ‘[the inclusion o f non- 
NGOs actors] was inspired by the idea that the diversity and the complexity o f  the problems 
o f  the South implied the participation ofdifferent social agents’377.
For the regional administration, making room for the participation of other actors was 
interpreted as a way o f enhancing the competition among actors, thus avoiding the perils o f 
NGOs’ monopolization of regional funds. In the words o f an informant from the regional 
administration, ‘NGOs had tried to create an specific sphere fo r  action through the 
monopolization o f  regional funds. This voracity can be understood in terms o f the very 
necessities o f  NGOs as organizations*378.
Nevertheless, as shown in the table on funds distribution among different partners, local 
enterprises and co-operatives had already been included in 1991 and 199237*. We have to 
wait until 1993 to find an explicit reference in the regional decrees to the participation o f 
public entities and co-operatives380. This formal recognition coincides with an increment of
376 See Decreto 58/J996 de 26 de Marzo por el que se regulan y  convocan las ayudas a proyectos con cargo 
a l FOCAD para la Cooperación y  Ayuda al desarrollo para 2996, B.O.P.V. no. 7 2 Abril 1996 pp. 6245- 
6361.
377 Sec Legarreta, Josu: ‘La cooperación pública Vasca’; Revista Española de Desenrollo y  Cooperación. 
No.3. 1998. p. 102.
378 Interview with José María Muñoa (cited)
379 However, these actors were not officially recognized as partncrs. See Decreto 352/1991 de 28 de Mayo por 
el que se regulan las ayudas para la cooperación y  el desarrollo para 1991. B.O.P.V. no.l 15 Junio de 1991 
and Decreto 74/1992, de 31 de Marzo, por el que se regulan las ayudas para la cooperación y  el desarrollo 
para  1992. B.O.P.V. no.78 Abril de 1992.
380 See Decreto 57/1993 de 2 de Marzo, por el que se regulan las ayudas para la cooperación y  el desarrollo 
para  1993. B.O.P.V. no. 65 Abril de 1993 pp. 2835-2876.
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the amount o f aid channelled through these partners, but it did not imply a dramatic 
increment in the number of non-NGO partners involved381.
As we have seen before, in the debate for the election o f the regional president on the 29th 
December 1994, the candidate José Antonio Ardanza stated that his government would 
utilize all the foreign policy instruments at hand to promote the internationalisation o f  the 
Basque economy. Furthermore, the Basque administration would promote the participation 
of Basque enterprises in Basque international co-operation as a  means of encompassing the 
humanitarian objectives of international co-operation within mutually benefiting activities 
and the expansion o f Basque enterprises in developing countries382.
Figure 13: Evolution of exports to Latin America as a percentage 
of Basque Country total exports 1990-2003
years
Source: EUSTAT
381 The 24,3% of the total expenditure was implemented through SAIOLAN S.L., which got funds for two 
different projects, one in Venezuela and the other one in Argentina in the same year. This means that the 
72,9% of the total expenditure channelled through non-NGOs actors was destined to fund the projects 
presented by SAIOLAN S.L. See Secretaria de Acción Exterior del Gobiemo Vasco, 1997: * Memoria 1988- 
1997 Cooperation publica Vasca. Ayudas al tercer M undo' {op.tit.) p.132.
382 See Diario de Sesiones del Parlamento Vasco. V Legislatura. No. 4 p.17 (op. tit.)
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From 1990 to 1994 the volume o f economic exchange between Latin America and the 
Basque Country had grown steadily. As it is shown in the graphic above, Basque exports to 
Latin America grew from approximately 5,53% of total exports in 1990 to 12,34% in 1994.
The increasing level o f  commercial exchanges between Basque Country and Latin 
America, which already by 1992 showed a positive balance of trade in favour o f the Basque 
Country’s export sector (see graphic below), pushed the Basque government to create an 
institutional structure that would help Basque enterprises to further penetrate Latin 
American markets.
First, the Basque Government together with the Euskal Etxeak/Casas Vase as (Basque 
Houses) established four Basque-American Institutes: the Basque-Argentinean Institute for 
Co-operation and Development, the Basque-Chilean Foundation for Co-operation and 
Development; The Basque-Venezuelan Institute for Co-operation Eguzki and the Basque- 
Mexican institute for Development383.
Figure 14: Evolution of the balance of trade between the Basque 
country and Latin America 1990-2003
Source: EUSTAT
383
See Karlos Pérez de Armiño and Irantxu Mendia: 'Las comunidades autónomas españolas y  América 
Latina: Una nueva dimensión de la conexión iberoamericana. El país vasco ’ (op.cit) p.16.
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Ardanza’s program for the expansion o f Basque trade through the incorporation o f the 
Basque entrepreneurial sector into the international co-operation system, announced in his 
address to the regional parliament by the end of 1994, was oriented towards furthering the 
intense economic relationship between Latin America and the Basque Country. Data for the 
years 1995-1998, shows a steady increase from 7’8% to 9,6% of total trade and an 
increasingly favourable balance of trade, which by 1998 mounted to 700 million euros, 
turning Latin America into the second most important market for Basque export sector.
Second, the entrepreneurial sector was introduced as an official partner o f Basque 
international co-operation in the decree 58/1996. This produced an increase in the number 
of non-NGO partners, including not only cooperatives, but also Basque enterprises, 
Universities and public bodies such as the Ente Vasco de la Energia (Basque Entity for the 
Energy) and the Basque public Television (EITB). (See table below) 384
Table 3: Distribution of aid among different actors384.
NGOs Other actors Education Direct agreements Emergency aid Total
1988 95,7 4,3 100
1989 98,1 1,9 100
1990 96,5 U 2,2 100
1991 86,5 6,8 1,5 5,2 100
1992 85,7 .4,8 0,3 4,1 5,1 100
1993 61,1 33,4 1,2 4,3 100
1994 87,1 6,1 1,4 5,4 100
1995 77,3 6,8 1,8 9 5,1 100
1996 60,4 20,3 2,4 11,9 5 100




2001 76,88 13,38 9,74 100
2002 83,50 5,75 10,75 100
Sources: For the period 1988-1997 José Antonio Alonso 1998 (op.cit). For the period 2001-2002 Basque 
Government Directorate of Development Cooperation, 2002: Informe sobre la resolución de la convocatoria 
de ayudas a proyectos con cargo al FOCAD 2002 ' Vitoria-Gasteiz.
384 From the year 2001 onwards, the Basque governments changed the parameters, thus they classify the 
projects in three main categories. Those categories are Chapter 1 DNGOs; Chapter II Other actor; Chapter III 
Education for development Emergency aid and Direct investments just disappear from public data-sets. In 
any case, the tendency of the Basque Government to distribute most of the aid among the DNGOs remains 
stable.
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However, the analysis of the list o f partners from 1996 up to 2002, demonstrates how the 
measures taken in the regional decree 58/1996 had little impact in the expansion o f the 
entrepreneurial sector in Latin America or any other destination o f Basque foreign aid. 
Most of the activities developed by entrepreneurs were undertaken by consulting 
enterprises and a handful of cooperatives. Overall, the degree o f penetration through aid 
activities and the continuity of these activities in a broader time frame is very low. Out o f 
the 720 projects financed by the FOCAD for the period 1996-2002 only 19 were 
implemented by enterprises or cooperatives.
Comparing different destinations, the implementation of aid projects through private 
sectors was numerically more important in Latin America than anywhere else. Fourteen out 
492 projects implemented in the area during this period (1996-2002) were undertaken by 
actors in the private sector. Yet, an important amount o f the projects developed by 
enterprises or co-operatives were implemented in the Basque Country. Four out fourteen 
projects implemented in the Basque Country from 1996 to 2002 were implemented by 
Basque cooperatives. These projects were mostly oriented to consulting and know-how 
promotion activities.
In summary, whereas Basque international co-operation didn’t have a strong impact on the 
process of internationalisation of Basque enterprises, the introduction of the Basque 
entrepreneurial sector as a partner within the FOCAD system raised a wave of protests 
among the traditional partners o f the regional administration, that would have further 
consequences in the overall configuration o f Basque international aid.
111.4.2. A new wave of mobilizations. NGOs and Basque international co-operation 
1996*1998.
The introduction o f  the entrepreneurial sector in the international co-operation realm 
represented, for Basque NGOs, an intolerable intervention o f the logic of market economy 
into the realm of international solidarity. As an informant put it, we believed that the 
participation o f business associations and co-operatives would turn international co-
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operation policy, into an instrument o f  international economic policy, reducing Basque 
administration aid programs to service the needs of Basque enterprises385.
Thus, NGOs first reaction against the formal inclusion of business associations was to 
severe the relations with the Basque Government. In June 1996, they appeared in front of 
the Basque Parliament’s commission on Human Rights to claim for a new public forum in 
which NGOs would have the opportunity to put forward their ideas, thus having a real 
input in the decision-making process, aside from proposing development projects. 
Furthermore, they denounced some irregularities that had taken place in previous years, 
concerning the allocation of funds for development co-operation386 387.
The situation by the end of 1996 had reached an impasse. Basque development co­
operation had reached a critical point, where NGOs were against the way in which the 
Basque Government was shaping the international aid system, thus compromising the good 
relationship established between the latter and regional institutions since 1989. Moreover, 
the first corruption scandals started to appear compromising the public image o f the whole 
system. In this situation the Basque Government decided once more to take note o f part o f 
NGOs’ demands.
First, in 1998, after long negotiations, the Basque administration created the Advisory 
Council for Euskadi’s Development co-operation. The scope o f this council was ‘to serve 
as a platform fo r deliberation and analysis á87. The Council was composed o f the members 
of the Comisión Gestora; one representative o f the municipalities388; seven representatives 
of the NGOs; one representative o f  the Religious orders present in the Basque Country; two 
representatives o f different sectors related to development issues. In addition a 
representative of the educational sector and o f  the micro-enterprises and cooperatives was 
included and finally, a representative o f a developing country. The composition o f the 
council was amended in the year 2000 to include one representative of the organisations
385 Interview with Iñaki Markiegui (cited).
386 See Ibarra et al. Participation, public policies and democracy (cited).
387 See Decreto 53/1998 de 24 de Marzo por el que se crea el Consejo Asesor de Cooperación al Desarrollo 
de Euskadi. B.O.P.V. no. 65 6 de Abril de 1998 pp. 5877-5881
388 The decree says explicitly one representative of EUDEL. EUDEL is the association of Basque 
municipalities. This institution is not integrated within the FEMP (Spanish federation of provinces and 
municipalities). It is worth noting that the Basque municipalities have developed their own cooperation fund 
Euskal Fondoak.
216
concerned with children care and gender issues389. The functions o f the advisory council 
ranged from the definition o f  specific criteria for the political orientation o f  the 
decentralised aid policy, to the control o f  the Basque administration.
Second, the crisis o f the public image o f Basque co-operation was definitely overcome in 
December 1998, when the Public Finances Court of the Basque Country approved a report 
exonerating the Basque administration from detected irregularities in the implementation o f 
some co-operation projects financed by the FOCAD in 1995 and 1996390. The crisis, which 
began in 1996 showed, to some extent, how important were still NGOs for the 
implementation o f Basque’s decentralized aid programs, as well as their capacity to exert 
pressure over institutions. Nonetheless, the way in which the crisis was finally overcome 
benefited the Basque government, reinforcing its dominant position in the realm o f 
international cooperation.
NGOs voiced their objections against the inclusion o f  the entrepreneurial sector in the 
cooperation realm. Moreover, they pressed the regional administration to open a forum 
where it would be possible to work out new policy criteria. Finally, they forced a report 
from the Public Finances Court o f  the Basque Country on the use o f funds destined for 
international co-operation. Yet, the impact o f  these measures had been less substantive than 
what has been asserted somewhere else391.
First, despite NGOs’ attitude towards business associations, the Basque administration 
continued to include them in the co-operation policy392. Data for the years 1996 and 1997 
show that the share o f  the funds received by business associations’ was never comparable 
to that received by NGOs. However, the more generalist claims o f NGOs* about the perils 
o f  including business associations as partners for international co-operation were never
389 See Decreto 22/2000, de I  de Febrero de modificación del Decreto por el que se crea el Consejo Asesor 
de Cooperación al Desarrollo de Euskadi. B.O.P.V. no. 30 de 14 de Febrero de 2000 pp. 2721-2723
390 See ‘Acuerdo del Pleno del Tribunal de Cuentas Públicas, de aprobación definitiva del informe sobre 
subvenciones a países en vías de desarrolloy a centros vascos adoptado el 1 de Diciembre de 1998’ B.O.P.V. 
no. 88 de miércoles 12 de Mayo de 1999 pp. 7476-7498.
391 See Gomá, R., R. González, S.Martí, LL. Peláez, M.Tnino, P.Ibarra M.J. Monteserín and A. Blas: 
‘Participation, Public policies and Democracy; International Solidarity and Anti-militarism in the Basque
Country and Catalonia’ (op. cit.)
392 See for instance the art. 2 of the Decreto 53/1997 de 18 de marzo, por el que se regulan y  convocan 
ayudas a proyectos con cargo al Fondo para la Cooperación y  Ayuda el Desarrollo para 1997. B.O.P.V. no. 
67 Abril 1997 p. 5726.
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addressed by the regional administration, who, from 1996 onwards, included them regularly 
in the list of eligible partners.
Second, the creation o f the Advisory Council, rather than weakening the position o f the 
regional administration, served to enhance its dominant role in the international co­
operation realm. The regional administration managed to re-incorporate NGOs into the 
decisional phase o f  the policy process, thus gaining part o f the legitimacy lost in previous 
years whereas the real capacity of the council to exert control over the activities of the 
administration was very much restricted as a consequence o f  the way in which both, its 
competences and its composition, were defined.
Finally, the report o f the Basque Country’s Public Finances Court, due to the reduced scope 
of it analysis, did not resolve the problems o f corruption denounced by NGOs. Conversely, 
the conclusions o f  the report accused some organizations of irregularities in the 
implementation o f  funds393.
III.5 1990-1998: Reconstructing the political discourse of international aid.
During the period 1990-1998, (more specifically from 1994 onwards) the Basque 
Government tried to revise the historical evolution of the policy in a number of documents. 
The first, the M emoria de la Cooperación internacional 1988-1994, which was updated in 
1998 by the Memoria de la Cooperación 1988-1997, which consists of a historical 
reassessment o f Basque international co-operation policy up to the date of publication. The 
second document is an article by the Director of International Co-operation for 
development o f the Basque government, published in 1998 by the Revista Española de 
Desarrollo y  Cooperación a well known publication within the Spanish development policy 
community.
These documents try to offer an all-encompassing picture o f Basque international co­
operation, as well as trying to offer a detailed account o f the origins of Basque Country’s
393 As it emerge from press articles o f the time, the image of the regional administration was contested. The 
way in which allocation priorities are defined. What is more, NGOs are accused of diverting the funds for 
development co-operation into different activities.
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international aid programs. To this respect the documents present the following 
commonalities.
First, both documents recognize the role o f the mobilization NGOs’ in the origin o f 
decentralized aid for development. Yet, the interpretation of this phenomenon differs from 
what we have seen in previous sections. According to the Memoria de la Cooperación 
Vasca, *responding to NGOs demands meant assuming the existing interrelation between 
institutions and civil society existing in democratic system s'394. In this way the Basque 
government redefined international co-operation through new symbolic lenses. Evoking 
democracy, as an ideal relation between citizens and institutions, implies linking a specific 
policy outcome to general practices of good-government. That is, the document uses a 
procedural argument, that links the virtues o f the procedure (open relationship between 
institutions and civil society) to the political outcome, further legitimizing the latter.
Furthermore both documents stress the historical relations o f the Basque Country with 
other territories395. Basque international co-operation scheme is the modem version o f the 
close connection that the Basque People has traditionally developed with other peoples. 
According to the documents, the ‘ existence o f  solidarity and mutual support feelings, made 
the relationship between those territories and the Basque Country go beyond mere 
mercantile relations' 396.
394 See Memoria de la Cooperación 1988-2997 {op. cit.) pp. 21-22
395 See Legarreta, Josu: ‘Cooperación Pública Vasca’; Revista española de Cooperación y  Desarrollo no. 3 
Año 1998 p. 101. Memoria de la Cooperación 1988-1997 (op. cit.) p. 21.
396 See Legarreta. Josu: ‘Cooperación pública Vasca’ (op.cit) p.101.
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Figure 15: Geographic allocation of Basque aid 1988-1997
E3 Europe 
0  Asia
£3 Latin America 
0  Africa
Source: Gobierno Vasco 1997: ‘Memoria Î988-I997 Cooperación Pública Vasca. Ayudas a l tercer mundo* 
Vitoria-Gasteiz: Servicio Central de Publicaciones
As we have already seen, these historical relations were concentrated mostly in Latin 
America and have substantially affected the pattern o f  geographic distribution o f aid. As it 
is shown in the figure above, the pattern o f aid allocation had remained quite stable for the 
period 1990-1997. The preeminence o f Latin America as the main destination o f Basque 
Aid confirmed that the structure of priorities established during the early years o f Basque 
International Cooperation programs, had been reinforced by the injection of economic 
resources and the process of institutionalization of the policy described above.
Yet, as we have already seen, by 1998 Latin America represented (beside the locus for 
strong historical ties) the second most important market for the Basque export sector. 
Legarreta’s article dismisses the impact of this factor in the configuration of Basque 
International co-operation policy397.
397 As wc have already seen the economic relation between Latin America and the Basque Country didn’t 
have a strong impact on entrepreneurial sector participation in international co-operation schemes. Y et, the 
inclusion in 1996 o f  the entrepreneurial sector in the list of eligible partners had triggered a great deal o f 
conflict among the members of Basque international co-operation policy community. That might explain the
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As is shown in the figure below mercantile relations do not play any substantive role in the 
Basque administration’s perception on the origins of international co-operation programs.
Figure 16: The origins of Basque international aid for development programs
Historical relations between the Basque Country and Latin America were a precondition for 
the events taking place in the late eighties. In the words o f Josu Legarreta: *Basque 
so cie ty’s sensitivity, [referring to these feelings of solidarity and mutual support explicated 
above] was manifested in the 80’s through NGOs ’ campaigns fo r  the 0,7% o f the regional 
budget to be destined to international aid initiatives in favor o f less developed countries' 398.
This method o f reassessing the origins o f the policy reinforces the symbolic power o f 
Basque engagement in foreign aid policies. Institutions would appear as qualified
choice for non including a reference to the economic relations between the Basque Country and Latin 
America.
398 Legarreta, Josu: ‘Cooperación Pública Vasca* (pp.cit) p.102.
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interlocutors for demands from the civil society. Furthermore, institutions would be able to 
trace the origins o f  these demands in order to make international co-operation a necessary 
political outcome even in a hypothetical case of non mobilization by NGOs (this relation is 
represented in the figure above by the dotted line). The result is a policy outcome which is 
not only legitimate according to ‘democratic standards’, but also necessary according to the 
history o f Basque politics and society.
However, the process o f policy reassessment, did not entail a reassessment of the meaning 
of the development agenda underpinning Basque international aid. As has been noted by 
José Antonio Alonso, Ht is surprising the lim ited scope o f normative underpinnings and the 
scarcity o f  strategic directives in Basque international co-operation policy ’3" .
As the author further notes, the list o f principles related to the debate on international 
development, utilized in administrative documents is too vague. They ranged from the 
alleviation of the causes of poverty to the support for the participation o f Basque social 
agents, including also references to the covering o f primary necessities in the recipient 
societies or to the promotion o f participatory development schemes39 400 401.
International co-operation was mostly understood in this period as part of the international 
relations of the Basque Country, rather than a policy in itself. The coalition agreement for 
the term 1994-1998, in its article 8, states that the main aim o f Basque international co­
operation was to  *[...] build-up a  solidarity and open country, which will use international 
co-operation as an instrument fo r  contributing to social development as well as it will 
permit us to reinforce our presence in the societies with whom we are co-operating,401.
What is more, the integration o f international aid policies in the framework o f Basque 
Country’s international relations, leads the Basque administration to consider the important 
benefits that this policy might have in the internal sphere. Again this corresponds to the 
coalition agreement description o f the main purposes o f  international co-operation:
399 José Antonio Alonso 1998: *Sistema Vasco de Cooperación al Desarrollo: Diagnóstico y  propuestas' (op. 
cit.) p.25
400 José Antonio Alonso 1998: * Sistema Vasco de Cooperación al Desarrollo: Diagnóstico y  propuestas' (op. 
cit.) p.26.
401 Quoted in José Antonio Alonso 1998: Sistema Vasco de Cooperación al Desarrollo: Diagnóstico y  
propuestas (op. cit.) p.25.
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•  To attain the objective o f the 0,7% of the regional funds to be destined to 
international co-operation.
•  To encourage the co-ordination between institutions and private organizations.
•  To empower the NGOs established in the Basque Country.
•  To orient public resources towards integrated activities, focusing the attention to 
specific areas.
•  To enhance the participation o f  enterprises in the cooperation policy, thus 
contributing to the internationalization of Basque enterprises.
International aid is interpreted, in line with the rest o f Basque Country’s international 
relations, not only as a way of projecting autonomous government abroad or the fulfillment 
o f  a moral demand, but first and foremost as a concrete response to specific political 
challenges.
A s the list above shows, the interpretation o f certain needs at the level of internal politics 
(i.e. enhancing the relations with organizations or supporting Basque enterprises 
internationalization) is used to underpin a policy outcome that has eminently an 
international dimension. The link established between the internal and the external 
dimension o f Basque politics denotes an important evolution in Basque international co­
operation policy, from the unconscious-kind-of-engagement o f late eighties, towards a more 
aware-of-my-interest- perception o f  the policy.
111.6 Basque international co-operation 1990-1998
A s we have seen the period between 1990-1998 witnessed a number of important changes 
in  the configuration o f  Basque international aid for development. These changes affect not 
only  the institutionalization of the administrative structure, which increasingly felt into the 
hands of the Foreign Affairs Secretariat, but also the way in which international aid policy 
is perceived by regional institutions. International aid becomes more and more an integral 
part o f  a broader project of international relations, rooted on the idea that the development 
o f  regional political autonomy requires its external projection. This process results in a 
revision of the symbolic elements underpinning Basque aid. The combination o f historical
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revisionism with the symbolic value of democracy as the organizing principle o f the 
relations between institutions and civil society results in a further reinforcement o f  the 
institutional profile of the Basque Country regional administration both ad intra and ad 
extra.
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The figure above shows how the interaction o f the domestic political agenda and NGOs 
agenda led to two different, and to a certain extent contradictory processes. On the one 
hand, it led to a  process of constitutionalisation of the policy. That is, from 1990 to 1998 
the institutional and legal framework for Basque foreign aid policy was established. On the 
other hand, it led to the increasing contestation from the part o f  social actors, which up to 
1996 had been the sole beneficiaries o f region’s engagement in foreign aid policies.
Consolidation is structured along the preferences o f the regional administration, which 
managed to impose their own political agenda over the claims o f NGOs, breaking the tacit 
agreement established before 1990. As we have seen, the actors was involved in the supply 
structure differed for the period 1990-1998, compared to the first stage in 1989.
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Figure 18: Supply structure and  policy consolidation 1990-1998.
Figure twelve shows how throughout the process of consolidation o f  the policy, the supply 
structure becomes more and more endogenous to the region and is less influenced by 
exogenous actors, such as the state administration or the European Union.
The construction of a regional system is represented by the big dotted line box, whereas the 
small boxes represent the subsistence o f the local and the provincial aid programs. The 
consolidation of the FOCAD witnesses the intervention o f the provincial administration 
which cooperated with regional administration, whereas maintaining their own international 
co-operation schemes. Conversely, municipalities, remained out o f the regional system of 
international co-operation.
The conflict with the State had less weight. This trend is observable at least since 1989 and 
comes to an end in 1993 when the Constitutional Court established the possibility for the 
Basque Country to open a representation office in Brussels, further establishing the limits 
o f  constituent units foreign projection in a general duty of respect for State foreign policy.
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At the same time, the relations with the NGOs became more and more conflictive. With the 
continuous process o f policy institutionalization, NGOs had less impact on the process of 
supply structuring, which increasingly responded to the necessities and the political 
agendas o f the regional administration.
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IV. 1998-2005: International co-operation in a context of uncertainty402.
1998 signals an important turning point in Basque politics. After more than eight years of 
coalition between the Socialist party and the Basque nationalist party, the new candidate 
from the Basque Nationalist Party, Juan José Ibarretxe sought the establishment o f a 
governing coalition with only nationalists parties. The governing coalition would include 
the Basque Nationalist Party and Eusko Alkartasuna, whereas majority of seats in the 
parliament were ensured by an agreement with HB403, which would support the governing 
coalition in the parliament.
Following Eliseo Aja, the Basque Nationalist party feared that the increasing wave o f 
popular rejection for radical nationalism, mostly after the dramatic assassination o f the 
local counsellor o f Ermua Miguel Angel Blanco on 12th Junel997404, would affect not only 
radical nationalism and the social and political setting o f ETA, but also democratic 
nationalism. At the same time, the Basque Nationalist Party considered insufficient the 
degree to which the Autonomy Statute and the decentralization o f  competencies from the 
centre to the Regional administration had been implemented. In this context, the leaders o f 
the Basque Nationalist Party sought in the radicalisation o f  its nationalist demands both the
402 I disagree with Ruano and Ugalde when they consider the period 1998-2005 as a period of consolidation 
for Basque decentralized aid. According to both authors the analysis o f the public expenditure in foreign aid 
initiatives shows the consolidation of the policy during the period analyzed. See: José Luis de Castro Ruano 
and Alexander Ugalde Zubiri: lLa acción exterior del Pais Vasco (1980-2003)' (op. cit.) Chapter 6 pp. 278 to 
279 and 288 to 290.
M y contention here is that a brief look to the data on funds allocation, geographic distribution o f aid and the 
administrative structure might show how Basque foreign aid was fairly well consolidated by 1998. Aid funds 
have increased steadily at least since 1994; geographic allocation shows a consistent scheme of geographic 
preferences from the part of the Basque administration; finally, the Directorate o f International Cooperation 
has been working under the aegis of the Secretariat o f Foreign Affairs since the early nineties. The result, as 
we have seen in the previous section, was that international cooperation was fairly well integrated with other 
regional foreign policy initiatives.
However, as I will try to argue in the forthcoming sections, for the period 1998-2005, particularly since 2001, 
instability in Basque politics has resulted in a major alteration of the position o f Basque aid vis-à-vis the rest 
o f  Basque Foreign projection.
403 Herri Batasuna, independcntist left-wing party which traditionally has played the role of the political arm 
o f  the terrorist group ETA.
404 On the 10* June 1997 Miguel Angel Blanco a counsellor from the Popular Party at the local assembly of 
Ermua, was kidnapped by the terrorist group ETA. Terrorist gave an ultimatum to the Spanish government. 
They would free Miguel Angel Blanco, only if in 48 hours all ETA prisoners would be re-allocated in prisons 
in the Basque Country. Before the deadline established by the terrorist group expired massive demonstrations 
took place in Spain claiming for the liberation of the PP counsellor. A few minutes after the expiration of the 
deadline, Miguel Angel Blanco was found wounded to death. He had been shot in his neck.
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means to put ETA’s violence to an end and to fully satisfy Basque necessities for self- 
government405.
Aja further claims that, as a result o f  negotiations/conversations between the PNV and ETA 
on the 12th September 1998, the Basque Nationalist Party, EA, HB and IU/EB406 
undersigned the agreement o f  Lizarra, by which these political forces committed 
themselves to find a political solution to the problem of violence and terrorism, seeking the 
constitution o f a united nationalist front in order to pursue the independence of the Basque 
Country through political means407. On the 16th September 1998 ETA announced a 
unilateral ceasefire, in order to favour nationalist political action.
The implementation of the Lizarra agreement in the months following the ceasefire sought 
the elaboration o f a new electoral census in which only real Basques(?) would have the 
right to vote, the establishment o f a  Basque ID card or the strengthening of Udalbiltza 
(assembly of representatives elected at the local level), which was the embryo o f a proper 
Constitutional Assembly for the Basque territories, including Navarre and French-Basque 
territories408.
The failure of the negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government, led to the end o f 
the ceasefire on the 28th of November 1999 and, to a certain extent, to the end o f the 
activities of the Basque nationalist front constituted along the lines of the agreement of 
Lizarra. HB the political aim o f  ETA, supported once again ETA’s radical claims, and the 
Basque Nationalist party was forced to breach the parliamentary agreement with the radical 
nationalists, establishing a minority government from early 2000 until the end o f  the term 
in 2001.
Alter 2001 elections a new coalition entered office in the Basque Country consisting o f the 
PNV, EA and IU/EB. The term 2001-2005 has been marked by confrontation between the 
so-called nationalist and constitutionalists blocs along the lines of Ibarretxe’s proposal for
405 See Elíseo Aja 2003: ‘El Estado Autonómico: Federalismo y  hechos diferenciales' (op. cit) p.299
406 The regional branch of IU, a left wing federation of parties, which includes the Communist Party. The 
national matrix o f the Party claims for the constitution o f a proper federal system in Spain as a means of 
overcoming territorial conflict in Spain. Since 1998, the regional branch o f IU (IU/EB) has more and more 
leaned to the positions o f the Basque Nationalist Party, as its support for the Ibarretxe Plan in the last years 
shows.
407 See Elíseo Aja 2003: * El Estado Autonómico: Federalismo y  hechos diferenciales' (op. cit.) p.300
408 See Elíseo Aja 2003: 'E l Estado Autonómico: Federalismo y  hechos diferenciales' (op. cit.) pp. 300-301
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the reformation o f Basque Autonomy Statute. The “plan” foresees the reformation the 
Autonomy Statute o f  the Basque Country, which would change the political status o f  the 
region in the Spanish state. According to the text of the proposal the Basque country would 
become a free-associated state to the Spanish State, with the right to re-negotiate their 
political status at any point in time. The problems of accommodating Basque nationalism 
have dominated the political debate in the Basque country and, in many respects even the 
Spanish political agenda.
The foreign policy agenda as it had been defined before 1998 has lost saliency in Basque 
politics. Ibarretxe’s address to the regional parliament in 1998 redefined the foreign policy 
agenda. The distinction between ad intra and ad extra projection o f self-government was 
reassessed in order to concentrate on the political impact o f the process of European 
integration, and the defence o f the autonomous space for decision-making. Full 
development of the Autonomy Statute and promotion of Basque identity were identified as 
the most important instruments for counteracting the perils of globalisation, 
internationalisation o f the economy and the integration in a broader European Union409. 
Europe is increasingly considered a limit to regional self-government, rather than a 
structure of opportunity.
This protective foreign agenda has been pushed to its limits since 2001. The combination o f 
a  domestic debate on the accommodation o f the Basque Country within the Spanish 
constitution with the debate on the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union, has 
pushed the Basque government to be more active in Europe in defence o f greater 
recognition for the regional tier and the defence of regional self-government. Furthermore 
the Basque Government has developed an intense political campaign in favour of the 
reformation o f Basque Autonomy Statute.
In Ibarretxe’s address to the regional parliament in 2001, the priorities o f the foreign policy 
agenda of the Basque government were the following: First, the definition of an integral 
foreign policy, which implied the involvement of all the departments o f the Basque 
government in the definition of the foreign policy agenda; second, the development o f 
instruments that allowed the Basque administration to play a leading role in the process o f
409 See Diario de Sesiones del Parlamento Vasco. VI Legislature No. 4 p. 28.
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European integration. According to the Lehendakari, the link between self-rule and the 
process o f European integration is more important than ever before. Thus, the Basque 
government was committed to an strict defence of the ‘space for self-government’ vis-à-vis 
European institutions, while seeking the development o f an active policy o f transborder co­
operation and the promotion o f  Basque culture and values abroad410.
Between 2001 and 2004, Basque government has participated in different European 
initiatives regarding the debates of the Convention on the Future o f Europe and the design 
of the Constitutional Treaty o f  the European Union. On top o f that, the Lehendakari 
engaged in an intense agenda o f activities oriented to gather international support for his 
political proposal in different European and international fora.
To many observers, Basque European activism in the framework of the constitutional 
debate can be understood only in the light o f internal political conflict. Pushing for the 
recognition o f  a European regional tier o f governments, which would respect the 
specificities o f the European regions with legislative powers, or pressing for the recognition 
of the rights o f Stateless nations in Europe, would serve the political agenda of reformation 
of the Autonomy Statute.
IV.1 International co-operation in the Basque Country 1998-2005
The period 1998-2001 did not witness major changes in the structure or functioning of 
international co-operation in the Basque Country. The analysis o f documents or interviews 
does not identify any alteration o f the patterns of supply or demand structuring in the realm 
of international co-operation policy. What is more, Basque Government data for 
geographical allocation of aid or the distribution of aid funds show an important gap for the 
years 1999-2001. Therefore, we can only assume the continuity of the major trends 
identified before in terms of the patterns o f aid allocation and distribution. Last but not 
least, budgetary stagnation due to the lack o f support for the Regional Budget Law in the 
Regional Parliament, have resulted in the reproduction o f Basque International Co­
operation policy budget along the lines defined before 1998.
410 See Diario de Sesiones del Parlamento Vasco. VII Legislatura No. 4 pp. 28-29
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However, since 2001 a number o f changes have taken place in the institutional structure 
and the political discourse underpinning Basque international co-operation. As a result o f  
the bargaining process between the political forces making up the coalition, international 
aid for development activities had been removed from the Lehendakaritza, and are now part 
o f  the functions o f the Housing and Social affairs Regional ministry. In the words o f an 
informant from the regional administration: ‘changes in the administrative structure, that 
is, the fact that international co-operation, together with the rest o f  the social policy 
competences are now controlled by 1U m ight trigger a process o f  policy reassessment, 
m ostly in the context o f the debate on the new Law on International Co-operation ^ .
According to the Programmatic lines fo r  the new International co-operation directorate, a 
process of policy reassessment was justified by the need to enhance the quality o f Basque 
international co-operation41 12. The proposal for renewed international co-operation was 
further implemented in the proposal for a co-operation Law put forward by the regional 
government in 2002413. The most relevant innovations are the following. First, international 
aid for development is understood as a policy independent o f other international activities 
o f  the Basque Government. International aid is understood as a moral compromise rooted 
on  the idea o f solidarity. As it is stated in the proposal for the Law on international co­
operation: *a compromise that doesn’t expect further pay-offs o f any kind, be them financial 
benefits, the projection o f the Basque entrepreneurs, ideological or religious propaganda 
or the construction  o f clientele networks.**14.
The idea of promoting solidarity through international co-operation has displaced in the 
texts the references to historical relations o f  the Basque Country with other territories, or 
the democratic re-interpretation o f the relationship between NGOs and institutions415. 
International aid is understood as a principle-inspired policy, rather than a  political 
response to NGOs or a modem interpretation o f past relations. The principle recalled is that
411 Interview with Igor Irigoyen (cited)
412 See Líneas programáticas de la nueva Dirección de Cooperación al Desarrollo February 2002. p .l.
413 See Borrador de texto articulado del anteproyecto de ley vasca de cooperación al desarrollo.
414 See Borrador de texto articulado del anteproyecto de ley vasca de cooperación al desarrollo. Art. 3.1
415 This is evident in the text we have quoted above. Furthermore the regional decrees regulating the 
allocation of funds stopped since the advent of the new governing coalition to refer to the elements mentioned 
above. See for instance Decreto J 71/2002 de 9 de Julio por el que se regulan y  convocan ayudas a proyectos 
con cargo al Fondo para la Cooperación y  Ayuda al Desarrollo para el ejercicio 2002. B.O.P.V no. 133 Julio 
2002 pp 12643-12753.
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of international solidarity, understood as a moral compromise with the population in the 
less developed countries o f the world.
It is worth noting that the affirmation o f  a  strong solidarity principle is combined with a list 
of possible pay-offs o f decentralized aid for development. This could be an indicator of the 
perception that IU had (as an opposition party during the rule o f  the PNV-EA and the PNV- 
PSOE-EE-EA coalitions) o f international co-operation. At the same time, the list o f pay­
offs include many aspects o f Basque international co-operation that have been severely 
criticized by NGOs and other social actors.
An immediate consequence o f  the introduction of a strong solidarity principle is that 
elements of the discourse on international development enjoy a more relevant role in the 
discursive structure. International development is understood as a complex process that 
goes far beyond the idea of economic growth. First, development is understood as a right 
rather than a moral desideratum. Second, the right to economic development must be 
interpreted under the principles of indivisibility and interdependence o f Human rights. 
Thus, the idea o f  development promoted by regional institutions is one that puts at the 
forefront the principle o f equality, and the idea of equal access to resources. At the same 
time, development must be sustainable, in order not compromise the right to development 
of future generations416.
The newly-gained saliency o f the development debate, in the construction o f a normative 
case for international aid, is materialised through important changes in the way the material 
and geographical preferences o f the policy are settled. Regarding the former it is 
noteworthy that any reference to the internal dimension of regional politics has 
disappeared. International aid is not about the promotion of NGOs or the Basque 
entrepreneurial sector. Conversely, the political purposes of international aid are related to 
affirmative action in the promotion o f  equality, social participation and the eradication of
417extreme poverty .
By the same token, the way in which geographical areas are prioritised has changed. The 
reference to the historical relations o f  the Basque Country with other territories lost most
416 See Borrador de texto articulado del anteproyecto de ley vasca de cooperation al desarrollo. A rt 3 
paragraphs 1-10.
17 See Borrador de texto articulado del anteproyecto de ley vasca de cooperation al desarrollo. A rt 4.
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o f  its relevance. Instead, the Basque government refers to peoples specially affected by the 
problems derived from economic underdevelopment418. The specific criteria for selecting 
geographical areas are the following:
1. Peoples and countries affected by extreme poverty, as indicated by the index on 
Human Development of the U.N.
2. Peoples suffering a generalised violation of Human Rights.
3. Areas in which humanitarian intervention is required.
4. Peoples and Countries with which the Basque Administration has kept in the past an 
intense co-operation experience.
5. Peoples and countries with a significant presence o f immigrants in Euskadi.
Finally, the parameters for identifying the partners for international co-operation had been 
changed. In the new legislation, the Basque government would recognise the role o f  agents 
o f  international co-operation, the NGOs and other organizations from the non-profit 
sector419. The emerging discourse on international aid is summarirzed in the figure below
Despite all the changes in the political discourse surrounding the realm o f international aid 
policies, it is still very early to evaluate whether these changes have had an impact on the 
implementation phase o f the policy.
A s far as this research is concerned, the final version o f  the Law on international co­
operation activities has not been approved yet by the regional parliament. Thus, the 
discursive pattern explicated above, remains as a kind of programmatic line, a direction the 
international development policy o f the Basque Country should take.
418 See Borrador de texto articulado del anteproyecto de ley vasca de cooperación al desarrollo. Alt. 5.
419 See Idem. Arts. 9-10.
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Figure 19: A qualitative change in international development co-operation.
The data presented in the graphic below show how the reformation process of Basque aid 
has had little impact in the geographic allocation of international co-operation. The data are 
consistent with the trends signalled by previously analysed data, which show the pre­
eminence o f Latin America as the destination o f Basque foreign aid.
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Conversely, the data for the distribution of aid among partners show the increasing 
allocation of funds to NGOs. As we have seen in the previous sections, the incorporation o f 
the entrepreneurial sector into Basque international co-operation altered partially the 
dynamics o f Basque cooperation implementation. Basque entrepreneurs managed to 
increase their share of funds, yet never menacing the dominant position of NGOs. Data for 
2001 and 2002 show that NGOs concentrate an ever increasing share of the funds, in line 
with the proposals o f the provisional text of regional international co-operation law. 420
Table 4: Distribution of aid among different partners 2000-2002420.
NGOs Other actors Education Total
2000 - . - -
2001 76,88 13,38 9,74 100
2002 83,50 5,75 10.75 100
Source: Basque Government
420 From the year 2001 onwards, the Basque governments changed the parameters, thus they classify the 
projects in three main categories. Those categories are Chapter I DNGOs; Chapter II Other actor, Chapter IB 
Education for development. Emergency aid and Direct investments just disappear form public data. Anyway, 
the tendency o f the Basque Government to distribute most of the aid among the DNGOs remains stable.
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Last but not least, in 2004 the Basque government issued a decree by which the Comisión 
Gestora of the FOCAD was reformed. The decree responded to major changes in the 
structure o f Basque international co-operation, which permitted the Basque government to 
be the only contributor to the FOCAD. According to the decree a  change in the institutional 
structure is needed in order to reflect changes in the structure of Basque donors. At the 
same time, the decree reflects the new allocation o f Basque international co-operation 
within the Administrative structure o f Basque government. The decree 62/2004, alters the 
structure o f the Comisión Gestora so that includes the members o f the Social and Housing 
policy regional ministry, which substitute the members o f the Foreign Affairs Secretariat 
and eliminates the participation of representatives from the Diputaciones forales421. Yet, it 
reproduces the pattern of dependency between the Comisión Gestora and the regional 
ministry in charged of international co-operation.
IV.2 Basque co-operation 1998-2005: reformation or stagnation?
Changes in the governing coalition since 2001 have brought about a  new way o f 
understanding international co-operation policies. This contradicts partially the assertion o f 
one interviewee who, when asked about opposition’s criticisms about Basque international 
co-operation, argued that even if  the leader o f the Popular Party would have been elected 
for regional president, 'he wouldn *t have change a thing, since international development 
co-operation offers an extremely comfortable position. A t end o f the day, it is easier to 
justify increasing public expenditure than severe cuts'422.
Yet, these changes might indicate also a process o f marginalisation of international co­
operation from the relevant political sphere in the Basque Country politics. As we have 
seen, politics in the Basque country have evolved towards a process of polarisation along 
the debate on the accommodation of the Basque Country in the Constitutional structure of 
the Spanish State. This change had an impact on the definition o f the international politics
4-1 See Decreto 62/2004 de SO de Marzo por el que se regula la comisión Gestora del FOCAD. B.O.P.V. 
Martes 6 de Abril de 2004 No. 66.
4:2 Interview with Jose María Muñoa (cited)
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agenda o f the Basque Government, which had increasingly focused on the defence of self- 
government and the promotion o f Basque autonomy vis-à-vis European institutions.
Changes in Basque politics have relegated Basque international co-operation to a secondary 
role in the context of the international activities o f  the Basque Country. From 2001 
onwards, International co-operation has been controlled by the Regional ministry for 
Housing and Social Policy, instead o f the Foreign affairs secretariat, which controls the rest 
of Basque foreign policy.
The directorate for international co-operation has triggered an ambitious process of reform, 
in which NGOs participate actively. As a  result, the rhetoric o f Basque aid has integrated a 
structured development agenda, displacing pervious considerations on the role o f the 
historical relations o f the region with other territories. What is more, since 2001 Basque 
international co-operation seems to live beyond the margins o f  political conflict in the 
Basque Country. Thus, reforms have brought the hope of greater independence of the aid 
structure from the system of Basque foreign relations. Yet, the de-politisation of aid also 
results the regional administration loosing interest in the fate o f Basque international co­




This chapter has tried to shed light on the international aid activities of the Basque Country. 
The policy has been analysed at different levels, trying to offer an all-encompassing image 
of what undoubtedly is a complex process, the constitution o f a  regional foreign aid policy. 
This conclusions try to sum-up the main findings of this chapter in terms o f the various 
levels of analysis.
V.1 Basque international co-operation: an overview of some data
Basque international co-operation is rather stable both in terras o f geographic distribution 
o f aid and in terms o f material distribution and distribution among partners. For the period 
1988-2003 Basque aid was concentrated in Latin American countries. As we have seen, 
both dependency on the structure of social actors, as well as the decision by the regional 
government to enhance the relations with Latin American countries (mostly from 1994 
onwards) can help us to understand this trend. The graphic below Shows the overall 
geographic distribution of Basque international co-operation.
Figure 21: Geographic allocation o f Basque foreign aid 1988-2002





The second marker of Basque international co-operation is that it has relied heavily on the 
participation o f NGOs, mostly during the project implementation phase. The data for the 
period 1988-2002 show how DNGOs have played a major role in structuring the 
implementation o f Basque foreign aid, whereas the participation of other actors, such as the 
Basque entrepreneurial sector, have had a secondary role in structuring decentralized co­
operation policy. Especially relevant is the scarce amount o f Direct agreements between the 
Basque administration and recipient countries. This is the direct result o f the early 
dynamics of the process of constitutionalisation of international co-operation policy. As we 
have already seen, Basque aid was defined as funds for NGOs’ international co-operation 
activities, as a means of avoiding interference from the central State. Since then, NGOs 
managed to ensure a high proportion o f development funds, whereas the Basque 
government has barely tried to go beyond the limits imposed in the early phases of 
constitutionalisation of the policy. The graphic below shows the distribution o f funds 
among different partners for the period 1988-2002.
Figure 22: Distribution of Basque Aid among partners 1988-2002
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The data presented above tend to emphasize the weight of Basque NGOs in the Basque 
foreign aid policy. Yet, a cautious analysis of the structures o f governance of Basque 
foreign aid, as well as the structure o f  discourse surrounding Basque government’s 
engagement in foreign aid policies, might help us to nuance this picture.
The following sections are devoted to summarize our findings regarding both the structure 
of governance o f Basque international co-operation and the discursive patterns 
underpinning Basque international aid. First, from 1990 onwards, we have seen how the 
structure o f governance attempted to concentrate decisional capacities in the hands o f the 
Basque government. From 1988 to 1998 NGOs were progressively relegated to the 
implementation phase.
Second, we have shown how the Basque government managed to put forward a coherent 
discourse on international co-operation for development. This discourse was meant to 
integrate international co-operation in a  broader project of international projection. Since 
1990 onwards, international projection has been perceived by regional politicians as an 
important instrument for pushing the limits o f political autonomy.
V.2 Who governed the construction of Basque international aid policy? International 
aid and the interactions between institutional and non-institutional actors
Basque international aid policy is the result of complex patterns o f interactions among 
different types of actors, i.e. institutional actors at different levels and organizations in civil 
society. The changing nature o f the interrelationships between the Basque administration 
and those actors can be summarized as follows.
First, the interactions with organizations in the civil society fluctuated from an initial 
moment in which NGOs enjoyed predominant position vis-à-vis both institutions and 
society towards the progressive centralization of policy resources in the hands of the 
regional administration all throughout the nineties. The situation has been changing in more 
recent times. New regional administrators have put at the forefront o f the political discourse 
many of the elements stressed by NGOs. This could be the beginning of a second golden 
age for NGOs.
Second, inter-institutional relations have also been o f some relevance in the configuration 
o f the policy. Within this realm o f inter-institutional relations the Basque Country’s two 
major institutional tiers can be identified, first, sub-regional institutions (provinces and 
localities)and second, the state administration.
As we have seen the regional administration tried in 1989 to incorporate sub-regional 
institutions into the construction of a broad international co-operation scheme. As we have 
seen the regional government managed to include the only Diputaciones forales in the 
FOCAD. Yet, all the institutional layers in the Basque Country (even the Diputaciones) 
maintained differentiated international co-operation schemes.
This could indicate that inter-institutional co-operation within the context of international 
aid for development has been interpreted by political actors as part of a broader game of 
inter-institutional relations. According to this interpretation the advantages of engaging in 
international aid policies were soon perceived by all institutional layers within the limits o f 
the Basque Country leading to a multiplication of the institutional supply activities within 
the regional limits.
Though it lies beyond the scope o f this dissertation, the difficulty establishing an integrated 
system o f international co-operation could be explained by the fact that institutional actors 
in the Basque Country were unable to compromise these benefits in exchange for further 
co-ordination and efficiency o f the programs. This dynamic of inter-institutional 
competition could be exemplified by the fact that the Basque government managed to 
relegate the Diputaciones forales, to a secondary role within the FOCAD, and as a result 
became the only participant institution in 2004.
Yet, the capacity o f the Basque administration to maintain a central role, vis-à-vis the 
potentialities o f the provincial administration in the region (due to their special fiscal 
status), shows clearly that the Basque Government took the possibilities opened by NGOs 
demands seriously.
Regarding the relations between the Basque administration and the State, the absence o f the 
latter as a  relevant actor in the process o f  configuration of the policy is striking. As we have 
seen, the State has played a residual role, normally as a final point of reference in the 
structure o f  incentives. This role o f the State in the structure o f  incentives is exemplified by
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the fact that the definition of international co-operation as subsidy to NGOs, intentionally 
tried to avoid any kind of interference by the State. The tendency o f the region to avoid any 
kind of State interference has been fuelled by the central administration's tendency to avoid 
entering the realm o f decentralized aid. This has been noted by the DAC committee from 
the OECD, which in one o f its latest reports on the Spanish aid system regretted the lack o f 
co-ordination between policy at the national level and decentralized aid initiatives423.
Therefore, the process o f policy constitution and the creation o f  an institutional structure 
which was able to manage decentralized aid in the Basque Country, was structured 
according to dynamic and complex relations between NGOs and regional institutions as 
well as the interaction between the local and the regional level. As we have seen, as a result 
o f  this process the Basque government managed to control the levers of the policy, leaving 
NGOs and the provincial administration partially aside. This situation might be changing, 
at least for NGOs, with the advent of the new governing coalition.
V.3 The terms of political discourse
As we have seen, the Basque government has constructed different discursive structures to 
justify its engagement in international aid policies. The way in which the policy is 
perceived in 1988 differed from the way in which it was understood in 1998 or in 2002.
Basque government evolved from a rather simple enumeration o f elements in 1988 towards 
a more elaborated discourse in 1998 and 2002. As we have tried to show in previous 
sections, variation in the discourses offered by the Basque administration throughout the 
period 1988-2002, is co-related to major changes in the way in which the international 
activities o f the Region were conceived, specially in relation to the broader project of 
constitution o f the Basque polity.
433 In 1998 the OECD/DAC report on Spanish international co-operation defined the Spanish aid system as 
pluralistic, taking into account the number o f actors involved in the policy. Yet, the 2002 report recommended 
that Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs should be accorded a clearer lead role in providing directions to all actors in 
development co-operation. MFA’s role in this regard would include ensuring consistency and synergies 
between the growing decentralised co-operation and overall aid policy. See OECD/DAC 2002: ‘Development 
Co-operation Review Series: Spain ' .OECD publications: Paris. OECD/DAC 1998: ‘Development Co­
operation Review Series: Spain'. OECD publications: Paris.
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In 1988 the regional government’s lack o f a structured discourse on international aid was 
strongly correlated to the inexperience of the Basque administration in the field. 
Furthermore, control from the part o f NGOs of the levers o f  the policy would explain why 
the regional administration’s discourse on international aid was to an important extent the 
result o f a process of incorporation o f NGOs demands. The only exception could be the 
references to inter-institutional relations, which as we have said before, can be interpreted 
as an attempt to take advantage o f NGOs mobilization, pushing forward the space for 
regional autonomy.
In 1998 and 2002, the picture was rather different. The greater level of institutionalisation 
resulted in rather sophisticated discursive patterns. The structure of discourse in 1998 
inscribes international aid within a broader conceptualisation of the links between 
international relations and the construction of an autonomous political space. A de­
consecrated set of historical relations with Latin America is combined with an explicit 
account of the democratic relations between institutions and society, which aims to further 
legitimise the policy outcome.
With the advent of the new governing coalition in 2002 the Basque government has 
changed radically the terms o f  the political discourse focusing on the problems of 
underdevelopment, which up to that moment had played a rather residual role. This change 
has played down many Udentitarian markers’ that had been included before. The most 
important being the reference to Third world immigration in the Basque Country, rather 
than to Basque emigrants. This would indicate that foreign aid is not anymore perceived as 
an instrument for projecting the Basque Country abroad but as a policy with increasing ad 
intra returns.
Furthermore, changes in the pattern o f  political discourse could be an indicator o f a major 
change in the relationship between the instruments for the international projection of the 
Basque Country and the broader process o f construction of the polity.
International relations had been controlled by the Lehendakaritza since 1990. As we have 
seen, different governing coalitions in the Basque country increasingly linked self- 
government and promotion o f regional autonomy to the international projection o f that
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autonomy. Foreign policy instruments had been increasingly subordinated to the needs of 
the political programs of the governing coalition in the Basque country.
From 2001 on, international co-operation policy has been separated from the rest o f  the 
international activities o f the region, which are controlled by the Lehendakaritza. The 
political program o f the new governing coalition for the period 2001-2005, structured along 
the so-called Ibarretxe’s plan, sought the re-definition of the institutional status o f  the 
Basque Country into a free-associated State. The implementation o f this program implied, 
in the last four years, the mobilization o f important international resources and the 
implementation o f an intense diplomatic agenda oriented to gain international support for 
Ibarretxe’s proposal. Yet, as we have seen one o f the traditional instruments for Basque 
international projection, International co-operation policy, has remained somehow absent 
from the agenda o f internationalisation o f the political program o f the governing coalition.
M y contention here is that the Basque government, from 2001 onwards has altered the 
virtuous relationship between international projection and region-building program. The 
political needs derived from the aggressive institutional proposal o f the Lehendakari, along 
which most of the political debate in the Basque Country has been articulated in the last 
term, forced the Lehendakaritza to emphasize those instruments o f Basque international 
policy, which more easily permitted the publicity of Lehendakari’s proposal. This led to the 
dismissal o f traditional instruments of foreign projection such as international co-operation, 
which cannot easily be structured along the needs derived from promotion o f  the ideas o f 
the Lehendakari.
This situation is similar to that of the early phases o f Basque political autonomy in the early 
eighties, when the newly established autonomous institutions, .controlled by the Basque 
Nationalist Party, engaged in the socialization o f constituencies within the values o f the 
virtuous Basque nation, in line with the directives of the Basque Nationalist Party. As we 
have already seen, at this stage the foreign projection o f  the Basque government 
concentrated its international projection on the incorporation the Diaspora to the project o f 
nation-building, which represented the sacred flame of the liberties lost in 1876.
Nevertheless, the functioning of international co-operation from 2001 to 2005 shows the 
relevance o f the existing structures o f dependency within Basque international co­
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operation. Basque international co-operation has maintained most of its identity markers 
under the aegis the Housing and Social Affairs Ministry, such as it is the case for the 
concentration o f  funds in Latin America. Furthermore, some o f  the innovations introduced, 
at least at the level o f discourse, have devolved international co-operation into the hands o f 
NGOs and social organizations in the Basque Country, who, from 1990 to 1998, had been 
progressively excluded from the decisional processes o f Basque international co-operation
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PART HI: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZED AID IN TUSCANY
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PART III: THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZED AID IN TUSCANY
I. Introduction
The first activities of Tuscany’s regional administration in the realm of decentralized co­
operation can be traced back to 1990, when the regional government passed the first 
regional law on international co-operation. Yet, it must be said that, by this time, 
international co-operation activities were not a novelty in the Tuscan territory. Since the 
mid-eighties, local institutions, in co-operation with local NGOs, had developed different 
co-operation schemes. Tuscany’s legislation echoed the reality in the territory o f trying to 
integrate pre-existing activities in the restrictive normative framework of the Italian State.
In 1999 a new system was established. The new system conferred greater deal o f autonomy 
on the regional administration to operate not only as a coordinator, but as the central piece 
o f a regional international co-operation system.
This major change is the regional response to a new political situation in Italy that affected 
both centre-periphery relations and the realm of foreign aid. Firstly, it can be said that in 
1999 ordinary statute regions enjoyed a greater level of autonomy. Institutional reform and 
the extended perception (in part devoted to the emergence o f the Lega Nord as a political 
force) that the solution to Italy’s problems of malgovemo resided partially in conferring 
more substance upon the regional tier o f government changed the position o f  the regions 
vis-à-vis the national government and expanded the role of sub-state tiers of government in 
the Italian political system.
Secondly, by 1999 the Italian overseas aid system had experienced an enormous crisis, due 
to a number of corruption scandals that questioned the use o f  national funds destined for 
aid. According to the perceptions expressed in various OECD/DAC reports issued at that 
time, the process o f  aid system restructuring, which basically implied reducing funds 
available for bilateral aid, forced NGOs to look for new partners. This process benefited the 
sub-state levels which gained some relevance in the aid realm.
The creation of this new system allowed the regional administration in Tuscany to establish 
a new political agenda for international development aid. This agenda introduced a broad 
interpretation of the principles of territoriality and decentralization. Furthermore, the 
documents emphasized Tuscany’s contribution to the process o f European integration.
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Finally, they addressed the question of the contribution o f Tuscany’s development 
experience, rooted in the integration o f civil society and an economic model based on small 
and medium-sized enterprises, to the economic and social development of Third World 
countries.
The chapter is structured to reflect these changes on a temporal basis. Thus, the first section 
is devoted to analyzing Tuscany’s initial steps in the international aid realm. Empirical 
evidence from this period shows how, at this stage, the region was trapped between the 
normative framework of the State and the previously existing co-operation schemes o f 
NGOs and localities.
The second section addresses the major changes brought by the regional law 17/99 and the 
piano regionale per la cooperazione 2001-2005. From 1999 onwards the region managed 
to structure a new system of international co-operation, rooted in a new normative 
perception o f the role o f territories in the international realm. Tuscany’s system managed to 
integrate territorial initiatives, yet it conceded a number o f directive and co-ordination 
capacities to the regional administration.
Finally, the conclusions of this chapter reassess the role o f Tuscany in the realm o f 
decentralized aid. In this respect the evolution of political discourse is confronted by the 
evolution o f the administrative structures to conclude that is far from clear whether 
Tuscany’s administration would be able to channel international co-operation towards a 
clear political scope, or, on the contrary, it would try to maintain the unstable equilibria 
between regional preferences, the inclinations of co-funding institutions and the demands o f 
social actors in the territory.
Nevertheless, before proceeding with the analysis o f  Tuscany’s involvement in foreign aid 
issues, a caveat must be introduced. The attentive reader might note that there is a 
significant variation in the amount o f primary sources available for the construction of the 
Tuscan case vis-à-vis the analysis presented in Part I I  o f Basque administration’s 
engagement in foreign aid. As I will try to show in the forthcoming sections this should be 
taken as an outcome o f this dissertation rather than as a constraint. In other words, the fact 
that important data are missing can be taken as an indicator o f the nature o f the politics of 
decentralized aid in Tuscany.
250
II. 1990: Tuscany’s first steps in the realm of international co-operation.
11.1 Regionalism in Italy before the 1990’s
Since the approval o f the Italian Constitution in the aftermath of the Second World War 
until the beginning o f the nineties, regional reform in Italy has undergone a number o f 
phases. Firstly, from 1947 until the 1970’s Putnam et al. had identified a minimalist 
approach to regional reform. Secondly, from the 1970’s to the early 1980’s a maximalist 
approach can be recognized. Finally, a third phase, the so-called managerial phase, took 
place during the eighties.
The establishment o f  Ordinary Statute regions was included in the Italian Constitution o f 
1947, yet the implementation of this constitutional mandate was postponed until the 
seventies. Following Putnam, the political strategies of both communists (who evolved 
from a highly centralist view to claims for decentralization) and Christian democrats (who, 
after advocating for regional reform in earlier stages, tried to defend a centralized political 
structure), led to the establishment of a minimalist approach to regional reform, which, at 
the end of the day, satisfied neither the political aspirations of the left nor the ambitions o f 
the Christian Democrats424.
The inclusion of the Socialist in the governing coalition in the early sixties triggered the 
process of regional reform in Italy, since the Socialist Party had established the 
institutionalisation o f a regional tier of government as one of their major claims in the 
bargaining process with the Christian Democrats. Yet, this process evolved slowly since 
Christian Democrats were reluctant to devolve political power and argued the important 
economic cost of establishing a new tier of government in the context of post-war economic 
reform. By 1970 two national laws institutionalised the minimalist legal framework for the 
establishment of the 15 Ordinary Statute regions in Italy425.
Nevertheless, the restrictive institutional framework established by the laws of 1970 and the 
subsequent constitutional doctrine established by the Court didn’t affect the optimism o f 
pro-regional elites regarding the constitution of the new tier of government As Putnam et
424 See Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti 1985: 'ha pianta e le radiai: Il radicamento 
dell ’istituto régionale nel sistema politico italiano’ Bologna: Società Editrice II Mulino p. 51.
425 See Robert Putnam et al. 1985: 'Lapianta e le radici: Il radicamento dell 'istituto régionale nel sistema 
politico italiano’ (op. cit.) p. 54.
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a l had stressed, the restrictive legal framework established for regional reform in Italy 
spurred pro-regional elites and parties who, from 1970 onwards, tried to turn the fate of 
regional reform upside down, leading to the second phase o f regional reform in Italy, that is 
the maximalist approach.
Following Putnam and co., the maximalist approach to regional reform represents the 
expansion o f regional autonomy beyond the limits imposed by the institutional reform of 
the early 1970’s and the rules o f the political game among national elites. As they further 
argue, from 1972 to 1977 the ‘regional front’ mobilized. Claims for greater regional 
autonomy were echoed in the law 382/1975, which implemented the constitutional 
provisions regarding the areas of regional competence and sought to establish adequate 
administrative and financial instruments for the implementation o f the new capacities. The 
law 382/1975 and the decrees, which further developed its contents, placed 25% o f the 
total public expenditure in the hands o f the regional administrations, whereas they sought 
an important reform of the national public administration426.
However, the implementation of the new normative framework was once again delayed 
during the last years of the seventies and the early eighties. According to Putnam et al, the 
main weakness o f  the system established in 1975 and 1977 was precisely that it didn’t 
affect the general decisional structure. Reductions in bureaucracy were not followed by 
administrative restructuring; devolution of powers was not accompanied by new 
coordination mechanisms between the State and the regions. What is more, different state 
organs, such as the Constitutional Court, remained unaltered after the institutionalisation o f 
the regional tier o f government. Moreover, regionalization occurred in the midst of an 
important economic crisis, which affected the allocation of funds to the new institutional 
tier427. In 1978 the ministry for the treasury sought to reduce regional and local budgets as a 
means o f containing the public deficit. Regions reacted by claiming that further cuts in 
regional budgets represented not only an interference in the development o f their 
constitutionally defined capacities, but first and foremost an attempt to undermine incipient 
regional policy schemes.
426 See Robert Putnam et al. 1985: "Lapianta e le radici: H radicamento d ell’istituto regionale nel sistema 
politico italiano’ (op. cit.) pp. 70-80.
427 See Robert Putnam et al, 1985: "La pianta e le radici: II radicamento dell 'istituto regionale nel sistema 
politico italiano’ (op. cit.) p. 84.
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For the newly institutionalised regions, the situation o f regional reform in the beginning o f 
the eighties was one in which inter-administrative relations were outdone by political 
bargaining. As Bruno Dente has pointed out, the prevalent model of centre-periphery 
relations was bargained-consensual rather than hierarchic-authoritative428. Regions put 
forward strategies destined to access the decisional center in Rome, and the 
institutionalisation o f arenas for direct political bargaining between the central state and the 
regions. Among these the opening of representatives’ offices in Rome is noteworthy.
A third phase o f  regional reform in Italy took place during the eighties. This period 
witnessed the progressive establishment o f  the regional tier o f  government as an important 
element o f the Italian political system. The organization of arenas o f  representation, such as 
the conference o f regional presidents, allowed for better representation of regional interests 
vis-à-vis the national government. As Caciagli has pointed out, from the latter half o f  the 
eighties onwards the regions began to play an increasingly important role in Italian political 
life429. At the same time, regions concentrated more and more in managing the political 
autonomy achieved in the earlier stages. As a result o f this managerial approach to regional 
autonomy, regions and regional policy progressively faded away from the front pages o f  the 
newspapers and the forefront o f Italian politics.
Nevertheless, ordinary statute regions in Italy were still rather weak. Firstly, regions were 
very much dependent on the State. This is of particular relevance regarding financial 
autonomy. Regional funds derived almost entirely from the State and were largely 
earmarked for specific issues (Desideri claims that 90% of regional funds met these 
characteristics). Secondly, regions were undermined from below by a deep-rooted tradition 
o f local government430.
By the mid-eighties regionalization in Italy could be understood as a two-fold process. On 
the one hand, the process of regionalization is rather weak at an administrative level. 
Legislation offered many blank spots, which permitted the State’s intervention in regional
428 See Bruno Dente 1985: ‘ Governare la frammentazione: Stato Regioni ed enti localiin Italia* Bologna: 
Società Editrice II Mulino p. 261.
429 See Mario Caciagli 2003: * Regioni d ’Europa: Devoluzione, regionalismi, integrazione europea* Bologna: 
IlMUlino Universale Paperbaks p.21.
430 See Carlo Desideri and Vincenzo Santantonio: 'Building a Third Leve! in Europe: Piospects and 
difficulties in Italy’ Regional and Federai Studies Voi 6 Issue 2 Summer 1996 pp. 97-98.
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competences. Decentralization was not accompanied by appropriate reform of the 
administrative structures o f the State, leaving important command and control capacities in 
the hands o f State bureaucrats. In many cases this rendered decentralization of competences 
ineffective. Finally, decentralization o f competences was not accompanied by an 
appropriate set o f financial capacities, increasing regions’ dependency on the State.
On the other hand, regions, as a result o f the activities o f regional politicians, were 
successful in entering the structure o f the Italian political system. Regions’ structures of 
representation increasingly placed pressure on the decisional structures at the center, adding 
to the political weight of the regions. This operation took place in the midst of a process of 
diminishing the overall notoriousness o f the regions, as an institutional tier, in the political 
scene. Regional authorities were more concentrated on managing their sphere o f  political 
autonomy conquered in earlier phases o f the process o f decentralization, rather than in 
mobilizing further reforms o f the system.
11.2 The problem of region’s projection abroad: the initial steps of Italian regions in 
the realm of international co-operation
The problems with recognising regions’ capacity to act abroad somehow summarized the 
above mentioned tendencies. Whereas during the seventies the minimalist framework for 
regional reform defined strict limits for regional projection abroad, the furthering o f the 
process of European integration (which increasingly affected regional policy) and the 
increasing importance o f transborder relations as well as the progressive 
internationalisation of the economy sent clear signals to the regions of the end of the State’s 
monopoly of foreign relations. Yet, changes in the realm o f regions’ foreign projection 
during the eighties and the early nineties were not the result o f major institutional reforms 
but the consequence of a process o f political bargaining between national, regional and 
local elites.
According to Palermo, during the eighties the problem o f  a region’s projection abroad 
intensified. Regions were more and more exposed to the effects of the internationalisation 
of economic exchanges as well as the process o f European integration which had an 
increasing impact on regional policy. Thus, regions were increasingly in need o f some kind
of international projection to implement many of their capacities and manage the sphere o f 
regional autonomy431.
As he further argues, the second half o f the eighties witnessed an increasing co-ordination 
between the State and the regions regarding foreign policy. Yet, this is not the result o f 
further reform of the institutional edifice for the vertical distribution o f powers, but a direct 
consequence of the mobilization o f the above mentioned arenas o f  interest representation. 
In 1987, the Permanent Conference of the State-Regions-Autonomous Provinces approved 
an agreement by which, while foreign policy remained principally a State prerogative, the 
specific role of the regions in the realm o f foreign relations was recognised. This agreement 
was further implemented in the context Law on International Co-operation approved in 
1987 which recognized the possibility o f regional and local governments* participation in 
co-operation schemes. Yet, the participation o f sub-state units was strictly monitored by the 
State administration, who had the right to control every single international contact 
established by regional, provincial or local authorities432.
Regional participation in international co-operation activities was further developed in a 
document from the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs: *Linee di indirizzo del CIS per lo 
svolgimento di attività di cooperazione alio sviluppo da parte delle regione dette provincie 
autonome e dagli enti localV issued in 1989433.
The document identified two main areas where sub-national units could develop their 
activities. These areas were: firstly, the so-called activities within the Italian territory; 
secondly, promotion, coordination and implementation o f international co-operation 
projects.
Within the first category, the region was bestowed with powers to organize and coordinate 
different activities related to education for development and capacity building projects in
431 See Francesco Palermo 1999: ‘77 potere esterno delle regioni: Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un 
potree interno alla costituzione italiana’ Verona: Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani p. 106-107.
432 See Francesco Palermo 1999: ‘7/ potere esterno delle regioni: Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un 
potree interno alla costituzione italiana1 (op. cit.) p. 108.
433 See Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo: ‘Linee di 
indirizzo del CISper lo svolgimento di attività di cooperazione allo sviluppo da parte delle regione delle 
provincie autonome e dagli enti locali’ (Approvate con delibera n. 12 dal Comitato Interministeriale per la 
Cooperazione allo Sviluppo nella riunione del 17-3-1989)
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Italy. Furthermore, sub-national units could develop activities destined both to enhance the 
capacities o f NGOs established on the territory and to ensure the participation o f local 
communities in cooperation activities with less developed countries. Finally, the region was 
charged with establishing documentation and information instruments.
In the second place, the State recognized the capacity o f sub-state units to present project 
proposals to the central government and to promote their own activities within the context 
of Italian overseas aid. These capacities were very much restricted. Sub-national units were 
forced to conform with priorities o f the Italian State’s foreign policy.
Firstly, sub-state units could develop their own projects in those specific realms where they 
had an exclusive competence. Projects should be oriented to capacity building and the 
strengthening o f local institutions in less developed countries. These projects should 
enhance the participation of local communities and private actors. Finally the participation 
of Italian communities o f emigrants was positively evaluated.
Secondly, sub-state units got recognized proposal capacities. They were entitled to propose 
to the central government projects that could be better developed by a lower tier o f 
government. Yet, the co-operation activities of sub-state units derived from this proposal 
capacity were defined as ‘intergovernmental cooperation’ and, as a consequence, had to 
respect the priorities established by the national authorities. The projects proposed by sub­
state units were evaluated by a Mixed Commission and the Foreign Affairs Ministry to be 
incorporated later on into the different national country-programs. Moreover, all 
international contacts established by the regions or localities during the project definition 
process had to be reported to the national authorities. Finally, once the project had been 
defined by the sub-national unit, the national administration would decide among all the 
proposals which projects would be implemented by the sub-national units.
By the early nineties Italian regions got recognized limited capacities to go abroad. Within 
the realm of foreign aid, regions could co-operate with Italian institutions and develop 
projects within the Italian territory and abroad. Yet, all these capacities, as we have seen 
before, were severely monitored by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, who could control the 
activities of the region both at the decision-making phase and at the implementation phase.
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The following sections explore Tuscany’s first attempts to develop their own international 
co-operation projects within the limits imposed by the Linee di indirizzo established by the 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs.
11.3 The origins of Tuscany’s decentralized aid for development policy. La regione  
nella tana?
Despite the fact that most analysts would situate the origins of Tuscany’s engagement in 
decentralized aid policies in 1999, the Redone Toscana had already issued a regional law 
directed at regulating international co-operation activities by 1990. This document is the 
Legge Régionale 10 Ottobre 1990 n.66, from now on L.R. 66/90. For the first time in a 
regional law, emergency relief, which have been subjected to ad hoc legislation in 1989 and 
1990434, shares the same space with other kinds of activities in the realm of co-operation 
with less developed countries. In this respect the L.R. 66/90 marks the initial phase o f  a 
proper regional concern with international aid for development issues.
The L.R. 66/90 included two important sections. One was devoted to defining the range o f 
regional activities in the aid realm. A second one was devoted to establishing a specific set 
o f administrative structures devoted not only to the implementation of the policy itself, but 
also to further regulation of regional international co-operation activities. In the following 
paragraphs we will try to present briefly how this system worked.
The L.R. 66/90 defines, in article 2, the tasks of the regional administration in the aid 
sphere. Article 2.1 states, as the first task of the region, the ‘promotion and the 
coordination o f a ll the initiatives taken, "within the limits o f the regional territory, in the 
realm o f co-operation activities as they are defined both in national and European 
legislation’. Thus, the regional administration assumes general coordination tasks whilst it 
devotes the subsequent paragraphs of Article 2. to the definition of more specific functions.
Article 2.2 lists the specific functions of the regional administration. These are:
434 See Legge Regionale 23 Febbraio 1989 no. 14 Contributi per le opere di soccorso a favore della 
popolazione dell’Armenia and thè Legge Regionale 30 Aprile 1990 no. 59 Iniziative di solidarietà in favore 
della popolazione Rumena.
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o Enact all the necessary activities destined to promote the main ends 
expressed in Article 1. These activities include: the enactment o f projects 
pursuing the integral development o f specific areas in least developed 
countries (LDCs), the construction o f infrastructure, the development of 
research schemes destined to improve the implementation o f the 
different programs.
o Employ qualified personnel for the implementation and evaluation of the 
development projects.
o  Promote the education of LDC’s immigrant communities residing in 
Tuscany, as a means o f favoring the integration o f these communities in 
Tuscany, but also in order to favor re-integration in their original 
countries.
o Sustain NGOs’ activities and projects.
o Enact programs o f  education and sensitization and all the initiatives 
favoring cultural exchange among territories.
Finally, Article 2.3 includes a specific reference to the realm o f  emergency aid. To this end, 
the region will act in the event of ‘natural disasters or situations o f deprivation which 
threaten the survival o f the population* through directly providing specific goods or 
qualified personnel.
This apparently advanced set o f  capacities and functions established in the L.R. 66/90 was 
limited by pre-existing national legislation435. As we have already seen, the document 
‘Linee di indirizzo del CICS per lo svolgimento di attività d i coperazione allo sviluppo da 
parte delle provincie autonome e degli enti locali* clearly differentiates two spheres of 
activity: firstly, those activities that are developed within the Italian territory; secondly, 
those activities that have an international dimension.
435 It seems that the limits imposed by the national legislation were widely respected, at least in the context of 
the international co-operation activities o f ordinary regions. I would like to thank Stefanie Wobbe for arguing 
quite convincingly on this issue.
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The first type o f activities included education, sensitization, personnel formation and the 
support o f Italian NGOs’ activities. In these areas regions and localities were guaranteed a 
great level o f  autonomy.
The second type o f activities included those activities that have an international dimension, 
namely activities related to the promotion and implementation o f co-operation schemes 
with territories in different countries. These were defined by the national legislation as 
intergovernmental relations, thus they were necessarily controlled by the state who was the 
sole administration with a constitutionally recognized capacity to act internationally436.
Therefore, the picture in 1990 is one o f  tight State control o f regional activities in the aid 
realm. As we have seen, according to the existing legislation a region could barely move 
outside Italian territory without complying with a number of State norms and controls.
However, the capacities of regional administrations as funding entities were understood as 
an activity taking place within the limits o f the Italian territory, thus not being subject to the 
tight controls reserved to those activities that implied intergovernmental relations.
11.3.1 The 1990 legislation and the pre-existing activities of local governments and 
NGOs
International co-operation activities were by any means a novelty in Tuscany’s territory by 
1990. As one informant puts it, ‘Since the late eighties a number of local NGOs were 
working hand in hand with local governments’437.
According to the same informant, problems derived from the integration of immigrants had 
compelled local governments to approach the NGOs since they were perceived as the only
f 436 In addition, we should not forget that the State had first the possibility of recourse against a supposed
violation of the division o f competences to the Constitutional Court, and second, control of the financial 
! capacities of the regions. The dependency of Italian regions on State transfers is widely acknowledged in the
I existing literature as one of the main problems for the proper development of a regional tier of government in
f Italy. Some examples are: Cassese and Torchia: ‘The meso level in Italy* in Sharpe J.L. (ed) 1993: * The Rise
ofM eso Government in Europe’ London: SAGE publishers pp. 91-113; Bruno Dente: ‘Sub-national 
Governments in the long Italian Transition’ in 'W est European Politics: Special Issue on Crisis and 
Transition in Italian Politics edited by Martin Bull and Martin Rhodes' Vol 20. No.l January 1997 pp. 176- 
193
437 A unique example o f this is the Istituzione Centro-Nord-Sud at the Province o f Pisa. Interview conducted 




organizations present in the territory which were skilled enough to deal with immigrants’ 
needs.
Yet, even if  co-operation between NGOs and local authorities was initially conceived to 
address the process of immigrant integration in the local community, it can be said that by 
the beginning of the nineties, the scope of these cooperation schemes stretched far beyond 
the regional borders438.
Moreover, Marcella Pulga has shown that in specific cases, such as the commune o f Sesto 
Fiorentino and the co-operation with the Saharawi people, the double membership o f 
activists in NGOs and in the local council helped the introduction o f  international co­
operation in the local political agenda439.
The importance of the pre-existing substratum o f  international co-operation activities 
present in the territory was recognized by the regional administration, as we have already 
mentioned, in Article 2.2.d, where it is claimed that one o f  the functions of the regional 
administration will be to ‘sustain NGOs’ activities and projects’.
However, this is not the only reference made in the documents to the role o f NGOs and 
localities in the co-operation policy in Tuscany. Actually, as we will see in the next section, 
the L.R. 66/90, when dealing with the definition o f the administrative structure in charge o f 
implementing aid schemes, reserves an important role to NGOs and local governments.
11.3.2 The administrative structure of Tuscany’s international co-operation and the 
participation of NGOs and localities
Articles three to eight of the L.R. 66/90 were devoted to the establishment of an 
administrative structure in charge o f  implementation o f the policy. The structure was
438 Interview carried out on the 14* o f November 2003. However, there is little evidence to support this 
assertion. I have not been able to find data on the number of NGOs or on the existing schemes o f co-operation 
between local governments and NGOs. Yet, it is a widespread impression among informants coming from 
different institutions and organizations that the pre-existing activities o f local NGOs played an important role 
in the definition of regional international co-operation schemes.
439 See Marcella Pulga: lDal movimentismo alla solidarietà come mestiere: l ’intervento delle ONG italiane 
nella questione saharawi’ Tesi di laurea in Governo Locale. Università degli Studi di Firenze. Facoltà di 
Scienze Politiche «Cesare Alfieri » Indirizzo politico-sociale. Anno accademico 2001-2002. pp. 69-74.
260
independent of the Giunta Regionale (regional government). It was divided into two main 
sections/organs.
On the one hand, an Ufficio Gabinetto was created, its main function being the provision o f 
technical support and advice440.
The second entity was the Consulta per la cooperazione alio sviluppo441. The Consulta was 
composed of at least fifteen members, the total number depending on the number o f local 
NGOs present. Apart from local NGOs and the 4 members representing the regional 
government, the Consulta includes a representative from the ANCI442, a representative 
from the URPT443 and a representative from the UNCEM444 45. The remaining members o f the 
Consulta p re sen ted  different sectors o f Tuscany’s society such as the trade unions or local
445entrepreneurs .
According to Article 6 the functions of this Consulta were the following:
Proposal, within the limits established by national legislation, o f the 
geographical and material priorities for the co-operation activities. This 
proposal capacity should be exercised taking into consideration the 
needs of the recipient countries.
Collect and evaluate the project proposals presented by different public 
and private subjects.
Proposal of a program of activities, to be approved by the Giunta 
Regionale
Evaluate previous years’ activities.
As we have seen, the regional legislation left room for local governments and local NGOs 
to influence both the policy definition and the implementation processes. Three reasons 
might account for this.
440 Art.3 L.R. 66/90.
44’ Art.4 L.R. 66/90.
442 Associazione Nazionel Comuni Italiani.
443 Unione Regionale delle Provincie Toscane.
444 Unione Nazionale Comuni Comunità Enti Montani.
445 Por a detailed list of thè members of thè Consulta Regionale per la cooperazione allo sviluppo see Art. 4.2 
L.R. 66/90.
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Firstly, for an ordinary regional administration in Italy aiming to develop its own 
international co-operation policy, the only way in which it could ever elude the controls 
established by the national legislation was to operate through NGOs. As we have already 
seen, the Italian government regarding the funding o f  NGOs* as an activity which did not 
imply ‘intergovernmental contacts’ and therefore corresponding to the internal dimension 
of regional politics. When the new system of the L.R.66/90 was created, the regional 
administration would have found co-operation with NGOs an easy way to have an external 
projection in the realm of international co-operation.
Yet, NGOs were an important stakeholder for the regional aid system for two further 
reasons. On the one hand, the importance of pre-existing co-operation activities set an 
important limit to a regional administration’s creativity. By the time the regional 
administration decided to engage in development aid policies, NGOs already had a long­
standing experience o f co-operation with other institutions. The most important partner was 
the Italian State, but, as we have already seen, NGOs have also been successful in 
establishing co-operation schemes with local authorities. Since national legislation almost 
forced the regional administration to operate through NGOs, their experience as a 
development stakeholder at the local level was a key resource in the process o f  bringing 
both NGOs and localities to a  relevant position in the regional system of international 
aid446.
On the other hand, the regional administration faced the problem of a lack of expertise in 
the field of international co-operation. Since the regional administration lacked the 
necessary experience to put forward its own international co-operation schemes it had to 
rely on the experience of other organizations and institutions, such as the local NGOs or the 
localities with which they have co-operated. As one informant put it, ‘the regional 
administration follow ed the model established by NGOs and localities, and it is only with 
the development o f a stronger regional administration that the region was able to push 
forw ard its own agenda on development issues' 447.
446 In addition to Article 2.2.d, which specifies that funding NGOs’ initiatives is one of the tasks o f the 
regional administration, the L.R. 66/90 states in Article 8.1 that ‘the region will favor the co-operation 
activities promoted by local governments. At the same time the region will promote coordination between 
local initiatives and the national and regional activities’.
447 Interview carried out on the 12th of November 2003
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11.4 Tuscany’s decentralized aid in the early nineties: a mystery enveloped in an 
enigma wrapped with a riddle?
At the beginning o f this section we claimed that despite the existence of the L.R. 66/90 
most of the informants we have come across in this research tended to situate the origins o f 
Tuscany’s decentralized aid policy in 1999. The denial of the existence of a proper policy 
before the enactment o f the Legge Régionale 23 Marzo 1999 no. 17, does not allow us to go 
much further than what it has been said in the previous sections.
Talcing into account this limitation, we can preliminarily conclude that Tuscany’s first steps 
in the development aid realm were very much limited from above but also from below. 
From above, the state’s extremely rigid conceptualization of the division of competences 
imposed a burden on regional international activities, and specifically on its capacities to 
operate in the aid realm, leaving them practically with the sole chance to act through 
financing NGOs’ activities.
From below the pre-existing co-operation schemes between NGOs and localities in addition 
to the regional administration’s condition o f newcomer placed the regional administration 
in a dependent position with respect to local NGOs.
As we have seen, the regional administration tried to put forward a ‘coordinator’ profile. 
However, it is very difficult to asses whether the region was able to exercise effectively 
these co-ordination tasks, or whether it ended up being a subsidizing institution. Again the 
darkness surrounding this period renders the task of clarifying this issue almost impossible. 
The fundamental features of Tuscany’s decentralized aid programs in the nineties can be 
summarized in the following figure:
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Figure 23: D ecentralized cooperation in  Tuscany 1990
The figure above shows how decentralized aid in Italy in the early nineties resulted from 
the interaction o f three different tiers o f government. Firstly, in the late eighties NGOs and 
local governments established co-operation schemes as a  means of dealing with the 
problems derived from the integration o f  immigrant communities in the territory. Secondly, 
at State level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE) regulated those activities through the 
linee di indirizzo. As we have seen, the document foresaw a set of tight controls on the 
activities of sub-state authorities in the realm of international co-operation. Finally, the 
regional level found itself trapped between early local initiatives and the State’s control the 
external projection o f sub-state actors. Tuscany’s authorities vested the region with co­
ordination capacities. Yet, it is not clear whether the regional administration was able to 
create a clear-cut profile as an international co-operation actor, or exert any influence over 
the other two actors involved. The text o f the L.R. 66/90 tends to support pre-existing 
activities in the territory, while it recognizes the limits imposed in national legislation. 
Apparently, Tuscany’s administration did not have a clear set o f preferences along which to 
structure its engagement in international co-operation policies.
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The end of the nineties signaled a turning point in Tuscany’s international co-operation 
policy. In 1999 the regional administration issued a new regional law on international co­
operation (L.R. 17/99 di 23 Marzo), which introduced a number of major changes with 
respect to the structure established in the L.R. 66/90. Such was the range of these changes 
that many informants do not hesitate in situating the origins o f regional engagement in 
foreign aid policies precisely in 1999.
The following sections explore Tuscany's international co-operation policy after 1999. 
First, we analyze the political context in which the L.R. 17/99 was issued. The so-called 
crisis of the first republic has had a tremendous impact on the structure of centre-periphery 
relations in Italy and in the configuration o f the territorial model. At the same time, the 
crisis o f Italian bi-lateral overseas development aid (ODA), which was the consequence of 
both the fiscal crisis of the State and the rise of corruption scandals, resulted in a process o f 
restructuring the international co-operation system. Italian authorities placed the emphasis 
on the multilateralization of aid and tried to incorporate sub-state institutions as a means of 
surmounting the crisis of public trust in State agencies.
Secondly, we present the main novelties introduced by the L.R. 17/1999. These changes 
can be structured along three major questions. Firstly, a new categorization of the different 
areas of activity and the capacities of the region is introduced. Secondly, the L.R. 17/99 
introduces the piano régionale, a programmatic document in which the policy preferences 
are defined. The third instrument o f change is the tavoli di coordinamento per area 
geografica, which involves all the actors operating in the same geographical area. The 
second section is structured as to analyze the impact of these changes in the structure of 
Tuscany’s international co-operation.
In the final section we place the evidence gathered on the nature o f Tuscany’s international 
co-operation policy after reform under the light of the theoretical framework that we have 
presented in the first part of this dissertation.
III. 1999: A  new decentralized aid system for Tuscany
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111.1 The changing the nature of Italian politics and Tuscany’s international co­
operation
111.1.1 Crisis and change in Italy’s territorial politics in the 1990’s
John Agnew has defined Italy as a heavily centralized state that has recently undergone a 
dramatic breakdown o f its old system o f managing severe geographical cleavages, in 
particular the North/South division and the rise of contending visions among new political 
parties o f how Italy can be reconstructed448 49.
In the early nineties the unique party-mediated political economy of Italy disintegrated. 
This was a system whereby various sectoral and geographical groups had been integrated 
into the national economy largely through the use o f state resources mediated by the 
parties .
According to Guzzini the Italian system before the 1990’s can be defined as a “dualistic 
clientelistic system”: ‘In an implicit contract, an externally oriented economic sector in the 
North and a domestically oriented, increasingly public and service oriented, sector in the 
South were accommodated. Clientelism managed domestic consent in a segmented society 
and buffered the effects o f the necessary opening to the European and wider international 
system’450.
This party-state system, or oligarchy o f parties allied to networks of particular interests, had 
its roots in the permanent exclusion o f  the Communists from national government. The 
Christian Democrats, the dominant party o f government from the late 1940s until 1992, 
could rule only in coalition with other parties. Permanence in office and the need to reward 
partners led to a systematic spoils system in which the State served as a source o f favors to 
allies451. Parties colonized the public administration and, through an extensive system of
448 See John Agnew 2002: "Place and Politics in Modem Italy * Chicago: The University of Chicago Press p. 
191.
449 See John Agnew 2002: * Place and Politics in Modem Italy’ (op. cit.) p. 196.
450 See Stefano Guzzini: *The long night of the First Republic: Years of Clientelistic implosion in Italy’ 
review o f International Political Economy 2 1995 p.31
451 See John Agnew 2002: * Place and Politics in Modem Italy’ (op. cit.) p. 196.
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state intervention, extended their reach into the civil society. They organized their 
supporters through exclusive subcultures in which loyalty was largely taken for granted452.
Politicians succeeded insofar as they could mediate between particular interests and 
generate financing for the party. Firms and parties rewarded one another in an organized 
and increasingly formalized cartel o f covert political alliances, state contracts and bribery. 
Yet, parties not only divided spoils vertically, they also shared them horizontally. Different 
parties and factions of parties had dominant roles in mediating between Rome and the 
various regions and localities where they were most strongly embedded453.
Following Guzzini’s analysis, by the end of the eighties the main parties and the interest 
groups involved in the system had reached an impasse with one another. In particular, as a 
clientelistic logic became more and more central to political consent through exchanges of 
votes for resources or favors, the more it lost legitimacy and the more it needed to resort to 
covert exchanges, which in turn undermined legitimacy, and so on454 45.
The growth o f the national budget and the pressure o f  both the European Union and 
international trade dramatically reduced the value o f the system to many of its previous 
beneficiaries and called into question the bargain struck between the parties and the Italian 
society. The increased corruption o f  the regime, as it came to rely more on illegal 
transactions and links with the organized crime, produced a break in the contract between 
the rulers and the ruled that gave rise to the criminal investigation of leading politicians and 
businessmen beginning in 1992 and the subsequent withdrawal of popular support for the
- * * 455mam parties in government .
The new parties that emerged from the wreckage o f the so-called first republic had to 
embark on defining themselves in relation to the new Italian reality in which the old 
mechanisms for national integration had largely broken down456. A party such as the Lega
452 See Michael Keating 1999: 'The Politics o f Modem Europe: The state and Political Authority in the Major 
Democracies. Second edition ’ Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar p.232.
453 See John Agnew 2002:'Place and Politics in Modem Italy’ (op. cit.) p. 197.
454 See Stefano Guzzini: ‘The long night o f  the First Republic: Years o f Clientelistic implosion in Italy* (op. 
cit.) p. 54.
455 See John Agnew 2002: *Place and Politics in Modem Italy* (op. cit.) p.198.
456 Yet, whereas they were able to reach an agreement on important policy changes (i.e. policy adaptation in 
order to meet Maastricht criteria), they were much less able to put forward proper institutional 
transformations. See Sergio Fabbrini: ‘Political Change without Institutional Transformation: What can we
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Nord took advantage o f the wreckage of the system to place an agenda o f political 
decentralization at the forefront o f the political scene.
The Lega Nord  is one of the most important examples o f  the novelties introduced in the  
Italian political system after the collapse of the system in 1992457. Firstly, it originally 
remained outside the traditional red-white (Communist-Christian Democrats) ideological 
axis, which structured most of the politics of the ‘First Republic*. It founds its origins in a  
set o f minor ethno-political groups, such as the Lega Lombarda or the Lega Veneto, which 
appeared on the political scene o f Italy’s northern regions in the eighties. These groups 
emphasized the existence o f  a distinct northern identity, which could be observed in the 
cultural traditions of these regions458.
Secondly, according to Desideri, since the beginning of the nineties the Lega Nord  has been 
able to structure a broader political program along the lines of a geographically defined 
political identity. The Lega seeks a fundamental, territorially-based redistribution o f  
political power, re-interpreting the political crisis of the early nineties to support the 
construction o f Padanian identity and vice versa (that is, using the communal virtues o f  the 
Padania as a justification for broader political change). The limits of the Lego’s claims have 
moved from blunt claims for independence of the Northern provinces configuring the so- 
called Padania (mostly in earlier stages, where the party used an anti-system rhetoric) to the 
defense o f federalism (in later stages, where the party has adopted a more pro-system 
profile, being part of the centre-right political coalition and participating in both 
Berlusconi’s governments)459.
The emergence of the Lega as an electoral force, its incorporation in the Berlusconi 
coalition (la Casa della Libertà), which since then has included devolution in its political 
program, and Lega's participation in the second (long) government o f Silvio Berlusconi 
(2001-2006?) has triggered a strong debate on the necessity o f empowering sub-state levels
learn from the Italian Crisis of the 1990s’ International Political Science review 2000 Voi. 21 No.2 pp, 173- 
196.
457 Together with the rise of Silvio Berlusconi and his party Forza Italia.
458 See among others: Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert 2001: ‘ The Lega Nord and the northern question in 
Italian politics' New York: Paigrave Macmillan pp. 9-38; Ilvo Diamanti 1993: *La lega: geografia, storia e 
sociologia di un nuovo soggetto politico' Roma: Donzelli pp. 69-107; Thomas W. Gold 2003: 'The Lega 
Nord and contemporary politics in Italy' New York: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 79-120.
459 See Carlo Desideri and Vincenzo Santantonio: ‘Building a Third Level in Europe: Prospects and 
difficulties in Italy’ (op. cit.) pp. 99-100
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of government, forcing all political forces in Italy to a major realignment regarding the 
decentralization o f political authority460. As an authoritative commentator on Italian politics 
states, ‘E sta to  il movimento attuato da Bossi aportare in cima all*agenda delle riforme il 
federalismo’461.
Nevertheless, the rise of regionalism in the political agenda o f institutional reform in Italy 
cannot be conceived as the sole effect o f the rise o f a political party such as the Lega Nord. 
Carlo Desideri has noted how, ‘since the end o f the eighties the regions have produced a 
stream o f proposals with the follow ing demands: expansion o f regions ’ competences; 
provisions fo r  their direct participation in the national political and legislative process 
through the creation o f a Regional Chamber; the granting o f  financial autonomy through 
changes in the regional tax base and the distribution o f  central government taxes; and 
direct participation in the EUpolicy-making process'462.
These demands have been accompanied by new modes o f political mobilization leading to 
the constitution o f a new form o f regionalism in Italy which is the manifestation of a 
bottom-up process of articulation o f demands rather than a top-down process, typical o f the 
period of creation of the regions in the seventies463. As Caciagli has pointed out, the first 
half o f the nineties witnessed increasing mobilization on the part o f Italian regional elites 
and their representative bodies, which claimed further institutional reform in the context o f 
a generalized political and financial crisis of the State apparatus464.
Since 1994, territorial reform has been a significant issue in Italian politics. Both left-wing 
and right-wing governments have tried to put forward major reforms, the last act of this 
drama being the Leghist proposal for territorial restructuring and devolution, recently 
approved by the Parliament. To establish the context in which Tuscany redefined its 
international co-operation policy, we will focus on three major reforms that occurred prior 
to 2000: First, the d.P.R of 31st o f March 1994; second, the so-called Bassanini Laws and
460 See Carlo Desideri and Vincenzo Santantonio: ‘Building a Third Level in Europe: Prospects and 
difficulties in Italy’ (op. cit.) p. 99.
461 See Leonardo Morlino 1998: *Giovanni Sartori: Una occasione mancata? Intervista sulla riforma 
constituzionale. Intervista sulla riforma constituzionaie a cura di Leonardo Morlino’ Roma: Laterza p. 97.
462 See Carlo Desideri and Vincenzo Santantonio: ‘Building a Third Level in Europe: Prospects and 
Difficulties in Italy’ (op. cit.) p. 98.
463 See Carlo Desideri and Vincenzo Santantonio: 'Building a Third Level in Europe: Prospects and 
Difficulties in Italy’ (op. cit.) p. 99.
464 See Mario Caciagli 2003: 'Regioni d ’Europe’ (op. cit.) p.22.
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the results o f the Bicamerale Commission of the national parliament; and third, the 
Constitutional Law 1/1999.
The d.P.R of 3 1st of March 1994 offered a new legal framework for the development o f a 
region’s foreign activities. The decree is the result o f a progressive change in the way in 
which the Italian territorial model had been working since the eighties onwards. According 
to Palermo, the system had evolved from the model o f  ‘separate spheres o f  power’ to the so 
called ‘marbled cake model’, by which the spheres o f  activity of different tiers o f 
government were systematically entrenched, rather than separated465.
The decree was discussed and approved within the context o f  the Permanent Conference o f 
State-Provinces-Regions. Following Palermo, the d.P.R of 31st o f March 1994 represents a 
step forward in the recognition, on the part o f the Italian State, o f regional capacities to act 
abroad. Two major changes were introduced. Firstly, the so-called ‘procedural 
benevolence’ by which the controls established in previous legislation were substantially 
reduced. Secondly, the establishment o f  areas for ‘regions* self-responsibility’, which 
opened greater spaces for inter-institutional co-operation in the foreign policy realm466.
The d.P.R. of 31st o f March 1994 created new possibilities for the projection o f Italian 
regions abroad. The decree sought to enhance a region’s capacities to act mainly at 
European level, but also in the international arena. As we have seen before, the evolution of 
the process o f European integration implied that a region’s capacities in areas such as 
economic planning or service delivery had an increasingly ad extra dimension, which was 
essential to it. According to Palermo, the d.P.R o f  31st o f  March 1994 addressed the 
increasing gap between the reality o f regional institutions’ daily practice and the sclerotic 
constitutional structure, which foresaw very little space for a region’s projection abroad467.
Yet, despite the relevance of the changes introduced by the d.P.R. of 31st o f March 1994, 
the impact of the crisis o f Italian politics on the territorial model was still to be felt in its 
greater consequences and intensity.
465 Sec Francesco Palermo 1999: *71potere esterno delle regioni: Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un 
potree interno alla costituzione italiana’ (op. c it.) p.171
466 See Francesco Palermo 1999: ‘77 potere esterno delle regioni: Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un 
potree interno alla costituzione italiana’ (op. cit.) p.172
467 See Francesco Palermo 1999: *77 potere esterno delle regioni: Ricostruzione in chiave comparata di un 
potree interno alla costituzione italiana’ (op. cit.) p.I73
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In 1997 the Italian parliament enacted two major pieces o f legislation (laws nos. 59 and 127 
of 1997) known as the Bassanini Laws, which put forward a new scenario for territorial 
politics in Italy, within the broader context of administrative reform in Italy.
Law 59/1997 empowered regional and local governments by conferring them with 
administrative responsibility in all areas “related to the protection of the interests and the 
promotion o f the development o f their respective communities” except those areas listed in 
the law itself. ‘These included\ as one might expect, foreign affairs, immigration policy, 
defense, the administration o f  justice, police and internal security. *468.
Law 127/1997 sought to continue the attempt to simplify administration in a number of 
areas o f public life, by improving the efficiency of decision-making and reducing the extent 
o f bureaucratic control procedures469.
The Bassanini laws pushed the constitutional framework for territorial politics in Italy to its 
limits. They established the maximum degree of sub-state autonomy that could be reached 
without altering the Vth Title o f the Italian Constitution.
Bassanini laws were approved while the Bicamerale Commission o f the National 
Parliament was still discussing the prospects for reforming the Vth Title of the Italian 
Constitution to establish a federal system of distribution o f powers. Yet, by 1998 the 
Commission was dissolved without achieving a far-reaching agreement on the direction of 
institutional reform. Despite the prospects for greater devolution of functions and 
increasing fiscal autonomy for sub-state units, the so-called federal system lacked one basic 
institutional pre-requisite for these reforms to be correctly implemented, that is the 
establishment o f a ‘federal Senate’ with strong powers.
Nevertheless, according to Newell, both the Bicamerale and the Bassanini Laws reversed 
the dominant conception o f the nature o f central-local relations in Italy. As he puts it, ‘in 
affirming the relevance o f such principles as subsidiarity and in raising the prospects o f  the 
dismantling o f  large parts o f  the machinery o f supervision from  above represent a
468 See James Newell: ‘At the Start o f  a Journey: Steps on the road to decentralization’ in Luciano Bardi and




significant approach towards a model [...]* in which sub-state units are something more 
than mere agents o f the decisional center.470.
By the end o f the XIIIth Legislature, an ample majority in Parliament enacted a 
constitutional law (Law 1/1999) that foresaw the direct election of regional presidents and 
gave regions the power to determine their own form of government. As a result, after the 
elections in 2000 the regions had embarked on a very intense phase of innovation. Yet this 
phase o f  innovation is constrained by the very limits o f institutional reform.
As Baldini and Vasallo stated, the need for a relatively major adjustment of the statutes 
and, more generally speaking, o f the regional organization structure, had brought about the 
limited constitutional revision enacted in law 1/1999 and the transfer o f administrative 
powers accomplished by the Bassanini laws. Yet the incomplete nature o f the federalization 
process weighed heavily over the revision of the Statutes. Some administrative powers 
were in the process of being transferred and the political role o f regional leaders had been 
reinforced. However, neither a new division of legislative and fiscal powers between the 
State and the regions had been defined nor had conditions been created to manage 
centrifugal forces in Italy, thus giving way to a transitional phase in which the limits o f the 
public performance of Italian institutions were uncertain471
The new rules o f territorial politics in Italy are the result o f  the changes brought by the 
major crisis taking place in the early nineties. As a result o f the collapse o f the partitocrazia 
new parties arose, putting forward new understandings of traditional territorial cleavages in 
Italy. The ability of the Lega Nord to conquer a substantial electoral substratum pushed 
territorial restructuring to the top of the Italian political agenda. Between 1994 and 1999 a 
number o f initiatives were taken. As a result, a major change in the philosophy inspiring
470See James Newell: ‘At the Start of a Journey: Steps on the road to decentralization’ in Luciano Bardi and 
Martin Rhodes (eds.) 1998: {op. cit.) p.162
471 See Gianfranco Baldini and Salvatore Vasallo: ‘The regions in search o f a new Institutional Identity’ in 
Mario Caciagli and A. Zuckerman (eds) 2001: ‘Italian politics: A review, Voi 16' Bologna: Il Mulino;
Oxford: Westview Press p. 95-96. Furthermore, in the eyes of some commentators these federalist reforms 
were perceived as a dangerous enterprise. Giovanni Sartori, when asked to evaluate the federalist reforms, 
claimed 'Non posso essere molto fiducioso. Un federalismo fa tto  per accontentare Bossi e prenderne voti non 
può essere una cosa seria. Se si decide di transformare la stiratura dello Stato, lo si debe fare perché si è 
convinti che quel cambiamento è necesario e che sarà benèfico. Non perchè c ‘è un demagogo che dice: o mi 
concedi il federalismo o pure tifacelo perdere le elezioni e ti metto il Nord in su b b u g lio See Leonardo 
Moriino 1998: ‘Giovanni Sartori: Una occasione mancata? Intervista sulla riforma constituzionale. Intervista 
sulla riforma constituzionale a cura di Leonardo Moriino’ (op. cit.) p. 98
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territorial politics in Italy has taken place. Yet, the changes introduced by the Bassanini 
Laws and the Law 1/99 brought about a higher degree of uncertainty regarding the limits of 
institutional capacities and the structure o f centre-periphery relations. As we have seen, 
whereas regions had been substantially empowered in their political capacities, it is not 
clear whether the appropriate instruments for managing the new space o f regional political 
autonomy had been put to work
In this context o f institutional uncertainty and open debate on the rules of territorial politics 
in Italy, Tuscany's administration decided to promote its international projection and the 
international co-operation program. In 1995 the regional government created the Servizio 
Attività Intemazionali (Office for Foreign Activities), which controlled the increasing 
activities of regional projection at the European level, derived from the new regime 
established by the d.P.R of 31st of March o f 1994.
The foreign projection of Tuscany had come to be a priority since the election o f Vannino 
Chiti as regional president. As stated by Emidio Diodato and Ilaria Bugetti in a recently 
published book, the political program of the regional president elected in 1992 put to the 
forefront the internationalization of the region and its participation in the decision making 
process at the European level472.
For the newly elected regional president, the reasons for this new emphasis on the 
international projection of Tuscany were twofold. Firstly, the process of European 
integration and the prospects created by the Maastricht Treaty and the Single European Act 
opened a new window of opportunity for regional mobilization in Europe. Europe was 
perceived as an increasingly important political arena where regions must actively promote 
their interests. Secondly, according to Chiti, the political action o f regional institutions must 
reflect the socio-economic structure o f a region which was increasingly dependent on the 
international projection of the Tuscan export sector. The Servizio Attività Intemazionali 
was charged not only with establishing links with European institutions, but also to 
promote the Tuscan export sector and the internationalization o f Tuscany’s economy473.
472 See Emidio Diodato and Xlaria Bugetti: ‘La presenza intemazionale della Regione Toscana (1970-2003)' 
in Emidio Diodato (ed.) 2004: ‘La Toscana e la globalizzazione dal basso’ Firenze: Chiari, p.248
473 See Emidio Diodato and Ilaria Bugetti: ‘La presenza intemazionale della Regione Toscana (1970-2003)’ 
(op. cit.) pp. 248-249
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These two major axes were complemented by a total reassessment o f Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid for development policy. As discussed in the previous sections, the L.R. 
66/90, in accordance with the Linee di indirizzo o f the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had 
established a regional system o f international co-operation in which the region retained a 
co-ordination role between State’s co-operation policy and the initiatives o f local 
governments and organizations in the tenitory. Yet, the impact of the scheme approved by 
the L.R. 66/90 on a region’s international activities was severely limited both by the strict 
controls established by the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs and the lack of resources available 
during the early years of the 1990’s (see figure below)
Figure 24: Total am m ount of aid Tuscany 1992-2003
Years
Source: Gabriella Panarese 2004: La cooperazione decentrata della Regione Toscana474
As shown in the figure above, from 1997 onwards, Tuscany’s international co-operation 
policy enjoyed a phase of increasing budgetary relevance. As many informants have stated 
this is the result o f an overall increase in the region’s economic resources derived from the 
process o f administrative decentralization initiated in 1994 and 1997.
474 Gabriella Panarese: ‘La cooperazione decentrata della Regione Toscana’ in Emidio Diodato (ed.) 2004: 
'La Toscana e la globalizzazione dal basso’ Firenze: Chiari pp. 271-285.
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Yet, the multiplication of regional funds for international co-operation activities is also a 
major consequence of an overall redefinition of the Italian aid system. As a result o f a 
major crisis, regions and localities were more and more perceived as an important actor 
within the Italian aid system. In a  context of harsh contestation of the results and the 
methods of Italian foreign aid, both the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs and NGOs looked for 
innovative ways to approach international co-operation and enhance the role of 
decentralized aid. The next section briefly explores this issue.
111.1.2 The crisis of Italian aid and the emergence of decentralized aid in Italy
The nineties witnessed a major crisis o f Italian aid, one consequence of which was a  major 
re-consideration of the role of sub-state units within the overall aid system. Regions, 
municipalities and provinces in Italy had evolved from a subordinate position vis-à-vis the 
State as it was established in 1987 legislation towards a more balanced relationship in 
recent years. From 2000 onwards, the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs has tried to incorporate 
regions and localities as active partners in Italy’s overseas aid, emphasizing its role as the 
coordinator o f different efforts and sensitivities.
As the OECD/DAC report on Italy states, ‘[In 1993] Fundamental reform was being 
demanded. Investigating judges were laying bare a system o f entrenched corruption 
involving political leaders, major industrial groups and organised crime. The aid 
programme was not immune from  these developments. Although there was little evidence o f 
corruption at the operational levels o f  aid administration, it was plain that aid management 
tools had been inadequate to ensure the integrity and effectiveness o f a programme that 
had expanded too rapidly in the 1980s. Public confidence in a id  had collapsed. ’ .
As the report further argues, * since 1993 the level o f state funding fo r  non-governmental 
organisations has fallen drastically and there has been a crisis, resolved only by special 
legislation, in payments to NGOs*16. [...] But political circles and the public generally, 
remain sceptical o f aid activities. Continuing parliamentary investigations have kept the 4756
475 See OECD/DAC 1996: ‘ Development Co-operation policy review o f Italy. Summary and Conclusions*
476 Actually as the report recognizes such was the level of the crisi o f Italian bi-lateral aid that NGOS were 
pushed to the multilateralistions of sources for funding development activities. See: Idem.
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Spotlight on the past errors in the official programme'477. Such was the crisis o f Italian aid 
that it was only through rescheduling the payment o f  debt that Italian overseas aid remained 
over the threshold o f 0,25% o f GDP478 The crisis o f Italian overseas aid is represented in 
quantitative terms by the following figure.
Figure 25: Evolution of Italian ODA as percentage of the GDP
Years
Source: OECD/DAC: ‘Review on Italy* The DAC Journal 2000 Vol. 1 No. 3.
477 Fabio Fossati has described thè functioning of thè Italian aid System before thè crisis of thè early ninties in 
thè following way: 'dopo la legge del ’79 la cooperazione iniziò ad essere gestita direttamente dai partiti, 
seguendo la logica della lottizzazione. Si consolidò un contesto nel quale la selezione dei destin Atari 
rispondeva a logiche spartitone tendenti a canalizzare gli aiuti verso le ex-colonie -gestite dai partiti di 
governo: Somalia dal Psi Etiopia dalla DC- o paesi marxisti-terzomondisti tipo Mozambico, Tanzania, che 
erano ideologicamente vicini al Pei. Ipartiti non delegavano più perchè gli aiuti potevano convertirsi in una 
fonte di finanziamento, l ’enesima di tipo illegale, per le loro Attività. Neglia anni ottanta i partiti nè hanno 
individuato nelle Ong o nelle impresse private. Si è configurata dunque quella modalità di risoluzione dei 
conflitti tipica delle politiche interne, e cioè il compromesso che veniva attenuato attraverso le già citate 
micro/politiche. Non a caso, la legioslazione in materia di cooperazione allo sviluppo era piutosto 
frammentata ; le diverse leggi succedutesi in tale settore hanno prodotto un caos istituzionale che favoriva 
l ’inefficienza’ As he further argues: ‘La cooperazione allo sviluppo si era bloccata. Nel ‘96,la Corte dei conti 
avrebbe presentato un rapporto sulla cooperazione italiana da ll’87 al ’94, denunciando un intreccio perverso 
fra  i partiti, imprese publiche e private’ See Fabio Fossati 1999: ‘ Economia e politica estera in Italia: 
Tevoluzione negli anni novanta’Milano: Franco Agnelli pp. 39,49-53 and 147.
478 See OECD/DAC 1996: Development Co-operationpolicy review ofltaly. Summary and Conclusions (op. 
cit.)
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The crisis of aid forced the Italian government to look for a new way o f defining the aid 
relationship. This new approach was to be found in the realms of multilateralism and 
decentralization, which from the mid-nineties onwards became the pillars upon which to re­
build the overall aid system.
Firstly, as shown in the graphic below, multilateral ODA began to have a greater role in the 
overall framework of Italian ODA since 1995. According to OECD data, from 1996 
onwards mulitlateral ODA amounted to 65-70% o f total ODA. This reconfiguration o f the 
structure of Italian ODA is partially the result of the major drop in the overall amount of 
resources. As a result of the corruption scandals and the overall crisis o f legitimacy o f the 
aid system, many bi-lateral programs were severed. Moreover, as emerges from the reports 
issued by the OECD, the crisis of the aid system caused Italian authorities to concentrate 
their efforts in the realm of multilateral aid.
Figure 26: M ultilateral and bilateral ODA in Italy 1994-1998
0  Bilateral ODA 
0  Mulitlateral ODA
Source: OECD/DAC: ‘Review on Italy* The DAC Journal 2000 (op. cit.).
Secondly, decentralized aid began to play a greater role in Italy’s international cooperation. 
As recognized in an OECD report, by 1996 *Italian local and regional authorities are now  
more involved and co-ordinated in the assistance effort,’479.
Until 1993, local authorities had looked to the DGCS (Directorate General for 
Development Cooperation) for financing and co-ordination. The crisis o f ODA in the early 
1990s meant this was no longer possible.
Since the mid-1990s, local government levels financed and co-ordinated their own 
programmes. They provided modest inputs into a number o f programmes (e.g. to the World 
Bank-led African Municipal Development Programme, the Prodere Programme in Central 
America, humanitarian relief in former-Yugoslavia under the Tavolo di coordinamento set 
up by the Prime Minister’s Office).
In the view o f the DAC committee o f the OECD, from 1997 onward, reforms o f the 
territorial architecture of the Italian State enhanced regional political autonomy. At the 
same time, reforms of the Italian fiscal system had granted regions and local authorities a  
significant share of fiscal autonomy480. According to DAC this affected in a positive way 
the insertion of decentralized aid within the overall framework of Italian international 
cooperation481. As shown in the graphic below, for the period 1997-1999, the general trend 
was to increase the amount o f funds allocated to international co-operation activities, thus 
increasing the relevance o f decentralized aid in the overall architecture of Italian 
international co-operation.
479 See OECD/DAC 1996: Development Co-operation policy review o f Italy. Summary and Conclusions (op. 
cit.)
480 See OECD 2001:4OECD Territorial Reviews: Italy* Paris: OECD Publications pp.152-153.
481 See OECD-DAC: ‘Review on Italy’ The DAC Journal Vol. 1 No. 3.2000 pp. 29-30
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Figure 27: Comparative allocation of resources for international co­
operation in seven Italian regions 1997-1999






Source: OECD/DAC: ‘Review on Italy’ The DAC Journal 2000 Voi. 1 No. 3.
In March 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved the new linee di indirizzo e 
modalità attuative della cooperazione decentrata, which institutionalised a new role for 
decentralized cooperation schemes within the overall framework o f Italian official 
development aid482. The contents of this document can be summarized as follows:
Firstly, the document situates decentralised aid for development in the context o f major 
changes in the agenda of international development According to the text, decentralised aid 
for development has progressively gained momentum. The document traces a normative 
detour, including diverse declarations from international conferences on development 
where the importance of decentralised aid has been somewhat asserted. According to the
482 See Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Unità di Coordinamento per la Cooperazione Decentrata: “Lìnee di 
indirizzo e modalità attuative della cooperazione decentrata allo sviluppo". Marzo 2000
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document, decentralised aid has consolidated in the international aid realm as an important 
instrument to foster democracy and therefore development, in a context o f globalisation 
which evidences both the link between the local and the global and the loss o f  power of the 
nation-state.
Secondly, the document explains the role of decentralised aid in the former international aid 
system, that is the framework established by the Legge n. 49/87 and the former linee d i 
indirizzo. This is described as the result of an innovative approach on the part o f  Italian 
authorities to the problems o f poverty and underdevelopment in the world. Yet, as is further 
recognised, major changes in the territorial structure of the State and in the international aid 
realm have forced both the national government and the sub-national units to rethink the 
instruments established by the former legal framework.
Thirdly, the document tackles the major challenges that Italian decentralised aid is facing in 
recent times and establishes new instances of co-operation and co-ordination between 
decentralised initiatives and national overseas aid programs.
The main challenge identified in the document is the problem o f responding to the demands 
of enhanced sub-state units. According to the text, the decentralisation process in Italy has 
empowered the regions with new capacities and responsibilities. Moreover, sub-state 
governments have gained experience in the international realm, both by acting as partners 
of international institutions and in managing their own economic development programs. 
According to the document, regions are well-equipped to deal with a development agenda 
which is very much focused on the interaction o f economic development, democracy and 
good governance (ensured through the decentralisation o f political power). Therefore, a 
new framework that accounts for all these changes and challenges must be established.
The proposed system defines decentralised aid as the “aid activities developed by sub-state 
units (localities, provinces and regions), which through the establishment o f a partnership 
relation with similar institutions in LDCS, aims at the sustainable development o f  their 
t e r r i t o r y The linee di indirizzo establishes new instances for co-operation and co­
ordination between national authorities and sub-national units. Firstly, it defines areas 
where the activities of sub-state units are especially welcomed. These activities are related 
to territorial management in LDCs, either in the form o f support for the decentralisation
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process or by helping sub-national governments in LDCs in dealing with territorial 
planning. Secondly, it defines a number o f instances for co-operation between the central 
government and the sub-state units. Its scope is to ensure co-ordination and establish 
permanent communication channels among different institutional tiers that help to maintain 
policy coherence. In terms o f co-financing national institutions are given the capacity to 
decide whether the proposal is worth the economic participation o f the DGCS (Directorate 
General for Development Cooperation).
The new Linee di indirizzo established by the Italian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs introduced 
a major change in the role o f decentralized aid within the overall framework o f Italian 
foreign aid. Whereas in 1987 the activities of sub-state units were to be severely controlled 
to preserve the integrity of the State’s foreign policy, the new Linee di indirzzo, issued in 
2000, conceived decentralized aid as an important marker o f the overall Italian aid system.
111.2 Una regione scatenata? The new decentralized aid system in Tuscany
In 1999 the regional administration decided to integrate international co-operation into the 
overall strategy o f foreign projection that had been taking shape in light of the new 
possibilities created by the d.p.R 31st o f March 1994.
The regional government issued a new law on international co-operation, the L.R. 17/99, 
which introduced a number of major changes in the way decentralized aid was to be 
conceived. Firstly, a new conceptualization of international co-operation is introduced. 
International co-operation is perceived as a mutually beneficial relation established between 
two territories. The territorialization of international co-operation has led to the 
establishment o f a system o f decentralized co-operation structured along the principles of 
partnership and subsidiarity.
Secondly, in line with the major principles illustrated above, the region constructed a new 
structure for implementation of the policy. The new system integrates the regional 
administrative structure in charge o f Tuscany’s international projection with the system of 
tavoli di coordinamento. The tavoli d i coordinamento are arenas o f representation in which 
institutional and non-institutional actors operating in the realm of decentralized aid co­
ordinate their activities and elaborate proposals for the regional administration.
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Finally, through the establishment of a five year plan of international co-operation 
activities, the regional administration has established a clear-cut definition o f both the 
material and geographical priorities o f Tuscany’s decentralized aid.
The following sections analyze the major changes brought by the L.R. 17/99 and the 
regional plan o f international co-operation 2001-2005. The picture presented here is 
nevertheless rather static. Firstly, important data such as the origin o f the resources 
employed by the region and the impact of other donors on the Tuscany’s decentralized co­
operation budget are missing. Secondly, the policy scheme defined by the L.R. 17/99 and 
the piano regionale 2001-2005 is a  rather new phenomenon. Thus, it is very difficult at this 
point in time to identify major trends. The system seems to  be evolving very quickly and it 
is still not consolidated.
Nevertheless, the following sections will try to compensate for these difficulties in offering 
a complete depiction of the policy as it is currently functioning. The analysis is structured 
as follows. Firstly, we will present the major changes in the normative underpinnings o f the 
policy and its influence in the overall conception o f  decentralized aid in Tuscany. Secondly, 
we will look at the way in which these major changes have been implemented through the 
administrative structure and the selection of material and geographic priorities.
111.2.1 The ‘new look’ in international co-operation: the L.R. 17/1999 di 23 di Marzo 
and everything after
The L.R. 17/1999 represents not only a major step forward in Tuscany’s engagement in 
international co-operation policy, but first and foremost a radical change in the way the role 
of the region in international co-operation is understood. This change operates at two 
levels. Firstly, the areas of competence o f the region in the international co-operation realm 
are re-defined. Secondly, a  new way o f conceiving the region is presented. The region is 
defined as a  territorial actor, thus focusing on the characteristic o f the region as a 
multidimensional space rather than on the limits imposed by the interactions between 
institutions. The following sections analyze these two questions.
111.2.1.1 Redefining the sphere of regional competences in the international co­
operation realm
Title I (Arts. 1-4) is devoted to defining the object and the main ends inspiring the L.R. 
17/90. In this respect, Art. 1 refers to the main ends pursued in the document, whilst Arts. 2 
to 4 define the different kinds of activities in which international co-operation is divided. 
The document recognizes three different types:
o Co-operation and international partnership
o International aid to LDCs.
o Emergency relief.
Co-operation and international partnership
Co-operation and international partnership is defined in Art. 2 as '‘those activities destined 
to favor the integral development o f  regional and local communities and the co-operation 
between territories and institutions in different States*.
The specific list o f regional government ‘capacities’ within this kind of activity is issued in 
Art. 2.2. The most important are: one, the promotion of the participation o f different actors 
within the framework of European institutions and programs; two, the promotion o f town- 
twinning agreements; three, participation in all the agreements for co-operation in which 
local governments participate; and four, promoting exchanges of information and know­
how.
The above mentioned activities were not included in  previous legislation. According to the 
functions enlisted above, the region would foster international co-operation, acting as a 
mediator between different tiers of government. The region would support local initiatives 
profiting from the new opportunity structure created by the European institutions.
Furthermore, the region would act as a representative for local governments and other 
organizations, helping them to pursue their interests. For instance, it would accelerate
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contacts with counterparts in other territories, or it would facilitate the access o f different 
actors to relevant information and know-how for their activities.
International co-operation with LDCs
International aid activities in the new regional legislation can be defined in a nutshell as 
those activities that are related to the promotion o f human sustainable development in 
LDCs483. Art 3.1 further specifies some features of international aid activities in Tuscany. 
According to this provision, the Regional administration promotes and sponsors 
decentralized, non-governmental aid, encouraging the participation o f a ll the members o f 
Tuscan civil society.*484. These activities must respect both the framework established by 
national laws and that o f the European Union programs.
With respect to international aid activities it is worth noting the following novelties.
1. The region makes a clear categorization of its own activities in the international aid 
realm, which are defined as decentralized non-govemmental co-operation. The use o f these 
two adjectives is by no means casual.
The document employs the term ‘decentralization’ referring to a broader process than that 
of the formal attribution o f competences among different layers o f government. 
Decentralized aid activities are not centred on a single institutional layer, but encompass the 
activities of both the institutions and civil society organizations within a single territory. As 
one of the informants puts it: Cooperazione decentrata è un modo di fare cooperazione tra 
comunità locali, non fra  enti locali. Un rapporto, dunque, che si stabilisce con un
483 Art 3 L.R. 17/99 says: ‘Gli interventi di cooperazione intemazionale con i Paesi in vi di sviluppo sono 
indirizzati allo sviluppo umano sostenibile su scala locale, al rafforzamento democratico delle istituzioni 
locali e della società civile alla ricostruzione e alla riabilitazione in seguito a calamità e conflitti belici, al 
rafforzamento dei procesi di pace, al rispetto dei diritti fondamentali dell’uomo1.
484 If we look at the list of tasks attributed to the regional administration in the realm of foreign aid, we find 
that the region is basically in charge of creating the institutional background to support initiatives already 
taking place in the territory. According to article 3.4 the region should:
a. provide adequate infrastructure for the implementation o f the developing projects
b. employ qualified personnel in order to provide technical assistance and for the administration and 
evaluation o f the cooperation projects
c. sponsor professional education of LDC’s citizens both in Tuscany and abroad
d. sponsor professional training schemes
e. participate in humanitarian intervention schemes and in all the initiatives intended to promote peace 
and democracy
f. promote both educational programs on human development and cultural exchanges between Tuscany 
and LDCs.
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territorio, con un territorio di dimensioni grossomodo equivalenti per creare tutte quelle 
forme dì sinergia e collaborazioni, e consente di avere rapporti diretti, rafforzamento 
reciproco e durata nel tempo, rispetto alla cooperazione del passato e a quella 
dell *emergenza*485.
This way o f understanding the decentralised character of decentralised co-operation is 
echoed in the piano regionale della co-operazione intemazionale when it states: ‘77 sistema 
regionale è quindi fondato sull'azione integrata di tutti soggetti, sulle loro competenze e 
conoscenze e sulla mesa in opera di strumenti si supporto allo sviluppo del sistema 
steso.’486.
In sum, the regional administration uses this idea of decentralization to stress the territorial 
character shared by all the actors involved in the policy. Territorializing the policy means 
that all the actors in the territory must have a say in its definition according to its capacities 
and preferences. Therefore, the region would operate a kind o f primus inter pares, which 
tries to integrate the capacities and activities of the different actors present in the territory.
Secondly, the region defines its activities as non-governmental. This expression might find 
its raison d'etre in the way in which the State’s legislation, through a restrictive 
interpretation of both constitutional law and doctrine settled by the Constitutional Court, 
used the concept o f inter-governmental relations to impose tight controls on regional 
international activities487.
Yet the expression ‘non-governmental* is not only a reminder o f  the supremacy of the state 
in the field of international relations, but it defines a broader philosophical background for 
regional engagement in international co-operation activities.
As we have seen in 1990’s legislation, the Italian State had understood any kind of 
interaction between two institutions as an inter-governmental (i.e. diplomatic) activity. The 
territorialisation o f co-operation implies a major change in the relative position of 
institutions and civil society. Re-dimensioning the role of institutions also means breaking
485 Interview with Malavolti conducted by Daria Bugetti on the 3rd April 2003.
486 See Piano Regionale della cooperazione intemazionale e delle attività di partenariato 2001-2005 p.lS.
487 The inclusion o f the non-go vemmental question in the definition of regional engagement in the aid realm, 
if only referring to the supremacy position of the State in international relations, was a superfluous measure. 
By the time the law was issued in 1999 the State had already changed its position from the restrictive vision 
explained in the former section towards a more open one.
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the traditional borders between international (understood as inter-state i.e. government) and 
intra-national relations. Territories would interact as part of networks that blur the 
intemal/extemal divide (and the control o f a single government).
If the subject o f co-operation is the territory (or the network of actors within a single 
territory) then the meaning o f co-operation activities would lie far beyond the 
characteristics o f one of the actors involved (i.e. institutional/govemmental). In this way, 
the co-operation policy would represent a  kind o f international activity that lies beyond the 
interpretative limits o f traditional international relations.
The ‘territorial turn* is summarized by one informant at the regional administration in the 
following m aim er ‘C 'è un dibatito povero sulla cooperazione intemazionale. Questo 
dibatito è ancorato su categorie vecchie. [ ...]  per essempio se può guardare dentro de il 
dibatitto sull concetto dì sviluppo locale, una delle cose più interesante è la persistenza dei 
rapporti [...] questo dibatitto non c ’è, [...] si rimendiccanopezzetini di poteri però non se 
risponde alla questione della integrazione dei territori. In questo senso, la cooperaizone 
decentrata in Toscana, alza il livello della sfida'm .
2. The second remarkable element is the fact that decentralized aid activities are not defined 
in terms of the degree of concessionality o f the activities, but in terms o f the mutual 
advantages that all the actors involved might extract from co-operation. Thus, Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid rescues the so-called enlightened self-interest argument in the definition 
of international co-operation activities.
Development co-operation activities (no matter who are the actors involved) had been 
traditionally defined as those activities which aimed to promote economic and social 
development in less developed areas o f the world. These activities must have a 
concessional character. The very idea o f concessionality would determine the frontier 
between international aid and other kinds o f exchanges.
However, the concessionality clause is not included in the definition exposed above. In fact, 
in the revealing words of an informant: ‘[...]/<* cooperazione allo sviluppo non va vista 
come un nobile atto di solidarietà, è anche questo in parte, ma si parla anche di idealità e 48
488 Interview with Fabrizio Pizzanelli conducted on the 24 th of November 2003.
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cioè di fa r  crescere qualitativamente e in modo giusto, ad esempio con uno sviluppo 
sostenibile, l'insiem e del nostro mondo.*489.
Thus, the concept o f development co-operation put forward by the region would clearly 
introduce the idea o f mutual interest. As the same informant says: ‘[...] in una cooperazione 
allo sviluppo che sia fondata su un partenariato vero, c'è un reciproco vantaggio delle 
realtà che cominciano a lavorare con le loro gambe e a valorizzare le risorse che hanno, 
ma c'è anche un vantaggio da parte d i un mondo di piccole e medie imprese che può  
trovare in queste opportunità di cooperazione allo sviluppo, la possibilità d i un intervento 
per trovare un equilibrio e per compiere una giusta internazionalizzazione delle loro 
attività produttive.’490.
Insisting on the same point, he argues that international development co-operation can be 
perceived as: ‘[...] un partenariato che si sviluppa in modo reciprocamente vantaggioso tra 
aree diverse del mondo*491.
Emergency relief
Emergency relief is included in Article 4 as a different kind o f  activity than international 
co-operation with LDCs or international co-operation and partnership. Emergency relief 
activities would take place in the event o f  a major natural disaster or a war, and are always 
destined to help the populations affected by these events. The extraordinary character of 
emergency relief pushes the region to reserve economic resources outside of the co­
operation activities scheduled in the piano regionale.
111.2.1.2 A ‘New look’ for Tuscany as a territory? Decentralized aid and the definition 
of Tuscany as political space
a. Introduction
As we have seen in the previous section, the three-fold classification o f the region’s 
international activities in the realm o f foreign assistance presented above results in a major
489 Interview with Vannino Chitti conducted by Ilaria Bugetti on the 17th April 2003
490 Interview with Vannino Chitti conducted by Ilaria Bugetti on the 17th April 2003
491 Interview with Vannino Chitti conducted by Ilaria Bugetti on the 17th April 2003
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change in the way in which the regional administration conceptualizes international co­
operation.
The new conceptualization o f the international co-operation activities o f the region is 
structured along two major axes. First, a  multidimensional notion of the territory is put at 
the centre of the stage vis-à-vis an institutional conception o f the regional space. Secondly, 
international co-operation is perceived as an instrument which might result in significant 
advantages not only to the aid recipient societies but also to the regional system. The 
following figure summarizes the major elements o f the new look of cooperation activities 
as they are presented in the L.R. 17/99:
Figure 28: A new look for Tuscany’s decentralized aid >
Firstly, as we have said before, regional international activities are ‘territorialized’. 
Tenitorialization implies a broad conceptualization o f the idea o f decentralization, as well 
as a reconfiguration of the concept o f the ‘international actor’. Following the L.R. 17/99, 
the regional administration aims to integrate all the synergies taking place in the territory o f 
Tuscany. These include not only co-operating with other institutional actors, but also co­
operation with civil society associations or the entrepreneurial sector. As a consequence o f 
the process of territorial integration of resources on the territory, international co-operation 
activities taking place in Tuscany cannot be resumed in the characteristics o f a single actor 
(i.e. institutional, thus governmental co-operation), but are a territorial phenomenon.
Secondly, the documents put forward a concept of co-operation that is rooted on a different 
premise than that of concessionality. Co-operation is understood in the L.R. 17/99 as a
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mutually beneficial activity. The immediate consequence of this conceptual change is that 
both international partnership agreements, which are traditionally a benefit-oriented 
activity, and international development aid, which is characterized by a certain degree of 
concessionality, could be mixed up in a broader notion o f international co-operation. 
Furthermore, the fact that emergency aid is separated from the broader realm of 
international aid for development activities reinforces the relevance of the idea that 
international co-operation is not only the result of ‘a nobile atto di solidarietà \
In the following sections I will try to show how this new conceptualization o f international 
co-operation is linked to a specific notion o f the region as a polity, through the definition o f 
clear-cut criteria to regulate the interactions between the constellation of actors involved in 
the policy.
b. Subsidiarity and partnership: decentralized aid as a system
The piano régionale della cooperazione intemazionale 2001-2005 further defines the 
above mentioned framework. The regional administration acknowledges the special role o f 
local entities and their associations within Tuscany’s international co-operation system. 
Firstly, local institutions are characterised in the piano régionale as the depositaries o f 
collective values such as co-operation, solidarity and the promotion o f peace. Secondly, as 
stated in the document, local institutions are able to both represent the common interest and 
to mobilize all the resources present in the territory.
This dual function leads the regional administration to grant an important role to local 
governments in a number of areas. These are: first, the process o f defining priorities and 
policy objectives; second, the management of the tavoli di coordinamento; third, 
participation in network programs; and fourth, the management o f the information system.
As a result of the important role reserved in the piano régionale to sub-regional actors, 7a 
regione intende pertanto sollecitare il massimo coinvolgimento dei govem i locali 
nelVattuazioni del presente piano, [...] i criteri che caratterizzano il rapporto tra la
regione e g li altri soggetti protagonisti del sistema regionale della cooperazione 
intemazionale sono improntati ai concetti di sussidiarietà e dipartenariato.'492 493.
Subsidiarity and partnership are the two major principles underpinning the interaction 
between the different organisations involved in the international co-operation system.
Subsidiarity is understood as a way o f reinforcing the capacities and the initiatives o f public 
and private organizations operating at grassroots level. The principle of subsidiarity ‘indica 
che le azioni di cooperazione intemazionale vengano radicate nel territorio regionale a 
partire da i soggetti di base, publici e privati, affinchè le indicazioni, le priorità, le risorse 
della Toscana si possano integrare valorizando tutte le com petenze'49*.
Following the document, the implementation o f the subsidiarity principle bestows local 
governments with the responsibility to co-ordinate both the networks of organizations 
participating in Tuscany’s international co-operation system and their initiatives so that the 
coherence o f the system is maintained.
Partnership is described as the manner in which the regional administration operates in the 
context of establishing the international co-operation system. Partnership means, according 
to the document, applying a general principle o f  equality between all the participants. 
Moreover, partnership implies a network-based system of implementation. Finally, 
partnership entails co-operation o f all relevant subjects in the planning process. As it is 
expressed in the regional plan for international co-operation, lil partenariato costituisce il 
modo di operare p iù  proprio in material di cooperazione, sia con riferimento all'impegno 
sul territorio della Toscana che a quello espresso nelle aree e nei Paesi con i quali si fa
. *404coopcrazione.
Partnership is understood as a way o f reinforcing the capacities of the local level, since it 
helps to incorporate the previous experiences of local governments into the policy design 
process. At the same time the piano regionale understands that the local authorities might 
have a special responsibility in strengthening the cooperative principle informing the 
concept of partnership. These two principles complete the normative framework established
49" See Piano Regionale della cooperazione intemazionale e delle attività di partenariato 2001-2005 
aggiornamento 2003 p. 9 (from now on piano regionale 2003)
493 See Piano Regionale 2003 (op. cit.) p, 9
494 See Piano Regionale 2003 (op. cit.) p. 10
290
by the idea of co-operation that we have previously explained. The process is illustrated in 
the following figure.





As we have seen, the L.R. 17/99 put forward a concept of international co-operation that is 
rooted in the idea o f territory. As we have seen, territorialization o f the policy implied a 
major change in the modes o f political action and a special concern for decentralization. 
The piano regionale puts the emphasis on the principles of subsidiarity and partnership as 
the guidelines for the implementation o f  different policy initiatives.
As shown by the figure above, these concepts operate at different levels o f abstraction. 
Firstly, both the ideas o f decentralization and non-governmental co-operation are 
fundamental characteristics o f the whole co-operation system, as it is defined by the L.R. 
17/99. Thus, they operate as major principles informing the establishment o f  the regional 
system of international co-operation.
Secondly, the pair formed by the concepts o f subsidiarity and partnership regulate the 
interrelations of the different actors involved in the policy. Furthermore, they generate
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obligations and capacities and are integrated in the text as guidelines for the 
implementation o f the policy. Thus, the second pair o f principles, that is partnership and 
subsidiarity, is the concrétisation of the broader normative framework defined by the ideas 
of decentralized and non-governmental co-operation. Let us examine this process in more 
detail.
As shown in the picture, subsidiarity defines a concrete meaning for the general 
decentralization clause. Decentralization, understood under the subsidiarity filter, would 
mean empowering actors operating at the grassroots o f the territorial system i.e. civil 
society organizations, entrepreneurs, but also local institutions. Furthermore, the notion of 
subsidiarity offers a  pattern o f  interaction between different constellations o f actors 
engaged in the system.
The subsidiarity principle places the need to operate public policy at the closest level to the 
citizen at the forefront of the political agenda. Thus, the introduction o f the subsidiarity 
principle entails a  special duty for the local institutions (they being the closest institution to 
the citizenry) to care for the process o f  implementing the policy. By the same token, 
aggregated levels such as the regional level are immediately bestowed with coordination 
and control functions.
Similarly to the principle of decentralization and its relationship with the concept o f 
subsidiarity, the idea of non-govemmental co-operation is operationalised through the 
concept o f partnership.
The non-govemmental principle can be summed up into two main ideas. Firstly, it 
separates regional international co-operation activities from inter-governmental relations, 
the latter being an exclusive competence o f the State. Secondly, it refers to a new way o f 
understanding the role of regional institutions within the broader system o f  relationships in 
which territorial actors participate. As stated before, non-govemmental international co­
operation constitutes a new kind of international activity that cannot be encapsulated in the 
characteristics o f  one of the participants (i.e. institutions -»  inter-governmental relations), 
but accounts for the integration o f different dimensions of the territory.
Partnership, as defined in the piano régionale, presents a two-fold concept, including both 
an ad intra  and an ad extra dimension. Firstly, it entails a general principle of equality ad
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intra between all the actors participating both in the processes o f  policy making and policy 
implementation. Policy is structured along a network-based system, integrated by 
institutional and non-institutional actors, rather than a  hierarchical administrative system 
(this is referred to in the regional plan aspartenariato toscano). Second, ad extra it requires 
the participation o f  counterparts, both at the institutional level and at the level of civil 
society, in recipient countries (this is referred to in the regional plan as partenariato locale).
In the partenariato toscano, local and regional institutions interact with other actors in the 
territory, as a kind o f primus inter pares. The political process would be one o f horizontal 
co-ordination among the different actors, the co-ordination capacities being reserved to the 
different institutional layers (in particular the regional administration). Thus, a policy’s 
characterisation is based on the process of integrating actors’ preferences, and as a 
consequence the policy realm cannot be reduced to the characteristics o f  any of the 
individual actors.
A network-based system of implementation extends the relevance o f the non-governmental 
principle and reinforces the territorial bases of the policy system. It implies the introduction 
o f a number of actors who are not necessarily institutional actors, but operate under a 
general equality principle. As we have seen this general equality principle reinforces the 
idea of non-governmental co-operation as referring to a major system of interaction rather 
than to the characteristics of one the actors involved.
The partenariato locale includes the establishment o f co-operation agreements with local 
and regional entities in the priority areas defined by the regional plan. The participation o f 
counterparts in recipient areas both in the decision-making process and in the 
implementation phase is essential to ensure the durability and sustainability o f the projects 
implemented.
c. Tuscany’s decentralized aid and Tuscany as a polity
In the previous section we have examined the normative apparatus underpinning Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid. As we have already said, the piano regionale regulates the interactions 
among the actors belonging to the regional system o f international cooperation through 
incorporation of the principles o f partnership and subsidiarity.
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The principles o f  subsidiarity and partnership integrate the multiplicity o f  actors involved in 
Tuscany’s decentralized aid  Yet, these values, in addition to defining the structure of 
relationships among actors, put forward two different representations o f  the region as a 
political space, depending on whether we focus on the external or internal dimension of the 
region.
Ad extra, through the notion o f  local partnership, the region is represented as a structure of 
opportunity for political action and mobilization. Institutions (particularly regional 
institutions) are in charge of co-coordinating policy initiatives coming from the grassroots 
level with the structure of opportunity created by the major changes occurring at the 
national and the international levels.
Ad intra, through the notions o f partnership and subsidiarity, the region is conceived as a 
highly homogeneous system in which a myriad of institutional and non-institutional actors 
interact. This system is rooted on a widely shared normative conception o f  the region as a 
political space, which is ordered along the notions o f participation, concertation, social 
integration and subsidiarity.
The mayor of the Comune di Sesto Fiorentino describes it in the following way: ‘ Credo che 
ci sia senz ’altro una storia di questo territorio che ha sempre favorito  e sollecitato le forme 
più svariate di volontariato e associazionismo. Questo mondo ha trovato nella pubblica 
amministrazione, a partire dai comuni passando p er le province fino  ad arrivare alla 
regione, sempre un punto di riferimento. E  * certo che ci sia stato un governo della cosa 
pubblica e delle istituzioni che ha tradizionalmente sostenuto queste forme, questo ha tra 
l ’altro consentito il diffondersi nel tessuto sociale di una forte  sensibilità solidaristica sotto 
mille form e. La cooperazione è ben radicata anche se proveniente da ambienti diversi. Io 
credo che senz'altro grazie alla sensibilità delle istituzioni vi è stato poi alla fin e  la 
possibilità che questo tessuto sociale si radicasse e sia riuscito a trovare degli interlocutori 
attendibili con i quali realizzare dei progetti,’495.
Thus, Tuscany is perceived as territory with a long tradition of participation and 
associationalism. Institutions are perceived as developing inclusive ways of integrating 
civil society in the governance o f the region.
495 Interview with Andrea Barducci conducted by Haría Bugetti on the 4th April 2003
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Moreover, in the words of a different informant from the regional administration, it is 
through these features that Tuscany can be recognized as a polity. As he states: *La regione 
toscana è riconosciuta con caratteristiche proprie. In una riunione a Bruxelles un 
ambasciatore intervenne in una riunione di regioni, affermò che in Italia lui riconosceva 
solo una regione, la Toscana. Può sembrare anche una battuta ma nasconde una verità, 
cioè, il tempo, lunghissimo, di secoli, ha costruito un certo ambito, in questo ambito poi la 
nascita delle istituzioni locali democratiche ha dato fia to  a uno sviluppo nostro, della pmi, 
dei distretti industriali, della laboriosità, della voglia d i fare in generale. ,496.
Decentralized aid becomes a direct consequence of specific structural characteristics o f 
Tuscany as a region. Meanwhile the very notion of Tuscany as a  polity is reinforced by the 
modes o f interaction established between the different actors participating in Tuscany’s 
decentralized co-operation.
The following sections will explore how these values are implemented in the regional 
system of decentralized co-operation. First, the tavoli di coordinamento are sought as an 
arena for policy concertation and horizontal integration. Second, the piano regionale 
establishes a number of priorities which aim to reflect territorial synergies as well as 
Tuscany’s model o f economic development. Yet, as the following sections show, the 
implementation o f  the policy is very much dependent on the structure of inter-institutional 
relations within the regional borders or the possibility o f integrating the image of Tuscany 
as a region in Europe within the agenda o f  decentralized co-operation.
111.2.2 Interest concertation and co-ordination of initiatives: the 1tavoli d i 
coordinamento9
As we have seen in previous sections in 1995 Tuscany established a special office for the 
international relations o f the region. This office (Servizio Attività Intemazionali) was in 
charge of dealing with the increasing exchanges between the regional government and the 
European institutions. At the same time, it was charged with structuring the incipient 
foreign aid policy and humanitarian intervention. 496
496 Interview with Giannarelli conducted by liana Bugetti on the 3rd of April 2003.
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The advent o f the L.R. 17/99 has slightly modified this panorama. Whereas the Servizio 
Attività intem ationali remains the institutional point o f  reference for the international 
activities of the region, the administration of international co-operation policies has been 
enriched by a new forum of debate, the tavoli di coordinamento.
The scheme below represents the administrative structure o f Tuscany’s international co­
operation in the context of Tuscany’s foreign policy. The Presidenza, that is the regional 
president, retains control over Tuscany’s international projection. Together with his 
counsellors, the regional president sets the political priorities in every single area of 
Tuscany’s international projection.
Below the level o f  presidency, the Servizio Attività intemazionale has the task o f 
establishing the regional plan for partnership and international co-operation activities. The 
plan is conceived as the technical implementation of the political directives established at 
the level of regional presidency. Yet, the setting o f regional priorities at the technical level 
receives the input o f the tavoli di coordinamento from below, intended to integrate the 
preferences o f the development policy community.
The 'tavoli di coordinamento* are regulated by A rt 11 of the L.R. 17/99. They are defined 
as co-ordination groups, whose mission is to facilitate co-ordination and programming o f 
the different initiatives taking place in a specific geographical area.
The piano régionale further defines the mission of these co-ordination groups. According 
to the plan the tavoli di coordinamento are in charge o f integrating different initiatives for a 
specific geographical area497. Integration is understood as a three fold process. First, the 
tavoli are the arena where different actors can exchange their experiences. Second, the 
tavoli establish a  mechanism for know-how exchange. Finally, the tavoli are the forums to 
establish specific priorities for every geographical area, that is, the tavoli put forward a 
programmatic document for every geographical area, following the general framework 
established by the regional administration.
497 See Piano Régionale 2001-2005 {op. cit.) p. 21
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Figure 30: Administrative structure for Tuscany’s international relations and 
international cooperation after 1999
Representatives’ 
























The tavoli might operate at three different levels498. On the one hand there are tavoii di 
coordinamento per area geografica. These arenas of concertation bring together all the 
actors operating in each of the geographical areas identified as priority areas by the regional 
administration. The main objectives in these tables are: firstly, to ensure policy coherence 
not only internally, but also regarding overseas policy priorities of both Italy and the 
European Union; secondly, to facilitate the formation of networks of actors operating in the 
same geographical area. Finally, the tavoii di coordinamento per area geografica are in 
charge o f  certain informative tasks. These are to evaluate ongoing projects of members of 
the tavolo, to gather information about the activities of other actors and to establish the 
framework o f  international, regional and national co-operation programs in which the 
members of the tavolo can participate.
498 See Piano régionale 2001-2005 {op. cit.) p. 19
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Tavoli per paese  also exist. These tavoli fulfil the same functions but are confined to a 
specific country. Finally, the third strand is the tavoli tecnici who are devoted to a specific 
sector o f activity.
From these three kinds of tavoli, only those structured along major geographic areas and 
countries have been implemented. Actually there are six tavoli di coordinamento per area 
geografica, which represent every geographic area recognised in regional legislation, and 
fourteen tavoliperpaesi, mostly devoted to countries in both Africa and Latin America499.
The tavoli d i coordinamento are conceived in regional legislation and other documents as 
arenas for concertation. They are defined as the instrument for integrating civil society in 
the decision-making process. Moreover, they ensure coherence and co-ordination between 
different co-operation initiatives.
However, despite the image depicted by the documentation, the experience o f the daily 
activities of the tavoli di co-ordinamento shows a rather different picture. According to 
many informants, the tavoli di coordinamento decreasingly (if ever) integrate all the 
interests in the territory, but they are used in the political exchanges between the regional 
and the local tiers of governments500. For instance, informants from the NGO sector mostly 
complain about the fact that none of the tavoli are presided over by an NGO member501.
Table 5: Distribution of the co-ordinators of the Tavoli di Co-ordinamento based on
their origins.
Representative Representative Representative 




Number o f Tavoli di
co-orinamento
presided
11 4 1 1 4
Source: Banca Dati Istituto Agronomico D'Oltremare.
499 The tavoli di coordinamento per area geografica are thè following: Tavolo Àfrica, Tavolo America 
Latina, Tavolo Asia, Tavolo Europa Centro-Orientale, Tavolo Europa sud-Orientale, Tavolo Mediterraneo. 
Then there are a number of Tavoli per paesi., a few examples are thè Tavolo Palestina, thè Tavolo Argentina, 
thè Tavolo Nicaragua, thè Tavolo Cuba, thè Tavolo Afghanistan, thè Tavolo Saharawi, thè tavolo Burlóna 
Faso, and thè Tavolo Romania. For a full Iist visit thè site: http://cdt.iao.florence.it/tavoli.phD
500 Interview conducted on thè 14* o f November 2003
501 Interview conducted on thè 6* o f November 2003
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As shown in the table above, the vast majority of the Tavoli di coordinamento are co­
ordinated by the members o f the Comuni, that is, the local governments. Four o f them are 
co-ordinated by provincial authorities (provinces o f Prato, Lucca, Livorno and Pisa) and 
only one is co-ordinated by a regional government representative. Finally one table is 
controlled by a representative of the ANCI in Tuscany.
According to some interviewees, the preference for the local level accords with the logic of 
the political interactions among different institutions and tiers of governments taking place 
in Tuscany. In the words o f one interviewee, ‘ the tavoli are used by the regional politicians 
to satisfy their own needs. For instance, in order to maintain internal institutional 
equilibria the regional administration decides to propose the mayor o f Pisa fo r  president o f  
the Tavolo Palestina. At the same time, politicians try to maintain the image o f  a co­
operative system where all the actors are equal. This is relegating NGOs to a secondary 
position in the decision-making process.9
According to NGO informants, Tuscany’s decentralized aid could be evolving towards a 
regional system in which NGOs and other civil society organizations provide the system 
with an input o f legitimacy and know-how, while they would operate only as 
implementation units503. At the same time, the regional and the local administrations would 
determine the major priorities following their political interests.
Yet, in the words of an informant from the regional administration, *[...] NGOs have 
instruments to control the regional administration’s excesses in the agenda-setting process. 
Decentralized aid is defined as an interaction process between social and institutional 
actors. This implies that part o f the legitimacy o f  the system relies on the participation o f 
NGOs (in their role o f voluntary associations). The region fo r  the moment cannot risk 
losing this source o f legitimacy and this might help NGOs to contain regional 
initiatives.’504.
The administrative structure managing decentralized co-operation in Tuscany has 
undergone substantial changes since the approval of the L.R 17/99. The most important
503 Interview conducted on the 18th of November 2003,
503 Interview conducted on the 14th of November 2003.
504 Interview conducted on the 18th of November
change has been the introduction o f  the tavoli di coordinamento as arenas of representation 
for stakeholders in civil society.
According to the interviews and the empirical evidence gathered, it is at the present time 
very difficult to evaluate whether the tavoli are operating as arenas of representation or as 
instruments for the distribution o f resources among different institutional tiers. Rather, the 
situation tends to be twofold. Whereas the regional administration (more specifically the 
presidenza, which holds important decisional capacities) is trying to keep control over the 
decision-making process and policy priorities, NGOs try to have an input in policy through 
an open interpretation of the role o f the tavoli di coordinamento. Furthermore, the regional 
administration has been unable to put forward a proper international co-operation agenda. 
This reinforces the uncertainty surrounding the functioning of Tuscany’s international co­
operation system. These issues will be further analysed in the following sections when we 
will discuss the implementation of Tuscany’s international co-operation.
111.2.3 Planning regional engagement in international co-operation activities: the 
piano reg iona le  2001-2005  and policy implementation
As we have said before, Title II o f the L.R. 17/99 introduces a new regulatory instrument: 
the Piano regionale della cooperazione intemazionale e delle attività di partenariato. As 
defined in Art. 5, the regional plan is issued in order to ‘regulate all the activities related to 
international co-operation, structuring them according to the targeted countries or specific 
areas within these countries.’ The plan is proposed by the Servizio Attività Intemazionali, 
after consulting the Regional Conference on Co-operation and Partnership, the Scientific 
Committee and the tavoli di coordinamento which have a major input in the process of 
amending the plan505 506.
The piano regionale is defined as the direct result o f the ‘experience accumulated after ten 
years o f  co-operation with other territories.'m . Moreover, ‘it has its origins in a rich 
regional patrim ony o f activities intended to promote solidarity and peace and in the 
experience o f a history o f  development based on the integration o f the economy at the local
505 These two organisms substitute the former Consulta Regionale per la  cooperazione and the Ufficio 
Gabinetto established by the L.R. 66/90.
506 See Piano Regionale 2001-2005 (op. cit.) p.3
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level* 507 . Therefore, the piano regionale has become the master document for 
understanding regional engagement in international co-operation activities.
The regional plan, as it is defined in the L.R. 17/99, is structured in three parts. The first 
part is devoted to the definition and evaluation o f the international co-operation 
activities507 08. The second part deals with financial issues509. The third part regulates the 
formal criteria for the implementation o f the different activities described in the previous 
parts510.
Yet, the analysis of the document can be structured according to the functions it fulfills. 
The plan is eminently an instrument aiming to assist the programming o f the 
implementation phase of Tuscany’s decentralized aid policy. In doing so, it establishes a 
number of priorities and distributes tasks among the different partners involved in the 
policy. In other words, the plan specifies who is doing what within Tuscany’s international 
co-operation system and establishes both the material and geographical priorities for the 
distribution o f funds.
111.2.3.1 What does the region do?
The plan identifies six types of activities: firstly, regional initiatives; secondly, projects 
implemented through other juridical persons {progetti a bando); thirdly, initiatives 
regarding the enhancement o f information systems; fourthly, co-operation and partnership 
agreements; fifthly, co-operation with European associations; and finally fund-raising 
activities. Most of the plan is devoted to discussing the first two categories.
ThePIR
According to the piano regionale, the region engages in a number o f PIR {progetti di 
iniziativa regionale), distributed among different geographical areas. These areas are the 
following: the Mediterranean and the Middle East; Latin America; Central and South- 
Eastern Europe; Asia and Oceania.
507 See Piano Regionale 2001-2005 (op. cit.) p.3
508 See Art. 5.3 L.R. 17/99
509 See Art. 5.4 L.R. 17/99
510 See Art. 5.5 L.R. 17/99
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Concerning the Mediterranean area, here the region operates mainly under the umbrella of 
the EU’s co-operation policy. Yet, the region has been able to create a dense network o f 
actors that includes, apart from the regional government, Israeli and Palestinian local 
authorities and all the Tuscan NGOs operating in the area. According to the plan, this 
network is basically focused in two main fields, first, a project on cultural goods 
management and tourism promotion in the area. The second project is called Ateliers 
Interregionali Mediterranei and is devoted to the exchange o f know-how on issues related 
to the future establishment o f a free trade area in the Mediterranean in 2010.
The second area where the region operates is Latin America. In this area the regional 
administration is engaged in the following activities. Firstly, the region participates in the 
PDHL (Programa de Desarrollo Humano a nivel Local)511 initiative for Cuba. The PDHL 
is a program sponsored by United Nations and the Italian government, which promotes 
decentralised co-operation schemes between local institutions and territories both in Italy 
and in Cuba. A number of Tuscany’s localities have participated in this program, whilst the 
region is in charge of co-ordinating the different activities512.
Secondly, the region participates in the project RE.SE.CA.-Colombia. Through this project 
the regional government agrees to co-operate with four Colombian departments (Atlantico, 
Cauca, Santander and Antioquia) on agricultural matters, namely creating infrastructures 
for the establishment of agricultural industries in these departments. This project is 
developed in co-operation with the MAE (Foreign Affairs Ministry) and the Istituto 
Agronomico p er VOltremare. (Overseas Agronomist Institute).
Finally, the region develops various activities in other countries such as Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic.
511 Program on Human Development at the Local Level.
512 The origins of regional participation in the program are slightly more complicated than the story presented 
by the piano régionale. As told by one of the interviewees, in the beginning (1998) it was the association 
Circolo ARC I, both because of its links with Cuban associations and because of its presence in Tuscany, that 
triggered the participation of Tuscany’s localities in the framework of the PDHL project for Cuba. It is only 
later on, in the year 1999, that the regional government showed some interest in it. The regional government 
fostered a number o f meetings with the partners of the project in order to evaluate the possibilities for regional 
participation in the project Finally, in 1999, the regional government began to fund a co-ordinating structure 
for this project Interview carried out on the 28th October 2903.
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The third area o f intervention is Central and South-Eastern Europe. The most important 
project in this area is the Progetto Balcani. This project is concentrated in two main areas. 
Firstly, through a project called ricostruire i ponti del dialogo e della cooperazione (re­
building the bridges for dialogue and co-operation), the region has established a co­
operation network which includes the local governments in Tuscany, Croatia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. As was the case for the Middle 
East, this network involves also all the Tuscan NGOs operating in the area. Within the 
context of this network, Tuscany’s activities are oriented to fostering economic 
development. Secondly, the region operates within the context of the programma PASARP 
established by the Italian Government in favour of Albania. The region develops co­
operation activities in different sectors in the area o f  the Prefettura di Scutari.
In Central Europe regional initiatives are concentrated in two main areas: the region of 
Malopolska in Poland and the Contea o f Brasov in Romania. In the case of Poland, the 
projects initiated by the region are directed at helping the region o f Malopolska to 
implement the acquis communautaire and to improve the technical conditions of 
production in the territory. In the Romanian case the project is aimed at preventing violence 
towards minors.
The fourth area of intervention is Asia and Oceania. Three initiatives are noteworthy: 
firstly, a project in India sustained by the EU, in the context of the ASIA URBS program, 
called ‘Environmental Exchanges between public administrations\  It consists basically of 
know-how exchange in the field o f industrial waste treatment and recycling. Secondly, a 
number o f programs of know-how exchange, related to different economic activities, were 
established between Tuscan localities and Chinese provinces. Thirdly, co-operation 
schemes were established in the fields o f energy, environmental policy, agriculture and the 
nautical and textile industries, with the state of Western Australia.
The progetti a bando
Through the progetti a bando the regional government supports the activities o f other 
actors in the co-operation realm. These actors are basically local governments and NGOs. 
However, a wide array of different actors, like public and private enterprises or universities, 
are also entitled to compete for regional funds. According to what is written in the regional
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plan, through financing third actors* initiatives the region acknowledges the relevancy o f 
these actors’ engagement for the development o f international co-operation schemes in 
Tuscany.
Competition for regional funds is opened up every year, when the new budget is approved. 
To this extent, the region issues a bando, a decree in which all the formal procedures and 
the requisites for the competing organisations are established. After that, the regional 
government decides, on the basis o f  the different priorities established, which proposals 
they will finance.
This is by far the most important activity developed by the region according to the funds 
available. For instance, in 2001 the budget intended to finance this kind of activity raised 
up to 806 million lires, more than 57% of the total regional budget for co-operation 
activities. In fact, the regional plan institutionalises this trend when it reserves more than 
40% of the resources to financing third actors’ initiatives, as is shown in the following table 
extracted from the piano regionale.
Table 6: Distribution of funds among the different types of activities513
Projects proposed by other actors, 40% or more
Projects related to town-twinning agreements Up tolQ%
Emergency relief 10%
PIR Regional initiative programs 40%
Source: Piano regionale 2001-2005.
The enhancement o f information instruments
The regional plan acknowledges the relevance o f having accurate systems of information 
and evaluation for the transmission of know-how. In this respect, three different 
instruments are established, firstly the annual Regional Conference. In this forum, a number 
of specialists discuss issues regarding the management o f  the international co-operation 513
5131 have not been able either to trace or to establish data for the remaining years. However, the tendency to 
operate through NGOs and other legal persons should be a constant characteristic of Tuscany's decentralized 
aid for the period 1990-2004.
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system and evaluate its functioning. The second initiative is related to the function of 
information and co-ordination entrusted to the tavoli di coordinamento. The third 
instrument is the sistema informativo de la cooperazione decentrata in Toscana, which has 
been developed by the IAO {Istituto Agronomico d 'Oltremare), an institution dependent on 
the M inistero degli Affari Esteri.
Co-operation and partnership agreements
According to the plan, the region has established a number of important co-operation 
agreements, with ‘similar institutional partners’. Following the piano regionale, these 
agreements are the result o f a  number o f  interacting factors. First, the document recognises 
the existence o f a long-standing tradition of solidarity in Tuscany. Second, the regional 
administration asserts the importance o f pre-existing town-twinning agreements. Finally, 
the region acknowledges the relevance o f the presence of Italian emigrants in other parts of 
the world as a foundation o f regional activities in this policy field. Most of these are 
established within the context of the PIR  activities that we have explained before514.
European associations
The last activity performed by the regional administration in the context o f the international 
co-operation plan relates to its participation in a number o f  European regional associations. 
The document justifies its inclusion in terms of the regional capacity to participate in the 
definition of a European model o f development As stated in the document, iLa capacità 
della Toscana di inserirsi come attore di rilievo nel cuore delle politiche europee e di 
contribuire alla determinazione degli obiettivi strategici d i sviluppo sociale ed economico 
della 'Unione, è stata sostenuta da una intensa partecipazione e da una ricca attività che ha 
permesso alla regione di giocare un ruolo importnate nelVambito delle prìncipalli 
Associazione europee di regioni e realtà locali.*515.
According to the tex t regional participation in the different European agencies and 
associations has contributed to extending the sensitivity o f  the regional administration to 
the problems o f the EU’s construction. Moreover, through its European level participation, 
the region has assisted in fostering a greater political role for the regions in the process of
514 Sec Piano regionale {op. cit.) p.15.
5,5 Idem.
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European construction, creating synergies with other European institutions such as the 
European Parliament and the European Commission. Finally, the document lists all the 
associations in which Tuscany participates.
Fund-raising activities
As stated in the plan, fund-raising is an important task for the regional administration. The 
region commits to fund-raising campaigns which target not only the national level but also 
European institutions and international organizations516. However, a lack o f appropriate 
data means it is impossible to further investigate the impact of fund-raising activities on 
Tuscany’s overall budget for decentralized development aid.
111.2.3.2 Settling the policy priorities: from the regional plan to policy implementation
The main function of the piano régionale, besides describing regional activities, is to 
establish a number o f priorities that inform the implementation process. To a certain extent, 
it can be said that the regional administration has attempted in the piano régionale to set out 
a detailed political agenda for its international co-operation activities. This political agenda 
is concerned with three main issues: first, the principles inspiring the implementation of the 
policy, what we have called the business philosophy; second, geographical priorities; third, 
material priorities, namely the fields in which the regional administration has decided to 
centre its activities. As we have devoted enough space to analysing the principles inspiring 
Tuscany’s international co-operation, the following sections concentrate on examining both 
geographical and material priorities. As I will seek to illustrate, there is a  huge gap between 
the rhetoric o f the plan and the reality o f spending decisions, which are subject to multiple 
constraints and pressures. Whereas planning seems to be an ideal activity, the politics of 
decentralized aid constrain the region’s capacities to push forward the agenda o f the 
regional plan.
516 See Piano régionale 2001-2005 (op. cit.) p. 46.
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ja. Geographical priorities
•  Geographical priorities in the piano regionale 2001-2005
The piano regionale clearly states the relevance o f setting geographical priorities. As the 
document states, soggetti della cooperazione decentrata in Toscana sono chiamati ad 
operare per programma di area geografica. Si ritiene infatti che lavorare per programmi 
di area determini condizioni favorevoli alle sinergie tra i diversi soggetti toscani e migliori 
la qualità degli interventi in un paese. ,517.
According to the document, the distribution of resources and activities between different 
geographical areas help to create synergies, offering a comprehensive view of what is done 
in a specific area. As we have seen, in order to reinforce this idea the piano regionale and 
the L.R. 17/99 had created the tavoli di coordinamento to establish a framework for the co­
ordination o f the activities in every specific area* 518 *.
In the piano regionale 2001-2005, there are three main geographical priorities: the 
Mediterranean area, Central-Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe. According to the 
document, the reasons behind the priority given to these areas are threefold. The first reason 
is the need to reconstruct dialogue and co-operation. Secondly, these areas are among those 
which are most affected by emigration towards the EU. Finally, these areas have developed 
a necessary relationship with the EU under the perspective o f both the Union’s eastwards 
enlargement and the growth o f partnership schemes within the Mediterranean area.
The fourth area would be Latin America, where, according to the document, ‘sono presenti 
fo rti comunità d i italiani.9519. Within this area, the piano regionale refers to the need to 
support ongoing peace and transitional processes, as it is the case for Cuba or Colombia. 
Furthermore, the document encourages the exchange of experiences and dialogue between 
local entities, in particular in Chile, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Argentina.
5X1 Piano regionale (op.cit.) p.19.
518 'Per ogni area geogràfica di cooperazione il presente piano fornisce indicazione che costituiscono, nel
loro insieme, il quadro di coordinamento delle strategìe e delle azione di tutti i soggetti impegnati in 
quell'area'. See Piano Regionale (op.cit.), p. 19 
*19 See Piano Regionale (op.cit.), p.22.
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Fifthly, the document underlines the importance of Africa, which risks becoming the 
‘continente d im e n tic a to . According to the plan, Tuscany’s activities would mostly 
favour Eritrea and Sierra Leone, which have been affected by armed conflicts. The 
document defends this choice in the following m anner *Certo VAfrica e p iù  grande d i 
questi due paesi, ma questi rappresentano la tragedia di questo continente, fa tto  di povertà 
e di bambini, che imparano ed esercitano l'arte della guerra ’* 521. Furthermore, the plan 
makes reference to the development o f co-operation activities in favour o f  the Saharawi 
people. Finally, a number of activities implying the participation o f the immigrants 
communities present in the territory are included in the list o f activities to be developed in  
Africa522.
The document further recognises two other areas o f intervention, Asia and Australia. 
Within the context of these areas, the plan maintains the existing partnership agreements 
and co-operation activities between local governments established by EU programs.
•  Geographical priorities and policy implementation
As the figure below shows, the pattern o f geographical allocation o f funds (taking each year 
individually) is not as stable and clear as it is depicted in the regional legislation and 
documentation.
For instance, the figures for Africa oscillate between the 45,7% allocated in 1992 and the 
1,7% allocated in 1998. The same considerations apply for the other areas identified in the 
plan with the exception of Asia which has never got a significant percentage o f the aid 
funds.
5:0 Piano Regionale (op.cit.), p.23
521 Piano Regionale (op.cit.), p.23
523 ‘Andranno altresì sviluppate attività che coinvolgano le comunità di immigrati presenti sul nostro 
territorio (Senegai, Congo edaltri)\ See Piano Regionale 2001-2005 (op.cit.), p.23.
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Figure 31: Geographic allocation of Tuscany's decentralised aid
1992-2003
@ Mediterranean area 
SBalkans 
B Eastern Europe 
§  Asia
0  Latin America 
E3 Africa
years
Source: Compiled by this author
The high volatility of regional funds contrasts with the image of stability sketched in the 
piano regionale. These two images can be somewhat reconciled if  we turn to the 
aggregated figures.
Table 7: Mean distribution of fund allocation Tuscany 1992-2003
Africa Latin America Asia Eastern Europe Balkans Mediterranean area
% o f total funds 20,61 17,67 3,66 4 26,22 27,84
allocated
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Calculating the mean distribution o f funds for the period 1992-2003 shows how both the 
Balkans and the Mediterranean area funds reflect the priority given to them by the piano 
regionale. The positions o f Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe are slightly different. 
In first place, Africa has received around 20% of the regional funds for the period 
analysed. Latin America, defined in the regional plan as the fourth priority area, remains 
behind Africa with an 18% share o f the funds. Also relevant is the case of Eastern Europe. 
Defined among the first three priority areas in the regional plan, it only receives 4% of the 
regional funds.
This data shows how the piano regionale has been less consistent with the existing patterns 
of policy implementation than would have been expected,. This is better illustrated by a  
comparison o f the data for the period 1992-2000 when the plan has not yet been issued, 
with the data for the period 2001-2003 when the plan was already in place.
Table 8: Comparative allocation o f funds in Tuscany fo r two periods 1992-2000 and
2001-2003
Period: 1992-2000 Period; 2001-2003
Africa 20.4 21.1
Latin America 15.6 23.9
Asia 2.5 7.2
Eastern Europe 1.4 11.7
Balkans 27.4 22.7
Mediterranean Area 32.7 13.4
Total 100 100
As we can see in the table above, a different pattern of allocation can be identified for each 
of the two periods. During the period 1992-2000, the Mediterranean area was the main 
recipient of aid, receiving almost 33% o f the regional funds for this period The second area 
in order of importance was the Balkans, where the region allocated 27% of its funds. In 
third place we find Africa, while Latin America occupies fourth position in the ranking of 
regional preferences.
For the period 2001-2003 the situation is slightly different. First, the Mediterranean area is 
not the most important area in terms o f the percentage o f  funds allocated, but occupies 
fourth place. Second, the most important area during this period is Latin America, which 
benefits from almost 24% o f all the funds during this period. The Balkans and Africa
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occupy second and third position in regional preferences. Eastern Europe is the fourth area 
in terms of share of the total funds, while Asia continues to be the last
A second element that can be introduced in the comparison o f both patterns of allocation is 
the degree o f concentration/dispersion of funds. According to the figure below the 
allocation pattern for the period 1992-2000 is much more dispersed than in the case of the 
period 2001-2003. The degree of dispersion is indicated by the relative distance o f the 
points in the graph. Each point corresponds to a specific area. These areas are 
homogenously distributed in the X axis, while they are distributed according to the 
percentage o f funds allocated in the Y axis.
As we see for the period 2001-2003 (boxes), the three most important areas seem to be 
close to each other, grouped in the space between 20% to 25%. The three less important 
areas seem to be relatively close to one another as well. The three areas are grouped in the 
space between 5% and 15%. Finally the difference between these two groups o f areas is 
always within the space determined by the line of 5% and the line of 25%.
The period 1992-2000 (triangles), shows a completely different picture. We can identify 
three groups o f areas. Firstly, the Mediterranean area and the Balkan area are located 
around the 30% line. A second group includes Africa and Latin America, which is located 
in between 15% and 20%. Thirdly, the group formed by Asia and Eastern Europe is located 
under the 5% line. The relative distance between these groups is also greater than in the 
case o f the period 2001-2003. The greatest and the least important groups o f areas are 
located in the opposite extremes o f the graph, while the distance between the first two 
groups is determined by the space between the 20% line and the 30% line, being almost as 
great as the distance between the first and the second group o f areas for the period 2001- 
2003.
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Figure 32: Comparative allocation o f funds: concentration of 
fund's among the different areas
Therefore, funds seem to be more equally distributed in the period 2001-2003 than in the 
period 1992-2000. In this period a great deal of effort was directed towards the 
Mediterranean area and the Balkans, while the rest o f the funds were unequally distributed 
between the remaining areas. According to the data shown in this graph, the distribution 
pattern for the period 2001-2003 shows a tendency towards equilibrium among the different 
areas o f intervention rather than favouring one over another.
Yet, the most relevant fact shown by the data presented above is that, for the period 2001- 
2003, the distribution o f funds among geographical areas does not comply with the letter of 
the plan’s directives. Taken separately, only the Balkans is located among the three more 
relevant areas, while the Mediterranean area falls to fourth place and Eastern Europe 
maintains fifth position. Moreover, if  we aggregate the percentages for all the first three 
priority areas identified by the piano régionale (Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the 
Mediterranean area), the sum only accounts for 47.8% of the total funds, while the sum of 
the rest of the areas (Latin America, Africa and Asia) accounts for 52,2%.
This rather surprising distribution of funds could suggest that Tuscany’s decentralized aid 
policy is still very much dependent on the input of other actors. The regional administration
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is unable to set clear-cut priorities or in the best o f the cases to force its partners to comply 
with the provisions of the plan. Let us examine this process in more detail.
G eographica!  distribution o f  funds an d  the im pact o f  Ita lian  a id  p o lic y  on Tuscany’s 
in tem ationai co-operation
The table below compares the patterns of aid allocation in Tuscany and Italy for the period 
1992-1998, a period in which Tuscany’s aid was still very much subject to the State’s 
intemationai aid priorities. If the above mentioned hypothesis is correct, this data should 
show a somewhat parallel distribution of funds in both cases. Yet, as we see in this table 
and in the following one, where the data have been aggregated, Tuscany’s distribution of 
funds differ from that of the Italian government.
Table 9: Comparative geographical allocation of funds Italy and Tuscany 1992-1998
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Italy Tuscany Italy Tuscany Italy Tuscany Italy Tuscany Italy Tuscany Italy Tuscany Italy Tuscany
Africa 27,6 45,7 28 20 23 16,4 57 32,5 38 23,3 52 19,5 57 1,4
Mediterranean 
and Middle 
East 24,2 21,5 19 32,9 42 32,8 17 26,8 20 47,4 15 34,5 7 20,7
Latin America 20 19,3 21,4 22 16 0 13 11,5 17 8 18 10,3 22 34,9
Asia ana 
Oceania 17 0 26 2 13 6 6 4,2 4 4,7 3 0 6 0
Europe 11,5 13,5 5,5 23,1 5 44,8 7 25 20 16,6 12 35,7 7 43
Source: Compiled by this author
Table 10: Comparative geographical allocation of aid Italy and Tuscany 1992-1998
Italy Tuscany
Africa 40,4 22,7
Mediterranean and Middle East 20,6 30,9
Latin America 18,6 15,2
Asia and Oceania 10,7 2,4
Europe 9,7 28,8
Source: Compiled by this author
It is evident that the Italian state played a relevant role in limiting Tuscany’s capacities to 
act abroad. The Italian administration, at least until 1993, retained command and control 
capacities. As we have seen in previous sections, the Italian state forced the regions and
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localities to carry out their co-operation activities in the framework of Italian international 
aid programs. This limited the possible areas for Tuscany’s intervention. The following 
figure can help us to better understand the impact o f  Italian aid programs on the 
establishment o f Tuscany’s decentralized co-opeitaion schemes.
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The figure above compares the patterns o f aid distribution o f Tuscany and the Italian State. 
Each geographical area is assigned a symbol. Thus, for each year every symbol is 
represented twice, one reflecting the percentage o f funds allocated by Tuscany for this year 
in that area and the second one reflecting the percentage o f State funds allocated in that 
year. The overall logic of the figure is quite simple, the more dependent Tuscany’s aid is on 
the State’s command and control capacities, the closer similar symbols should be 
represented in the figure.
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As the figure above shows, Tuscany’s aid was very much confined within Italian aid 
schemes in 1992. The only exception would be Africa and Asia. Tuscany’s administration 
did not allocate funds in Asia whereas the remaining percentages o f funds were 
concentrated in Africa, a very sensitive area for local NGOs.
From 1993 onwards the figure shows the increasing dispersion of symbols, thus, the 
existence of differentiated patterns o f  geographical allocation o f  funds for Tuscany and the 
Italian State. This situation is a direct consequence o f the major crisis of the Italian aid 
system.
As discussed previously, the edifice o f Italian aid collapsed in the early nineties as a result 
o f the fiscal crisis o f the State and a number of corruption scandals. This crisis resulted in 
an overall re-definition o f Italian international co-operation which increasingly 
concentrated co-operation efforts in multilateral, rather than bilateral, aid, reducing the role 
o f the latter. Since 1994, regions simultaneously sought to enhance their capacity to 
develop autonomous foreign projection schemes. These two elements jointly account for 
the diminishing capacity of the State to exert efficient control over Tuscany’s foreign aid 
activities before 1999.
Tuscany’s pattern of allocation would increasingly follow the pattern set by existing 
activities of NGOs. Moreover, thanks to its enhanced capacities to develop an autonomous 
European policy, from 1995 onwards the region begun to engage in the decentralized aid 
for development programs o f European institutions. This trend is further confirmed by the 
analysis o f Tuscany’s pattern o f geographical allocation from 1999 onwards.
During this period, the EU became an important partner in Tuscany’s decentralized aid 
policies. The European Union does not exert command and control capacities but it has 
established its own aid initiatives in which regions are invited to participate. The EU 
therefore operates as a financing institution.
At this stage Tuscany, (mainly due to financial, but also political and normative, reasons) 
began to apply for European funds, while at the same time it maintained organizations’ 
allegiance to the regional aid system by sustaining NGOs* initiatives. These initiatives 
might align with European international co-operation policy or, on the contrary, might 
respond to their own priorities. Later sections explore these issues.
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Geographical priorities and the interaction between the international co-operation 
agenda and the agenda o f Europeanization
Tuscany’s decentralized co-operation, as defined in the L.R. 17/99 and the piano regionale 
2001-2005, is strongly related to the agenda o f Europeanization and the politics o f  
developing an active profile in the context of European integration.
Since 1994 Tuscany has developed an ever increasing agenda of European affairs. This 
agenda materialized in the creation o f an office for international projection activities in 
1995 and in the establishment of a representatives’ office in Brussels in 1998. Moreover, 
Emidio Diodato and liana Bugetti have insisted on the relevance of the agenda o f European 
integration for the last Chiti government and particularly in Claudio Martini’s first term in 
office523.
According to Fabbrini and Brunazzo, a broad process o f Europeanization of Italian regional 
policy took place in the nineties. This process would have reinforced the capacities o f  
regional institutions in Italy. In their own words: ‘The adoption o f EUprinciples, in Italian 
regional policy, has reinforced the regional governmental institutions, a t the expense o f the 
national legislature and executive. Moreover, the Italian regions increased their activities 
o f lobbying and networking a t the European level, setting up in Brussels their own regional 
offices. [...] This has encouraged the formation o f a network o f  relations among regional- 
level social and political actors, plausibly contributing amongst other things to increase the 
capacity to spend European regional funds by the Italian regions, although that capacity is 
still below the European average. Thus, the Italian regions gradually increased their 
financial capacity through European programmes. O f course, that increase appeared yet 
unsatisfactory. [...] Regional political and administrative élites, especially where they were 
able to activate the favourable cultural and social conditions, increasingly used the 
Europeanization thrust (and the resources connected to it) to look fo r  more autonomous 
(from the national élites preferences) strategies o f local and regional development.'52*.
523 See E m id io  D io d a to  and Haría B ugetti: ‘L a  presenza in tem azionale  d e lla  Regione T oscana (1970-2003)’ 
(op. cit.) pp . 248 -252
i2* See Serg io  F ab b rin i and M arco  B runazzo: ‘Federalizing Italy: T he convergen t effects o f  eunopeanization 
and dom estic  m obilization* Regional and Federal Studies, V oi. 13, N o .l ,  Spring 2003, p p . 110-111
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The introduction o f the piano regionale as a regulatory instrument within the international 
co-operation system has permitted the introduction of the European agenda within the 
agenda of international co-operation. There are multiple reasons for this process of 
conflation. As we have mentioned before, Tuscany is dependent on external resources to 
keep decentralized aid policy functioning. Thus the EU, given its commitment to 
decentralized aid policy schemes, represents an attractive partner.
Nevertheless, it is also important to note the impact o f very nature of the regional plan as a 
regulatory instrument of international co-operation. The piano regionale s main task is to 
further integrate decentralized co-operation schemes in the general framework of Tuscany's 
foreign projection. The regional plan for international co-operation is produced by the 
Foreign Affairs Service o f the region in accordance with the agents o f the territory, thus 
mirroring the general international policy priorities offset by the regional presidency.
The ever-increasing importance o f the European integration agenda in the framework of 
Tuscany’s foreign projection has led to Tuscany’s increasing co-participation in different 
European programs. Tuscany has developed a number of co-operation schemes with new 
member states in Central-Eastern Europe, intended to facilitate the implementation o f the 
acquis communautaire in these countries. Furthermore, in the context o f its co-operation 
activities in Latin America, Tuscany participates in a number o f  networks sponsored by the 
European Union’s program URBS-AL. In Asia, Tuscany participates in the program ASIA- 
URBS. In the Mediterranean area, Tuscany participates in the programs MEDA LIFE as 
well as having put forward a number of initiatives in the context o f the program 
INTERREG III-B. Finally, one of the most important tasks o f  the Tuscan administration 
within the decentralized aid system is to raise funds from European programs to make them 
available to actors in the territory.
The lack of the appropriate data does not allow us to quantify the relative weight of 
European initiatives within the Tuscany’s overall decentralized co-operation scheme. Yet, 
from the analysis o f the regional plan and the geographical allocation o f funds, it clearly 
emerges that the EU has an important impact on the setting o f regional preferences. Firstly, 
as is evident from the analysis o f the plan, the region is establishing, in accordance with the 
overall strategy o f Europeanization o f  the region mentioned above, a European profile for
.! I'
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the region. Secondly, the connection with European institutions has been implemented 
through incorporation of the regional plan's geographical priorities, for example Central- 
Eastern Europe, areas which were not originally in the mindset of regional politicians. The 
next sections analyse these issues.
Tuscany as a region in Europe.
As stated in the piano regionale 2001-2005, the diffusion o f  co-operation schemes between 
sub-state tiers o f government at the European level, the extension of the principles o f  
subsidiarity and partnership and their impact on the national political scene are key 
elements in order to understand Tuscany’s engagement in decentralized aid policies525 526.
Within this context, Ha Toscana intende rafforzare il suo ruolo di Regione d'Europa nella 
costruzione di una comunità aperta agli scambi commerciali, demografici e culturali 
soprattuto nell'area mediterrànea, in rapporto a quei Paesi in Via di Sviluppo che cercano 
in Europa punti di riferimento p er una cooperazione p iù  avanzata.' 526 . Tuscany’s 
administration intends to reinforce its role within Europe by participating in international 
co-operation schemes with those countries which see the possibility for advanced modes o f  
international co-operation.
This idea (i.e. the link between the reinforcement o f Tuscany’s role in Europe and 
international co-operation schemes) is further developed in the document La Toscana per la 
pace e la cooperazione. According to this document, the promotion o f peaceful relations 
among peoples and respect for cultural differences has been at the core o f  regional 
involvement in development co-operation policy. Regional involvement in the Balkans and 
the Mediterranean situates Tuscany at the core o f  a  network of pacific relationships 
between the East and West and between the south bank of the Mediterranean and Europe.
The original contribution o f Tuscany to the process o f European integration is that o f 
representing best European traditions o f democratic governance and respect for human 
rights. Moreover, Tuscany represents a model of civic co-existence and o f endogenous and
525 See Piano regionale 2001-2005 {op. cii.) p. 4
526 See Piano regionale 2001-2005 {op. cit.) p . 8
318
sustainable economic growth based on local development. These considerations are the 
main guidelines for the development o f  Tuscany’s international co-operation.527 528.
In the words o f an informant from the regional government: ‘l ’identità toscana appare 
legata alTeuropa. Questo è un po  nella storia della Toscana. Si è sempre guardato 
alVestemo. Da un punto di vista storico la Toscana è sempre stata indipendente, quindi ha 
sempre tessuto rapporti politici con l 'esterno. Questo sicuramente ha pesato. Soprattutto le 
motivazioni geografiche sono delle motivazioni che guardano al futuro delVEuropa, nel 
senso che VEuropa deve essere più fo rte  e coesa al proprio interno e deve essere un punto 
di riferimento per le aree vicine ad  esempio i Balcani. Per questi Paesi Vohiettvvo è 
Tingresso in Europa, con tutte le difficoltà dei casi, allo stesso tempo Vewropa deve essere 
un punto di riferimento anche per il Mediterraneo. Storicamente deve giocare un ruolo 
forte, non si può pensare che questi paesi abbiano riferimento altrove. Percorso per 
Veuropa è obbligato*5,2*.
The piano regionale has emphasized Tuscany’s role as a European region in the 
Mediterranean area. The document emphasizes the development of dynamics of dialogue 
and co-operation in the area, as a result o f  the Barcelona Declaration for the development of 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership529. Yet, the piano regionale insists on the need to better 
structure co-operation schemes in the as a  forerunner to establishing a free trade are in the 
Mediterranean Sea in 20IO530.
Tuscany’s contribution to the development of better co-operation instruments first resides 
in the valuing, through dialogue and co-operation among peoples, of mutual respect for 
cultural differences and safeguarding cultural diversity in the area, and o f a Mediterranean 
identity, which is perceived as a common heritage of the different peoples and cultures 
which had developed in the area531.
Secondly, the region emphasizes the importance of focusing attention on territorial 
development strategies and the significance of endogenous growth-oriented economic co­
operation strategies. Tuscany is perceived in this document as a region offering a tradition
527 See La Toscana per la pace e la cooperazione. Firenze 12 novembre 2001.
528 Interview with Fabbrizio Pizzanelli conducted by liana Bugetti on the 20th o f  March 2003
529 See Piano regionale 2001-2005 (op. cit.) p . 24 .
530 See Piano regionale 2001-2005 (op. cit.) p .  2 4 -25 .
531 See Piano regionale 2001-2005 (op. cit.) p . 2 5 .
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of territorial development rooted on the integration o f territorial interests and local 
development strategies, which might serve as a point of reference for other territories in the  
south bank o f the Mediterranean seeking to foster sustainable development strategies.532.
The documents stress Tuscany’s contribution in the area of capacity and institutional 
building at the local level as part o f  a broader tradition o f socio-economic development 
based on local development strategies. This relies on grassroots participation and 
mobilization as an important resource to establish inclusive development strategies533.
Yet, in addition to the programmatic dimension and the self-defined role o f Tuscany as a  
region in the Mediterranean area, the incorporation o f a European dimension to  
decentralized aid policies has brought about an inevitable process of adjustment between 
Tuscany’s self-defined priorities as an international actor and the necessities o f the process 
of European integration and enlargement
Tuscany as a region in Europe and the structure of funds allocation.
The integration o f the co-operation agenda and the agenda o f Europeanization is not an 
easy task for Tuscany’s regional administration. As emerges from the text o f  the piano  
regionale the integration o f both agendas is heavily dependent on the coincidence between 
Tuscany’s self-established role as the gateway of Europe to the Mediterranean area and 
European development policy priorities as settled in Brussels.
The plan insists, and it is common currency among informants, that eastward enlargement 
has displaced the attention o f European policy initiatives in the realm o f international co­
operation to Central and Eastern Europe, while the importance of the Mediterranean Area 
would have been severely downplayed in the years 1999-2004534.
Thus, the effects of the integration of the Europeanization agenda in Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid policies seem to be two-fold. First, it is perceived as a major asset that 
might permit Tuscany to develop a central role in the Mediterranean region. Nevertheless,
532 S ee  Piano regionale 2001-2005 (op. cit.) p . 25.
533 S ee  Piano regionale 2001-2005 (op. cit. ) p . 26.
534 S ee  Piano regionale 2003 pp. 14-16 an d  24 .
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in the last few years changes in the European agenda of international co-operation would 
have constrained Tuscany’s capacity to develop this role.
Table 11: Comparative allocation o f funds in Tuscany for the periods 1992-2000 and
2001-2003
Period: 1992-2000 Period: 2001-2003
Africa 20.4 21.1
Latin America 15.6 23 .9
Asia 2.5 7.2
Eastern Europe 1.4 11 .7
Balkans 27.4 22 .7
Mediterranean Area 32.7 13.4
Total 100 100
The data presented above would partially confirm the weight o f  the European development 
agenda in defining the geographical priorities of Tuscany’s decentralized aid. There is a 
neat division between the period 1992-2000 and the period 2001-2003. During the former 
period, Tuscany allocated very little resources to Eastern Europe, whereas the most 
important share o f aid funds were allocated to the Mediterranean area, very much in line 
with Tuscany’s aspiration of playing a differentiated role in the area.
The period 2001-2003, during which the regional plan on international co-operation 
activities was implemented, shows a rather different pattern. Both Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean area enjoy a similar level of funds allocation. This imply that the allocation 
of funds to Central-Eastern Europe is eight times bigger than during the period 1992-2000, 
whereas the percentage of funds allocated to the Mediterranean area has been reduced to 
less than half.
The chart below shows an even more striking picture by comparing the allocation o f funds 
on a yearly basis. Data for the period 2001-2003 would confirm the overall impact o f the 
agenda o f European integration on policy schemes in Tuscany.
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Figure 34: Comparative allocation o f funds Eastern Europe vs. 
Mediterranean Area
Thus the picture is one in which, since 2001, Tuscany seems to be finding it difficult to 
combine the idea of being a region in Europe, its normative consequences in terms of the 
tasks and goals of the region’s international projection, and effective participation in 
European international co-operation programs and the consequences o f eastward 
enlargement.
NGOs and the definition o f geographical priorities in Tuscany’s decentralized aid
In 1996, analysing the impact o f federal reform on social movements, Marco G. Giugni 
wrote: *Se I *esperimento regionale non ha probabilmente cambiato di molto I ’azione dei 
movimenti sociali in Italia a causa del suo limitato potere decentralizzatore, la creazione di 
un vero e proprio stato federale dovrebbe indurre i movimenti a decentralizzarsi e a 
moderare il loro repertori d ’azioni, così come dovrebbe provocare dei cambiamenti 
rispetto alle loro possibilità d i sucesso.'535. According to the author, mobilization in the
535 See M arco  G . G iugni: ‘Federalism o e m ov im en ti socia li’ Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica X X V I. n. 1. 
A prile 1996. p . 168.
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context of a federalist system would be more successful in obtaining a reaction from 
institutions than proactive political behaviour.
As we have seen in earlier sections, in the case o f solidarity movements, co-operation 
between organizations and local and regional institutions can be traced back to the mid­
eighties. Furthermore, as previously noted, the overall crisis o f the Italian co-operation 
system pushed NGOs, not only towards the supra-national arenas, but also towards the sub­
national tiers o f  government. Since the mid-nineties, the latter became an attractive partner 
for the development of international co-operation schemes.
Most interviewees identify the constitution of a decentralised aid policy system in Italy as a 
bottom-up process, linking the establishment of decentralised aid schemes to a long 
tradition of associationalism in the territory. In the case o f  Veneto or Lombardy, the 
associations were part of the Catholic culture of parochial associations and missionaries, 
whereas in Tuscany, associations emerged in the context o f  left-leaning movements of 
solidarity with the independence cause in Africa or Latin America (especially Nicaragua 
and Cuba)536.
As we have seen, since the early phases of Tuscany’s engagement in decentralized co­
operation schemes, social movements have played a relevant role. In the mid-eighties it was 
due to the initiative of such movements that local and regional institutions began to develop 
international co-operation schemes.
After the reforms of the L.R. 17/99 the regional administration opened the decentralized co­
operation system to the participation o f local NGOs, both through their participation in the 
tavoli di coordinamento and through the participation of local NGOs in the progetti a 
bando. Thus, NGOs have an important input in the structure o f decentralized aid schemes 
in Tuscany. This is especially evident if  we consider the geographical allocation of 
resources.
The regional plan acknowledges the influence of NGOs in defining geographical priorities 
when it states: T America Latina, p u r non essendo identificata dalla regione come 
prioritaria, Vattività di cooperazione degli attori toscani la segnalano come una delle aree 
priviligiate dalla cooperazione di base e conseguentemente anche Vattività della Regione
536 Interview conducted on the 14th o f November 2003.
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Toscana sì è andata evolvendo, registrandone la crescita sia dal punto di vista quantitativo 
che qualitativo.,537.
The paragraph quoted above may help us to characterize the impact o f NGOs on the overall 
process o f establishing decentralized aid schemes in Tuscany. On the one hand, Tuscany’s 
administration has tried to put in place a number of directives to guide the structuring o f  
international aid schemes’ implementation.
On the other hand, the region has had to come to grips with the network o f associations 
operating in the territory, which had been developing international co-operation activities 
since the late seventies and early eighties, without taking into account the needs o f  
Tuscany’s foreign projection. In the initial phases o f Tuscany’s engagement in 
decentralized aid policies, the regional administration learnt from the social actors. 
However, the agenda of internationalisation o f  the region brought about by Chiti gave a 
new dimension to Tuscany’s international co-operation537 38.
The new agenda was accompanied by the steady growth o f the administrative apparatus 
which was devoted to development aid issues. This increased the capacity o f the region to 
reflect upon issues related to economic development assistance, and to act in a more 
independent fashion vis-à-vis other actors539.
These changes have led to a new scenario where the relations between social actors and the 
regional administration could become increasingly conflicting. The region does not blindly 
follow NGO initiatives and tries to push decentralized co-operation in the direction of its 
main interests. At the same time this political control is not balanced by an increase in 
available resources, thus the region’s capacity to control NGOs activities in exchange for 
economic resources is compromised.
Moreover, NGOs remain a necessary instrument both for implementation and also at the 
level o f the normative resources for the policy, thus the regional administration has to 
accommodate the interests and activities of NGOs in the overall system540.
537 See Piano regionale 2003 (op. cit.) p. 31.
538 Interview conducted on the 12th o f November 2003.
539 Interview conducted on the 12th o f November 2003.
540 Interview conducted on die 12th o f November 2003.
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As explained by an informant from thè NGOs: *le ONG in generale hanno una loro politica 
che poi si realizza o meno indipendentemente dalla possibilità di finanziarla o meno. Noi 
abbiamo relazioni in diverse parti de l mondo e cerchiamo finanziamenti da parte dei vari 
finanziatori. La regione toscana p e r  il COSPE rappresenta il 3% dei fondi, quindi noi 
lavoriamo insieme alla regione. Ovviamente alla regione chiediamo i soldi per l ’area che 
lei ritiene prioritaria, per VAfrica sub-sahariana chiediamo ifond i a chi ritiene quest’area 
prioritaria. Che sia il ministero, l ’Unione Europea, associazioni cattoliche ecc., le Ong 
sono “opportuniste”, però abbiamo preteso che la priorità non divenisse esclusività. 
Questo perché pensiamo si debba rispettare tutta la società, e c ’è chi lavora nel 
mediterraneo, n e ll’Africa ecc. la Regione non può dare contributi solo a chi va nel 
mediterraneo perché lei ha fa tto  questa scelta politica, ma deve sostenere anche 
l ’associazione dei congolesi, ad esempio. ,541.
The data on the comparative allocation o f funds presented above to some extent confirms s 
the overall picture presented. The region has had to integrate its own preferences with that 
of associations operating in the territory. For both periods identified (before and after the 
L.R. 17/99), the allocation of funds in areas of special interest for Tuscany’s NGOs has 
remained quite stable. What is more, in the case o f Latin America the allocation o f funds 
has substantially increased, from 15,3% to 23,9% (see data below).
Table 12: Com parative allocation o f funds Latin America and Africa for the periods
1992-2000 and 2001-2003
Period: 1992-2000 Period: 2001-2003
Africa 20.4 21.1
Latin America 15.6 23.9
The increasing relevance of Latin America as a destination for Tuscany’s decentralized aid, 
even when the region recognizes that this is not a priority area, reveals that NGOs remain 
an important player within Tuscany’s international co-operation. In a similar vein, the case 
of Africa would account for the important role of NGOs within the overall system, even if 
in this case Tuscany does not explicitly downplay the relevance o f the African continent for 
Tuscany’s international co-operation. *325
541 Interview with Malavolti conducted by liana Bugetti on the 3rd of April 2003
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•  Geographical allocation and the multilayered structure of Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid.
In previous sections we have analysed the gap between what it is stated in the plan and the 
implementation of Tuscany’s decentralized aid programs in terms of the geographical 
allocation o f  funds. Behind an image o f relative inconsistency, the analysis o f  the patterns 
of allocation o f Tuscany’s foreign aid can help us to assess the impact o f the interaction o f  
the regional administration with different actors. Previous sections have focused on three 
major actors: the State, the EU and NGOs operating at the local level.
As we have tried to show, the State’s administration has lost all of its command and control 
capacities over Tuscany’s decentralized co-operation. The comparative analysis of the 
patterns o f fund allocation shows how Tuscany, from 1993 onwards, has increasingly 
developed an autonomous pattern o f allocation vis-à-vis the State’s foreign aid policy. As 
we mentioned before, this process can be understood as the result of a major crisis of Italian 
foreign aid and the reforms taking place in 1994 which permitted Italian regions to develop 
an autonomous foreign profile. From 1995 onwards, the regional administration began to 
approach the European Union as part o f a broader strategy to internationalise the region, 
which has had a strong impact on the establishment of decentralized aid policies in the 
region.
The analysis o f the impact o f  the European Union’s co-operation schemes has shown, to a 
certain extent, the relevance of the European input on the development o f  regional 
decentralized aid policy from the late nineties onwards. At the level o f policy making, the 
regional administration has connected the development of decentralized aid for 
development schemes to the implementation of Tuscany’s role as a region in Europe. This 
role is defined in terms of facilitating access to European initiatives by civil society actors. 
More importantly, the region has defined its role as the gateway o f Europe to the 
Mediterranean area.
The twofold nature of the link between Europeanization and decentralized co-operation has 
had contradictory effects on the implementation of Tuscany’s decentralized aid for 
development policies. The regional administration, by coordinating its decentralized aid
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programs with European initiatives, has complied with policy preferences established at the 
European level. As we have seen before, these include the development o f co-operation 
programs for accession countries in Central Eastern Europe.
Whereas the region has tried to orient its decentralized aid programs towards the fulfilment 
of the Mediterranean agenda, the capacity of the region to allocate funds in the area is 
constrained by European policy initiatives, since Tuscany does not enjoy a high level o f 
financial autonomy and an important part of the funds managed at the regional level would 
be provided by European programs.
Unfortunately the lack of appropriate data does not permit us to further confirm this point. 
Nevertheless, the information gathered during the interviews and the analysis o f  the 
documentation at hand would indicate the existence, from 1999 to 2003, of a Europe-driven 
re-allocation o f Tuscany’s decentralized aid for development initiatives towards Central- 
Eastern Europe, and therefore of an increasing impact of the European Union on Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid policy schemes.
Finally, NGOs are sought to influence the pattern o f aid allocation. As we have said before, 
Tuscany’s aid relies on the participation of NGOs as implementation agents (at least 40% 
of the funds are implemented through NGOs). NGOs have their own political agenda as 
well as their own policy preferences that they seek to implement. Part of the strategy of 
NGOs has consisted in diversifying the sources of funding, thus limiting the impact o f a 
single institutional tier and permitting them to better develop their own policy objectives.
As a result, NGOs have been able to introduce some amendments to regional policy 
priorities. Basically, these are the inclusion of Africa and Latin America, traditional areas 
of intervention for Tuscan NGOs, among the priorities of the regional administration. The 
analysis of the allocation data shows how both areas have received a substantial amount of 
funds since the approval of the regional plan (45% percent o f the funds allocated for the 
period 2001-2003), indicating the important role that NGOs play in the process of policy 
implementation. Nevertheless, the lack o f data on the distribution o f funds among partners 
does not permit us to further confirm the weight o f NGOs in decentralized aid policies in 
Tuscany.
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As arises from the empirical evidence presented above, the interactions between institutions 
and social actors within the decentralized aid system have led to two different patterns o f 
exchange. ,r
In the context of exchanges with European institutions, Tuscany has profited from the 
opportunity structure opened by European projects. Consequently it has had to comply with 
EU policy preferences. Yet, this does not imply that Tuscany’s decentralized aid policy is 
integrated in an overall European scheme. Conversely, in recent years, as a result o f  
participation in European schemes, Tuscany has compromised important elements of its 
own international projection agenda in exchange for the possibility of participating in 
European decentralized co-operation schemes and profiting from European funds.
The interactions with social actors would respond to a different logic. Here the region has 
incorporated NGOs in the decision making process. They also play a fundamental role in 
the implementation of the policy. Thus, a process o f broader integration of the regional 
administration and social actors can be identified. This systemic logic is counterbalanced 
by the relative autonomy o f NGOs within the system and their opportunistic approach to 
the regional administration as explained by an informant in  the previous section.
Nevertheless, it seems plausible to say that NGOs have had an input in defining 
decentralized aid co-operation policy in Tuscany, which goes far beyond the limits o f 
merely opportunistic action within a system of multiple donors. This view is supported by 
the fact that NGOs manage more than 40% of the total regional decentralized aid funds 
each year. Furthermore, the impact o f  NGOs on Tuscany’s decentralized aid has altered the 
patterns of funds allocation to include Latin America and Africa as priority areas, despite 
the traditional Mediterranean leanings o f the region.
Contrary to what occurs when the region approaches European institutions, the interactions 
between social actors and regional institutions represent systemic constraints on the 
capacity o f the region to develop decentralized aid as a part of a broader project of 
international projection. Firstly, NGOs are necessary in the implementation phase, as well 
as representing an important symbolic asset. Secondly, the region’s lack of resources does 
not permit it to exchange compliance on the part o f the NGOs for a political agenda for 
regional funding purely structured along the necessities o f  Tuscany’s foreign projection.
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The result is that the interactions between NGOs and the regional administration introduce 
bargaining and an incremental strategy o f policy implementation at the core of Tuscany’s 
system o f decentralized aid.
b. Material priorities: decentralized aid and Tuscany’s economic development model
• Introduction: Sustainable local development and Tuscany’s development co­
operation activities
The piano regionale settles a number o f  material priorities, that is, a set of priority activities 
within the broad realm of development policy aid. The fields of intervention must be 
coherent with the general objectives identified in earlier parts o f the plan and in the L.R. 
17/99. These broad objectives can be basically summed up as the promotion o f local 
development and the reinforcement o f  civil society in LDCs.
The commitment o f Tuscany’s administration to local development promotion initiatives is 
described in the following terms by an informant from the regional administration: ‘Per 
quanto riguarda l ’idea dello sviluppo, si dovrebbe piuttosto dire la dimensione locale dello 
sviluppo, quindi le esigenze e i problemi che nascono in una comunità regionale o 
locale.*542 543.
The promotion o f local sustainable development is identified in the piano regionale as a 
multifaceted process. First, it has a political/institutional dimension. The piano regionale 
commits to supporting the institution building processes. The document expresses special 
concern for democratisation processes at the local level and decentralisation: 'Uno dei 
compiti più relevanti della cooperazione decentrata è costituito dale politiche di 
“institution building”, di appoggio ai processi di decentramento e democratizazione a 
livello locali. Questo punto è rilevante anche in funzione della creazione dell’ambiente 
politico più adeguato per i progetti di cooperazione nei servizi pubblici. '5**.
Secondly, it presents an economic side. The piano regionale establishes a number of 
priorities in the field of economic co-operation. These are: the promotion o f the informal 
sector (micro-enterprises) and the development of small and medium sized enterprises; the
542 Interview with Fabrizio Pizzanelli conducted by Ilaria Bugetti on the 20,h o f March 2003.
543 See Piano regionale 2003 (op. cit.) p. 31.
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promotion o f sustainable agriculture and the protection of cultural goods. Finally, the  
region engages, in co-operation with the Banca Etica, in a number o f micro-credit 
initiatives.
Thirdly, local development, according to the piano regionale, has an environmental facade 
to it. The region specifically establishes among its priorities the protection o f the 
environment and the development o f ecologically sustainable initiatives. The document 
recalls the collaboration o f  the ARPAT, a regional centre specialised in environmental 
impact assessment.
Finally, the piano regionale defines co-operation in the health care field as a regional 
priority. In this respect, the region understands that co-operation in the health care sector 
should mainly take place in those areas identified by the document as priority. The regional 
government sponsors agreements among the different actors in the health sector in Tuscany 
and their counterparts in specific underdeveloped areas, defining long term co-operation 
schemes.
Nevertheless, as an informant from the regional administration states: *[...] in realtà è una 
concezione che stiamo costruendo, facendo più che avendo una piena consapevolezza d i 
tutte le opportunità che sono legate alla dimensione locale dello sviluppo,’544 54.
The notion o f sustainable local economic development presented so far seems to be heavily 
linked to debates on the evolution o f  Tuscany’s economic development model. In the words 
of the same informant: *[...] Dovrei anche dire che quella dei modelli locali di sviluppo è  
una riflessione in crescita, che si accompagna alla crescita del decentramento del mondo, 
della riflessione dello sviluppo locale, su cose nuove come la specializzazione in campo 
agricolo, la valorizzazione dei beni culturali, certe form e di turismo diffuso sul territorio, 
valorizzazione della piccola e media impresa e dell'artigianato,54S.
The linkage between Tuscany’s economie model and decentralized aid operates, at least at 
the level o f political discourse, in the following manner: Firstly, regional authorities build 
up the case for exporting what they consider a particular model of integrating the economy 
and the construction of the polity. The so called Tuscan economic model is presented as a
544 Interview with Fabrizio Pizzanelli conducted by Ilaria Bugetti on the 20th of March 2003.
545 Interview with Fabrizio Pizzanelli conducted by Ilaria Bugetti on the 20,h of March 2003.
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system of production deeply rooted in the traditions of the territory and in a widespread 
ideological consensus. This consensus is the result of leftist political subculture combined 
with the emphasis on practices of concertation and social integration.
Secondly, regional authorities try to situate the contributions of the Tuscan development 
model in the context of globalization. On the one hand, the practices o f concertation and 
social integration, 'the tuscan way o f doing things\ is invoked Social movements are 
integrated in the frame of regional politics. Consequently, decentralized aid is conceived 
partially as an instrument within the context of broad dialogue between social actors and 
the regional administration.
On the other hand, the changes in the international economic structure derived from 
globalisation have challenged the regional system of production. The regional 
administration seeks for new ways of promoting the regional productive tissue abroad. 
These new strategies of internationalisation o f the economy include decentralized 
cooperation as a means of assisting regional industries access to emerging markets.
The following sections explore the relationship between decentralized aid and Tuscany’s 
economic development model. First, a brief excursus on the nature of Tuscany’s economy 
is presented. Secondly, Tuscany’s economic development model is explored in relation to 
decentralized aid for development. Regional authorities perceive Tuscan economic model 
as an asset o f the decentralized aid for development system. Finally, I will try to show the 
way in which the discourse of regional authorities has been constructed is contradictory and 
consequently it might operate only in a policy context o f low institutionalisation and 
scarcity of resources546. 54*
544 The lack o f appropriate data forces us to analyse the link between the economy as an identity marker and
the construction of a decentralized aid system in Tuscany only at the level of political discourse.
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• Excursus: “Tuscany’s economic development model”
Tuscany’s development model evolved since the fifties along the lines of concentration o f  
small and medium sized industries and specialization leading to what has been called “the 
four Tuscanies.”547.
The consolidation of this model was made possible through the growth o f inter-industry 
relations between firms specialized by phases. This phenomenon multiplied the territorial 
interactions between productive and residential areas rather than sifting them out. The 
process was also sustained by a local redistribution o f population that took place according 
to the mechanisms of gradual adjustment, which tended to bring together the place o f  
residence and the place o f  production. The outcome was the formation o f  localised 
networks o f socio-economic interaction which took place in relatively self-contained 
territorial contexts where residence and place o f work operated to create a sense of self- 
identity548.
According to Sforzi, industrial districts in Tuscany were characterized by co-participation 
between the community and small firms. Co-participation consisted o f the process by 
which the community exercised an autonomous function in relation to the organization o f  
production based on a common social culture. A shared base of common values and 
normative orientations served to create a cultural context favourable to economic 
enterprise; it influenced industrial relations and the activities o f local government and 
administration549.
Carlo Trigilia has shown how interactive networks o f local and regional institutions in 
Tuscany encouraged and sustained a leftist political sub-culture. The political continuity 
provided by this leftist subculture contributed to preserving the traditional social 
environment and the shaping of a particular orientation regarding economic activities.
547 See Fabio Sforzi: ‘The “Tuscan model” and recent trends’ in Giacomo Becattini, Marco Bellandi, Gabi Dei 
Ottai and Fabio Sforzi 2003: ‘From Industrial Districts to Local Development: An Itinerary o f  research ’ 
Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar p.32-33; See also: Shari Garmise: ‘Convergence in the European 
Community: The case of Tuscany* in Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti eds 1994: ‘ Regional 
development in a modem European economy * London: Pinter Publishers p. 29-30
548 Fabio Sforzi: ‘The “Tuscan model” and recent trends’ (op. cit.) p. 41.
549 Fabio Sforzi: ‘The “Tuscan model” and recent trends’ (op. cit.) p. 41.
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Moreover, it has generated a strong consensus that has allowed successive regional 
governments to pursue activities that favour the growth o f small business550.
According to Nanetti, modernization encouraged the transformation o f  this consensus, 
which moved from an implicit social base to explicit forms o f political exchange between 
institutions and stakeholders and entrepreneurs. Institutions provided advanced business 
services to small and medium size firms. These services helped to contain the costs of 
innovation, secure new markets, assist in restructuring o f productive capacity and 
expanding production activities through the promotion o f cultural, environmental and 
archaeological resources. These services took four main forms: a) strategic assistance; b) 
specific education requirements such as vocational schools and management training 
courses; c) direct regulation of externalities and the labour market; d) the instigation of 
public-private partnership to provide the necessary resources for larger development- 
inspired projects. As a result, small firms, the preservation o f  the political sub-culture and 
Tuscany’s institutions have become even more interdependent551 52.
The evolution from an industrial economy to a service-oriented economy has changed the 
structure of Tuscany’s economic system, leading to increasing diversification among the 
different Tuscanies. The regional economic system can be defined as a network in which 
different local systems of production are integrated. The exchange of goods and services 
has redefined the regional economic space to create a regional system that goes beyond the 
sum of local systems of production, permitting a better assessment of endogenous resources 
for economic growth. The structure o f relations has progressed beyond specialization and 
articulation along the single productive process to include the exchange o f services. 
Tuscany (as opposed to Tuscanies) is conceived o f as a  structure of opportunity for the 
expansion o f open local systems o f  production that create and capture external demand
550 See Carlo Trigilia 1986: ‘ Grandi partiti e piccole imprese’ Bologna: Il Mulino pp. 131 and 209-309
551 See Raffaella Y. Nanetti 1988: ‘ Growth and Territorial policies: The Italian model o f social capitalism' 
London: Pinter Publishers pp. 93-116
552 See Alessandro Cavalieri (ed) 1999 * Toscana e Toscane: Percorsi locali e identità regionale nello 
sviluppo economico’ Firenze: IRPET pp. 263-269
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• Tuscany’s development model as an asset 
The Tuscan econom ic m ode / as a norm ative m arker.
Elements o f Tuscany’s development model have been used by politicians as to build up a 
system of normative markers for decentralized aid policy. This system of normative 
markers puts Tuscany’s development model at the centre o f a twofold way o f conceiving 
the region. A d  intra the region is defined in terms o f the practices of concertation and the 
broad ideological consensus which supported the development of industrial districts. This 
“Tuscan way o f  doing things” affects the way in which social movements and NGOS are 
integrated in decentralized aid policies. A d extra the normative discourse surrounding the 
economic development of the region, particularly the practices of concertation, is used as a 
discursive marker of the necessary link between economic development and practices of 
good governance and sustainability.
These issues have been summarized in the following statements by Vannino Chiti and 
Massimo Toschi: ‘La regione, in fa st diverse ha portato avanti, prima una pratica che si 
chiamava dì programmazione negoziata o contrattata [...] E ’ dunque diventato un fatto di 
volontà politica e istituzionale, su che cosa c ’è obbligo di coinvolgimento, qual è  la parte 
che aspetta alle organizzazioni del mondo economico e sociale ecc. Queste esperienze non 
hanno riguardato solo la vita economica ma anche la vita complessiva della regione, per 
esempio le associazioni di volontariato ecc.*553 54. Therefore, 4Siamo anche un modello sul 
piano economico. C 'è una modalità d i amministrare il territorio che può essere presa ad 
esempio. [...] La toscana gode comunque di una situazione autonoma, nella
consapevolezza di avere un proprio modello una propria identità, e di essere creativi nella 
costruzione delpartenariato’SSA.
The Regional development model is deeply rooted in the continuity of a leftist political sub­
culture that switches the debate on the modes of exporting Tuscany’s development model 
into a highly normative one in which considerations o f the practices of good governance are 
placed side by side with issues such as ecological sustainability or the promotion of 
medium and small sized enterprises.
553 Interview with Vannino Chitti conducted by Ilaria Bugetti on the 17* April 2003.
554 Interview with Massimo Toschi conducted by Ilaria Bugetti on the 21s* of March 2003.
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Regional institutions commit, through decentralized aid schemes, to the worth o f the 
Tuscan model o f  economic development as a normative value along which to structure, not 
only Tuscany’s projection abroad, but also the construction o f Tuscany as a territory.
As stated in the piano regionale, the regional administration is trying to * valorizzare un 
modello di “sviluppo toscano ” che contraponga a quello del libero mercato il concetto di 
sviluppo sostenibile, seguendo una nuova strategia politica che ponga al centro la nozione 
di governance valorizzando il ruolo fondamentale e decisivo delle entità subnazionali. Le 
strategie di azione individuate in ocassione di questo evento, legate ai temi della 
sostenibilità e rivolte ad aprire il contesto regionale agli spazi intemazionali di un mondo 
vario e complesso, rappresentano una meta importante per una Toscana che intende 
accettare la sfida di ridefinire il proprio ruolo oltre i confini naziona lif55.
Thus, beyond exporting an image o f succesful economic development, ‘Tuscany’s model 
of development” becomes an important benchmark for the policy, by which the regional 
administration links the normative consensus underpinning Tuscany’s model of economic 
development to the values underpinning decentralized aid for development. That is, 
‘Tuscany’s development model” becomes a normative choice in the context o f  an 
increasingly globalised economy, which opposes a liberal market economy to Tuscany’s 
integrated model o f local development.
As an informant from the regional administration states: *L'internazionalizzazione può  
avvenire in modo selvaggio, oppure con una sponda che da sicurezza ed equilibrio, per cui 
riconosco e accetto che il mio vantaggio consiste nel trasferire alcune attività nei paesi con 
cui costruisco partenariati, operando così delle trasformazioni nel cuore delle attività che 
svolgo nei Paesi avanzati da cui provengo. Non bisogna andare a bruciare territori e a 
costruire aziende selvagge che inquinano e deturpano il territorio. Di conseguenza anche 
io posso beneficiare e imparare qualcosa dall 'internazionalizzazione. Abbiamo cercato di 
dare equilibrio, una convinzione politica ideale, ma anche degli obiettivi che dessero un 
equilibrio e una risposta diversa rispetto al liberismo selvaggio.’5 56.
555 See piano regionale 2003 (op. cit.) p. 43.
556 Interview with Vannino Chiti conducted by liana Bugetti on the 17th April 2003
Furthermore, the incorporation o f Tuscany’s development model as an asset o f Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid policies has to be interpreted within the broader framework of the 
dialogue established between the regional administration and social movements on the 
challenges posed by globalisation. This issue has become a priority of the regional political 
agenda since the arrival o f Claudio Martini to the regional presidency557.
According to one interviewee from the regional administration: ‘Bisogna mantenere il 
dialogo con i movimenti che sono portatori di esigenze, qffinché si riesca a fa re  qualcosa 
di concreto p er cogliere quelle che sono le opporîunità della globalizzazione [,,,]Questo 
riassume Porto Alegre, S. Ross ore, l ’European social forum , ecc.’558.
The regional administration has shown a special sensitivity towards the problems stemming 
from globalisation, thus exporting Tuscany’s development model is represented by the 
regional administration, as part of an overall strategy of responding to the problems posed 
by globalisation.
After the disaster of the demonstration against the G8 summitt held in Genova in 2001, the 
success of the European Social Forum of Florence in November 2002 showed that 
movements could be integrated in the political scenario in a different manner, putting 
Martini at the political centre o f a broader debate between the center-left and Berlusconi.
Political visibility forced the regional government to undertake a political agenda, which 
implied, not only the integration o f social movements in the political scenario o f  the region 
but also acting on global problems such as the protection o f  environment or the respect of 
human rights.
The political discourse underpinning decentralized aid for development seems to be very 
much bounded within the elements presented in previous paragraphs. That is, the regional 
administration conception on the normative value o f Tuscany’s development model within 
the debates o f international economic development and the perils derived from 
globalization lies at the heart o f the normative values surrounding practices of decentralized 
aid in Tuscany. *5
557 See Emidio Diodato and liana Bugetti: 'Lapresenza intemazionale della Regione Toscana (1970-2003')* 
(op. cit.') pp. 254-255




Decentralized aid in Tuscany is perceived by regional elites, as the expression of the values 
of concertation and a broad ideological consensus on the way o f  integrating politics and the 
development o f the economy, by which the Tuscan development model, would represent 
both an exportable model and a normative choice in a context that emphasizes de- 
localization of production and mobility of capital.
Yet, as we will show in the next section there is a different way of conceiving the link 
between decentralized aid and Tuscany’s economic model. Decentralized aid has been also 
placed at the centre of the debates on the problems of internationalisation of the regional 
productive tissue. As a result, decentralized aid schemes seem to be an important 
instrument in the politics o f internationalisation of the regional economy.
Decentralized a id  and the internationalisation o f  Tuscany's econom y
Exporting Tuscany’s model of economic development is also perceived as an important 
instrument to promote the internationalisation of the entrepreneurial sector in Tuscany. As 
an interviewee from the regional administration has described it: ‘La Regione Toscana ha 
cercato di unificare le spinte. Da una parte c'era una spinta di visione politica. Bisogna 
costruire uno sviluppo che sia sostenibile, che continui p e r  le generazioni che verranno. 
Contemporaneamente a queste visioni politiche, bisognava dare una sponda a ll' 
internazionalizzazione del mondo economico della toscana, perché questa è un esigenza, 
l'alternativa sarebbe il crollo dell'attività produttive in alcune realtà più avanzate.’559.
Since 2003, the Agency for the economic promotion of Tuscany (APET) has issued an 
annual plan o f economic promotion activities, which determines the main goals and 
instruments for the internationalisation o f Tuscany’s economy. The plans for the years 
2003, 2004 and 2005 include a section devoted to the interaction o f the promotion of 
Tuscany’s export sector and decentralized aid schemes.
5S9 Interview with Vannino Chiti conducted by Ilaria Bugetti on the 17th April 2003. Unfortunately the lack of 
data on the partners of Tuscany's decentralized co-operation does not allow us to further explore this 
hypothesis, beyond the level of political will.
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In the words o f an observer o f Tuscany’s international activities, */a regione mostra un 
approccio all'internazionalizzazione economica integrato con la cooperazione allo 
sviluppo e  alle attività intem azionali.’560.
The plan for the year 2003 makes this point clear when it states: 7 'obiettivo è quello di 
attivare progetti in grado di sviluppare rapporti economici con aree di futura integrazione 
o assorbimento nell’ottica dell'U nione Europea come i Balcani, l ’area Medisud e  
L *Europa Centro Orientale, quindi promuovere, sviluppare o rafforzare ed organizzare 
razionalmente la collaborazione industriale/economica e l ’integrazione progressiva fra  
paesi di aree diverse,’561.
Thus, the regional government seeks to integrate decentralized aid activities with actively 
seeking markets for the region’s productive sector. As stated in the plan for 2004, the 
primary goals o f linking economic promotion and international co-operation activities are 
to put in place a number o f projects aimed at strengthening Tuscany’s economic relations 
with speicific areas and to open new markets for Tuscany’s products (if these activities are 
accompanied by the institutional projection activities o f the regional presidency)562 . 
According to the plan, the main areas o f interest for developing these kind o f projects are 
the Balkans, the southern bank o f the Mediterranean and Latin America.
In the last three years the resources allocated to projects o f economic co-operation has 
increased from 80.000 euro in 2003 to 130.000 in 2005. This represents around 7,5% of the 
annual total regional expenditure in international co-operation programs.
560 Raffaella Colletti 2003: ‘Partenariati territoriali per lo sviluppo economico locale: Vesperienza delle 
regioni italianef Paper presented at thè Conferenza Intemazionale Semestre della Presidenza Italiana 
dell 'VE: Il Partenariato Interreg-ionale Nella Polìtica di Prossimità: Il Mediterraneo ed i Balcani. Ancona, 
17-18 Ottobre 2003 pp. 12-13. http://www.cespi.tt/Ancona/Paper4.PDF
561 Regione Toscana, Dipartimento di Sviluppo Economico 2002: * Programma delle attività di promozione 
economica per le risorse dell’agricoltora, dell ‘artigianato, della PM I industriale, e del turismo anno 2003’ 
p. 24.
562 See Regione Toscana, Direzione Generale dello Sviluppo Economico 2003: *Programma delle attività di 
promozione economica per le risorse dell 'agricoltore, dell ’artigianato, della PMI industriale, e del turismo 
anno 2004* p. 20.
338
Figure 35: Resources allocated for economic co­
operation programs 2003-2005
years
Once again, limits on the amount o f information available regarding these initiatives does 
not permit us to evaluate the real impact of these programs on the overall definition of 
Tuscany’s decentralized aid.
As result of the economic crisis affecting the region, both ‘the internationalisation o f the 
economy’ and ‘enhancing the competitiveness o f  the regional productive sector’ are 
increasingly becoming mantras in the economic discussions o f regional politicians and the 
media.
In Martini’s political program for the 2005-2010 term, the problem of internationalising the 
economy is situated first among the three major pillars o f the political priorities for the next 
term.
The program recognizes that an efficient international promotion of the competitiveness of 
the productive sector bypasses the engagement o f regional institutions in both promotion 
and lobbying activities in different international fora: ‘Di fronte alle sfide della 
globalizzazione ed alVimpatto dei prodotti asiatici sui nostri mercati [...] ci vuole ben 
altro. La sfida oggi si gioca sulla qualità e sulla sostenibilità sociale ed ambientale non 
certo su ll’ipotesi d i tirare su barriere doganali. In concreto ciò significa: a) difendere con 
forza ed intelligenza le nostre produzioni sui mercati mondiali, prima di tutto attraverso un 
impegno che chiederemo alle istituzioni dell’Unione europea per una piattaforma che 
interessi tutti i distretti toscani e per promuovere una politica più rigorosa sul piano delle
regole commerciali e della responsabilità sociale, da condividere tra tutti i Paesi 
partecipanti alVOrganizzazione mondiale del commercio. In questa prospettiva ci faremo 
protagonisti di specifiche iniziative nella sede europea di Bruxelles, insieme al Governo 
italiano e agli imprenditori t o s c a n i b )  sostenere con impegno e perseveranza la 
proiezione intemazionale delle imprese toscane nel mondo e, ad un tempo, l 'aumento del 
flusso  di investimenti nel territorio della nostra regione.y$63.
Thus, the region foresees concentrating important resources in the promotion and the 
internationalisation of the Tuscan economy. Yet, it is not clear how internationalisation o f  
the economy will affect the implementation of decentralized aid for development policies in 
Tuscany. The regional government is concerned with the need to enhance the instruments at 
hand for accessing new markets. Whether this would imply a broader engagement of the 
productive sector in decentralized co-operation activities, and if so, how will it affect the 
structure o f Tuscany’s decentralized aid programs cannot be predicted yet.
B eyond the  lim its o f concerta tion?  Decentralized, the political p rogram  o f the  
reg ional governm ent a n d  the conflic ting nature o f  Tuscany's developm ent m odel as  
an  a s s e t
Tuscany’s development model has been defined as an asset for regional policies o f 
decentralized aid. First, it is the source of a broader normative legitimacy for the policy 
since it is supposed to bring the broad normative consensus supporting Tuscany’s economic 
development model into the realm o f decentralized aid. Second, through the rhetoric o f 
exporting the model of economic development, the region has linked the development o f 
decentralized aid policies to the dialogue between institutions and the social movements 
contesting the nature and effects o f globalisation. Third, exporting Tuscany’s development 
model through decentralized aid has been connected to the practices o f internationalization 
of the regional productive sector.
The attempt to link decentralized aid for development policies with the development of an 
overarching strategy of promoting local development in the context o f globalisation seems 563
563 See Regione Toscana: ‘Toscana 2010:programma di govem oper la VU1 legislatura' pp. 17-18.
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to be an interesting way o f bridging the existing gap between a number o f elements in the 
region’s political agenda. Yet, it is not clear whether, in a context o f broader policy 
institutionalization the region would be able to manage the complex agenda sketched 
above.
An informant from the regional administration has suggested that the saliency gained by 
Martini in the overall Italian political context as a result of his approach to social 
movements could pose some problems, particularly when it comes to the implementation of 
a political agenda which increasingly includes major global overtones: *[...] il Forum che 
tutti g li anni si svolge a S. Rossore. Vi è un intento, una voglia di impostazione di misurarsi 
come governo regionale con i grande mutamenti che stanno accadendo nella nostra era, 
sono mutamenti di carattere economico, sociale, ambientale, e di fa r s i dunque che l ’azione 
di governo si traduca in un ' azione efficace e concreta in questa direzione*564.
As we said before, after the disaster o f the demonstration against the G8 summitt held in 
Genova in 2001, the success of the European Social Forum of Florence in November 2002 
showed that movements could be integrated in the political scenario in a different manner, 
putting Martini at the political centre of a broader debate between the center-left and 
Berlusconi. Political visibility forced the regional government to undertake a political
I
agenda, which implied, not only the integration of social movements in the political I
scenario of the region but also acting on global problems such as the protection of I
environment or the respect o f human rights.
Decentralized aid schemes, combined with the adequate promotion of local development, >
might be an interesting but nevertheless limited instrument to address some of these issues, 
precisely because of the limited amount of financial autonomy enjoyed by Tuscany’s j
regional administration. As a result a  major problem of credibility arises, primarily vis-à-vis Ij
social movements, but it could also reach the level of local constituencies565. }¡1
I
It should be noted that the strategy undertaken by the regional administration, linking the !
Tuscan model o f economic development and the internationalization o f  the productive
_________________________  i
564 See interview with Andrea Barducci. Conducted by II aria Bugetti on the 4th April 2003
565 It is worth noting than in the last regional elections, part o f Martini’s electoral campaign emphasized the 
region’s links with social movements and the regional programs of international co-operation. See Claudio 
Martini 2005:‘I nostri prossimi cinque anni’ p. 10
http://presidente.regione-to$cana.it/inWdb file/10544 prossimiSanni.pdf
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sector to the debates on the perils o f globalisation and decentralized aid, has succeeded in a 
context of low policy institutionalization and scarcity of resources.
The evolution o f the relationship with the social movements is very much dependent on the 
figure of Martini as a regional president. What is more, as we have already seen, the 
scarcity of resources available pushed NGOs to diversify their sources, thus gaining 
autonomy vis-à-vis the regional administration, whereas it has pushed the region to 
integrative forms of policy implementation, where social actors play a relevant role.
Nevertheless, Tuscany’s decentralized aid for development policy relies on the 
participation o f  NGOs as a source o f legitimacy. What is more, the link between NGOs and 
decentralized aid has been stretched as to include also social movements and the debate on 
the perils o f globalisation. The link between the world o f NGOs working on development 
co-operation and realm of movements operationalised through the incorporation of the 
Tuscan economic development model, and the ideological consensus underpinning it, into 
the decentralized aid policy schemes.
At the same time, Tuscany’s decentralized aid schemes are increasingly perceived as a 
resource in the fight against the crisis o f the regional economy and the promotion of the 
internationalisation of the regional economic sector. Once more, the ideological 
underpinnings o f Tuscany’s economic development model facilitate the integration of the 
productive sector in decentralized aid for development strategies.
In the context o f further policy institutionalization, a plausible increment o f regional funds 
directed to decentralized aid, and an ever increasing incorporation o f an agenda of 
promoting regional economic interests into the decentralized aid system, it is very plausible 
that the equilibrium between these elements would be substantially altered, leading to 
major problems in integrating the different layers o f  Tuscany’s development model as an 
asset
111.3 Tuscany’s decentralized aid after 1999
Previous sections have shed light on the major changes brought about by the L.R. 17/99 
and the piano regionale 2001-2005. The breadth o f the changes introduced covers many
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different aspects. Firstly, the way o f  conceiving the role o f  the region in the realm of 
development assistance and in the general realm o f international relations has changed. A 
systemic image o f  the region has been put forward. The region is depicted as a territorial 
system in which a myriad o f institutional and non-institutional actors interact Interactions 
are regulated by the principles o f subsidiarity and partnership, thus conceding great 
relevance to sub-regional tiers o f government and civil society, whereas the region would 
act as a catalyst for energies present in the territory. This manner of conceiving the role of 
the region is linked in the documents analysed, as well as in the minds of many informants, 
to a specific understanding o f Tuscany as a territory.
Secondly, we have analysed the changes introduced at the level of the administrative 
structure in charge o f designing and implementing decentralized aid schemes in Tuscany. 
Since 1995 Tuscany’s regional administration had established an administrative structure, 
which main task was to develop Tuscany’s foreign projection, mainly oriented to the 
European Union.
The L.R. 17/99 has introduced a new system of fora in which actors in the territory, either 
institutional or not, can participate. The tavoli di coordinamento fulfil important evaluation 
and programming functions and are in charge o f establishing the priorities for each 
geographical area in which Tuscany develops decentralized aid projects. The tavoli di 
coordinamento are sought to integrate actors in the territory both in the decision making 
process and in the implementation phase. Yet, as informants from NGOs have pointed out, 
the internal logic of the tavoli di coordimento might turn them into a piece in the overall 
context o f political exchanges between local and regional political elites. The political 
weight of local elites, which preside over most of the tavoliy may relegate local NGOs to a 
secondary role in these decisional fora.
Thirdly, we have analysed the piano regionale 2001-2005. Through this document the 
regional administration, in collaboration with the tavoli d i coordinamento, establishes a 
categorization o f the activities covered by the decentralized aid program, as well as setting 
the policy’s main geographical and material priorities. The analysis o f geographical and 
material priorities helped us to uncover the extent to which the regional program of 
decentralized aid is dq)endent on the input of other actors, both institutional and not.
343
Tuscany’s decentralized aid after 1999 is heavily dependent on the input o f both European 
Union programs and NGOs, whereas the Italian State has lost both its control capacities and 
its ability to influence regional decisions. The interactions between different agents o f 
Tuscany’s decentralized aid are represented in the following figure.
Figure 36: Tuscany's decentralized aid after 1999
The figure above represents Tuscany’s decentralized aid as the result of the interactions of a 
number of actors. The image is subdivided in two major areas. The first one is determined 
by the dotted box and represents the territorial system constituted by all the actors operating 
within the Tuscan territory. The second one is composed of the two small boxes 
representing the EU and international organizations and the State administration, which are 
exogenous to the territorial system. The State administration is conceived as having a weak 
impact on the territorial system. As we have seen before, the collapse of Italian aid opened 
the way for regions and NGOs to develop their own programs, whereas the crisis of the
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Italian political system in the nineties altered the rules of territorial politics in Italy, leading 
to a political context of uncertainty. Finally, the double-headed arrow connecting the State 
to NGOs represents the interrelations between these two agents. In the nineties the crisis of 
the State’s international aid program pushed NGOs to look for alternative economic 
sources. As a result NGOs leamt to diversify their sources weakening their link with the 
State.
Conversely, the EU (and other international organizations such as UN) has had an 
important input in the definition o f decentralized aid policies in Tuscany: firstly, NGOs 
participate in European co-operation schemes; secondly, the EU is an important source of 
funds for regional decentralized aid initiatives. As we have tried to show through the 
analysis of aid allocation, the EU’s decentralized aid schemes has had an important impact 
on the region’s capacity to develop its own agenda as a region in the Mediterranean area. 
The region has found it somewhat difficult to encompass the Mediterranean agenda with 
the priorities o f European development policy derived from the necessities of eastward 
enlargement. Thirdly, the European Union remains an important normative point of 
reference in the definition o f Tuscany’s foreign aid. This point is illustrated in a number of 
documents in which the regional administration presents the idea of becoming a central 
actor in the process of constructing a Euro-Mediterranean partnership.
Within the territorial system, the regional administration has established a triangular 
relationship in which associations and local institutions participate. Local institutions and 
NGOs have a long standing tradition of co-operation in the international development 
realm, which is at the roots of the establishment of the first decentralized co-operation 
programs in Tuscany. This pattern o f  relations has been enriched, following reform in 1999, 
by a distinct set o f relations between NGOs, local governments and the regional 
administration. On the one hand, the region has been able to create strong ties with local 
institutions. Local authorities preside over most of the tavoli di coordinamento, and 
according to the regional plan they should catalyse the synergies in the territory becoming 
important subjects in the establishment o f partnership and co-operation schemes.
On the other hand, the interactions between NGOs and the regional administration seem to 
be more complex. As we have seen, NGOs have structured their own agenda of
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international co-operation regardless o f the preferences defined at the regional level. This 
agenda is not structured along a single co-ordinator of NGOs as it might be the case in the 
Basque country, but it mirrors a long tradition of co-operation activities with areas in Latin 
America and Africa, which are not by far part of Tuscany’s decentralized aid priority areas. 
Yet, as the analysis of the geographical distribution of funds has shown, NGOs managed to 
keep these areas high up on the agenda, despite the regional plan’s recognition o f  the scarce 
interests o f the regional administration in those areas.
Nevertheless, as an informant puts it, the increasing bureaucratisation o f the system might 
be changing this situation. The diminishing role o f NGOs in the tavoli di coordinamento 
could be a sign o f a major change in the orientation of decentralized aid in Tuscany. As we 
have noted before, Tuscany’s administration has been able to integrate local institutions in 
the decision-making system, relegating NGOs to a  secondary role.
Tuscany’s decentralized aid after reform in 1999 presents a complicated pattern o f  
interrelation among actors, which has not led yet to the constitution of a multilevel system 
of governance. Decentralized aid in Tuscany seems to be trapped between a highly 
developed political agenda o f internationalisation and a scarcity of material resources, 
which determines dependency on a number of actors and therefore forces the region to 
comply with normative agendas that were not part o f the initial design.
As we have seen in previous sections, Tuscany has embarked on a process of 
internationalisation, which involves three major dimensions. First, there is an important 
European dimension. Second, there is an economic dimension, related to the process of 
internationalising the productive sector in Tuscany. As discussed in previous sections, 
Tuscany’s economic development model is perceived as an asset for decentralized aid 
policies. Through decentralized aid, the region has tried to combine the needs of the 
productive sector derived from the increasing internationalisation of the economy with 
regional concerns regarding the major perils of globalisation and the role o f the Tuscan 
model o f economic development as an asset in the establishment o f decentralized co­
operation interventions. Finally, the region has wrapped up this agenda of 
internationalisation by constructing an overarching image o f  Tuscany as a polity, in which
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the elements previously mentioned interact with a specific perception of Tuscany’s political 
history.
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IV. Concluding remarks: decentralized aid in Tuscany 1990-2005 - a long political 
detour, but where do we go?
This chapter has tried to show the evolution of decentralized aid policies in Tuscany from 
1990 to the present day. As stated in earlier sections, the task is not easy because of the lack 
o f appropriate data and literature, not only concerning decentralized aid policies in 
Tuscany, but more generally on the international projection o f this and other Italian regions.
Nevertheless, the depiction presented here shows a clear evolution from the initial steps in 
which the region was constrained both from below and from above, to the present situation 
in which the region has been able to design its own agenda o f internationalisation.
The following sections try to summarize this long political detour focusing on three main 
aspects: first, the structure o f actors* interactions around the constitution of a decentralized 
aid system in Tuscany, second, the evolution o f  the political discourse underpinning 
decentralized aid schemes; and third, the interaction between political discourse and 
practice in the implementation of decentralized aid.
IV.1 The changing nature of the opportunity structure: the State, the EU, the regional 
government and the local NGOs
As we have seen throughout this chapter, the nature o f the actors involved in these 
interactions has changed. Two periods can be identified, the first being the period 1990- 
1998. In this period the region has had to face strict controls from the State, civil society 
and local institutions. As we have seen the region was unable to establish clear-cut 
priorities besides those it imported from the State, nor it was able to overcome the 
development agenda put forward by the NGOs.
The situation progressively changed by the end of this period, mostly due to major changes 
in the State’s position. The State experienced a major legitimacy crisis that also affected the 
international aid realm. As a result, bilateral aid programs almost disappeared, and the State 
felt the necessity to look differently at decentralized aid for development policies within the 
context o f a major process o f restructuring the international aid system. According to many 
commentators and international institutions, decentralized aid for development has since 
gained saliency in Italy’s aid plans.
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At the same time, the crisis of the Italian State placed the NGOs in a difficult position since 
one o f their main sources o f funds drastically dried up. NGOs felt the necessity to look for 
new partners On the one hand, these partners were found in international arenas, in 
organizations such as the EU and UN. On the other hand, NGOs started to consider the 
regional level more seriously.
Finally, the crisis of the Italian State left much more space for the regions to decide the fate 
of their decentralized aid programs, while it curtailed one o f the most important sources o f  
funding. The regional administration, which had gained a certain degree of fiscal autonomy 
in the last years, had to seek new partners to co-finance decentralized aid initiatives. As we 
have seen, in the case of Tuscany the EU and also the UN were extremely relevant for these 
purposes.
These trends crystallised in the second period (1999-2005). During this period the State 
would substantially lose its presence, becoming a residual actor, whereas the European 
Union begun to play an increasingly relevant role. The NGOs had lost some o f their 
supremacy in the agenda-setting process, but they retained control of input legitimacy. As a 
result, while the region was able to operate more autonomously than in the previous period, 
it still had to respond to pressures both from the European level and from civil society.
IV.2 A new way of seeing things: regional discourse and decentralized aid for 
development.
Since 1990, the regional administration has changed the way in which it has perceived 
decentralized aid for development policies. As we have seen, these changes ranged from a 
not clearly identifiable discourse in the early nineties to a fully-fledged set of propositions, 
principles, norms and ideas developed in the documents corresponding to the period 1999- 
2003.
The regional administration has built this discourse both upon a new conceptualisation of 
the role of territories in the globalised world and upon a new way of conceptualising co­
operation, which is understood fundamentally as a mutually beneficial activity. These new 
co-ordinates have led to a system o f norms rooted in the principles o f subsidiarity and 
partnership.
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The documents analysed use a number o f elements that help to establish a recognisable 
political profile. Firstly, they place the role o f local institutions and civil society 
organizations at the centre. This is done mainly through incorporating the regional 
discourse o f concepts such as subsidiarity, partnership and decentralization. These 
concepts, most o f them being related to the practices o f public administration, are bestowed 
with a strong normative load, which can be identified with a broader idea o f good 
government.
Secondly, the regional administration introduces a material conceptualisation o f 
international co-operation which goes beyond the idea of economic assistance. The model 
o f development put forward by the region tends to combine concerns with the exportation 
o f a successful production model based on small and medium sized enterprises with 
promotion of the institutional conditions for development.
Finally, the regional administration has been inclined to approach specific international 
institutions at the level of political discourse. As we have seen, the regional administration 
tends to incorporate goals and objectives from institutions such as the EU into its own 
international aid policy. A major concern is expressed concerning the role that the region 
might play in relations between the EU and neighbouring countries. The regional 
administration situates its aid efforts in a dual relation to the process of European 
integration. Tuscany’s decentralized aid policy would be the visitor’s card of Europe in 
these countries, helping to establish contacts between LDCs and European institutions, 
while the region would simultaneously operate to voice needs o f these countries in front of 
the European institutions.
IV.3 Una regione scatenatta o un personaggio a lia  ricerca d i autore? Discourse and 
political practice.
Despite the apparently successful profile put forward by the regional administration 
throughout the documentation analysed, a gap between the aims and the achievements can 
be perceived. Analysis of the implementation of geographical priorities or the day to day 
politics o f the tavoli di coordinamento shows that the regional administration has not been
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able to fully develop its political program. Thus, the range and the scope o f the changes 
introduced in 1999 remain in some respects a mystery.
Furthermore, the overall picture is one in which a large gap between the grand design of the 
regional plan and the spending decisions seems to exist. The regional administration is 
forced to find difficult political compromises in order to push its own political agenda o f 
internationalization. Thus, whereas the rhetoric o f the plan describes an ideal situation in 
which Tuscany’s foreign projection corresponds with clear priorities, the reality of its 
actual implementation shows how decisions tend to be incremental and the result o f 
complicated bargaining processes.
Tuscany’s administration is still constrained on two fronts. The first is its relation with co­
funding institutions such as the EU. Here the gap between the aims and the achievements 
shows how the intended dual relation with the EU has not been achieved. The regional 
administration has tried to incorporate the EU’s geographical guidelines. However, it has to 
comply with long standing traditions o f co-operation which do not necessarily regard these 
areas as a priority. These traditions o f co-operation in the territory constrain the capacity o f 
the region to embrace the EU’s co-operation policy priorities, and force the region to 
muddle through the preferences o f one of its main co-funding institutions and the civil 
society organizations with a long standing tradition of co-operation. The result is a complex 
pattern of funding assignments and distribution among different geographical areas.
Second, the region still has to rely on NGOs, not only as implementation partners, but as a 
source o f legitimacy for the policy. The analysis o f the tavoli di coordinamento shows how 
the region, despite its efforts to limit the role of NGOs in the decision making process, is 
still restricted by the idea of a participatory system, in which legitimacy greatly depends on 
the degree o f participation of civil society associations.
The conditions o f NGO participation in the decision making phase, if more limited than in 
1990, still permit NGOs to control certain key resources. As some informants have pointed 
out, NGOs still enjoy a position o f certain predominance, derived from their relative 
economic autonomy. Since the regional administration has not been able to mobilize the 
necessary amount o f resources to create a pattern o f dependency among institutions and
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actors in civil society, it is forced to constantly negotiate with NGOs in exchange for their 
support.
Thus, even if  the region has enlarged its maneuvering capacities, it has had to constantly 
compromise between the front lines determined by the funding institutions’ priorities and 
the necessary participation of NGOs. This exercise is not always easy, and normally results 
in a certain abandonment o f regional self-declared policy priorities. This undermines the 
region’s capacity to put forward an autonomous institutional profile in the policy area.
What is more, as we have seen before, the strategy undertaken by the regional 
administration, linking the Tuscan model of economic development and the 
internationalization of the productive sector to debates on globalisation and decentralized 
aid has succeeded, at the level o f political discourse, as a result o f the context of both low 
policy institutionalization and scarcity o f resources. In the context of further policy 
institutionalization, a plausible increment of regional funds for decentralized aid, and an 
ever increasing incorporation o f an agenda of promoting regional economic interests into 
the decentralized aid system, it is very plausible that the equilibrium between elements o f 
the regional agenda of economic development would be substantially altered.
The lack o f important empirical evidence (mostly data sets), which we have noted in 
previous pages has to be interpreted within the overall rift between discourse and practice 
along which the politics of decentralized aid seem to be structured. The description o f  the 
politics o f decentralized aid in Tuscany moves back and forth from discourse to evidence. I 
believe this is not only a major problem for this dissertation, but a reflection of the state o f 
affairs in Tuscany’s decentralized aid since the approval of the L.R. 17/1999.
Tuscany’s decentralized aid has experienced notorious changes in the last six years: a broad 
re-conceptualization of what decentralized aid means has been undertaken; an 
administrative structure has been created to deal with foreign aid; planning documents have 
been issued and priorities had been established. All these are novelties vis-à-vis the 
functioning of Tuscany’s foreign aid in the early nineties.
Nevertheless, this process has taken place in an overall context o f political reform by which 
the region is trying to build up a new political profile within the turmoil o f institutional 
reform in Italy. As I have discussed in earlier sections the process of institutional reform
sought to federalize Italy, yet, it is far from clear whether the appropriate steps have been 
undertaken to ensure the functioning o f a meso-tier of government in Italy. In the meantime 
regions operate in a context of political and institutional uncertainty that affect severely 
their capacity to implement their political programs. My contention here is that uncertainty 
reflects in the way decentralized aid is structured in Tuscany.
The result is that aspirational politics as represented in the words of many informants and 
the documents analyzed, clash with a political reality in which incremental decision-making 
marks the day to day functioning o f  the institutions dealing with decentralized aid and 
foreign projection of the region in a context o f uncertainty.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that despite the mediocre results of piano régionale, the 
system of decentralized aid in Tuscany after reforms in 1999 present a major difference vis- 
à-vis the original design o f Tuscany’s decentralized aid in 1990. Whereas, the position of 
the regional administration within the overall structure of foreign aid provision remains 
uncertain, it is clear that both the L.R 17/99 and the piano régionale respond to a similar 
logic which could not be found in earlier pieces of legislation. That is, the regional 
administration through the L.R. 17/99 has reinforced the link between the 
internationalization o f the region and the process o f region-building. This process is the 
result of a new way of conceiving the role of the region as a polity beyond the limits 
traditionally imposed by the politics o fpartitocrazia.
Tuscany’s decentralized aid is still a personaggio alia ricerca di autore. The situation is 
one in which the region is still looking for a set o f markers upon which to construct an 
identifiable profile. This attempt is confronted by the limits imposed by a lack o f  resources, 
which forces the region to bargain with different actors. Yet, the region has tried to convert 
the need for concertation in markers o f the policy, rather than interpreting it as a constraint. 
It is too early to judge whether the regional administration has succeeded or not in this 
effort. The increasing institutionalization of the regional tier in Italian politics, and future 
reforms which foresee the furthering o f  regional powers, might affect Tuscany’s capacity to 
develop its political program and the nature of decentralized aid programs.
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Ii PART IV: COMPARING DECENTRALIZED AID POLICIES IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY
[ AND TUSCANY. REASSESSING A REGION’S MOTIVATIONS TO ENGAGE IN
[ DECENTRALIZED AID POLICIES
I
j I. Introduction
In this part development aid policies in Tuscany and the Basque Country are reassessed in a 
comparative fashion. The main intention is to put together all the relevant elements to come 
up with a discrete set of explanatory factors that can account for the origins o f regional 
j engagement in decentralized aid policies. This part is structured as follows. Firstly, a brief
| summary o f the main features o f decentralized aid policies both in the Basque Country and
| in Tuscany is presented.J The second chapter tries to go a step further beyond the most evident differences between
I our cases. In this section I will try to show how, despite the major differences between
Tuscany and the Basque Country, the origins of decentralized aid in both regions respond 
| to a common set o f factors. Firstly, the capacity o f NGOs to translate rather abstract
I considerations on human development into an issue o f regional politics is an important
j element for both our cases. Secondly, the existence in both cases o f a  context o f
I institutional uncertainty created a window of opportunity that was seized by regional
j administrations in both Tuscany and the Basque Country. Thirdly, in both regions domestic
[ political agendas perceived the internationalization of the region as conditio sine qua non
j for furthering the scope of regional political autonomy. As a result both regions had
| incorporated the constitution o f a decentralized aid system into the broader process o f
| regional building by linking decentralized aid policies to the specific notion o f  the region as
I political space.
ii
i The third chapter presents a reassessment of the decentralized aid puzzle in light o f the
1 major outcomes o f the comparative analysis. As I will try to show in this section, the
i
i decentralized aid puzzle can be understood only by linking the constitution o f decentralized




II. A brief summary of the main findings presented so far
In Part II and Part III we have discussed the international co-operation policies o f two 
European regions i.e. Tuscany and the Basque Country. This section aims to provide a re­
assessment o f the most relevant features of these two cases as a means of settling the basis 
for further comparative analysis.
11.1 Decentralized aid as a policy outcome in the Basque Country and Tuscany: two 
different paths towards the establishment of International co-operation policies
The analysis o f the evolution of decentralized aid policies in Tuscany and the Basque 
Country illustrates the constitution of two different systems of international co-operation. 
The story of Basque decentralized aid is one of progressive centralization of decisional 
capacities in the hands of the regional administration, while implementation is entrusted to 
NGOs. The analysis o f the Tuscan case, meanwhile, shows how actors in the territory can 
be integrated in the decisional phase as well as in implementation.
As we have seen the distinct paths of evolution respond to the different games played by 
regional actors. In the case of the Basque County the region was faced almost exclusively 
with NGOs and local institutions, while in the case of Tuscany, the regional government 
had to deal, and still does, not only with the forces vives in the territory but also with a 
restrictive state framework and the preferences of supranational institutions. As a result the 
Basque government has had a greater margin of manoeuvre, while Tuscany, at a very early 
stage, had to muddle through the political demands of a number of agents and institutions.
These differences in patterns o f interaction, as well as in the number of actors involved in 
defining the policy, result in major differences in the way aid systems are managed. In this 
respect, it can be said that the Basque country has created a rather hierarchical system in 
which the Basque administration would control decisional capacities while the agents in 
charge o f the implementation phase had very little say in setting policy priorities. 
Nevertheless, this situation could be changing with the new governing coalition in office. 
For instance, it can be said that NGOs are having an input in the procedure to adopt a new 
regional law on international co-operation. Yet, since the political outcome is still
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uncertain, it is not clear whether NGOs or localities would enhance their capacities within 
the new system.
On the contrary, the situation in Tuscany is one in which concertation among interests 
rather than a  policy option is a  real need for the regional administration. Tuscany’s 
international co-operation system must be {per fo rm ) open to other actors’ participation at 
any individual stage o f the policy. As a consequence, the regional administration plays a  
co-ordinating rather than a directive role. As we have already seen in the chapter devoted to 
Tuscany, the institutionalization o f  concertation tables in  which both NGOs and local 
authorities participate would reflect the non-hierarchical character of Tuscany’s aid system.
11.2 Decentralized aid and political discourse: two different ways of explaining what 
the institutions are doing
Previous parts showed how both regions, the Basque Country and Tuscany, operated in a 
different manner when explaining the regional administration’s engagement in international 
aid policies.
As previously stated, the Basque Country concentrated its political discourse on 
relationships with emigrant communities and the continuity throughout history of the 
relations between different areas o f the world and the Basque Country and a re­
interpretation o f institutional responses to the political demands of NGOs in the late 
eighties, which are perceived as the pinnacle of democratic relations between institutions 
and civil society.
This triad o f elements creates a complex pattern o f argumentation in which a historicist 
argument is combined with a new understanding o f the divide between the domestic and the 
external realm o f politics. The connection between NGOs’ demand and external projection 
would account for this fact. Moreover, the fact that many documents refer to domestic 
reasons for international projection, such as the relationship with NGOs or the 
internationalization of the Basque economy, would reinforce the argument that the Basque 
administration perceived international projection through decentralized aid as a means of 
responding to the newly-coined necessities of the region.
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Tuscany proceeds from a completely different basis for establishing a case for international 
aid for development. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Tuscany’s discourse starts 
from a re-inteipretation of the notion o f  region itself. The regional administration asserts 
the value of territoriality, de-coupling the international activities o f the region from the 
traditional conception of inter-governmental relations. Thus, the idea would be that 
partnership and co-operation might be  the expression of inter-territorial relations which 
emerge spontaneously out of a globalised world. The role of the regional administration is 
one of coordinating territorial initiatives rather than issuing policy directives.
This broader conception of inter-territorial relations, which is operationalised through the 
ideas o f partnership and co-operation, is put in the context o f  the geopolitical role that 
Tuscany aims at playing in a globalised world. According to what we have seen in the 
documents analyzed, Tuscany aims at playing an intermediation role between the EU and 
the countries in a number o f geographical areas. In this respect, Tuscany represents a 
history o f success in the constitution o f a social model of economic development, in line 
with the best tradition of European values of democracy, social integration and 
participation. At the same time, due to its specific location in the Mediterranean, Tuscany 
can play the role o f the portaparola o f the countries in the south bank of the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East vis-à-vis the EU.
Tuscany’s administration discourse aims to entangle different political dimensions. Firstly, 
a case is made on the relevance of inter-territorial relations within a global political space 
that tends to be more and more fluctuating and fluid. Secondly, the region confirms a 
vocation towards Europe and the process o f supranational integration as a major political 
claim, reinterpreting this process in the Mediterranean geo-political context in which the 
region seeks to play a central role.
11.3 Summary of findings
Up to this point we have discussed the different paths undertaken by Tuscany and the 
Basque Country when defining decentralized co-operation schemes. The differences 
mentioned above are summarized in the following table.
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Table 13: Decentralized aid in the Basque C ountry and Tuscany compared
M ode o f  governance Discursive markers
The Basque Country Hierarchical system.
Internationalization of the region 
Relationship between institutions and 
social movements
Continuity of historical relations with 
other areas of the world specially Latin 
America
Tuscany Horizontal integration and co-
Region as a territory in the scenario of 
globalization
ordination Institutions as co-ordinator of
grassroots initiatives j 
Tuscany’s role in the Mediterranean
The following chapter reassesses these two different paths in a comparative fashion to 
come up with a set of the distinct elements that configure a  shared logic of action for both 
cases. As discussed later, both cases share three major elements. Firstly, NGOs have 
mobilized at the local level translating the agenda of international development into a 
territorial key, thus triggering the regional administration’s interest in these issues. 
Secondly, this process takes place in a context o f  uncertainty and reform, especially 
regarding the nature of centre-periphery relations in the cases analyzed. Thirdly, both cases 
show how the constitution o f decentralized aid policies is intimately related to the broader 
project o f region-building.
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III. On the conditions for regional engagement in decentralized aid for development 
policies
In the former section we have summarised the main conclusions o f the two case studies, 
focusing mainly on the differences between them. This section aims to explain what the 
two processes discussed above have in common. That is, the main scope of this section is to 
argue that despite the differences observed, both regions responded to a similar political 
rationale.
In a nutshell, it can be said that both regions attached extraordinary symbolic value to 
decentralized aid for development policies to change an eminently assistentialist policy into 
a marker for the regional political profile. This symbolic dimension corresponded with 
specific dimensions o f the region-building projects in every single case. Thus, region’s 
engagement in decentralized aid for development policies is the result o f the extension o f 
the region-building process to include the creation of a specific international profile.
Yet, this process is not by any means evident or automatic. It is the result o f complex 
processes of interaction of different elements. This section aims at identifying the 
conditions for this process to occur and how can we explain the region’s international 
profile as an aid donor as a consequence o f  the form of the domestic political agenda.
111.1 Decentralized aid and social demand
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the existence of a more or less explicit demand 
on the part of regional constituencies on issues related to international co-operation seems 
to be an important factor.
Empirical evidence shows how, in both cases, there is a new perception of the problems of 
underdevelopment. The way in which this was expressed takes very different shapes. Social 
demand articulated mostly by NGOs managed in both cases to change constituencies’ 
perception o f underdevelopment. The specific strategies used in each single territory are 
less important than the fact that organisations, both in Tuscany and the Basque country, 
managed to put forward a political agenda in which the problem of underdevelopment was 
a central issue for regional politics.
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The capacity o f  NGOs to change the perception o f underdevelopment is the result of a 
number of elements related to their capacity to articulate a political discourse in which the 
sense o f reciprocity plays a major role.
This is very important for both the cases we have looked at. For example, in Tuscany, 
NGOs created a change in the perception of underdevelopment by linking it to immigration. 
In this way NGOs could easily approach local tiers of government preoccupied with the 
integration o f immigrants in local communities and encourage them to develop a proactive 
profile vis-à-vis the causes o f immigration from underdeveloped areas566.
The very success o f  NGOs in introducing the development agenda at the regional level 
therefore relies on the fact that they managed to translate the debate on the causes o f 
underdevelopment to the specific territorial contexts in which they were operating. Through 
different strategies, civil society organisations managed to introduce the debate on 
underdevelopment in a territorial stance that has traditionally remained outside the realm of 
international aid for development
From the late seventies onwards, private organizations such as NGOs began to have a say 
in international fora. The integration o f NGOs in international politics led to major changes 
in the form and content of the international debate on underdevelopment. Y et the strategy 
of the NGOs has been one o f gaining access to the institutional levels where this debate 
take place while keeping strong roots in civil society. This double-edged strategy allowed 
them to link rather abstract considerations to the daily life o f many citizens. In the cases we 
are looking at, NGOs in both Tuscany and the Basque Country managed to operate this link 
on a territorial basis. They link the debate on underdevelopment to particular cognitive 
frames operating in a specific territorial context. This process o f  territorializing discourse is 
relevant since it would be key in allowing regional political institutions to further bring 
decentralized aid into the political agenda.
In the Basque Country, NGOs played an important role in the constitution of an 
international aid system. NGOs managed to build up a moral case very much rooted in two 
major political traditions: firstly, internationalist Christian solidarity inspired by the work
566 See: pp . 259 -260
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o f Basque missionaries and religious associations operating in the Basque Country since 
the sixties, and secondly, left-wing internationalist movements567.
NGOs managed to establish a complex political discourse. This discourse began by 
asserting that one o f the major questions surrounding the problem o f underdevelopment is 
the very invisibility o f underdeveloped areas. NGOs aimed to resolve this problem through 
changing development issues into a societal question rather than an institutional one568.
According to the NGOs, national and supranational institutions in the north, in dealing with 
the problem o f underdevelopment, had attended only to their own interests, thus 
perpetuating the uneven distribution o f  economic resources among the peoples o f the 
world. That is the reason why a major change was needed. As we have already seen, this 
major change took the form a broad moral compromise that would bind both society and 
institutions at any single tier o f government569.
NGOs made a rather instrumental use o f a rhetoric of decentralising international co­
operation. Yet Basque NGOs, through campaigning in 1985 and 1989, managed to turn 
international co-operation into an important issue of the regional political agenda. As stated 
in previous chapters, the nature of the moral compromise sought by NGOs and, moreover, 
the modes of mobilization were determinant in the process o f raising the consciousness o f 
Basque society570.
Firstly, the strong presence of religious and lay organizations ensured that the transmission 
o f the political discourse would reach all levels of Basque society. NGOs managed, mostly 
through personal contacts, to attract the attention of regional politicians571. At the same 
time, they tried to mobilize society through different means, such as parish activities, 
signature campaigns, seminars and demonstrations.
Secondly, NGOs managed to consolidate a unique political discourse. Already by 1989 
they settled the Co-ordinator o f NGOs, which from then on has acted as the voice of NGOs 
vis-à-vis regional institutions. The constitution of the Co-ordinator o f NGOs represents an
567 See: pp . 143-148
568 See: pp. 148-150
569 See: pp. 155-158
570 Idem,
s7‘ See: F .N . 292 p. 158.
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important step forward since it helped to consolidate a syncretic position in which different 
sensitivities could find a place.
The process o f  territorialization o f the question o f underdevelopment in the Basque Country 
took place thanks to the active campaigning of locally based NGOs. Most o f  the issues 
addressed by NGO discourse were simply translated from the international debate on 
underdevelopment. Yet, the extraordinary capacity o f NGOs to mobilize resources at the 
level o f civil society turned international development aid into a pressing issue on the 
Basque political agenda.
The analysis o f  social mobilization in Tuscany shows how NGOs took a different strategy 
in the process o f consolidating social demand at the territorial level. As we have already 
seen, NGOs co-operated with local governments in specific programs directed at 
facilitating the integration o f immigrant communities present in the territory572.
These activities soon stretched far beyond the regional borders. NGOs managed to 
convince local authorities that an integral policy towards immigration had to include a pro­
active profile on the causes o f emigration. NGOs thus linked both underdevelopment and 
emigration to build a case for the participation o f localities in international co-operation 
schemes.
At the same time, a long standing tradition of NGO activity already existed in the territory. 
NGOs in Tuscany were used to co-operating with different institutional tiers, such as the 
State or supranational institutions. Therefore, when it was the time to convince sub-state 
tiers of government, NGOs enjoyed a predominant position573.
This position o f  predominance has been recognized by the regional authorities in the early 
phases of the process o f constituting a system of international co-operation at the regional 
level. As we have already seen, NGOs enjoyed great capacities in the decision making 
process as well as being the most important actors in the implementation phase. What is 
more, pre-existing co-operation schemes affected the nature o f NGOs* mobilization. Co­
operation at the local level had situated organizations much closer to institutions than
572 See: pp . 259-260
573 See: pp . 260-262
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Basque associations were at the beginning of the negotiation574. Thus, NGOs in Tuscany 
did not need to have recourse to social mobilization since they enjoyed easy access to 
institutional tiers.
Therefore, the case o f Tuscany shows how NGOs paid attention to the needs o f targeted 
institutions when establishing a case for international co-operation. The capacity o f NGOs 
to link the problems of immigrant integration with the issue of underdevelopment is a 
striking demonstration of the ability o f NGOs to touch the sensitive keys o f sub-state 
institutions.
Territorialization o f social demand operates mostly at the institutional level. NGOs 
managed to build a case for international aid that benefited from local institutions’ anxieties 
rather than imposing a moral vision on international development Yet, the effects on 
institutions are rather similar since, as we have seen, it allowed regional institutions to gain 
a political arena to further develop their political program.
Demand structuring is an important factor determining regional engagement in foreign aid 
policies. As we have seen, a process of territorialization o f NGOs’ demands can be 
observed in both cases analysed. Without these processes neither the Basque Country nor 
the Tuscan administration would have ever engaged in international aid policies in the late- 





Figure 37: Demand structuring
The process o f  demand structuring is the result o f the interaction of NGOs with different 
institutional tiers: firstly, the State administration; secondly, the European Union and other 
supranational organizations such as the U.N. Therefore, the representation of the process o f 
demand structuring places NGOs at the centre of a triangular relation in which the national 
administration and supranational organizations are involved. This triangular relation 
constitutes a multilayered political arena where the case for decentralized aid is built-up. 
This arena is represented by the dotted box surrounding the triangle formed by the boxes 
NGOs, State administration and EU and supranational organizations.
Yet, NGOs also operate on a territorial basis. This is represented by a second dotted box 
including regional administrations, local administrations and NGOs. As we have seen in 
both our cases, NGOs are rooted in the territory and develop an important part of their 
activities at the local and regional level. In the case of decentralized aid for development, 
NGOs are able to structure demands vis-à-vis regional institutions precisely because they 
are able to translate the process of demand structuring into territorial terms.
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The process o f demand structuring, as it emerges from the cases analyzed, is one of 
multilayered bargaining in which NGOs play a dominant role. Learning from the 
experience o f dealing with national administrations and supranational agencies, NGOs are 
able to make a territorial case for decentralized aid which targets institutions in a particular 
territory. NGOs catalyze the normative debates on the practice o f international co­
operation, which take place at the international level, introducing them in the realm of 
territorial politics. Thus, NGOs operate as a nodal institution between the realm of 
territorial politics, where mobilization takes place, and a multilayered political arena, which 
includes national and supranational institutions, where both the morals and the practice of 
international co-operation are constructed.
Finally, it should be noted that mobilization at the territorial level is a function o f diverse 
functional needs and a feature o f NGOs as organizations. As we have seen, in some cases, 
such as the case of Italian NGOs, there is a problem o f diversification of the sources of 
funding. In a context of crisis and change of the international development realm at the 
national level, many NGOs have opted for targeting diverse institutions and organizations. 
As a result NGOs co-operate both with supranational organizations and sub-state tiers of 
government in different development co-operation schemes .
In other cases, NGOs target sub-state tiers of government as a part of an overall strategy of 
political bargaining with the national administration. As shown in the Basque case, NGOs 
reacted to the negative results o f  previous bargaining processes at the national level by 
targeting different institutional tiers. In their own words, the involvement o f a  regional 
administration in international co-operation policies could be an example for other 
institutional tiers576.
Finally, there is an important normative dimension to NGO mobilization. As we have seen 
in both cases, NGOs operating at the regional level engaged in a process o f territorialization 
of the agenda of international development. NGOs established a discourse in which 
international development was somehow linked to the politics of the territory.
575 See: pp. 275-281
576 See: pp. 155-158
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III.2 A context of uncertainty: centre-periphery relations, the limits of political 
autonomy and the constitution of decentralized aid policies
In both cases, decentralized aid for development policies begun in a specific institutional 
context, that is in the framework o f a broader process o f decentralization o f political power. 
The argument could be summed up as follows: the structure o f centre-periphery relations, 
both in the realm of overseas aid and regarding the vertical distribution o f power and the 
limits o f regional autonomy, might favour a region’s capacity to design innovative 
instruments for the extension o f  political autonomy.
In the Basque case the impact of the process o f  construction of the Estado de las 
Autonomías is evident. As previously stated, the eighties and the nineties witnessed the first 
attempt at consolidating a quasi-federal system o f  distribution o f political power. This 
process has conceded increasing visibility to sub-state tiers o f  government, which engaged 
in a process o f  enlarging the scope o f regional political autonomy. This process has been 
particularly relevant in the Basque Country, which obtained the highest level o f  political 
autonomy since the early phases o f constitution of the Estado Autonómico .
Nevertheless, the relationship between central administration and sub-state units (especially 
those with the highest level o f political autonomy) has not been easy. The articulation of 
sub-state units in the framework of Spanish politics has been a difficult process. Sub-state 
units tried to expand the range o f their functions and capacities, whereas the State tried to 
impose limits upon regional political autonomy. The unclear limits established in the 
Spanish constitution, together with the lack of articulation o f institutional devices for 
regional representation at the centre, has favoured dynamics of individual confrontation 
between the central administration and the Comunidades Autónomas in which the 
Constitutional Court has been called to arbitrate in the situation.
In this political context of uncertainty, we have discussed how the regional government 
decided to expand the international dimension of its increasing political autonomy. At a 
certain point the domestic construction o f  the polity required an external projection o f this 
process o f  regional construction. Decentralized aid became an interesting instrument to 
pursue a policy o f  foreign projection, without questioning the limits of the State’s exclusive 57
577 See: pp . 163-166
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capacities in the realm of foreign policy, in a political context in which the very notion of 
foreign policy was under discussion.
The case of Tuscany shows a somewhat similar process. As pointed out before, a broad 
process of political decentralization has taken place in Italy since the mid-nineties. The 
process found its origins in a major questioning o f  the form of the Italian republic, which 
collapsed after the corruption scandals at the beginning of the nineties578 579.
Reforms in the late nineties provided ordinary statute regions with greater capacities and 
political and fiscal autonomy. The direct election of the regional president and the 
increasing capacities o f regional tiers o f government resulted in a major visibility o f the 
regions as an institutional tier, forcing regional politicians to rethink the role of regional 
institutions and the very nature o f the region as a political arena.
Similar to the Spanish case, the process of decentralization led to a questioning of the limits 
o f regional political autonomy vis-à-vis the central administration, and more specifically, 
the limits o f the State's exclusive capacities to act in the international sphere. As we have 
seen before, the d.P.R o f 31st o f March 1994 offered a new legal framework for the 
development o f the region’s foreign activities. The decree is the result o f a progressive 
change in the way in which the Italian territorial model had been working since the eighties 
onward, evolving from a ‘separate spheres of power’ model to the so called ‘marbled cake 
model’, by which the spheres o f activity o f different tiers of government were 
systematically entrenched, rather than separated. Two major changes were introduced: 
firstly, the so-called ‘procedural benevolence’, by which the controls established in 
previous legislation were substantially reduced; secondly, the establishment o f areas for 
‘regions’ self-responsibility’, which opened up greater space for inter-institutional co- 
operation in the foreign policy realm .
Nevertheless, as we have said in Part I, the interactions between regions and the State are 
not only reduced to the vertical distribution o f political power. As we have seen in earlier 
parts of this dissertation, the national system o f international aid established important
578 See: pp. 266-275
579 See: p .2 7 0
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contextual elements that might facilitate regions’ engagement in decentralized aid 
policies580 581.
In the two cases analyzed, regions’ engagement in decentralized aid for development 
policies took place in the midst o f an overall process o f  redefining the international aid 
system. In the case o f the Basque Country, the national system of decentralized aid was at 
the earliest phases of its constitution. After the transition to democracy, the Spanish 
government had, mainly since 1982, found itself in the midst o f a total reconstruction of the 
system of foreign relations. The process was conducted along three major lines: firstly, 
accession to the European Communities; secondly, Spanish status in NATO; and thirdly, 
the enhancement o f relations with third countries in America and the Mediterranean. In this 
context, the normalization o f Spanish foreign aid policy became a priority. Yet, the Spanish 
foreign aid system was constructed very much in line with a state-centred view o f 
international relations, thus not permitting the participation o f sub-state units or even civil 
society organizations .
Questioning the way the system was managed lay at the roots of NGOs’ mobilizations in 
the eighties which sought, in the constitution of decentralized aid schemes, an example of 
the way in which the interactions between institutions and organizations could lead to a 
fairer system o f  international co-operation582. Decentralized aid policies in the Basque 
Country have been marked since then by an autonomous development regarding the 
evolution of the State’s foreign aid policy, which has neither had any kind of impact on the 
development o f  Basque decentralized aid policies, nor has the integration o f the Basque aid 
system in the overall structure o f Spanish foreign aid been foreseen.
Tuscany’s engagement in decentralized aid for development took place in the context of a 
crisis o f the Italian international aid system, which facilitated regions’ engagement in 
decentralized co-operation schemes583. Yet, the conditions in which Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid operates in the context o f Italy’s foreign aid are slightly different.
580 See: pp. 108-110
581 See: pp. 143-148
582 See: pp . 157-158
583 See: pp . 275-281
372
As we have seen, prior to the nineties there was a general increase in the amount o f funds 
available to aid programs, which since the 1990’s have decreased rapidly. Cuts in the 
amount o f funds destined to aid programs were the result o f a fiscal crisis o f the Italian 
State and important corruption scandals that affected the public image of Italian aid584 *.
The lack of funds at the national level caused NGOs to diversify their resources. NGOs 
tried to involve sub-state tiers o f government in co-operation issues, whereas they try to 
benefit from the structure of international co-operation programs established by 
international organizations or the European Union .
The rapid growth of decentralized aid programs in Italy, together with the crisis of 
legitimacy undergone by Italian aid programs, forced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
develop a more inclusive strategy. On the one hand, Italian aid has concentrated in the last 
years in participating in multilateral aid schemes, rather than on the provision of bilateral 
aid. On the other hand, the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, in a  recent document, has perceived 
decentralized aid schemes as a specific marker o f  Italian foreign assistance, thus trying to 
integrate decentralized aid within the framework o f  Italian aid policy586.
In Part I, we presented the figure below to discuss the impact o f centre-periphery relations. 
The figure tried to explain the State’s capacity to control key resources that might affect the 
constitution o f decentralized aid systems. These resources were the access of regions to the 
international sphere and the possibility of participating in international co-operation 
activities. The interaction o f these two forms o f access determined four regions o f centre- 
periphery relations and therefore four different roles for the State. Yet empirical evidence 
presented in previous parts shows how the role o f the State and the structure o f centre- 








Figure 38: S tate’s resources and strategies
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As illustrated the figure above, both Italy and Spain had evolved from a position in which 
both states acted as a gate-keeper towards more flexible positions. In the Italian case 
(represented by  a dotted line arrow), soft- policy coordination schemes take place, whereas 
in the Spanish case (represented by a normal arrow), the State has remained passive vis-à- 
vis the development of decentralized aid systems. Furthermore, the figure above determines 
three major regions in which decentralized aid for development schemes might take place, 
whereas the north-east comer would be the only space where decentralized aid for 
development schemes cannot take place.
It has to be noted that the evolution o f  both our cases towards the southern regions of the 
graphic determined changes in the rules of the game that altered the context in which 
political bargaining took place, creating a context o f political uncertainty. This favored the 
capacity o f regions to develop innovative policy instruments such as decentralized aid 
schemes. Yet, it is important to note that this process is by no means automatic.
Further interpretation o f the pay-offs o f  engaging in decentralized aid, in a context in which 
the limits o f political autonomy are uncertain, is needed. Both regions we examine 
structured decentralized aid within the broader framework o f  processes o f region-building
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and the necessities derived from the changing nature of regional political autonomy. The 
next section explores these issues.
111.3 The politics of decentralized aid and region-building
The process of defining decentralized aid schemes can be defined as one of transposition or 
cross-fertilization among political realms. Ideally, regions’ engagement in decentralized aid 
for development should be governed by considerations about the uneven distribution of 
resources and the role of sub-state units in the fight against poverty. Yet, as we have seen in 
both cases, regions’ engagement in decentralized aid has gone far beyond the limits o f the 
incorporation o f the international debate on underdevelopment into the regional political 
sphere.
The figure below represents the process of supply structuring. Two major spheres can be 
distinguished. The first sphere includes actors, such as the State administration and the 
European Union and other supranational organizations. In the figure above these actors 
have an impact upon the regional domestic framework where the policy takes place. As we 
have said in previous sections, the State controls specific policy resources that might affect 
the constitution of decentralized aid programs, such as the vertical distribution o f  power 
and the structure of its international co-operation programs. The European Union and other 
international organizations put forward international development initiatives where regions 
might or might not participate. Finally, as we have seen during the analysis of the impact of 
NGO mobilization and the process of demand structuring, national and supra-national 
institutions have a direct impact on the strategies o f NGOs.
The second sphere is constituted by the domestic political sphere. Decentralized aid, in both 
the cases analyzed, seems to be very much the result of the interaction o f a set o f domestic 
logics. As we have seen, in both cases decentralized aid for development schemes is 
determined by the interactions o f the constellation of actors operating at the territorial level. 
As well as regional institutions, this includes local institutions and NGOs operating in the 
territory. 375
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Figure 39: Supply structuring
J
I
Decentralized aid seems to be very much confined within the logic of inter-institutional 
relations. NGOs’ mobilization targeted not only regional institutions, but also sub-regional 
tiers of government. The process of supply structure, in both the cases analyzed, reflected 
the nature o f inter-institutional relations within the limits o f the region. In Tuscany the 
agenda o f institution-building shaped both the structure and the modalities of the region’s 
engagement in foreign aid policies
Furthermore, the constitution o f decentralized aid programs in both cases seems to be very 
much defined by the relationship between social movements (particularly NGOs) and the 
regional administration. The accommodation of NGOs’ demands, and the integration of 376
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NGOs in the decision-making process and the policy implementation phase, was a major 
issue determining the structure of a  region’s decentralized aid programs in Tuscany and the 
Basque Countiy.
Therefore, the agenda of the process o f constitution of decentralized aid policies is very 
much structured along issues which are heavily related to the agenda of region-building. 
The Basque Country and Tuscany have been able to structure the constitution of 
decentralized aid for development policies along a broader process of construction o f the 
region as a political space.
Firstly, both regions have put forward a specific understanding of the region as an 
international actor linking the construction of a  space for regional autonomy to its 
projection abroad. Yet, the connection between foreign projection and region-building 
operates at a deeper level than that o f the mere international projection of the region. 
Foreign policy, in our case decentralized aid for development policies, seems to be an 
important marker in the broader process o f constructing the region as a political space.
Secondly, both regions have constructed decentralized aid policies along a specific 
understanding o f the region as a polity, which is first determined by a specific 
understanding o f the structure o f inter-institutional relations; and second, by a 
characterization o f the relations between institutions and the civil society.
Following sections will explore the link between the politics of the construction o f the 
region as a political space and the politics of decentralized aid for development. This 
process can be summarized in the following figure:
Figure 40: Decentralized aid and the politics of region-building
III.3.1 Decentralized aid and the region as an international political actor
In both cases, regional engagement on decentralized aid policies has coincided with an 
overall process of restructuring the role o f NGOs in the international arena. Firstly, changes 
brought by globalisation and European integration have led to a process o f  functional 
internationalisation of the regions. Yet, parallel to that process, regions had developed a 
proper foreign policy profile. The development o f a foreign policy profile at the regional 
level is very much dependant on the changing nature o f  regional political autonomy. In 
both our cases, the regional administration had understood since the early nineties that the 
preservation o f  regional autonomy implies not only a pro-active political strategy within the 
limits o f the nation-state, but also the development o f an active role at both the European 
and the international level. Both cases show how the development o f decentralized aid 
policy schemes is heavily dependent on the development o f a foreign policy agenda.
In the case of the Basque Country, the changing nature of the agenda of internationalisation 
of the region has had a tremendous impact on the configuration o f decentralized aid 
policies. For many years the foreign project o f the Basque administration has been 
structured by relations with Latin America and the history o f exchanges between the region 
and this area o f the world.
In the eighties, the Latin American connection represented a meeting point among a 
number o f sensitivities which were extremely relevant in defining decentralized aid 
schemes. Relations with the Basque Diaspora in Latin America were a high priority in the 
political agenda o f  the newly-coined regional institutions. Basque Diaspora recalled in the 
mindset o f Basque nationalism a history of the lost freedoms and exile in which Francoist 
repression o f the symbols and institutions of the Basque nation was but the last stage of a 
long process o f repressing the liberties and the cultural features of the Basque people587.
For the first nationalist governments in the Basque Country it was extremely important to 
link both the institutional and the communitarian dimensions of the Diaspora. Thus, the 
process o f constructing the Basque polity had to include not only those living within the 
boundaries o f the Basque Country, but also those who had been historically compelled to 
abandon the country.
587 See: p p . 180-190
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However, later governments, as a result o f changes in the structure of governing coalitions, 
watered down the sacred nature o f  the Diaspora as the repository of the history and the 
legitimacy o f  Basque institutions. In the period 1988-1989, references to the Diaspora in 
legal documents highlight the exchanges between the Basque country and the territories 
with which the Basque Country has developed links throughout history588 589.
Latin America was the locus for the development o f a broad set of activities on the part of 
Basque NGOs and other associations in civil society. The social dimension of the Latin 
American connection traces its roots to a long tradition of Basque missionaries’ activities as 
well as through the recent links established by Basque civil society organizations with 
specific underdeveloped areas. Firstly, religious orders and associations had maintained 
traditionally strong ties with specific areas in Latin America, where they developed their 
missionary activities. Secondly, the seventies had witnessed a surge of left-wing 
movements concerned with the political situation in Latin America. Revolutions in the 
sixties and seventies triggered a great deal of support and mobilization in the Basque 
Country, since political activists from the left movements perceived the Latin American 
experience as an example o f  the plausibility of the political program of the radical left .
As a result, Basque decentralized aid, which in this phase was heavily controlled by NGOs, 
concentrated most its activities in this area.
From 1990 onwards, the Basque administration began to develop an intense agenda of 
foreign projection590. The internationalisation of the region included three main dimensions. 
First and foremost, the Basque government emphasised the process of internationalisation 
of the Basque economy. This included promoting foreign investment in the region, but also 
promoting Basque enterprises abroad. The regional government developed a strategic plan 
for the promotion of Basque foreign trade. This plan included the utilisation o f all the 
foreign policy instruments at hand in order to encourage the projection of the Basque 
entrepreneurial sector abroad, including participation in international aid schemes.
588 S ee: pp. 190-193
589 Idem
590 See: pp. 199-202
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The second dimension recognized the relevance o f the process of European integration, 
which was perceived as an opportunity for enhancing self-government, but also as a space 
for uncertainty.
Thirdly, the agenda of internationalisation included a reassessment o f the role of the 
Diaspora. The Diaspora was not perceived as a passive source of legitimacy, but was 
defined as an active agent in the process o f cultural, institutional and economic projection 
of the region, deepening the tendency to de-consecrate the role of the Diaspora in Basque 
politics. The internationalization of Basque economy benefited largely from this new role 
of the Diaspora and Latin America turned into the most important area in terms of 
economic exchanges for the Basque export sector.
The new agenda was accompanied by an intense process o f institutionalisation o f Basque 
foreign policy. In 1990, the Basque government created the Secretariat o f Foreign Affairs 
to centralize the increasing international and European projection of the Basque 
government. Yet, as we have seen in previous chapters, the Secretariat o f  Foreign Affairs, 
which initially was oriented towards the implementation of the European agenda of the 
Basque government, soon included international co-operation policy and relations with the 
Diaspora, integrating them, as we have already seen, in a unified system o f  foreign 
policy591.
Nevertheless, the position of decentralized aid within the system of international relations 
of the Basque Country has changed in the last five years. The emergence of a new political 
agenda in the Basque Nationalist Party, exemplified in the Ibarretxe plan of a new political 
status for the Basque Country within the Spanish State and the EU, has changed the 
priorities of Basque foreign policy592.
The distinction between the ad intra and ad extra projection o f self-government was 
reassessed in order to concentrate on the political impact o f the process o f  European 
integration, and the defence of the autonomous space for decision-making. Full 
development o f  the Autonomy Statute and the promotion o f Basque identity were identified 
as the most important instruments to counteract the perils of globalisation, an
591 See: pp. 203-209
592 See: pp. 227-230
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internationalised economy and integration in a broader European Union. Europe is 
increasingly considered as a limit to regional self-government, rather than a structure of 
opportunity593.
This protective foreign agenda has been pushed to its limits since 2001. The combination of 
a domestic debate on the accommodation of the Basque Countiy within the Spanish 
constitution with the debate on the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union has 
pushed the Basque government to be more active in Europe in defence o f greater 
recognition for the regional tier and the defence o f regional self-government Furthermore, 
the Basque Government has developed an intensive political campaign in favour of 
reforming the Basque Autonomy Statute.
Changes in Basque politics have relegated Basque international co-operation to a secondary 
role in the context of the international activities of the Basque Country. From 2001 
onwards, International co-operation has been controlled by the regional ministry for 
Housing and Social Policy, instead o f the Foreign Affairs secretariat, which controls the 
rest o f Basque foreign policy. As we have previously noted, since 2001 Basque 
international co-operation seems to live beyond the margins o f political conflict in the 
Basque Country. Yet, the de-politicization of aid also results in the regional administration 
losing interest in the fate o f  Basque international co-operation, which might lead to a 
process o f policy stagnation594.
In the case of Tuscany, decentralized aid served the specific political agenda of 
internationalising the region. Since 1994 Tuscany has developed an ever increasing agenda 
o f European affairs. This agenda materialized in the establishment in 1995 of an office for 
international projection activities and in 1998 in the establishment of a representatives* 
office in Brussels. As noted by some commentators, the process of European integration 
was perceived by the regional administration as an important opportunity for the 
development of Tuscany595.
Decentralized aid offered a new policy field in which to develop a European profile for the 
region. The relationship between the European agenda and the agenda o f  decentralized aid
593 See: pp. 229-230
594 See: pp. 236 and 237
595 See: pp. 273-275
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can be structured along three main dimensions. Firstly, the regional administration has tried 
to define its role in terms o f its capacity to co-ordinate the access of organizations and local 
institutions to the European political arena. The regional administration would channel 
territorial interests towards supranational institutions and facilitate access to funds and 
other resources596 597.
Secondly, the regional administration has joined a number o f European co-operation 
initiatives. As we have already seen, the regional administration raises funds from 
European co-operation schemes, which are later implemented as regional co-operation
597programs .
Finally, the European connection operates at a symbolic level. On the one hand, the 
regional administration, in many of the documents analysed, has tried to depict the region 
as an intermediary actor between the EU and the south bank o f  the Mediterranean area. The 
region exports the values of democracy and respect for human rights, as well as an image of 
a successful European region. In doing so, it also makes a contribution to the process of 
European integration. Tuscany can offer a story of successful social integration in line with 
the best tradition of European democratic governance598.
On the other hand, the regional administration has tried to act as the representative of the 
needs o f certain geographic areas vis-à-vis European institutions. Tuscany is portrayed as a 
region especially skilled to understand and promote socio-economic development in the 
south bank o f the Mediterranean Sea, due to a long tradition o f intense relationships with 
countries in this area599.
Decentralized aid for development has proved an interesting instrument within the overall 
strategy o f enhancing the region’s role at the European level. Yet, as we have noted before, 
the regional administration’s conflation of the European agenda and the decentralized aid 
agenda has presented some problems. Firstly, as we have seen in the analysis of the 
distribution o f  funds, Tuscany has gambled with important elements o f the normative 
agenda presented in previous paragraphs in exchange o f European funding. This might
596 See: 300-306
597 See: p. 317
598 See: pp. 318-320
599 Idem
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indicate that for the regional government, European funding is a necessity rather than a 
policy option600.
Secondly, as we have seen in previous chapters, the implementation of decentralized aid for 
development schemes is very much dependent on the acquiescence of civil society 
organizations601. This places the region in a difficult position since it has to grapple with the 
requisites o f European programs and the preferences of organizations in civil society602.
111.3.2 Decentralized aid and the politics of constructing the region as a polity
In both cases analyzed, regions’ engagement in decentralized aid schemes seems to be very 
much bounded by the limits of regional politics. What is more, both regions have profited 
from the opportunity structure opened by NGO mobilization to put forward a distinct image 
o f  the region as a polity. As we have said before, this image is constructed along tw o major 
dimensions: firstly, the structure o f inter-institutional relations; secondly, interactions 
between institutions and civil society.
111.3.2.1 Inter-institutional relations and the politics of decentralized aid
The first dimension would define the region as an institutional space. Regions are not 
unitary spaces, but compounded polities. Within the regional space a number of institutions 
interact, leading to the configuration of distinct institutional arrangements which determine 
the characteristics o f the region as an institutional space. As we have seen, both cases show 
different ways o f dealing with the politics of institution-building within the limits o f the 
region.
Regional institutions in the Basque country had to deal with strong sub-regional tiers of 
government. The Basque Country is a quasi-federal polity in which equilibria between 
institutional actors are not easily achieved. What is more, the structure of party politics in 
the Basque Country and the lack o f clear majorities forced the creation of governing 
coalitions, which in most cases attain uneasy political compromises. The presence of an
600 See: pp. 320-322
601 See: pp. 322-325
602 See: pp. 326-329
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overarching political force, such as the Basque Nationalist Party has, rather than 
simplifying the political spectrum, added complexity to the politics of institution-building 
in the region. This party controls important institutional resources in the Basque Country at 
the local and provincial levels as well as it has been the dominant party at the regional 
level.
Yet, within the nationalist front, contending positions on the role of sub-regional 
institutions and the articulation o f inter-institutional relations in the Basque Country had 
taken shape throughout the whole history o f the Basque Nationalist Party. An especially 
virulent moment o f confrontation within the nationalist front on the structure o f  inter- 
institutional relations took place in the early eighties, when the Ley de Territorios 
Históricos regulating the capacities of the provincial level was debated and approved603 604.
Social mobilization in 1985 and 1988 targeted not only the regional level, but also the 
provincial and the local level. The task o f NGOs was to create a general moral compromise 
which would tie up all the institutional levels in the Basque Country. The result was the 
multiplication o f  the number o f donors within the limits o f the Basque territory. The initial 
response of institutions was not co-ordinated, rather, every single tier tried to fulfill NGOs* 
demands as a means of echoing the moral challenge posed by the massive mobilization o f 
the NGOs404.
By 1990, three different institutional tiers were allocating resources to decentralized aid 
schemes. The picture is one o f scattered initiatives and un-coordinated efforts, as well as 
normative insecurity and institutional uncertainty in the realm o f decentralized aid. At this 
point the regional administration decided to create a unique international aid for 
development system, the FOCAD. Yet, co-ordination was perceived as a threat, since it 
would mean losing visibility vis-à-vis constituencies. Thus, the debate was established in 
terms o f a trade-off between efficiency and visibility605.
The problem o f  visibility affected Basque institutions in different ways. For local 
governments the pay-offs of engaging in decentralized aid were too important to sacrifice 
upon the altar o f  policy co-ordination and efficiency. At the provincial level the situation
603 See: pp. 163-165
604 See: pp. 158-161and 196-198
605 See: pp. 203-206
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was rather different. Provinces are an important institutional tier in the Basque Country due 
to their capacities for collecting taxes, which affords them a great presence in Basque 
politics. Thus, the pay-offs in terms of political visibility were not as important as at the 
local level.
The establishment of the FOCAD with the co-operation of provincial authorities shows the 
extent these considerations were present in the mindset of provincial and local politicians. 
Yet, the evolution o f the FOCAD and the way in which the regional administration has 
concentrated decisional capacities and resources in its own hands shows how the region 
was able to extract the most out of the co-ordination of policy efforts in the international aid 
realm.
The institutionalisation of the FOCAD strengthened the link between the creation of a 
decentralized aid system and the construction of a strong regional tier of government vis-à- 
vis the provincial and the local levels. Since the establishment of the FOCAD, the role of 
the Basque Government and the Foreign Affairs secretariat within the system of 
decentralized aid for development would be increasingly determinant. As we have seen, the 
evolution of the administrative structure in charge of managing the FOCAD increasingly 
concentrated important decisional capacities in the hands of the Secretariat of Foreign 
Affairs as a means o f ensuring the unity of the Basque Country’s foreign projection606.
Nevertheless, the process o f concentrating the international activities of the Basque 
administration in the hands o f the Foreign Affairs Secretariat did not go uncontested. As wc 
have seen, parties in the governing coalition raised strong criticism to the way in which the 
Basque Nationalist party was using the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs for its own political 
purposes607. The debate was particularly strong between the Basque Nationalist Party and 
the Socialist Party. What is more, in recent years the Diputaciones Forâtes abandoned the 
structure o f the FOCAD, drawing back economic resources to their own decentralized co­
operation programs608.
Regional engagement in decentralized aid policies has served a precise agenda of 







capacities in the hand of the regional administration vis-à-vis sub-regional tiers of 
government, which nevertheless still enjoy an important role.
The origins o f this agenda are to be found in the process o f establishing the Estado de las 
Autonomiasy which has incorporated regional institutions into a centralized administrative 
system. In the particular case o f the Basque Country, the existence o f a strong tier of 
provincial administration, which enjoys special political status, made the need for an 
agenda o f institution-building at the regional level even more pressing. This was perceived 
as an important instrument for legitimating the newly-coined regional institutions.
Ever since 1990, the regional administration has tried to construct a unitary image of the 
region as an institutional space, which relied on the unity o f the Basque foreign projection 
as an important symbolic resource. Yet, the accommodation o f this image into a political 
reality, one which is extremely fractionalised, has not been an easy process. First, it has 
been contested from the ranks o f Basque Nationalism, or coalition parties, such as the 
Socialist Party. Second, it has been efficiently counteracted by sub-regional tiers of 
government, which nevertheless have been able to maintain visibility within the limits of 
the Basque Country.
Similarly, the constitution of a new regional system of international aid in Tuscany in 1999 
echoed a broader process of redefining the way in which the region is understood as a 
political space. The mid-nineties witnessed a process of decentralization in the Italian 
political system. The process o f administrative decentralization had conceded greater 
visibility to the regions. Regional politicians had embarked upon broad processes o f polity 
constitution in which regional autonomy is reconfigured to create a proper regional political 
space beyond the tight framework o f  Italian politics. Tuscany’s administration has 
emphasized the territorial character o f  the region leading to a broad process of political 
integration of the different actors present in the territory.
As we have seen, when Tuscany’s regional administration decided to further engage in 
decentralized aid for development policies, it had to deal with a strong local tier as well as a
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I
J number o f well established co-operation schemes between sub-regional institutional tiers
I and social actors609.
J The changing context of Italian politics from the early nineties onwards and the ongoing
I process o f administrative reform make it very difficult to asses the nature o f the region-J municipality relations in Italy.
! For many years these two tiers of government were conceived to be part of the broader
I
j chessboard o f the Italian partitocrazia. Regions and local governments were necessary
I elements in the distribution o f political power and benefits among constituencies. At the
same time, they help the system of elite recruitment. Finally, they served to enhance the 
political relevance o f both Catholic and Communist sub-cultures.
Changes in the pattem of inter-institutional relations and administrative reform has created 
a vacuum that has not yet not been totally filled. Regional governments seem to be 
progressively gaining political saliency and visibility, while the local level tries to maintain 
its traditional relevance. Changes in the role of political parties in Italian politics permit 
institutions to develop a new political agenda which is much more concentrated on issues of 
territorial politics than on the system o f benefits exchange and redistribution.
In this context, Tuscany’s administration has been able to translate practices of co­
ordination and the need to integrate a strong local tier of government into a new system of 
markers for economic, political and social success. The system designed in 1999 legislation 
is meant to open up the decision-making process to different institutional actors in the 
territory. The important role played by local tiers of government in the Tavoli di 
coordinamento shows the important commitment o f the regional administration to the 
practices of concertation610.
Co-ordination and integration of institutional actors in the territory are perceived as good 
political practices. Regional administration perceives concertation not only as a necessary 
device in a system overcrowded with many different political actors, but a symbolic marker 
for the polity. Thus Tuscany’s regional administration, by  emphasizing the territorial
609 See: pp. 259-262








character of the polity, managed to build up an institutional profile very much focused on 
the co-ordination o f  activities in which the local level plays a  predominant role61 *.
111.3.2.2 The accommodation of NGOs and the politics of decentralized aid
The second dimension, along which the image of the region as polity is constructed, is the 
structure of relationships between regional institutions and social actors. In both cases 
analysed, NGOs played an important role by structuring demands vis-à-vis institutions. 
Yet, NGOs had also become an important partner o f  regional institutions in the 
implementation phase. In both cases the accommodation o f  NGOs has been a contested 
process.
In the Basque case, NGOs played a dominant role in the policy before 199061 12. The 
institutionalisation o f the FOCAD, and the progressive interest o f the regional 
administration in constructing an integrated agenda o f international relations, has altered 
the relationship between NGOs and the regional administration.
For NGOs the progressive centralization of decisional capacities in the hands o f the 
regional government represented an attempt to create a clientelistic network in which 
NGOs would participate in the aid system providing it with legitimacy and know-how, but 
coping with regional preferences in the exchange o f important economic resources. 
According to the words of many informants from the NGOs in the Basque Country, some 
NGOs agreed to play this game. Yet, most o f them decided to face the challenge posed by 
regional administration’s attitude. As w e have seen, it is not clear whether NGOs managed 
to escape from the clientelistic trap. Negotiations with regional institutions resulted in a 
number o f institutional reforms in the aid system. Yet, these reforms operated at a rather 
symbolic level. Thus, it is not clear whether NGOs have been able to enhance the 
instruments for participation in the decisional phase613.
Nevertheless, the regional administration had perceived the integration of NGOs in the 
implementation o f decentralized aid schemes as the pinnacle of democratic relations
611 See: pp. 2S7-295
6,2 See: pp. 190-193
613 See: pp. 210-218
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between institutions and civil society. As we have seen in the chapter on the Basque 
County, the regional administration identified compliance with the demands of NGOs, 
rather than as the result o f the interaction of different political agendas, as a moral 
necessity. That necessity resulted from the character of NGO mobilization, and also from 
the perception on the part o f institutions of the existing interrelation between institutions 
and civil society existing in democratic systems. Thus, references to NGOs evoke the 
democratic and open nature o f the Basque Country as a polity614.
In the case of Tuscany, NGOs have had a relevant role in defining and implementing 
decentralized aid schemes. As we have seen in the chapter on Tuscany, NGOs had 
developed co-operation activities since the early seventies.
In the eighties, NGOs convinced a number of municipalities to participate in international 
co-operation activities leading to the institutionalisation o f the first decentralized aid 
schemes at the local level615. From 1999 the institutionalisation of a regional decentralized 
aid for development policy has altered the dominant role of NGOs. On the one hand, the 
regional administration has committed to the integration o f social actors at every single 
stage o f the policy, that is both at the decisional and the implementation phases. This 
commitment is consistent with the above mentioned perception o f the region as a polity in 
which practices o f concertation and social integration are perceived as a moral value616.
On the other hand, the progressive institutionalisation of the policy has raised tensions 
between NGOs and institutions. Firstly, NGOs had complained about the way in which the 
system of the tavoli di coordinamento is organized. According to NGO informants, the 
region uses the tavoli as an instrument in a broader system o f political exchanges between 
regional and local institutions, whereas NGOs play a secondary role within them617.
Secondly, NGOs have been able to counteract the agenda o f policy preferences defined by 
the regional administration. As emerges from the analysis o f geographical allocation, 
NGOs do not have to comply with the political agenda o f the region which defines the 
Mediterranean area as a priority area. NGOs have concentrated their activities in those
614 See: pp. 218-223
615 See: pp. 259-262
616 See: pp. 287-295
617 See: pp. 295-300
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areas with which they have established co-operation programs since the seventies, namely 
Latin America and Africa618.
Finally, most NGO informants have recognized the limited impact that Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid policy might have on the structure of organizations. The limited amount 
of resources available and the strategies of diversification o f funds make NGOs quite an 
independent actor in the context of Tuscany’s decentralized aid for development.
III.4 A summary of findings
The findings presented in earlier sections can be summarized in the following table. 
Table 14: The Basque Country and  Tuscany compared
The Basque Country Tuscany
Social demand Territorialization of debates on 
international development as a 
precondition for region’s engagement in 
decentralized aid polices.
Territorialization of debates on 
international development as a 
precondition for region’s 
engagement in decentralized aid 
polices.
Structure o f centre-periphery 
relations
Changing structure of centre-periphery 
relations: From a restrictive framework 
to a passive attitude of the State vis-à-vis 
region’s engagement in decentralized aid 
policies.
Changing structure of centre- 
periphery relations: From a 
restrictive framework to models of 
soft-coordination between the State 
and the regional level in 
international co-operation issues.
Agenda o f 
internationalisation
Internationalisation of the regional 
economy, relations with the Diaspora 
and European agenda.
Tuscany as a region in Europe. 





The Basque Country as a quasi-federal 
polity in which the regional 
administration is trying to gain a central 
role
Central role of local governments. 
Tuscany’s regional administration 
act as a co-ordinator of initiatives 




Subordinated to the necessities of the 
regional administration. Clientelistic 
relations. NGOs provide know-how and 
legitimacy for the Basque decentralized 
aid system in exchange for economic 
resources.
Emphasis on the coordination with 
social movements.
618 See: pp. 322-325
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IV. The decentralized aid puzzle revisited
The comparative analysis o f  Tuscany’s and the Basque Country’s decentralized co­
operation schemes has confirmed the validity of the argument sketched in earlier parts o f 
this dissertation. Firstly, previous sections show how the participation o f NGOs was 
fundamental for the constitution o f decentralized aid systems in both Tuscany and the 
Basque Country. In both cases, NGOs managed to introduce the problem of 
underdevelopment at a high level o f the regional political agenda. At the same time, they 
controlled important symbolic resources and know-how, which made them key players in 
the initial stages o f policy development.
Secondly, we analysed the impact o f some elements o f the domestic political agenda on the 
constitution of a decentralized aid system in both cases. The first element was the structure 
o f inter-institutional relations. This includes not only the patterns of centre-periphery 
relations and the relations o f the regional governments with supranational organizations, 
but mainly the patterns of regional-local relations. As we have seen in both cases, the 
scattered nature o f the demand structure, and the strategies pursued by NGOs operating in 
the territory, permit the agenda o f region-local relationship to have an impact in the 
creation o f regional decentralized aid systems.
The second element of the domestic political agenda refers to the process o f symbolic 
construction o f the region as a political actor. The region’s engagement in decentralized aid 
politics has been tinged with a specific set of identity markers, which reflected the qualities 
o f the region as a polity.
Finally, the constitution of decentralized aid programs seems to be very much dependent on 
the nature of the regions’ projection abroad.
Therefore, four factors can be identified as the major forces underpinning regions* 
engagement in decentralized aid schemes: firstly; the impact o f NGOs' mobilizations and 
demands on local and regional institutional tiers; secondly, the agenda o f  
internationalisation o f the region; thirdly, the structure o f  inter-institutional relations 
mainly between sub-state tiers o f government; andfourthly, the nature ofNGOs-institutions 
relations.
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The explanatory value of the above mentioned factors can be summarized in the following 
table:
Table 15: Explanatory factors and regions’ engagement in decentralized aid policies
NGOs' 
mobilization
Agenda o f  
internationalisation
Structure o f inter- 
institutional 
relations




Region's engagement in 
decentralized aid policies
Yes Yes Yes
Yes No Intervening factor might affect the No
No Yes nature of the policy outcome. No
No No No
The table above summarizes the explanatory power of the factors lying at the heart of a 
region’s engagement in decentralized aid policies. As clearly stated, two types of factors 
can be identified. First, both NGOs’ mobilization and the existence of an agenda of 
internationalization o f the region are necessary but not sufficient conditions for regions to 
engage in decentralized aid policy schemes. As earlier parts o f  this dissertation have shown, 
it is only when both factors are combined that we can speak properly o f  region’s 
engagement in decentralized aid for development policies.
Decentralized aid, as we have maintained since the beginning o f this dissertation, cannot be 
understood only as the result o f  the transposition of the normative agenda of international 
development to territorial levels, which have traditionally remained outside these debates. 
Neither can it be only described as the result of a major paradigmatic shift in the realm of 
international development co-operation policies. These elements taken alone are necessary 
but not sufficient conditions to explain the origins of regions' engagement in decentralized 
aid politics.
The impact of the agenda o f international co-operation development cannot be decoupled 
from the activities o f NGOs which operate as major catalysts between the territorial levels 
in which mobilization take place and the multilayered arena o f international development 
where the normative agenda of international co-operation is built up.
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This dissertation has sought to reveal the politics behind decentralized aid for development 
linking them to the broader process of region-building. Regions are continuously 
constructed and re-constructed as political spaces. This process might be plainly evident in 
the context of broad change in the political system or on the contrary might present a lower 
profile. This process is made up o f  the interactions of diverse notions o f space which 
modify the limits o f  political autonomy.
In this dissertation we have discussed how regional political space increasingly presents an 
international dimension, which has been traditionally neglected. Regions have to face 
increasingly volatile challenges posed by the internationalisation of the economy and 
competition for resources, investments and markets to allocate production o f regional and 
local producers. At the same time, the process of supranational integration and globalisation 
is stripping political capacities from domestic levels and allocating political responsibility 
and decision-making to supra-national arenas.
Regions have perceived the magnitude o f both challenges. They are increasingly defining 
policy schemes aimed at developing an international projection for the region. Thus, the 
region as a political space spills over the limits o f the porous division between domestic 
and international politics. The necessities derived from the process of internationalisation o f 
the region as a political space has had an impact on the definition of decentralized co­
operation schemes. As we have seen, regions have more or less explicitly connected 
decentralized aid to other issues in the agenda o f internationalisation. These include: the 
internationalisation o f the economy and the search for new markets for regional production; 
increasing access to supra-national decisional arenas; or enhancing the relationship with 
Diaspora communities, either as a  means of reinforcing the idea of community or as a 
means o f gaining access to administrations within the states hosting the Diaspora.
This list o f issues should not be perceived as exhaustive. Rather, it might well be the case 
that regions develop new modes o f connecting the needs derived from the 
internationalisation o f the regional political space with the issues raised by NGOs’ 
mobilization within the regional territory.
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Second, the structure of inter-institutional relations and the relations between institutions 
and NGOs can be taken as intervening factors. They influence the structure o f the policy 
outcome, but only influence to a limited extent the decision to engage in decentralized aid 
for development policies.
¡interactions with other tiers o f  government determine the space o f regional autonomy from 
above and from below. Traditionally, scholars have focused on the interaction between the 
State and the regions. Yet, as emerges from this dissertation, it is also important to look at 
the interaction between local and regional tier, in the establishment of policy schemes at the 
regional level.
In the event o f diversified demand structuring (where demands are not addressed to any 
particular territorial level), the structure of local-regional relations came to play a  
fundamental role in the definition o f decentralized aid schemes. Regions and localities 
might perceive aid as an opportunity to gain support and legitimacy vis-à-vis other 
institutional tiers. Conversely, under certain conditions they might establish co-operative 
patterns creating a territorial supply structure that goes beyond the differentiation between 
institutional tiers. In both cases, as emerges from the results o f this dissertation, institutions 
re-interpret the challenge posed by the emergence o f a territorial agenda of international 
development co-operation in terms o f an agenda o f domestic inter-institutional relations.
Furthermore, regional institutions interact with civil society. Regions try to depict an open 
relationship with movements and NGOs. In both cases analysed, the incorporation o f civil 
society in the political life o f the region seems to be a marker in constructing the notion o f 
the region as a polity.
The politics o f region-building seem to lie at the heart o f the way regions have responded to 
the normative agendas mobilized by NGOs operating in the territory. This last analysis 
would confirm our initial claim that it is only through combining the analysis o f regional 
domestic politics and the changing nature of the international development agenda that we 






I. A summary of the major findings of this dissertation
In this dissertation we have discussed the politics o f decentralized aid for development. In 
the introduction to this dissertation we have tried to present the origins of decentralized 
aid for development programs in European regions as a twofold puzzle. Firstly, we 
sought to illustrate the existing literature’s inadequate treatment of the question of why 
regions engage in foreign aid policies by pointing to a number of important theoretical 
and empirical shortcomings in the cunent literature on decentralized aid for development. 
As we argued, the major shortcoming was the failure of the literature on decentralized aid 
to address the political dimension o f  decentralized aid. In order to resolve this problem, 
we proposed the possibility o f bridging the gap between the literature on decentralized 
aid and the comparative analysis o f  regional politics.
The second dimension of the puzzle was entirely normative. We argued that the overly 
normative character o f academic work surrounding decentralized aid for development 
paid lip favour to the very values that it was intending to protect. Decentralized aid has 
been presented in the literature as a major normative change in the development 
paradigm, yet the values attached to it have not been confronted by the day to day 
practice of decentralized aid politics. The moral sphere o f  decentralized aid has been 
detached from everyday practice. Thus, the academic debate has been unable to produce 
the appropriate instruments to evaluate the real nature of the beast, beyond a set of self- 
legitimating assertions on the commitment of regional and local governments to the 
agenda of human sustainable development. The argument was that if  we are to commit 
seriously to the new normative agenda of decentralized aid, we have to understand the 
policy beyond the stereotypical normative depiction of the literature.
The remainder o f this dissertation has analysed the major theoretical problems posed by 
regions’ engagement in decentralized aid policies. The analysis has been subdivided in 
three major parts and the main results can be summarized as follows.
In Part I we presented the theoretical argument o f this dissertation. First, I separated the 
analysis of decentralized aid as a political practice from the analysis of decentralized aid 
as the result o f purposeful action. This distinction was structured according to the
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Tdifferences between the analysis o f the constituents of decentralized aid as a social kind, 
(that is, the response to the question o f what made decentralized aid possible?) and the 
analysis of the causal mechanisms explaining a specific social phenomenon, a region’s 
engagement in decentralized aid schemes (that is, why regions engaged in foreign aid 
polices?).
Decentralized aid, as a political practice, finds its origins in major changes occurring in 
three different realms. Firstly, the discourse on decentralized aid for development 
emerges parallel to the rise o f  institutional economics in economic theory and its well- 
known emphasis on the need for a ‘proper institutional setting’ before economic growth 
can take place.
Secondly, development institutions began to tie development assistance to the existence 
of suitable institutional schemes to implement it, or to the accomplishment o f  proper 
policy reforms. Moreover, whereas development aid has been understood in the past as a 
state development agency to state development agency relation, from the early nineties 
onwards practitioners increasingly emphasized the role of civil society and local 
institutions as the appropriate partners for development policy.
Thirdly, the eighties witnessed a major process of territorial restructuring. Political 
autonomy has been redefined and the capacities of sub-state units have been restructured 
in the context o f globalisation and increasing supranational integration. A process of 
territorializing politics, in which territorially bounded identities and practices are of 
greater importance, seems to be taking place.
From the point o f view of purposeful action, regions’ engagement in foreign aid policies 
is the result o f  specific processes o f interaction among a distinct set o f institutional and 
non-institutional actors. Regional governments, driven by NGOs and social actors 
operating in the territory, would engage in multilevel processes of political bargaining 
that would result in a specific policy outcome.
Region’s engagement in decentralized aid policies was presented here as the result o f the 
interaction o f two major sub-processes, the first being a process of demand structuring, 
where NGOs are the dominant actors. As we tried to show, NGOs act in complex milieu 
o f political authority. They act vis-à-vis national institutions, they also structure demands
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vis-à-vis supranational agencies, finally they direct part o f their activities to lobbying 
sub-state tiers o f  government. Through a process of multilayered bargaining, NGOs are 
able to structure a case for decentralized aid for development.
The second process is one o f supply structuring. In this process, a number o f agents have 
an impact. First, the State might control key policy resources. Second, the European 
Union might facilitate regions’ engagement in decentralized aid policies through specific 
development initiatives. Finally, regions sought to respond to NGOs* demands as a 
means of tackling a number o f  issues in the domestic political agenda, which increasingly 
requires a region’s international projection and recognition.
Lastly, I discussed the methods employed in this dissertation. I contended that a ‘most- 
different case’ oriented comparison is the most suitable way to test the validity of the 
argument exposed so far. First, case-oriented comparisons permit better assessment o f the 
process of conjunctural causation and might help the researcher to build up better 
informed and thicker theories. Second, the ‘most different cases* research design is 
pursued as a means of covering the widest range o f variation, thus permitting a deeper 
understanding o f the impact o f different factors on our policy outcome.
In Part II and Part III, we have dealt with the politics o f  decentralized aid in two 
European regions, the Basque country and Tuscany. The Basque country has been 
presented as a rather complex polity in which tradition and modernity are uneasily 
entangled. The politics of decentralized aid reflect the major political tensions underlying 
the Basque polity, and the political projects aiming at structuring it.
The Basque country administration has been able to create a state-like international 
profile. This is constituted by both a strong institutionalisation of the region’s 
international projection and deep concerns about the important effects that the 
internationalisation of the Basque country might have for the construction o f the polity.
At the same time, decentralized aid reflects the incapacity o f the regional administration 
to impose centralization in a highly fragmented polity such as the Basque country. In the 
process of centralizing decisional capacities, the regional administration had to grapple 
with important resistance on the part o f civil society counterparts and other institutional 
actors, such as the local and provincial administrations.
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In addition, the regional administration has to deal with a strong body made up of 
religious and lay organizations, which greatly structure social life in the Basque country. 
Despite all the efforts, it is not clear from empirical evidence whether the Basque 
administration has been able to fully develop a clientelistic pattern of relationships with 
local NGOs. NGOs had been able to clearly articulate detachment and contestation vis-à- 
vis the path undertaken by regional institutions.
The changes in the political agenda brought by the Plan Ibarretxe have once again altered 
the position o f  decentralized aid in  the overall picture o f the Basque country’s 
international policy. Whereas the institutional result o f  the major process o f policy reform 
is still unclear, it might well be the case that Ibarretxe’s political agenda could result in 
the detachment o f decentralized co-operation from the fate of Basque politics. The 
construction o f a political agenda, very much concentrated in the political vision of 
Basque nationalism in a highly divided political context, could paradoxically result in the 
dissolution o f the links between Basque international co-operation and the rest o f Basque 
foreign policy.
Conversely, as we have tried to show in Part III, Tuscany’s regional administration seems 
to be putting forward a more integrative model of foreign projection. This is built upon a 
reassessment o f the interactions among institutions and between institutions and society. 
Subsidiarity and partnership seem to be the major principles upon which Tuscany’s 
foreign projection is structured. As a result, both organizations in the civil society and 
local institutions enjoy an important role at every phase o f the decision-making process.
However, Tuscany’s model o f foreign projection has to be analysed in the context of 
institutional uncertainty created by the institutional reforms of late nineties. As we have 
seen, institutional reform has not been comprehensive. While it seems to be a clear 
compromise with the idea that sub-state tiers o f government are to play an increasing role 
in Italian politics, reform has not resulted in constitutionalisation of the necessary 
institutional elements to consolidate a space of regional autonomy.
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Thus, beyond the commitment o f the regional administration to the practices of 
concertation and social integration, the role o f subsidiarity and partnership in Tuscany’s 
decentralized aid seem to be the result o f  a process o f flexible adaptation to a fragmented 
territory in a context o f  institutional uncertainty.
In Part IV, a comparative analysis o f the politics of decentralized aid in Tuscany and the 
Basque country has been presented. The comparative analysis o f Tuscany’s and the 
Basque country’s decentralized co-operation schemes confirmed the validity of parts of 
the argument sketched in Part I.
First, it showed the fundamental role played by NGOs in the establishment o f 
decentralized aid systems in both Tuscany and the Basque country. In both cases, NGOs 
managed to introduce the problem o f  underdevelopment at a high level of the regional 
political agenda. At the same time, they controlled important symbolic resources and 
know-how, which made them key players in the initial stages o f policy-making.
Second, it showed the impact of some elements of the domestic political agenda on the 
constitution of a decentralized aid system in both our cases. These elements were the 
following: first, the nature of the regional agenda o f foreign projection. The limits o f 
regional political autonomy increasingly spill over the porous division between domestic 
and international politics. As emerges from the results of the comparative analysis, the 
necessities derived from the process o f  internationalising the region as a political space 
has had an impact on the definition o f decentralized co-operation schemes.
Regions have connected, in a more o r less explicitly fashion, decentralized aid to other 
issues in the agenda o f internationalisation. These include the internationalisation of the 
economy and the search for new markets for regional products; increasing access to 
supra-national decision-making arenas; or enhancing the relationship with Diaspora 
communities, either as a means o f reinforcing the idea of community or as a means o f 
gaining access to the administrations within the states hosting the Diaspora.
The second element was the structure o f  inter-institutional relations. These included not 
only the patterns o f centre-periphery relations and the relations of the regional 
governments with supranational organizations, but mainly the patterns of regional-local 
relations. As we have seen, in both cases the scattered nature o f  the demand structure and
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the strategies pursued by NGOs operating in the territory introduced the agenda of 
regional-local relationships to the process of establishing regional decentralized aid 
systems. Regions and localities perceived decentralized aid as an opportunity to gain 
support and legitimacy vis-à-vis other institutional tiers. Furthermore, under certain 
conditions they established co-operative patterns creating a territorial supply structure 
that goes beyond the differentiation between institutional tiers. In both cases, as is clear 
from the results o f this dissertation, institutions re-interpret the challenge posed by the 
emergence o f a  territorial agenda o f international development co-operation in terms of 
an agenda o f domestic inter-institutional relations.
Finally, regional institutions interact with civil society. Regions try to depict an open 
relationship with social movements and NGOs. In both cases analysed, the incorporation 
of civil society into the political life o f the region seems to be a marker in the 
construction o f  the notion o f the region as a polity.
The analysis o f  the major results o f this dissertation confirms our initial intuition on the 
political character of a region’s engagement in decentralized aid policies. This is a 
process that seems to be very much bounded within the logic o f region-building. I 
acknowledge the existence o f a lack o f consistency between empirics and theory in this 
dissertation. Yet, I believe that the logic o f inquiry pursued in this dissertation has yielded 
theoretical gains. Firstly, the theoretical framework presented in Part I  limited partially 
the scope of the narratives presented in Part II  and Part III. As a result the comparative 
analysis presented in Part IV  produced empirically sustained and generalizable 
statements on the origins of decentralized aid.
Secondly, an inductively oriented presentation of our narratives yielded an improvement 
of the analytical instruments presented in Part I . In other words, theory learnt from the 
cases. As we state in the introduction, the lack of positive theory on the field made it hard 
to trace the appropriate counterfactuals in order falsify our hypotheses. Inductively 
oriented narratives have proven a valid instrument to test the validity of the theoretical 
framework proposed in Part I.
As we have said in the introduction, this way of looking at the origins o f decentralized 
aid polices posed important questions to scholars addressing decentralized aid for
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development. The remaining parts of these conclusions assess the major contributions of
this dissertation to the broader debates presented in the introduction. I will proceed as
follows. First, I will present the contributions to the literature on decentralized aid. These
can be summarized in two major headlines. Firstly, this dissertation has brought politics
into the discussion of decentralized aid for development It should be noted that the
incorporation o f regional politics to the discussion of the origins of decentralized aid
policies is partially inspired by the analysis of the literature on the so-called foreign aid
puzzle. Thus, I will explore some contributions that, I believe this dissertation has put 1
forward regarding not only the literature on decentralized aid but also the debates on the
foreign aid puzzle. Secondly, at a methodological level we have broken the mould of j
nationally oriented comparisons by presenting a cross-national comparison of two j
S
European regions. j
Then, I will explore the contributions of this dissertation to the analysis of regional I
politics and more specifically to the analysis of the foreign projection of sub-state units. j
These can be summarized as follows. At the outset, this dissertation has brought the tools
of comparative regional politics into a policy field which has not been considered by the
specialized literature. Second, with respect to the analysis of the conditions for regional
engagement in foreign policies, this dissertation furthers the path begun by authors such
as Michael Keating and John Kincaid, who had differentiated between the opportunity
structure in which regions’ foreign projection takes place and the motivations compelling
regional actors to act externally. What is more, it helps to better assess the impact of the
opportunity structure and the motivations of regions’ foreign projection.
Finally, these conclusions return to the normative discussion of decentralized aid. The
intention of this dissertation has been that to assess a nonnative debate that has been
taking place since the nineties among the development community, which sees regional
and local authorities at the centre of a major change in the development paradigm- t
Showing the crude politics behind decentralized aid, this thesis intended to put forward a
critical way o f committing to the same nonnative agenda. ;j
403
¡jui u ugiJMjWMugimww pujuum ji m  n
404
lf.1 Decentralized aid as regional politics
This dissertation has tried to bridge the gap between decentralized aid and regional 
politics. In doing so it has yielded some theoretical gains. The debate on decentralized aid 
for development had left aside the analysis o f the motivations o f sub-state units to engage 
in decentralized aid schemes. It was assumed that the origins o f these programs were to 
be found in the natural implementation o f  a new paradigm o f development, which placed 
the problem o f  participatoiy development and the importance o f the local scale in 
promoting economic growth at the forefront.
Bringing regional politics into the picture has permitted us to better assess the 
mechanisms by which the above mentioned agenda was incorporated and implemented at 
a territorial level, which has traditionally remained outside such questions. This 
dissertation has analyzed decentralized aid as a policy process, in which both a process o f 
demand structuring and a process o f supply structuring can be differentiated. The demand 
structuring process sees NGOs playing a central role. Organizations are able to translate 
the agenda of international development to the terms of territorial politics, structuring a 
specific set of demands vis-à-vis regional and local institutions. Therefore, the impact o f 
the changes on the agenda of international development is mediated by NGOs’ 
interpretation and mobilization.
The supply structuring process put regional administrations at the centre o f the stage. As 
we have seen in this dissertation, after an initial phase in which they followed the thrust 
o f NGOs and social actors, regions have been able to develop a distinct approach to the 
questions raised by NGOs’ mobilization. In both cases analyzed, regions were able to 
link regional engagement in decentralized aid activities to a broader process of regional 
construction which sees the constitution of an international profile as an important 
element in the configuration of regional autonomy.
As we said before the discussion o f the major outcomes o f the specialized literature on 
decentralized aid for development is inspired on the analysis o f the debates on the so- 
called foreign aid puzzle. To a certain extent, the decentralized aid puzzle as it has been
II. The contributions to the specialized literature on decentralized aid for
development policies
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represented here is a transposition o f  the foreign aid puzzle to a different level o f analysis. 
Yet, as we said in Part I the debate on the origins o f foreign aid policies, as it has evolved 
since the fifties has not been a particularly successful one. The foreign aid puzzle has 
remained somehow unresolved.
In this dissertation we have approached the decentralized aid puzzle from a procedural 
perspective. That is, emphasizing the interactions between a set of agents and trying to 
observe the changing nature of the process of preferences construction. I believe this 
perspective represents a way of overcoming the spurious debate between realists and 
idealists that has lingered since the fifties until the present day without reaching an 
agreement.
This dissertation claims for a different approach to the foreign aid puzzle. This approach 
should start from a clarification o f the dimension o f  the foreign aid relation that is under 
scrutiny. Coming back to example we mentioned in Part I, the rationale behind aid 
allocation patterns might be consistent with the rationale behind the very act o f  giving aid, 
yet the consistency of both rationales should not be taken as a given as much o f the 
literature tended to do, mostly during the seventies.
What is more, as this dissertation shows aid relationships are extremely complex 
phenomena, therefore require no only from cautious definition of our research questions, 
but also from refined methodological instruments, which may be able to capture the 
nuances behind policy decisions. My contention here, in line with recent branches of the 
literature (particularly Mosley and Breuning) is that regression analysis should be 
complemented with more qualitative-oriented analysis that might facilitate the 
interpretation o f regression scores, as well as deepening the knowledge of the cases we 
are analyzing.
This dissertation has proven that the analysis o f the process of construction o f the aid 
relationship yield interesting theoretical and empirical gains vis-à-vis those analysis that 
tend to figure out the structural factors behind foreign aid. What is more, as we claimed 
in Part I both modes of analysis can and should complement each other instead of 
engaging in a straggle for scientificity.
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Nevertheless, these findings have to be taken as an unintended result o f this dissertation. 
As we said in Part I, the analysis o f the debates on the foreign aid puzzle served to 
contextualize the nature o f  our research question, but also to point at a set of fundamental 
elements that should be taken into consideration in the definition of the decentralized aid 
puzzle. Therefore, beside the general statements presented in previous paragraphs, this 
dissertation does not intend to be a  contribution to the debate on the origins of foreign aid.
The shortcomings of the literature on foreign have been used here as a source of 
inspiration for the definition o f the decentralized aid puzzle. Consequently the outcome 
of this dissertation can be only taken as a source of inspiration, but cannot be transposed 
as if  this dissertation would have been designed as a contribution to the solution of the 
foreign aid puzzle itself.
11.2 Decentralized aid goes abroad! Comparative cross-national case oriented 
analysis
One o f the most important theoretical gains yielded by this dissertation is that it has gone 
beyond the limits of the national case-oriented analysis or the national oriented 
comparison. Both the literature and the practice of decentralized aid for development 
have been traditionally constrained by the limits of the single national case. For instance, 
during many o f the interviews conducted for this dissertation, I was struck by the fact that 
many interviewees remained surprised that a cross-national comparison of the type 
conducted in this dissertation could be really implemented. In fact, their diffidence was 
not due to methodological considerations on the comparability of the cases selected, but 
to the fact that many of them did not know what was going on outside the national border.
Yet, their reaction is natural if  we take into consideration that the bulk of the studies 
conducted in the realm o f decentralized aid for development has been confined to 
analyzing a single country, or comparing a handful o f regions within the limits of a 
specific country.
This dissertation has proposed a cross-national comparison o f the politics of 
decentralized aid in two European regions. In this manner, we have been able to evaluate 
the impact o f a number o f factors, which have been traditionally taken as given by the
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specialized literature (i.e. the impact o f  the national opportunity structure, or the effects 
o f the process o f European integration).
By choosing regions in two different countries, this work has been able to assess the 
impact o f  these elements on the configuration of decentralized aid schemes, both at the 
level o f demand structuring and supply structuring.
At the same time, the ‘most different cases’ approach pursued in this dissertation has 
permitted us to maximize the value o f  the empirical analysis in terms o f yielding 
generalizable statements. Yet, it is worth noting that this aspect of the dissertation (the 
possibility o f  generating generalizable statements on the conditions for regional 
engagement in foreign aid) could and should be improved by extension o f the empirical 
analysis to new cases.
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As we have said in earlier parts o f  this dissertation, the debate on regional involvement in 
foreign policies has been a long and fruitful one. Starting in the late seventies, heavily 
influenced by International Relations Theory and the impact of transnational relations, it 
has come to a point at which the international activities o f  the regions are understood, not 
only as part o f broader changes in the structure o f international politics but also as part of 
a process o f  restructuring territorial politics.
This dissertation has contributed to the literature on regions’ involvement abroad with the 
analysis o f a policy field which has traditionally remained outside the scope of this body 
of literature. Yet, the major theoretical gains yielded by this dissertation go far beyond 
the incorporation of a new policy field to the vast area covered by the studies of sub-state 
units’ foreign policy.
III. The contributions to the analysis of regions’ involvement in foreign policy
111.1 Why do regions go abroad?
The contents o f this dissertation can be placed in the broader framework of the analysis 
of regions’ foreign activities and more specifically on the motivations undeipinning 
regions’ involvement in foreign policy schemes. As we have seen in earlier parts o f this 
dissertation, the debate on regions’ motivations to go abroad has been long and fruitful. 
Recent contributions have sought to distinguish between the opportunity structure in 
which regions’ international mobilization takes place and regions’ motivations to go 
abroad.
This dissertation has followed the path taken by authors such as Michael Keating and 
John Kincaid, distinguishing between the analysis of the constituents o f decentralized as 
a political practice and the determinants of regions’ engagement in decentralized aid 
politics. As a result, we have been able to distinguish the process o f generation of the 
opportunity structure for decentralized aid from the actual configuration of particular 
decentralized aid policies in every single case.
As we have seen before, decentralized aid as a political practice is the result o f the 
combination o f a multiplicity o f  factors. These include: firstly, major changes in the
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agenda of development as a result o f the crisis of the Bretton Woods system; secondly, a 
major paradigm shift in economic theory; thirdly, the activities carried out by 
supranational organizations, which helped to anchor these changes in specific policy 
schemes; and fourthly, a major shift in the way territorial politics are conceived.
Within this general context, regions’ engagement in decentralized aid is the result of the 
interaction o f the processes of demand structuring, which manage to territorialize 
important aspects o f the international debates on development, and the process o f  supply 
structuring, in which demands are combined with a specific regional agenda of 
internationalization.
Yet, this is not the only theoretical gain yielded by the analysis put forward in this 
dissertation. As we have seen in Part IV, the comparison o f  both our cases shows a major 
difference between the processes o f demand and supply structuring. Whereas the former 
is a multilayered process, in which actors operating at different territorial levels interact, 
the latter is very much bounded by the limits imposed by  the interactions o f agents 
operating in the territory.
III.2 Multilayered arenas and multilayered decision making vs. the domestic 
determinants of decentralized aid
In earlier parts of this dissertation we have discussed whether the establishment of 
systems of multilayered foreign policy as a result o f globalization was at the roots of 
regions’ engagement in foreign policy schemes. We initially resolved the question by 
agreeing with Ngaire Woods that the impact o f globalization was mediated by the 
structure of domestic institutions which determined diverse impacts depending on the 
cases analyzed. The analysis conducted in this dissertation can help us to go on the 
argumentative path opened in Part I.
In Part IV, as a result of the comparative analysis o f our cases, we have been able to 
specify how multilayered arenas might affect the constitution of decentralized aid for 
development policies.
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The process o f demand structuring, as it emerges from the cases analyzed, is one of 
multilayered bargaining in which NGOs have a dominant role. Learning from the 
experience o f dealing with national administrations and supranational agencies, NGOs 
are able to build up a territorial case for decentralized aid aimed at targeting institutions 
in a particular territory. NGOs catalyze the normative debates on the practice of 
international co-operation, which take place at the international level, introducing them in 
the realm of territorial politics. Thus, NGOs operate as a nodal institution between the 
realm o f territorial politics, where mobilization takes place, and a multilayered political 
arena, including both national and supranational institutions, where both the morals and 
the practice o f international co-operation are constructed.
However, the process of supply structuring is characterized by a radical separation of the 
spheres of territorial politics and the multilayered policy arena of international co­
operation. As we have seen in the analysis of both our cases, the impact o f European co­
operation policy or national international co-operation schemes on the constitution of 
decentralized aid systems can be reduced to the construction of a structure o f opportunity. 
European agencies put forward programs to which regional or local institutions might or 
might not adhere. National institutions define the institutional and legal framework in 
which regions and localities might or might not develop their international co-operation 
programs. Moreover, both our cases show that sub-state tiers of government have the 
capacity to push the limits o f their political autonomy far beyond the limits previously 
established by the national legal framework.
In both cases, the supply structuring process is very much contained within the limits o f 
the politics o f the territory. As we have seen, the nature o f the different policy outcomes 
is determined by the interactions o f the constellation of actors operating at the territorial 
level (local institutions, regional institutions and NGOs). These interactions are structured 
by the combination of three types o f  normative agenda: first, the normative agenda o f 
development as translated by NGOs operating in the territory; second, the political 
agenda of internationalization o f  the territory, which is perceived by regional 
administrations as a conditio sine qua non for the development of political autonomy; 
third, the agenda of inter-institutional relations within the limits of the territory, which
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determines the construction o f diversified supply structures or, on the contrary, the 
construction o f an integrated territorial system o f international co-operation.
Therefore, this dissertation has proven that elements that we might circumscribe within 
the notion of territorial politics determine region’s projection abroad (particularly if  we 
attend at the process of policy-making and the definition o f policy preferences) vis-à-vis 
other inputs such as the impact o f  supranational institutions or the construction of 
multilayered arenas of decision-making.
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IV. Taking decentralized aid seriously
v
The conditions o f underdevelopment and poverty, under which an ever increasing portion !
;j
of the world’s population lives, is (or at least should be) one o f the most pressing issues ]
o f contemporary world politics. Decentralized aid for development is pursued to 
contribute to the alleviation o f poverty and underdevelopment by involving local and 
regional governments. Yet, we still have to leam how to take decentralized aid seriously.
From a normative viewpoint, this dissertation is rooted in a critical approach to the }
current moral debate sunrounding decentralized aid for development policies. As we have J
Ü
said before, the construction o f a self-legitimating argument around disparate political j
practices and the establishment o f a  neat distinction between what is going on in reality, j
which in most cases goes practically unnoticed, and the over developed moral debate I
underpinning the practice o f decentralized aid are obscuring the actual practice of 
decentralized aid.
Addressing the politics of decentralized aimed at restating the relationship between the j
moral argument and the actual practice of decentralized aid. This dissertation has j
illuminated what many practitioners consider to be the dark side of development co-
operation where ideals meet necessities and interests. Yet, I do not believe that ideals and
politics have to be separated. j
Development co-operation, and more specifically decentralized aid for development, |
finds its ultimate roots in a set of widely shared moral values. Yet, these values operate in
a world in which political decisions have to be taken. The preservation o f the values
underpinning decentralized aid cannot come at the cost o f  separating the sphere of
politics from the sphere o f  morals, as the scarce attention paid by the specialized
literature to the politics of decentralized aid seems to suggest. !
Conversely, only by identifying the dark zones, by looking deep into agents’ motivations, 
by taking decentralized aid as a serious political question in which different normative 
agendas have to find a place, we might be able to find the appropriate sphere in which 
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Picture 3: M ilitary expenditure and underdevelopm ent
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Picture 4: Dependency and underdevelopment
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